S.C. Vohra v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India

13. Pursuant thereto, the respondents filed a Review Application seeking review of the above order, being R.A. No. 14/2007, which was dismissed by the learned Tribunal vide its order dated 25.01.2007, finding no error apparent on the face of law.

14. On such remand, the respondent, vide order dated 20.02.2007, reiterated the penalty of dismissal from service on the petitioner.

15. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed the O.A. No. 499/2008, which as noted hereinabove has been dismissed by the learned Tribunal inter alia stating that the challenge of the petitioner on merit to the disciplinary proceedings and the findings was barred by principles of res judicata. We quote from the Impugned Order as under:

16. Additionally, the learned Tribunal also looked into the merits of the matter and gave a final finding as under:

17. Aggrieved of the same, the petitioner has filed the present petition.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:

18. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Tribunal erred in holding the O.A. to be barred by the principles of res judicata. He submits, the earlier order dated 14.12.2006 had expressly left all other grounds open while remitting the matter to the Appellate Authority for reconsideration on the issue of proportionality of punishment. The cause of action for the second O.A. arose only upon the failure of the Appellate Authority to comply with the directions issued by the learned Tribunal, and therefore, the bar of res judicata was wholly inapplicable.

19. The learned counsel further submits that the order dated 20.02.2007 passed by the Appellate Authority is a non-speaking and mechanical order, passed in complete disregard of the mandate of the learned Tribunal.

20. The learned counsel further submits that the inquiry was conducted in a biased manner by selectively proceeding only against the petitioner despite allegations being directed against an audit team comprising several individuals. He contends that no motive has been attributed to the petitioner and no benefit on account of the alleged unauthorised audits has been identified to have been accrued by the petitioner. He highlights that no loss was caused to the respondents on account of the alleged acts of the petitioner.

21. The learned counsel further contends that the expert opinion of the Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL), does not constitute reliable or cogent evidence as the specimen signatures of the petitioner were not directly obtained from him but were photocopies from the record of the Office.

22. The learned counsel for petitioner submits that the delay of several years in issuance of the charge-sheet remained unexplained and was occasioned by alleged afterthoughts and improvements made by the department, thereby causing serious prejudice to the petitioner defence. To this effect he places reliance on judgements of Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, 1990 Supp SCC 738, Ashok Kumar v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corp. Ltd. And Anr., 2025:PHHC:134651.

23. The learned counsel contends that irrespective, even if the charges against the petitioner are assumed to be true, the punishment of dismissal from service is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct, especially considering the petitioner long and otherwise unblemished service record. The learned Tribunal, according to the petitioner, failed to exercise its jurisdiction to judicially review the punishment on the touchstone of proportionality. He places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council and Ors., 2025 INSC 264, to buttress his argument.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS:

24. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that during the course of investigation, original records of the concerned industrial units were obtained and sent to the CFSL, CBI, New Delhi, for expert opinion. After seeking clarifications and original documents, the CFSL, vide its report dated 30.01.2003, opined that the signatures appearing on the audit documents matched the specimen signatures of the petitioner. On the basis of this material, a prima facie case having been established, a charge-sheet dated 26.03.2004 was issued to the petitioner.

25. The learned counsel further submits that the delay in issuance of the charge-sheet was bona fide and fully explained, as it was occasioned by the time taken in collecting records, obtaining expert opinion from CFSL, and due to the petitioner own belated responses. Given the gravity of the allegations, involving breach of integrity by an employee of a constitutional body like the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, the matter required careful and thorough examination. The delay, therefore, does not vitiate the disciplinary proceedings.

26. The learned counsel submits that two Articles of Charge were framed against the petitioner, namely: (i) conducting unauthorised Central Excise audits and recording audit completion certificates by misusing official position, and (ii) impersonating an Assistant Audit Officer by misusing the official seal and signing in such capacity, thereby violating Rule 3(1) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

27. The learned counsel submits that the Inquiry Officer examined multiple witnesses, including witnesses from the concerned industrial units, one expert witness from CFSL, and official witnesses from the respondents organisation. Several witnesses specifically identified the petitioner as the person who had conducted the unauthorised audits.

28. The learned counsel submits that the petitioner preferred a statutory appeal, which was duly considered by the Appellate Authority in accordance with law, and the same was dismissed on merits vide order dated 20.07.2005. It is further submitted that the petitioner had an additional statutory remedy of revision, which he chose not to avail.

29. The learned counsel further contended that in O.A. NO. 1513/2006, the learned Tribunal examined the matter on merits and did not interfere with the findings of guilt. The matter was remitted only on the limited aspect of proportionality of punishment. The Review Application filed by the petitioner was also dismissed, and the findings on conviction thus attained finality.

30. The learned counsel submits that it is settled law that courts and tribunals do not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed in disciplinary proceedings unless the same is shockingly disproportionate or perverse. In the present case, the misconduct proved against the petitioner impersonation and unauthorised audit by an officer of a constitutional authority is of grave nature. He submits that the punishment of dismissal, is in fact lenient.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:

31. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel on behalf of the respective parties and have perused the record.

32. At the outset, it is necessary to recapitulate the settled law governing the scope of Judicial Review in matters of disciplinary proceedings. The power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not that of an Appellate Forum to reappreciate the evidence. The jurisdiction is limited to examining whether the Enquiry was conducted by a competent authority in accordance with the prescribed procedure, whether there was adherence to the principles of natural justice, and whether the conclusions reached are based on some relevant evidence. The ambit of judicial review is, therefore, confined to examining the correctness of the decision-making process and the fairness of the procedure adopted. This principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 749, the relevant portion of which reads as under:

The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case." (Emphasis supplied)

33. Having noted the limited jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while dealing with the disciplinary proceedings, we may now turn to the merits of the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties.

34. The learned Tribunal, while dismissing O.A. No. 499/2008, held that the challenge to the disciplinary proceedings and findings of guilt was barred by the principles of res judicata, in view of the earlier order passed in O.A. No. 1513/2006. The petitioner has assailed this conclusion.

35. This Court is of the view that the learned Tribunal was not entirely correct in invoking the bar of res judicata in the strict sense. The order dated 14.12.2006 passed in O.A. No. 1513/2006 had expressly left all other grounds open and had remitted the matter only for reconsideration of proportionality of punishment by the Appellate Authority. The cause of action for filing the subsequent O.A. arose upon the passing of the fresh appellate order dated 20.02.2007. Therefore, the challenge to the disciplinary proceedings and findings cannot be held to be barred by res judicata in its technical application. However, as shall be demonstrated hereinafter, this conclusion does not advance the case of the petitioner, as the challenge fails on merits.

36. The petitioner has contended that the delay of nearly five years in issuance of the charge memorandum dated 26.03.2004 vitiates the disciplinary proceedings. The record reveals that the allegations pertained to unauthorised audits conducted between 1996 and 1999, which came to light upon receipt of a complaint dated 25.05.1999 from the Delhi Textile Processors Association. Thereafter, a factfinding inquiry was conducted, records were collected from several industrial units, and forensic examination of documents was undertaken by the CFSL. The delay in issuance of the charge sheet, therefore, stands satisfactorily explained by the respondents. The nature of allegations of impersonation, misuse of official seal, and unauthorised exercise of statutory functions, necessitated a detailed and cautious investigation. Mere passage of time, without demonstrable prejudice, does not vitiate disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner has failed to establish any real prejudice caused to his defence due to the delay. To this extent the judgments of the Supreme Court in Bani Sharma (supra) and of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Ashok Kumar (supra) cannot come to the aid of the petitioner.

37. As far as the requirement to prove motive or benefit accrued to the petitioner, we are of the opinion that mere absence of proof of the same cannot come to the aid of the petitioner. Once it is proved that the petitioner had conducted the Audit unauthorisedly and misused the official seal, mere absence of proof of actual benefit derived by the petitioner from such acts is of no relevance to the charge against the petitioner, which we quote herein under: “Article I: The said Shri S.C. Vohra, irregularly conducted Central Excise Audit of various industrial units during the period from November 1996 to May, 1999 and recorded the Audit Completion Certificate in RG-I registers unauthorisedly by misusing his official position Shri S.C. Vohra thus failed to maintain absolute integrity and acted in a manner unbecoming of a government servant violating Rule 3 (i) (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Article II: That the said Shri S.C. Vohra misused the official seal of Assistant Audit officer. He not only put the official seal in RG-I registers but he himself signed as Assistant Audit officer also. Shri S.C. Vohra by impersonating the Assistant Audit Officer failed to maintain absolute integrity thereby violating Rule 3 (I) (i) of COS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.” (emphasis supplied)

38. The petitioner has argued that all members of the alleged audit team were not proceeded against and that certain complainants were not examined. This submission also cannot come to the aid of the petitioner. There cannot be a claim of equality maintained in an illegality. Once it is found that the petitioner had acted illegally, mere fact that the respondents did not proceed against the others, cannot come to the aid of the petitioner. Merely because other individuals were not proceeded against, does not exonerate the petitioner, nor does it render the proceedings discriminatory. Furthermore, the second charge against the petitioner pertained to him impersonating an Assistant Audit Officer, hence the inclusion of the names of other persons was of no relevance to the same.

39. The department is also not required to examine every conceivable witness. The evidence adduced was sufficient to establish the charges against the petitioner. It is well settled that a departmental enquiry is not governed by strict rules of evidence.

40. The petitioner has urged that the punishment of dismissal from service is disproportionate, considering his long service. The Appellate Authority, pursuant to the remand by the learned Tribunal, has reconsidered the question of proportionality and has recorded reasons for affirming the penalty. The misconduct proved involves impersonation and misuse of official position, which goes to the root of the employer-employee relationship. In matters involving loss of integrity, length of service cannot be a mitigating factor. The punishment imposed cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate or such as would shock the conscience of this Court. To this effect, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar (supra) cannot come to the aid of the petitioner.

41. This Court reiterates that it cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own views on punishment. The disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with law, and the conclusions arrived at do not disclose any illegality warranting interference.

42. In view of the foregoing discussion, although the learned Tribunal may not have been entirely correct in invoking the principle of res judicata as an absolute bar, the ultimate conclusion arrived at by it in dismissing O.A. No. 499/2008 does not call for interference.

43. Accordingly, this Court does not deem this to be a fit case to interfere with the Impugned Order dated 29.07.2008 passed by the learned Tribunal in exercise of our powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

44. No order as to costs.

MADHU JAIN, J. NAVIN CHAWLA, J. JANUARY 22, 2026