Equus Stud Pvt. Ltd v. Dharmil A. Bodani

62. The Plaintiffs say and submit that the wrongdoers, namely, the 2nd Defendant and his nominees are exercising control over the affairs of the 1st Defendant even though the 2nd, 8th and 9th Defendants have been removed from the Board of Directors by the overwhelming majority of the genuine votes cast at the Extra- Ordinary General Meeting held on 9.1.2001. The said Defendants have misused their office as directors and have through a series of steps attempted to defeat the legitimate rights of the Original Plaintiffs who are were 99.96% equity holders of the company. The said Defendants are also acting to the detriment of the company by disposing off the livestock and assets of the company. The said Defendants have had kept the Original Plaintiffs completely in the dark as regards both operational and management decisions. A series of illegal measures have been adopted by the 2nd, 8th and 9th Defendants after they were called upon to tender their resignations and documents have been fabricated and sham and bogus meetings alleged to have been held in an endeavor to reduce the Original Plaintiffs to a minority shareholding. It is respectfully submitted that it is absolutely necessary and in the interest of justice as well as equity that suitable orders and directions be issued at the ad- interim and interim stage that will prevent further wrongdoing on the part of the concerned Defendants and will restore the integrity of the Board of Directors of the 1st Defendant company. In view of the exceptional circumstances of this case, it is respectfully submitted that this Hon'ble Court issue mandatory directions at the adinterim and interim stage as prayed for. failing which grave and irreparable loss, harm and injury will be caused to the Original Plaintiffs and the valuable assets and properties of the 1st Defendant company will be frittered away. It is submitted that the balance of convenience is clearly in favour of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants.”

8. It is clear from the aforesaid averments that the suit in question as filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants is a suit, purely in relation to the company and the rights the plaintiffs assert qua the 99.96% of their equity shareholding, which according to the plaintiff was sought to be usurped by the defendants. It is seen from the prayers as made in the plaint that reliefs were also sought in respect of a share purchase agreement dated 27 October 1998, entered inter se between the plaintiffs and defendants. Thus, from the case of the plaintiffs as made out against the defendants in the plaint and from the reliefs as prayed for in the suit, it is clear that there is serious dispute between the plaintiffs and defendants in relation to the shares of the company the respective parties hold in the company and/or nothing beyond the management and control, the plaintiffs and defendants are asserting in controlling the company. The reliefs in the suit also inter alia include a challenge to certain resolutions appointing the defendants as directors and the reliefs for their removal as directors.

9. It is stated by the plaintiffs that the company has only one asset, namely, the Stud Farm situated at Village Shirgaon, Taluka Maval, District Pune, and there is no property.

10. After the institution of the suit in the year 2001, the plaintiffs had moved Notice of Motion No.683 of 2001 in the suit praying for interim reliefs. The prayer as made by the plaintiffs in the Notice of Motion was for appointment of Court receiver for running the stud farm being the property of the said company and for appointment of the plaintiffs as agents of the Court Receiver.

11. On such Notice of motion the learned Single Judge has passed an order on 5 March 2004. In such order, the learned Single Judge noted the plaintiffs contention that the stud farm was under the control and management of defendant no.2, and that the same was facing several difficulties inter alia for the reason that payments to the bank had become overdue, as also electricity supply was disconnected, workers were not paid, and even the grampanchayat and village panchayat dues were outstanding. In such proceedings, a statement as made on behalf of defendant no.2, that on or before 31 January, 2004, defendant no.2 will clear all the dues of workers, that the electricity supply would stand restored, as also he would pay all the revenue dues and substantial paymentss would be made to the bank, was sought to be made. The learned Single Judge, however, observed that defendant no.2 was not in a position to make any substantial payment to the bank and in fact had committed breach of the solemn statement made before the Court as recorded in the Court’s previous order that there was a dispute in making payments to the bank. The Court also noted that the bank had issued a notice under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002 (“SARFAESI Act”). In such circumstances, the Court accepted the contention as urged on behalf of the plaintiffs (respondent nos.[1] and 2 herein) that it was necessary that the “Court Receiver” be appointed “on the property” namely on the stud farm, and that the plaintiffs be appointed as agents of the Court Receiver, so that they will make payment of the bank dues, as also clear electricity charges, land revenue, village panchayat dues and payment to workers, etc. The Court accordingly passed an order allowing the notice of motion in terms of prayer clause (a). The relevant extract of the said order reads thus:- “5. Learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs submits that in this view of circumstances, therefore, Receiver has to be appointed on the property. He further submits that if plaintiffs are appointed as Agents of the Receiver, they will make payment of entire dues of the Bank and that they will clear all the other dues viz. electricity dues, land revenue, Village Panchayat dues, as also the dues of workers, subject to result of the suit.

6. He further states that plaintiffs shall also maintain accounts while running stud farm as the Agents of the receiver.

7. In my opinion, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the defendants, specially the fact that if the payment is not made to the Bank immediately, the property itself is likely to be sold, in my opinion, it would be appropriate to appoint the receiver of the property with direction to the Receiver to appoint the plaintiffs as Agents of the Receiver for managing stud farm. In this view of matter, therefore, following order is passed:- (a) Notice of Motion is granted in terms of prayer clause (a). (b) The Receiver is directed to take possession of the property and then to appoint the plaintiffs as "Agents of the Receiver" for the purpose of managing stud arm and the property in relation to which the Receiver is appointed, on usual terms and conditions excepting the condition for payment of royalty and furnishing security. (C) "As the Agents" of the Receiver, the plaintiffs shall be entitled to institute the proceedings for recovering any amount that may be due to stud farm from the debtors. The amount recovered by the Agents shall be deposited with the Receiver. The Receiver shall invest that amount in a National listed Bank in fixed deposit for appropriate period during the pendency of the suit.

(d) Appointment of the plaintiffs as Agents is subject to the condition that plaintiffs should enter into the negotiations with the Bank immediately to settle the dues of the Bank and make the payment to the Bank and produce the documents before the Receiver showing that payment has been made to the Bank within the period of two week from today. Only after this document being produced, the Receiver shall proceed to take possession of the property. (e) If any document in relation to the property of the Company are received by the Agents from the Bank, the Agents shall make copies of those documents and submit them to the Receiver. The original documents however shall be kept in the safe custody of the Agents. (f) The dues of M.S.E.B., Village Panchayat shall be settled and paid by the Agents within the period of six weeks from today. The agents shall be free to hold negotiations with the workers and to settle the dues of the workers. Notice of Motion is disposed of. At this stage, a request is made by the Learned Counsel appearing for Defendant No.2 to stay the operation of this order. Though such prayer is usually granted, in this case due to the conduct of the defendant no.2 the situation is reached that unless immediate steps are to be taken for making payment to the Bank, the property would be sold/lost. Therefore, request is rejected. Receiver and parties to act on the ordinary copy of the order duly authenticated by Associate/ Personal Secretary.” (emphasis supplied)

12. The aforesaid order passed by the learned Single Judge appointing Court Receiver on the property of the Company was not disturbed by the Division Bench in Appeal (Lodging) No. 168 of 2004 which was filed by original defendant nos.[1] and 2, except to the extent that the order directing royalty charges to be paid by the original plaintiffs.

13. It is thus clear from the order dated 05 March, 2004 passed by the learned Single Judge that the Court Receiver was appointed in respect of the stud farm, which was the only property of the company and not in respect of any other property. Thus, it is only stud farm which was custodia legis and the powers, functions and duties which are to be discharged by the Court Receiver and respondent nos.[1] and 2 (plaintiffs) as the agents of the Court Receiver were only in respect of the stud farm.

14. Insofar as the present proceedings are concerned, there is something peculiar, that is merely because the Court Receiver was appointed by the learned Single Judge in respect of the said property of the company and as respondent nos.[1] and 2 (plaintiffs) were appointed as the agents of the Court Receiver, in the suit in question (which is between two group of shareholders), a dispute was sought to be raised by the plaintiffs against the appellant, (a third party to the suit), claiming access to the stud farm/property of the company, through the disputed land, of which the appellant is claiming ownership. The dispute appears to have arisen in the year 2016 when the appellant put up a gate on the land which the plaintiff claim to be their access to their stud farm used by the plaintiffs vehicles.

15. The appellant, on the other hand, contended that the appellant was not a party to the suit. The appellant resisted the assertion of the plaintiffs claiming any right of way, contending that there was no legal right whatsoever in the plaintiffs, seeking any relief qua the appellant’s land for being used as a pathway/road to the plaintiffs’ property. The appellant contended that in fact there were two alternate roads, which were available to the plaintiffs to access their property, for such reason no relief could be claimed by the plaintiffs against the appellant’s property which was not the subject matter of the suit. This was the complexion of the dispute between the plaintiffs and the appellant in the interim application on which the impugned order is passed.

16. The plaintiffs thus sought a relief against the appellant, although the appellant was not a party to the suit in question, the suit being purely a suit inter se between the shareholders of the said company. The interim application in question sought a relief against the appellant to restrain the appellant from preventing the plaintiffs to use the road. The learned Single Judge partly granted such relief as noted above. Significantly the learned Single Judge was clearly of the opinion that such relief in fact needs to be prayed by the plaintiff in independent proceedings when it was observed that it would be appropriate for the parties to take recourse to appropriate proceedings to assert their respective contentions, as noted by us hereinabove.

17. Mr. Narichania, learned senior counsel for the appellant has several grievances against the impugned order. He would submit that the first and foremost grievance would be that once the appellant admittedly was not a party defendant to the suit in question, the suit being a suit purely between the shareholders of the company and in relation to the affairs of the company, it was ill-conceivable for the plaintiffs to seek any relief in the suit against the appellant – a third party to the suit. It is next contended that what was sought to be asserted by the plaintiffs against the appellant was an assertion of a legal right to enjoy the appellant’s immovable property, in respect of which the appellant has corporeal rights. It is submitted that the assertion of the plaintiffs is of the nature affecting the very title and the valuable rights of the appellant in respect of its immovable property which are sought to be challenged by the plaintiffs in seeking such relief. It is Mr. Narichania’s submission that certainly such issue could not have been subject matter of consideration in the suit in question considering its nature which had nothing to do with the rights of the appellant in respect of its property on which the gates were installed by the appellant, which was fully within the rights of the appellant.

18. Mr. Narichania would next submit that the reading of the impugned order would itself indicate that the learned Single Judge was conscious of the fact that the Court would lack jurisdiction to adjudicate on such issues as clearly seen not only from the observations made in the impugned order, but also the operative directions as contained in paragraph 42(VI) whereby the learned Single Judge has grated liberty to the parties to agitate their claims over the road, as regards proprietary title thereto as well as the right of user thereof in appropriate proceeding before the appropriate forum, to be decided on its own merits. Mr. Narichania would hence submit that once such observation was made, there was no occasion for the learned Single Judge to injunct the appellant from restraining the plaintiffs (stated to be through the Court Receiver) from using the appellant’s land, aseerted by the plaintiffs to be an access to the plaintiff’s stud farm as directed in operative paragraph 42(II) of the impugned order and issue further directions that the appellant shall ensure that the gates placed on the subject road be opened whenever the Court Receiver and/or the plaintiffs intend to use the subject road to access the stud farm of the plaintiffs. It is also his submission that such directions as made in the impugned order would overlook two fundamental aspects, firstly that the appellant’s rights in respect of their landed property could not be disturbed, unless appropriate orders are obtained by the plaintiffs from the appropriate Court. Secondly, he would submit that even prima facie examination of such rights and at the behest of the plaintiffs, could not have been subject matter of any consideration in the suit in question. This also for the reason that the appellant had taken specific plea that the subject road was on the land belonging to the plaintiffs and as two alternate roads were available to the plaintiffs to access their lands, the plaintiffs could not have asserted any right of way through the appellant’s land. It is also his submission that it is not the case of the plaintiffs that the land in question was a public land and/or a public road, as also it was not the case of the plaintiffs that their land was landlocked and that the access to the plaintiffs could only through the appellant’s land.

19. Mr. Narichania would also submit that the entire foundation of the plaintiffs case in the interim application in seeking a relief against the third party (appellant) was to the effect that as the plaintiffs property was custodia legis by virtue of the learned Single Judge appointing Court Receiver, vide an order dated 05 March, 2004, hence, the appellant having put up gates on the appellant’s own property to use its land with pathways, this would amount to interfering in the rights of the Court Receiver merely for the reason that the plaintiffs were appointed as the agents of the Court Receiver. It is submitted that the rights of the Court Receiver being obstructed by the appellant was completely untenable, as what was asserted by the plaintiffs, were the purported rights of the plaintiffs to access the appellant’s land. Hence the case of the plaintiffs that the appellant was obstructing the Court Receiver was wholly untenable. In this context, Mr. Narichania would also submit that as the plaintiffs are asserting a right to access the plaintiffs land through the land of the appellant, it was certainly not correct for the plaintiffs to set up an argument of any right, authority or powers of the Court Receiver being involved so as to be the basis for moving the interim application in question in the suit in which the appellant is not a party. It is his submission that the plaintiffs in asserting such plea needs to stand on their own independent right to show that the rights were impeachable rights that the appellant could not have denied such rights and this could be only in appropriate proceedings.

20. Mr. Narichania would further submit that the plaintiffs’ contention on the appellant’s suit filed before the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division at Vadgaon, Taluka Maval, District Pune, being withdrawn by the appellant, would not entitle the plaintiffs to move an Interim Application against the appellant in the suit in question, is also untenable. In such context, Mr. Narichania would submit that the appellant has made an application for withdrawal of the said suit with liberty to file a fresh suit, however, the Civil Court without assigning any reason whatsoever, passed an order of a simplicitor withdrawal of the suit. It is submitted by Mr. Narichania that against such order review proceedings were filed by the appellant which is stated to be subjudice before the Civil Court, Vadgaon. It is submitted that in such review proceedings, the plaintiffs have now intervened, and are opposing such application filed by the appellant. It is submitted that however the pendency of such proceedings in which the plaintiffs are also parties in no manner whatsoever would create a situation of the plaintiffs having any right to seek an injunction in the suit in question, which is totally unconnected and not even remotely concerned with the disputed property belonging to the appellant through which the plaintiffs are seeking an access. It is submitted that it is settled law that the plaintiffs must succeed or fail on their own case and cannot take advantage of weakness in the defendants/respondents’ case to obtain a decree. In such context, reliance is placed on the decision of Punjab Urban Planning & Development Authority vs. Shiv Saraswati Iron & Steel Re-Rolling Mills[1].

21. Mr. Narichania would next submit that the impugned order is also required to be faulted on the ground that admittedly the appellant was not a party defendant to the suit and unless he was to be accepted as necessary party to the suit, such interim application could not have been entertained, much less an order as impugned passed against the appellant. In such context, reliance is placed on the decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Movin G. D’Souza vs. Vivian, daughter of Wilfred Fonseca and wife of Ravi Shetty & Ors.2. On the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Narichania would submit that the appeal needs to be admitted and the effect and operation of the impugned order be stayed.

22. On the other hand, Mr. Dhond along with Mr. Kamat, learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs have made the following submissions:-

(i) The approach of the learned Single Judge in granting reliefs to the plaintiffs ought not to be faulted on the contentions as raised by the appellant. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly considered that the plaintiffs’ property/stud farm is custodia legis and it is the Court Receiver’s ingress and egress (through the plaintiffs who are agents of the Court Receiver) which has been prejudicially affected by the actions as taken by the appellant. ii. Once the Court Receiver was in charge of the plaintiffs property, the Court Receiver, through the plaintiffs, was entitled to such relief, when an obstruction was caused to the Court Receiver’s access to the property of the company, being administered by him as per the orders passed by this Court. It is hence submitted that the learned Single Judge was justified in passing the impugned order to restrain the appellant from creating any obstruction to the right of way enjoyed by the Court Receiver. iii. In fact, such obstruction caused by the appellant brought about a situation of the third party like the appellant taking a stand contrary to the orders passed by this Court appointing Court Receiver. In such situation, the Court would be within its jurisdiction to injunct a third party from obstructing the Court Receiver discharging his duties entrusted to him, under the orders of this Court which would include any obstruction caused to the agents of the Court Receiver that is the plaintiffs who are the agents of the Court Receiver. iv. Apart from the aforesaid submissions, it is submitted that the access to the plaintiffs’ property from the disputed land was the regular access as enjoyed by the plaintiffs and hence, the obstruction as created by the appellant certainly would be an issue for consideration of the Court in the suit in question when the plaintiffs were managing the said property as agents of the Court Receiver, hence, the plea of the plaintiffs having any alternate access was neither relevant nor could have been raised by the appellant in opposing the reliefs as prayed by the plaintiffs before the learned Single Judge. In so far as the powers of the Court to protect the rights and authority of the Court Receiver is concerned, reliance is placed on the decisions of (i) Kanhaiyalal vs. Dr. D. R. Banaji & Ors.3, (ii) Kilachand Devchand & Co. Ltd. vs. Ajudhiaprasad Sukhanand & Co. & Ors.4, (iii) Bank of India vs. M/s. Senior Travels Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.5, (iv) Everest Coal Company (P) Ltd. vs. State of Bihar & Ors.6, (v) Anthony C. Leo vs. Nandlal Bal Krishnan & Ors.7, (vi) Narayan Manik Patil & Ors. vs.

6 (1978) 1 Supreme Court Cases 12 7 (1996) 11 Supreme Court Cases 376 Jaywant J. Patil & Ors.8, (vii) Cletus Gonsalves vs. Audrey alias Hina Khan & Ors.9, (viii) Helmore vs. Smith (1)10 and (ix) Dixon vs. Dixon11. v. The disputed access to the company’s property being the only appropriate access as has been noted not only in the impugned order but also in the orders passed by the co-ordinate Benches of this Court in the present appeal. It would hence be imperative that the plaintiffs be permitted to use the access without any obstruction from the appellant. vi. The appellant in fact, had instituted a suit (Regular Civil No. 51 of

2019) in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division at Vadgaon, Taluka- Maval, District- Pune, which was withdrawn and which has not been so far restored, and the restoration of which itself is subject matter of adjudication before the learned Single Judge. It is, therefore, required to be presumed that the appellant had abandoned its rights in respect of the disputed land and this would be the position which would be required to be recognized under the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1(4) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. It is thus required to be presumed that the appellant had abandoned its rights in respect of the disputed land from where the plaintiffs were having access to their stud farm.

10 (L.R.] 35 Ch.D. 436 11 [1904] 1Ch. 161 vii. The appellant could not succeed even before the Sub-Divisional Officer (“SDO”) in the proceeding in regard to the disputed land although the plaintiffs were not parties to such proceeding, such proceeding before the SDO hence have become relevant. The actions of the appellant are required to be considered on the facts as they stand, as not only the first gate, but thereafter with intent to disturb the rights of the plaintiffs, a second gate was put up and an obstruction was created in ingress and egress of the plaintiffs/Court Receiver and the vehicles of the plaintiffs visiting the plaintiffs’ property. viii. It is submitted that the appeal itself deserves to be dismissed and in any case, no interim relief is required to be granted.

23. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We have also perused the record.

24. In the context of the prayers as made in the Interim Application praying for stay of the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, the primary question raised by the appellant is whether in a suit filed inter se between the group of shareholders (plaintiffs) and the company and other shareholders (defendants), the Court would have jurisdiction to issue an injunction of the nature against the third party, namely, the appellant, who is not a party to the suit. The second question as raised by the appellant is whether the learned Single Judge could, on one hand, grant an injunction against the appellant (a third party to the suit) and on the other hand, direct the parties to agitate the issue subject matter of such injunction in appropriate proceedings before the appropriate forum, accepting that the dispute arises in respect of the appellant’s property in respect of which the appellant is asserting ownership rights whereas the plaintiffs are merely asserting right to access.

25. To consider whether the appellant has made out a prima facie case for stay of the impugned order, the following discussion would aid our conclusion.

26. At the outset, we may observe that it is not the plaintiffs case that they are the owners of the disputed land on and from which the plaintiffs are seeking access to their property. The appellant is asserting ownership rights on such land on the basis of documents of ownership. If this be the position, then certainly it is the case of the plaintiffs asserting rights of whatever nature including asserting easementary rights, on property belonging to a third party or a party who is not a defendant in the suit in question. In fact, the suit itself is on a completely different cause of action than what is sought to be asserted in the Interim Application, when relief was prayed for against the appellant and which came to be granted by the impugned order.

27. In our opinion, the aforesaid circumstances are significant for the appeal court to examine as to whether any prima facie case was made out by the plaintiffs so as to entitle the plaintiffs for a relief of a temporary injunction in the suit and that too against the appellant who is not a party (defendant) in the suit. This more particularly as the appellant, referring to the impugned order, contends that the learned Single Judge very consciously has observed that such issues are required to be agitated by the parties in the appropriate proceedings before the appropriate forum and all contentions of the parties in that regard are expressly kept open, which is contained in paragraph 42(VI) of the impugned order.

28. We find substance in the contentions as urged on behalf of the appellant when the appellant contends that in the circumstances in hand on first principles, the impugned order to the effect it injuncts the appellant prima facie would not stand the test of law. This for the first and foremost reason that the scope and cause of action of the suit is completely different and totally alien to the property of the appellant which suffers an injunction by the impugned order. Further the appellant is not even remotely connected with the cause of action, the plaintiffs have espoused in the suit in question and that too without being a party defendant to the suit, the appellant could not have been injuncted qua the appellant enjoying over its rights over its property, which was not the subject matter of adjudication in the suit in question. It is not in dispute that the appellant’s property on which the plaintiffs are asserting rights is not the subject matter of suit. If this be so, we wonder as to how by the impugned order, the learned Single Judge could have exercised jurisdiction to injunct the appellant.

29. The position in law that the Court would not exercise jurisdiction in a civil suit to injunct a person who is not a party to the suit, is well settled. In such context, we may refer to some of the decisions.

30. In L.D. Meston School Society Vs. Kashi Nath Misra12 the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in the context of an order of injunction passed by the Civil Court against the persons who are not parties to the suit, observed that as none of such parties being the parties to the suit, it was obvious that no injunction could be issued and accordingly, such order injuncting the third parties to the suit was set aside.

31. In West Bengal Housing Board vs. Pramila Sanfui and Ors.13 one of the issues which fell for consideration of the Court was whether a temporary injunction against the persons who are not parties to the suit, could be granted. In such context, the Court observed that it is well settled principle of law that either temporary or permanent injunction can be granted only against the parties to the suit. The relevant observations of the Court read thus:-

32. Thus, considering such settled principle of law, prima facie the impugned order would be required to be held not sustainable.

33. The case of the plaintiffs is to the effect that for many years, such access was being used through the appellant’s land. If this be so, certainly it was not a case that any such rights of the plaintiffs could be agitated in the suit in question and for which independent proceedings were required to be instituted by the plaintiffs, if the plaintiffs intended to assert any right of egress and ingress from the appellant’s land. This could only be by filing a Civil Suit before the appropriate Court having territorial jurisdictions.

34. The next contention so urged by the plaintiffs is to the effect that such access is required to be used by the Court Receiver, as the plaintiffs’ property is custodia legis, hence such obstruction as created by the appellant, would amount to obstructing the Court Receiver/agents of the Court Receiver (i.e. the plaintiffs). This according to the plaintiffs would be contrary to the order dated 5 March, 2004 passed by the learned Single Judge, appointing the Court Receiver in respect of plaintiffs’ property. It is in such context, reliance is placed by Mr. Dhond on the decisions as noted by us above on the rights of the Court Receiver. In our opinion, there cannot be a second opinion on the proposition of law, as discussed and laid down in these decisions, however, these decisions would not assist the plaintiffs in the facts in hand, as in our prima facie opinion, there is no attempt whatsoever on the part of the appellant in any manner to disturb the Court Receiver’s possession and enjoyment of the property, in respect of which the Court Receiver has been appointed and thereafter he has appointed the plaintiffs as his agents. Per se no report has been made by the Court Receiver on no alternative access being available to access the stud farm, which is the only property in respect of which Court Receiver was appointed by this Court. We may also observe that after perusing the order dated 5 March, 2004 passed by the learned Single Judge appointing the Court Receiver, the appointment is only and exclusively in respect of plaintiffs property and no other property. Even otherwise, if the Court Receiver was to be of an opinion that certain rights of the Court Receiver are being affected by any action of the third party, and the complexion of such rights involved adjudication of rival contentions of the parties, in such a situation, as rightly observed by the learned Single Judge, the only manner in which such rights could be asserted, was by filing appropriate proceedings before appropriate Court, which has not been done either by the Court Receiver or the plaintiffs or the company in their independent right.

35. Prima facie, we find substance in the contentions of Mr. Narichania that considering the nature of the suit in which the Interim Application of the plaintiffs as moved in the suit, within the ambit of the suit property which apart from being not the subject matter of the suit was also not within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, so that any cause of action in regard to such property and against the third party like the appellant could be delved by the High Court on its Original Side. The High Court on its Original Side certainly did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain any plea on such property as also against the appellant and even for such reasoning, the impugned order could not have been passed. Thus, it would be correct for the appellant to contend that in the facts and circumstances, such injunction granted by the impugned order against the appellant, would prima facie be required to be held to be without jurisdiction. It would be difficult to accept the proposition that the Civil Court when inherently lacks jurisdiction, it would nonetheless have equity jurisdiction to grant an injunction purely on equitable considerations akin to what the High Court would wield under Article 226 of the Constitution.

36. We are also not persuaded to accept the contentions as urged by Mr. Dhond and Mr. Kamat on behalf of the plaintiffs that the appellant having filed a suit before the Civil Judge Junior Division at Vadgaon, Taluka Maval, District Pune and the suit itself being withdrawn, the plaintiffs would become entitled for a relief of the nature as prayed for in the Interim Application and as granted by the learned Single Judge by the impugned order. In the present facts such plea is totally untenable, as it would amount to the Court deviating from the well settled principles that the Court would look into the plaintiffs case whether he makes out a case for grant of an injunction on the well settled principles of law followed by the Court in grant of temporary injunction and not the case of the defendant much less any weakness of the defendant. A proposition which ought not to be disputed is that any litigant seeking a relief from the Court is required to establish his rights in support of such relief. If he fails to establish his legal right while seeking temporary injunction and fails to make out a prima facie case accompanied with other acceptable parameters to enable the court to grant injunctory reliefs before the Court of appropriate jurisdiction, the proceedings must fail. In such context, Mr. Narichania would be correct in his contention in placing reliance on the decision in Punjab Urban Planning & Development Authority vs. Shiv Saraswati Iron & Steel Re-Rolling Mills (supra) when he contends that the position in law is well-settled that the plaintiff must succeed or fail on his own case and cannot take advantage of weakness in the defendant’s case to get a decree. Such rights would stand independent and would not depend on the failure of adjudication of defendant’s right in defendant’s proceedings.

37. In Union of India & Ors. vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors.14 even in the context of suit for declaration of title, the Supreme Court observed that the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants could not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff.

38. In Jagdish Prasad Patel (Dead) & Ors. vs. Shivnath & Ors.15, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle as laid down in the case Vasavi 14 (2014) 2SCC 269

Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. (supra). The relevant observation as made by the Court reads thus: