State of Maharashtra v. Rajagonda Bhimgonda Patil

15. In Delhi Development Authority (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the applicants seeking condonation of delay must explain that they were diligent during the limitation period and could not file the appeal because of a sufficient cause arising within the prescribed period. However, in most cases, the prescribed limitation period had already expired long before the judgments in Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra (dead) and others[4] and Indore Development Authority (supra) were delivered. The appellants let the limitation period lapse, perhaps because they saw no case on merits for appeal. When the law was subsequently reinterpreted in the two cases above, the appellants approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the present appeals, petitions and applications. The Court held that such reasons do not constitute sufficient cause. In the present matter, the State's case is not significantly different.

16. In Delhi Development Authority (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a party cannot take advantage of its deliberate inaction during the limitation period. Allowing to the contrary would distort incentives for parties and create dystopian consequences for the judicial process. Further, the Court held that if a subsequent change of law is allowed as a valid ground for condonation of delay, it would open a Pandora’s box where all the cases that were subsequently overruled or the cases that had relied on the judgments that were subsequently overruled, would approach the Supreme Court and would seek a relief based on the new interpretation of law. There would be no finality to the proceedings, and every time the Supreme Court reached a different conclusion from its previous case, all such cases and those relying on it would be reopened.

17. The excuses in paragraph 4 of the Application cannot be accepted and do not constitute sufficient cause to explain this inordinate delay. Very casually, a reference is made to heavy rainfall in Kolhapur or the vacant Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) post. The Application, in terms, states that the delay was caused by an “administrative procedure of the State which cannot be dispensed with.” Given the inordinate delay of 1679 days, i.e. 4 years and 7 months, in instituting the Review Petition, this is hardly any explanation.

18. Since the Applicant is a State, a liberal approach can be adopted when considering an Application for condonation of delay. However, frivolous excuses like those in the present case cannot constitute sufficient cause. The usual claims on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making file notings cannot be accepted given the modern technologies being used and available. The limitation law binds everybody, including the Government. Based on such reasoning, the Hon’ble Supreme Court declined to condone the delay of 472 days by the State Government in instituting an Appeal in the case of Postmaster General and Others Vs. Living Media India Limited and Another[5].

19. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others[6], the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that the concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. The Court held that there is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted. In contrast to the latter, it may not be attracted. The first warrants a strict approach, whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

20. In Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the State, a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. But an application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a law on merits is seminal to the justice dispensation system. Besides, an application for condoning delay should not be handled routinely based on individual philosophy, which is subjective. The Court held that the increasing tendency “to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order condoning the delay of 2449 days.

21. In Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through LRs. & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr.7, the Hon’ble Supreme Court advised the Courts to distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an ‘explanation’ from an ‘excuse’. Although people tend to see ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’ as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an ‘excuse’ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. The Hon’ble Supreme Court lamented that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces to sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication. 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 865

22. In Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Others[8], the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that the expression “sufficient cause” embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such that it would persuade the court, exercising its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as excusable. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether the party could have avoided it by exercising due care and attention.

23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone, the ends of justice can be achieved. Suppose a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies. In that case, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law due to his vigilance.

24. Therefore, applying the above legal principles to the gross facts of the present case, we hold that the State shows no sufficient cause for condoning a delay of 1679 days, i.e. 4 years and 7 months in instituting this Review Petition. The Application for condonation of delay is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.

25. However, without prejudice to the above, even assuming we were to exercise our discretion and condone the delay because the Applicant is an impersonal entity like the State. Still, in the facts of the present matter, we are satisfied that no case has been made to exercise our review jurisdiction.

26. In fact, from perusing the application for condonation of delay and the main review petition, we are satisfied that the State’s case is squarely covered by Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC, which provides that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of which review is sought is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.

27. As noted earlier, the Application for condonation of delay, the synopsis to the Review Petition and the Review Petition state that this Court’s judgment and order dated 15 November 2017, for which the review is applied, was based on Pune Municipal Corporation Vs Harakchand Solanki (supra). However, in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs Manoharlal (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has overruled Pune Municipal Corporation Vs Harakchand Solanki (supra) on 6 March 2020. The State Government, therefore, issued a Notification dated 23 June 2020 directing all State Government departments to file Review Petitions in cases where Petitions were allowed by following the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation Vs Harakchand Solanki (supra).

28. Thus, it is clear that the main ground for instituting this Review Petition is the subsequent overruling in Indore Development Authority vs Manoharlal (supra). Such a ground is expressly prohibited under the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC. Therefore, the Review Petition would have to be dismissed even if we were to condone the inordinate delay of 1679 days, i.e. 4 years and 7 months, in instituting it.

29. In Government of NCT of Delhi and another vs. K. L. Rathi Steels Limited and others[9], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC provides that if the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based is reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of the superior court in any other case, it shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Thus, even an erroneous decision cannot be a ground for the Court to undertake the review, as the first and foremost requirement of entertaining a Review Petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and in the absence of any such error, the finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed.

30. In K. L. Rathi Steels Limited (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court also rejected the argument based on Shailendra (supra). In the said decision, Harakchand Solanki (supra) was declared as per incuriam and liberty was granted to file Review Petitions in matters disposed of relying upon Harakchand Solanki (supra). Still, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, overruling Shailendra (supra) held that if a judgment and/or order has attained finality because a judicial remedy is either not available in law or even if available, such remedy has been lost, it is not open for a higher court of law by a judicial fiat either to create a remedy for the party on the losing side to pursue or to grant liberty to him to pursue an otherwise available remedy-which by passage of time might have been lost-behind the back of a party who would obviously be seriously affected if he were compelled to contest the proceedings once again. Such an act of the Court would be without the authority of law.

31. In K. L. Rathi Steels Limited (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that Order XLVII of CPC does not authorise a review of a decree, which was right, on the happening of some subsequent event. With the introduction of the Explanation, there seems to be little room for serious debate on the point under consideration. Resultantly, the Court cannot permit what the statute prohibits. Thus, even if we were to condone the inordinate delay in instituting this Review Petition, it would still have to be dismissed on its merits.

32. Another ground which was faintly urged was that the compensation amount in Writ Petition No.11997 of 2016 was deposited in the Government account or in any event, the same was tendered to the Petitioners in the said Petition. Firstly, there is no clarity on this issue. Secondly, this position was never clearly projected. Thirdly, this is not some case of discovering new or essential matter or evidence that the State Government could not have discovered despite due diligence. Fourthly and most pertinently, a mere deposit in a separate bank account or even tendering of the amount was not accepted as sufficient to save the acquisition in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation Vs Harakchand Solanki (supra). Therefore, even based on this ground, which was faintly urged, no case for review is made out even if we condone the inordinate delay of 1679 days, i.e. 4 years and 7 months in instituting the Review Petition, no case is made out to allow the Review Petition.

33. The Interim Applications for Intervention are entirely misconceived. There is no question of the Applicants in the said Interim Applications seeking intervention in the Review Petitions. If at all they have any grievance with the judgment and order dated 15 November 2017 and if they could be considered as “aggrieved persons” under the law as explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. L. Rathi Steels Limited (supra), it is for them to pursue their independent course and not seek intervention or impleadment in these Review Petitions. In any event, at least one of the proposed Intervenors instituted a separate Review Petition and was heard in it.

34. For all the above reasons, the Application for condonation of the 1679-day delay, i.e., 4 years and 7 months, in instituting the Review Petition, is dismissed. However, even assuming we were to condone this inordinate and unexplained delay, even on merits, the Review Petition was liable to be dismissed for the reasons we indicated in this order.

35. Accordingly, all the Interim Applications and, consequently, the Review Petition (Stamp) No.19950 of 2022 are hereby dismissed.

36. There shall be no order for costs. (Kamal Khata, J) (M. S. Sonak, J) Designation: PA To Honourable Judge