Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. The State of Maharashtra

8. The Rajasthan Government Pariwar Card No.21711 issued in the name of Chetanram s/o Ratnaram in the year 1989 showing age of 'Nirana' as son of Chetanram to be of 12 years. Further, showing Anada, Mukhram, Birbal to be the brothers of 'Nirana'. (Annexure­ 'L­1' in his report).

9. A T.C. Form issued by Rajkiya Madhyamik Vidyalaya Udrasar, Tahasil­Shridungargarh, District­Bikaner, dated 19/09/2003, in the name of Anadaram s/o Chetanram Sanatan. (Annexure­ 'L­2' in his report).

10. A Transfer Certificate, dated 15/07 /1994 in the name of Mukhram s/o Chetanram issued by Rajkiya G. R. Mohata Uccha Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Shridungargarh, Bikaner. (Annexure­ 'L­ 3' in his report).

11. A photocopy of Proforma for verification of age examination, dated 24/08/2005 regarding Narayan Chetaram Chaudhary. (Annexure­'J­1' in his report)”

10. The reasoning and the finding of the Inquiring Judge in his report of 12th March 2019 were in the following terms:­ “38) So far as the inquiry directed to be conducted by this Court is concerned, at the outset, the relevant provisions of law with regard to the inquiry as to juvenility has to be mentioned for reference. The provisions under the Act have been mentioned above.

39) As per section 2(35) of the Act, Juvenile means a child below the age of 18 years. The authorities referred above, specifically referring to retrospectivity as to consideration of the application of present law to the fact of juvenility is concerned, there cannot be any dispute about it. Hence, Section 9(2) of the Act is a relevant provision on the basis of which the petitioner has filed a petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India for declaration that he was a child under the Act. The said provision is reproduced above. In the case of "Raju ­vs­ State of Haryana [(2019) 14 SCC 401] " there is a reference to Rule 7 A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules 2007. The said rule deals with making of inquiry by the Court in the claim of juvenility. Sub­Rule 3 of Rule 12 of the said Rules has stated about the procedure to be followed for age determination. After the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 came into force, the relevant provision relating to the procedure to be followed is U/sec.[9] of the Act. Similarly, section 94 of the Act deals with presumption and determination of age. For ready reference, all these provisions have been reproduced above.

40) The authorities of "Surendra Kumar ­vs­ State of Rajasthan [(2008) SCC OnLine Raj 138]" and "Shah Nawaz ­vs­ State of Uttar Pradesh and Another [(2011) 13 SCC 751]" are relevant with reference to the school record. Similarly, the authority of "Surendra Kumar (supra)" is useful regarding entry in electoral roll. The authority of "Darga Ram alias Gunga ­vs­ State of Rajsthan [(2015) 2 SCC 775]" is useful regarding ossification test. All these cases have to be considered with reference to the case of "Raju (supra)" and the provisions of law noted above.

41) As per the provision in section 94 above, in case of doubt regarding whether a person is child or not the process of age determination shall be undertaken and evidence shall be sought to obtain the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate from concerned examination board, if available. The certificate given by Corporation, Municipal Authority or Panchayat can also be obtained and in the absence thereof, age can be determined by ossification test.

42) Therefore, if Rule 7 A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 is read with it's Rule 12 and the present Section 9 and Section 94 of the Act, it is clear that, the date of birth from the school certificate or matriculation certificate or a certificate of Corporation etc. is relevant consideration. Thus, preference has to be given to the School Certificates. Even in the case of "Raju (supra)" the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India made it abundantly clear that the school certificate would be relevant for the name as well as date of birth.

43) In view of the above provisions of law, and the authorities placed on record, I proceed to examine the documents to see whether the documents relied on by the petitioner are genuine and authentic and whether those can be relied on to decide juvenility. The submissions made by learned DGP and learned advocate for the petitioner will be looked into simultaneously.

44) The Police Officer had visited the Rajkiya Adarsh Uccha Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Jalabsar. He has recorded statement of the Incharge Head Master Namrata Prabhusing with reference to the document at

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ serial no. 7 appear to be identical. Hence, even the document at     │
│ serial no. 7 can be considered.                                      │
│ 51) As per Section 94 of the Act, only when the school certificate   │
│ or the certificate of Panchayat and Corporation etc. is not found,   │
│ the ossification test can be resorted to. Since, in this case        │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

33.1. A claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage of a criminal proceeding, even after a final disposal of the case. A delay in raising the claim of juvenility cannot be a ground for rejection of such claim. It can also be raised for the first time before this Court.

33.2. An application claiming juvenility could be made either before the court or the JJ Board. 33.2.1. When the issue of juvenility arises before a court, it would be under sub­ sections (2) and (3) of Section 9 of the JJ Act, 2015 but when a person is brought before a committee or JJ Board, Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 applies. 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub­ section (2) of Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub­section (2) of Section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. 33.2.3. When an application claiming juvenility is made under Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 before the JJ Board when the matter regarding the alleged commission of offence is pending before a court, then the procedure contemplated under Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would apply. Under the said provision if the JJ Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Board shall undertake the process of age determination by seeking evidence and the age recorded by the JJ Board to be the age of the person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of the JJ Act, 2015, be deemed to be true age of that person. Hence the degree of proof required in such a proceeding before the JJ Board, when an application is filed seeking a claim of juvenility when the trial is before the criminal court concerned, is higher than when an inquiry is made by a court before which the case regarding the commission of the offence is pending (vide Section 9 of the JJ Act, 2015).

33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rules 12(3)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the JJ Rules, 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub­section (2) of Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.

33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the criminal court concerned. In case of an inquiry, the court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub­section (2) of Section 94 of the 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.

33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.

33.7. This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.

33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.

33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.

33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Evidence Act viz. Section 35 and other provisions.

33.11. Ossification test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.”

32. Was the Inquiring Judge wrong in giving his findings? The documents on which he has primarily relied upon are the school register, certificate of date of birth of Niranaram issued by the school authorities on 30th January 2019 and transfer certificate dated 15th August 2001. The latter, however, is not a certificate of transfer showing Niranaram’s shifting to another school but this certificate records that he had left from Class III on 15th May 1989. Then there is transfer certificate of Andaram dated 19th September 2003 which shows the date of birth of Andaram as 4th April 1980. There was another transfer certificate before the Inquiring Judge of Mukhram, but this was discarded by the Inquiring Judge as the same did not correspond with the school records. All the aforesaid documents appear to have their origin in the admission register of the school, the original of which we have secured and seen. Apart from the documents of the school, there is a family card, to which we have referred to earlier. The date of issue of Family Card is 1989 and, in this card, issued by the State Government, Nirana’s age is shown to be 12 years. But there are two other signatures of authorities on this card, of 1991 and 1992. For this reason, we choose to ignore this document for our inquiry. Apart from these materials, there is extract from the electoral roll which shows age of Niranaram to be 18 years on 1st January 1993. So far as per this recordal, his age at the time of commission of offence would be 19 years. The school documents point to Niranaram’s age to be below 16 years in the year of commission of offence. The case of Abuzar Hossain (supra) was relied upon by the learned counsel for the State to contend that production of documents of the threshold stage of juvenility­claim is sufficient to call for an inquiry but further inquiry is necessary to examine the authenticity or the genuineness of documents involved. In Parag Bhati (Juvenile) through Legal Guardian­Mother­Rajni Bhati ­vs­ State of Uttar Pradesh and Another [(2016) 12 SCC 744], in relation to the similar provision under the 2000 Act it has been highlighted that the credibility of documents should be prima facie to direct inquiry. In the cases of Manoj alias Monu alias Vishal Chaudhary ­vs­ State of Haryana and Another [(2022) 6 SCC 187], Ravinder Singh Gorkhi (supra) and Birad Mal Singhvi (supra) the necessity of the documents being reliable has been stressed for determining the juvenility claim.

33. As we have already stated, the school in question is a government school. The “date of birth certificate” of Niranaram has been issued by the office of the headmaster of the said school. This certificate has been issued on the letterhead of the State Government carrying the national emblem. The principal of the school has in writing disclosed that the content of the admission register is maintained in ordinary course of business. Hence, in normal course the said register would satisfy the test specified in Section 35 of the 1872 Act, of being a relevant fact. The case of Birad Mal Singhvi (supra) dealt with age disclosure in relation to election and not under 2015 Act. The latter gives a guideline under Section 94 thereof about the documents which shall be accepted as evidence. The certificate of date of birth has not been accepted by us straightway. In the present application, extract from the admission register has been annexed, supported by an affidavit of the applicant himself. Moreover, we had ourselves called for the original school admission record by our order passed on 8th September 2022, requesting Dr. Manish Singhvi learned Additional Advocate General, State of Rajasthan to ensure production of the same and the said register was produced before us.

34. As regards authenticity or genuineness of the admission register, which forms the basis of certificate of the applicant’s date of birth, argument of Mr. Patil is that the whole register was fabricated. His submission is that at the time the extract therefrom was produced before the Inquiring Judge, the same was not paginated. He also argues that the register was not stitched. Further, he has submitted that serial entry no. 566 of the register shows the date of entry of the student to be 2nd February 1980, which is not in order in relation to the other entries. He has also referred certain other entries in the register prior in order to serial no. 568, in which dates of admission of the respective students are earlier than that of the applicant. But these entries, at best, would show some defect in maintaining the records and cannot lead to the conclusion that the entire admission register is fabricated. Reference has also been made to an entry of one Lekhram, that stood against serial no. 423, which reappeared in entry

562. The endorsement of the school in serial no. 423 is that “his name was deleted” whereas against entry no. 562, recordal is “as per previous records”. This clearly appears to be the case of re­admission or re­entry in the school. His further stand is that there was interpolation of pages. He has again pointed out that one of the pages (page no. 33) of the register has been stitched in reverse. But these are nitpicking submissions and cannot lead to the conclusion that admission register itself is fake. So far as Niranaram’s name is concerned, in the admission register there is no discrepancy. His serial number is 568 which falls in order in which the register is maintained and is in sequence with the admission entries of other students barring few minor discrepancies as regards names in other entries. Even if the register has been freshly stitched and paginated to be sent to this Court, that would not lead to a conclusion that the whole thing has been fabricated. Moreover, there is no clear evidence to demonstrate that at the time of initial inquiry, the register was unstitched or without pagination. We have ourselves seen the register and it is of sufficient vintage. Thus, we agree with the Inquiring Judge that the date of birth recorded therein was not a fabricated entry.

35. Now there are four other dates reflecting different ages of the applicant. The first is the age in the chargesheet on the strength of which he has been tried, convicted and sentenced, that is 20 years in the year 1994. But the source of disclosure of this age has not been brought to our notice by learned counsel for the parties, except that the applicant’s age was given by his counsel before the High Court at the stage of appeal hearing. Next is the age reflected in the electoral roll and if one goes by that, then his age at the time of commission of offence would be 19 years. The electoral roll was referred to in the police report dated 2nd March 2019 but does not appear to have been considered by the Inquiring Judge. The third source of his age is the family card, in which it is mentioned that he was 12 years in 1989 or 1991/1992. That would have taken his year of birth to 1977­79, and that would make him 15 to 17 years of age at the time of commission of offence. For the reasons we have already explained, we have discarded the latter document. Now which document or source is to be accepted by us? In the case of Pawan (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court has rejected the juvenility plea when documents to raise the plea of juvenility were collected after conviction. In that judgment, this Court cited the case of Murari Thakur (supra) and the Coordinate Bench observed:­ “41. The question is: should an enquiry be made or report be called for from the trial court invariably where juvenility is claimed for the first time before this Court. Where the materials placed before this Court by the accused, prima facie, suggest that the accused was “juvenile” as defined in the 2000 Act on the date of incident, it may be necessary to call for the report or an enquiry be ordered to be made. However, in a case where plea of juvenility is found unscrupulous or the materials lack credibility or do not inspire confidence and even, prima facie, satisfaction of the court is not made out, we do not think any further exercise in this regard is necessary. If the plea of juvenility was not raised before the trial court or the High Court and is raised for the first time before this Court, the judicial conscience of the Court must be satisfied by placing adequate and satisfactory material that the accused had not attained the age of eighteen years on the date of commission of offence; sans such material any further enquiry into juvenility would be unnecessary.

42. As regards A­2, two documents are relied upon to show that he had not attained the age of eighteen years on 25­9­2003/26­ 9­2003. His age (17 years) mentioned by the trial court at the time of recording his statement under Section 313 CrPC is a tentative observation based on physical appearance which is hardly determinative of age. The other document is the school leaving certificate issued by the Headmaster, Prem Shiksha Niketan, Bilaspur, Rampur which does not inspire any confidence as it seems to have been issued on 16­10­2006 after A­2 had already been convicted. Primary evidence like entry from the birth register has not been produced. We find it difficult to accept Annexure P­3 (school leaving certificate) relied upon by the counsel. For A­1, the only document placed on record is a school leaving certificate which has been procured after his conviction. In his case also, entry from the birth register has not been produced. We are not impressed or satisfied with such material. There being no satisfactory and adequate material, prima facie, we are not persuaded to call for report about the age of A­1 and A­2 on the date of commission of offence.”

36. So far as the case of the applicant is concerned, on the basis of materials disclosed in the present application, an inquiry was directed in the order passed on 29th January 2019. In the case of Pawan (supra) school leaving certificate issued by the headmaster of a school did not inspire the confidence of the Court. Here however, we have called for the original admission register itself, on the basis of which certificate of birth was issued. The latter is a document specified under Section 94 (2)(a)(i) of the 2015 Act. In the order of sequence the age proof is required to be proved as per the aforesaid provision, the date of birth certificate is the first document to be examined for determination of age. Thus, factually the ratio of the said judgment can be distinguished. In the case of Pawan Kumar Gupta (supra), the juvenility claim was raised for the second time and for this reason it was held that the same plea was not maintainable. A Coordinate Bench in the case of Mohd. Anwar (supra) has observed that belated claims not only prevent proper production and application of the evidence but also undermine the genuineness of the defence. But this authority does not lay down, as an absolute proposition of law, that belated production of age proof cannot be examined to determine juvenility of an accused. Furthermore, Section 9 (2) of the 2015 Act specifically stipulates that such plea can be raised “at any stage”. The ratio of the case of Surajdeo Mahto (supra) would also not apply in the facts of this case as in this proceeding the Inquiring Judge has gone into the question as to whether the certificates relied upon by the applicant belonged to him or not and has returned a finding that Niranaram was indeed Narayan. We have also tested this finding and sustain the view of the Inquiring Judge.

37. In the cases of Ramdeo Chauhan (supra), Sanjeev Kumar Gupta ­vs­ State of Uttar Pradesh and Another [(2019) 12 SCC 370], Parag Bhati (supra), Manoj (supra), Babloo Pasi ­vs­ State of Jharkhand and Another [(2008) 13 SCC 133] and Birad Mal Singhvi (supra), different Benches of this Court came to findings as regards reliability of the documents upon applying mind and none of these authorities lay down that the certificate of date of birth by the school authorities based on admission register of the school will not be acceptable for an inquiry under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. On the other hand, in the order of priority in the aforesaid provision, the date of birth certificate by the school authority has been given the pre­eminence. Though the heading of the said section reads “presumption and determination of age”, the section itself does not specify that the date of birth certificate by the school would only lead to presumption. The way the provision thereof has been framed, the documents referred to in the first two sub­clauses of sub­section (2) of Section 94 of the 2015 Act, if established in the order of priority, then the dates reflected therein has to be accepted to determine the age of the accused or convict claiming to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence. In the event the document referred to in Section 94 (2)(i) is there, the inquiring body need not go to the documents referred to in sub­clause

(ii) thereof. The only caveat, implicit thereto, which has been sounded by several decisions of this Court, is that the document must inspire confidence. But lack of inspiration of the age­determining authority must come for some cogent reason and ought not to be sourced from such body’s own perception of age of the juvenile­claimant.

38. A Constitution Bench in the case of Pratap Singh ­vs­ State of Jharkhand and Another [(2005) 3 SCC 551] dealing with the meaning of juvenile under the 1986 Act and the 2000 Act, held:­ “12. Clause (l) of Section 2 of the 2000 Act defines “juvenile in conflict with law” as meaning a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence. The notable distinction between the definitions of the 1986 Act and the 2000 Act is that in the 1986 Act “juvenile in conflict with law” is absent. The definition of delinquent juvenile in the 1986 Act as noticed above is referable to an offence said to have been committed by him. It is the date of offence that he was in conflict with law. When a juvenile is produced before the competent authority and/or court he has not committed an offence on that date, but he was brought before the authority for the alleged offence which he has been found to have committed. In our view, therefore, what was implicit in the 1986 Act has been made explicit in the 2000 Act.”

39. In a later decision, in the case of Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh and Another ­vs­ State of Uttar Pradesh [(2013) 11 SCC 193], this Court’s view was reflected in the following passage:­ “72. The upshot of the above discussion is that while the appellant was above 16 years of age on the date of the commission of the offence, he was certainly below 18 years and hence entitled to the benefit of the 2000 Act, no matter the later enactment was not on the statute book on the date of the occurrence. The difficulty arises when we examine whether the trial and the resultant order of conviction of the appellant would also deserve to be set aside as illegal and without jurisdiction. The conviction cannot however be set aside for more than one

72.1. Firstly, because there was and is no challenge to the order of conviction recorded by the courts below in this case either before the High Court or before us. As a matter of fact the plea of juvenility before this Court by way of an additional ground stopped short of challenging the conviction of the appellant on the ground that the court concerned had no jurisdiction to try the appellant.

72.2. Secondly, because the fact situation in the case at hand is that on the date of the occurrence i.e. on 24­ 5­1988 the appellant was above 16 years of age. He was, therefore, not a juvenile under the 1986 Act that covered the field at that point of time, nor did the 1986 Act deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to try the appellant for the offence he was charged with. The repeal of the 1986 Act by the 2000 Act raised the age of juvenility to 18 years. Parliament provided for cases which were either pending trial or were, after conclusion of the trial, pending before an appellate or a revisional court by enacting Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 which is to the following effect: “20.Special provision in respect of pending cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence: Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and special reason to be mentioned in the order, review the case and pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile. Explanation.—In all pending cases including trial, revision, appeal or any other criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, in any court, the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceases to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply as if the said provisions had been in force, for all purposes and at all material times when the alleged offence was committed.” In Dharambir ­vs­ State (NCT of Delhi) and Another [(2010) 5 SCC 344] and Mahesh Jogi ­vs­ State of Rajashthan [(2014) 15 SCC 184], similar view has been taken by this Court. In Satya Deo alias Bhoorey ­vs­ State of Uttar Pradesh [(2020) 10 SCC 555], it was observed by a two­Judge Bench of this Court that in light of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 read with Section 25 of the 2015 Act, an accused cannot be denied his right to be treated as a juvenile when he was less than 18 years of age at the time of commission of offence. The reasoning of the Court was that such right stood acquired and fructified under the 2000 Act, even if the offence was committed prior to enforcement of the 2000 Act on 1st April 2001.

40. So far as the applicant is concerned, his claim of juvenility based on his date of birth in the school certificate would not vary based on definitions of juvenile, “juvenile in conflict with law” or “child in conflict with law” under the 1986 Act, 2000 Act or the 2015 Act. For applying the procedure for determining his claim, of juvenility or of being a child, in our opinion, the law applicable at the time of undertaking that exercise by the concerned statutory body would prevail. Hence, in his case, we have tested his claim on the basis of the provisions of Section 9 read with Section 94 of the 2015 Act.

41. Under the 2015 Act the date of birth certificate ought to be the main factor for determination of juvenility. In the case of Rishipal Singh Solanki (supra), the two­Judge Bench of this Court has laid down the principle that an inquiry initiated under Section 9 (2) of 2015 Act would be similar to that contained in Section 94 of thereof. We accept this view. We have called for the source of the date of birth certificate, which recorded the applicant’s birth date at the time of his entry into the school which was in the year 1986. So far as the inconsistent dates of birth mentioned in the other documents, none of them is specified to be taken into consideration for undertaking the process of age determination as laid down in Section 94 (2) of the said statute. Once the applicant has discharged his onus, in support of his claim of juvenility by producing the date of birth certificate from the school, the State had to come up with any compelling contradictory evidence to show that the recordal of his date of birth in the admission register was false. The State, in this case, has not come up with any such compelling evidence which would render such certificate to be unreliable or false. The State and the complainant have sought to disprove the applicant’s case on the basis of materials disclosed by him only, apart from the electoral roll. Here, we cannot indulge in any guesswork to doubt the entry in the school register. No evidence has been led to contradict the basis of the age of the applicant reflected in the aforesaid document. The certificate of date of birth as evidence of age having been provided in the statute itself, we shall go by that. The other factor which has crossed our mind is as to whether a boy of 12 years could commit such a gruesome crime. But though this factor shocks us, we cannot apply speculation of this nature to cloud our adjudication process. We possess no knowledge of child psychology or criminology to take into account this factor while examining the report of the Inquiring Judge. Moreover, the age of the applicant revealed in the ossification test keeps the age of the applicant as claimed by him, within the range specified in the report. The said test was conducted in the year 2005, and his age was determined in the range of 22 to 40 years. If we take 22 years as his age in 2005, then his year of birth would haven been 1983. That would broadly correspond to the date of birth contained in the admission register.

42. In the case of Rishipal Singh Solanki (supra), it has been laid down that if two views are possible on the same evidence the Court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. In the case of State of Jammu & Kashmir (Now U.T. of Jammu and Kashmir) and Others ­vs­ Shubham Sangra [2022 SCC OnLine SC 1592], the decision of Parag Bhati (supra) was followed, which laid down that benefits of the 2000 Act ought to be extended to only such cases wherein the accused is held to be a juvenile on the basis of clear and unambiguous case that the accused was minor on the date of the incident and the documentary evidence at least prima facie inspires confidence regarding his minority. It was opined in this judgment that when an accused commits a grave and heinous offence, his plea of juvenility cannot be allowed to come to his rescue and Court cannot take a casual or cavalier approach in determining his minority. A somewhat different view has been expressed in the case of Rishipal Singh Solanki (supra), which we have referred to above. A view similar to that taken in Rishipal Singh Solanki (supra) was reflected in the decision of a two­Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Rajinder Chandra ­vs­ State of Chhattisgarh and Another [(2002) 2 SCC 287]. In our opinion however, in the event the Court, Board or the Committee is satisfied that the claimant on the date of offence was a juvenile, the dimension of gravity of the offence cannot be considered by the Court to reject the benefit granted to an accused or convict under the 2015 Act. We agree with the observations made in the cases of Shubham Sangra (supra) and Parag Bhati (supra) that a casual or cavalier approach should not be taken in determining the age of the accused or convict on his plea of juvenility, but a decision against determination of juvenility ought not to be taken solely for the reason that offence involved is heinous or grave. The degree or dimension of the offence ought not to direct approach of the Court in its inquiry into juvenility of an accused (in this case a convict). The exception where a different view can be taken has been provided by the legislature itself in Section 15 of the 2015 Act and if on the basis of commission of heinous crime, a juvenile is required to be denied the benefit of the 2015 Act, the course specified therein would be required to followed.

43. In the light of our findings and the reasons we have disclosed above for arriving at such finding, we accept the report of the Inquiring Judge. We declare that the date of birth of the applicant as reflected in the certificate issued by the Rajkiya Adarsh Uccha Madhaymik Vidyalaya, Jalabsar, tehsil ­ Shri Dungargarh, district – Bikaner, dated 30th January 2019, a copy of which has been annexed in the Inquiry Report as “I­2”, is to be accepted for determining his age at the time of commission of the offence of which he has been convicted. Going by that certificate, his age at the time of commission of offence was 12 years and 6 months. Thus, he was a child/juvenile on the date of commission of offence for which he has been convicted, in terms of the provisions of the 2015 Act. This shall be deemed to be the true age of Niranaram, who was tried and convicted as Narayan. He has already served more than 3 years of incarceration and under the law as it prevailed at the time of commission of offence as also under the 2015 Act, he cannot be subjected to capital punishment. In view of this finding, the order sentencing him to death passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in Sessions Case No. 462 of 1994 and subsequently confirmed by the High Court and by this Court would stand invalidated by operation of law. He shall be set free forthwith from the correctional home in which he remains imprisoned, as he has suffered imprisonment for more than 28 years, having regard to the provisions of Section 18 of the 2015 Act. Section 21 of the 1986 Act also carried substantially the same provision on the question of maximum punishment that can be awarded to a delinquent juvenile by the Juvenile Court. The restriction on term of detention that can be awarded by the Board under the 2015 Act to a child below 16 years would also apply to the Court before which the juvenility question is being determined.

44. I.A. No. 5242 of 2016 as also I.A. No. 5245 of 2016 are applications taken out by the applicant for reopening the review petition. We are of the view, however, that an application under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act is an independent proceeding and we have decided the same without revisiting the review order. Crl. M.P. No. 155609 of 2019 has been filed by the intervenor raising objection to the inquiry report. We dispose of the same as we have considered the content of this petition. All other applications shall stand disposed of.

45. The present application stands allowed in the above terms. … .......................... J. (K. M. JOSEPH) … ........................... J. (ANIRUDDHA BOSE) … .......................... J. (HRISHIKESH ROY) NEW DELHI; 27th March, 2023. ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.11 SECTION II-A S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS CRLMP.NO.157334/2018 in R.P.(Crl.) No. 1139-1140/2000 In Crl.A. No. 25-26/2000 NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY Applicant(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Respondent(s) (with IA Nos.5242 & 5245 OF 2016) Date: 27-03-2023 These matters were called on for pronouncement of judgment today. For Petitioner(s) Mr. R.Basant, Sr.Adv. Mr. Vishnu P., Adv. Ms. Trisha Chandran, Adv. Ms. Shreya Rastogi, Adv. Mr. Shadan Farasat, AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. Sachin Patil, Adv. Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv. Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR Mr. Bharat Bagla, Adv. Mr. Sourav Singh, Adv. Mr. Geo Joseph, Adv. Mr. Risvi Muhammed, Adv. Mr. Durgesh Gupta, Adv. Mr. Hrishikesh Chitaley, Adv. Mr. Vijay Kari Singh, Adv. Mr. Rajat Joseph, AOR Hon’ble Mr. Justice Aniruddha Bose pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon’ble Mr.Justice K.M.Joseph, His Lordship and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Hrishikesh Roy. CRLMP.NO.157334/2018 is allowed and the applicant is directed to be released forthwith in terms of the signed reportable judgment, which is placed on the file. Original admission register and the documents to be returned to the learned advocate for the State of Rajasthan. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (NIRMALA NEGI) (VIDYA NEGI)

COURT MASTER (SH)

ASSISTANT REGISTRAR