M/s. Amar Builders v. Champalal Indraraj Sand alias Rahtekar & Ors.

High Court of Bombay · 27 Jan 2025
Madhav J. Jamdar
Writ Petition No.13939 of 2018
civil petition_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The High Court allowed condonation of delay in filing cross-objections in a civil appeal where the appeal was stayed and not taken up for final hearing, emphasizing the wide discretion under Order XLI Rule 22 CPC.

Full Text
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.13939 OF 2018
M/s. Amar Builders
A Proprietory Firm through its Proprietor
Amar H. Manjrekar …Petitioner
VERSUS
Champalal Indraraj Sand alias Rahtekar since deceased through legal heirs
Hiralal Indraraj Sand alias Rahtekar & Ors. …Respondents
Mr. Nachiket V. Khaladkar, Advocate, for the Petitioner.
Mr. S. S. Kanetkar, Advocate, for the Respondents.
CORAM: MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J.
DATED : 27th JANUARY 2025
JUDGMENT

1. Heard Mr. Khaladkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Mr. Kanetkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents.

2. By the present Writ Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the challenge is to the legality and validity of the order dated 4th August 2018 passed by the learned District Judge-5, Pune below Exhibit-54 in Civil Appeal No.9 of 2009. By the impugned order, Application filed for condonation of delay in preferring cross-objection in said Civil Appeal No.9 of 2009 has been dismissed.

3. Mr. Khaladkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner raised the following contentions: i. Although apparently the delay is of 8 years, 8 months and 5 days, in fact, there is no delay as the Appeal was never taken up for hearing and for about 6 years the hearing of the said Appeal was stayed. ii. The Appeal has been filed on 20th December 2008 and along with the Appeal itself amendment Application bearing Exhibits-8 and 9 have been filed by the present Respondents (Appellants/Defendants) seeking amendment in the plaint as well as in the written statement to the counterclaim. Said Amendment Applications were allowed on 20th April 2009. The said order was challenged by the present Petitioner i.e. Defendant by filing the Writ Petition No.9688 of 2010 and this Court granted stay to the hearing of the said Appeal. The said order dated 20th April 2009 passed below Exhibit-8 and 9 in Civil Appeal No.9 of 2009 allowing amendment has been set aside by the High Court by the order dated 20th

2016. The Respondents filed SLP in the Supreme Court challenging the order dated 20th July 2016 and the said SLP was dismissed on 16th December 2016. iii. In the meanwhile, as the Appellant No.1 passed away on 29th September 2010 and Appellant No.2 passed away on 5th August 2011, Applications were filed in said Civil Appeal No.9 of 2009 to bring on record heirs and the said Applications were allowed by the order dated 27th July 2017. iv. The amended Appeal memo was served on the Petitioners on 11th August 2017 and immediately on 7th October 2017, cross-objections have been filed by the present Petitioners along with Application for condonation of delay. v. He therefore, submitted that although the delay mentioned in the impugned order is of 8 years, 8 months and 5 days, in fact, there is no delay as the Appeal was never taken up for hearing. He submitted that hearing of the said Appeal was stayed for about 6 years and therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned Appellate Court of rejecting Delay Condonation Application in filing cross-objection is required to be quashed and set aside. vi. Mr. Khaladkar, learned Counsel relied on the decision of a learned Single Judge in the case of State of Maharashtra vs..

4. On the other hand, Mr. Kanetkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents raised the following submissions: i. The Application for amendment in the written statement to the counterclaim and to the plaint was allowed by the order dated 20th April 2009. Amended written statement to the counterclaim has been filed before the Appellate Court on 30th April 2009. On the very day, learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioner (i.e. Respondent before the Appellate Court) filed Application for allowing amendment in the written statement in view of amendment in the plaint and amendment in the written statement to the 1 2011(6) ALL MR 242 counterclaim in view of amendment in the writte statement. It appears that on 26th June 2009, an Application was filed bearing Exhibit-28 for framing issues and accordingly, the Appeal was adjourned for framing of issues, may be perhaps as the plaint and the counterclaim were allowed to be amended. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned from time to time for submission of the Paper-Book on 15th September 2009, 28th October 2009, 5th December 2009, 6th January 2010 and 9th February 2010. He submitted that the Roznama of the learned Appellate Court of 26th March 2010 shows that the same has been adjourned for arguments. Mr. Kanetkar, learned Counsel therefore, submitted that as the Appeal has reached upto the stage of arguments, the learned Appellate Court rightly rejected the Application for condonation of delay in filing the cross-objections. ii. He submitted that even if, the reasons given by the Petitioner are accepted as it is, then also there is considerable delay in filing the cross-objections. iii. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Banarasi and Ors. vs. Ram Phal[2] and submitted that as crossobjections are concerning prayers regarding mesne profits and injunction, unless cross-objections are filed, the said prayers cannot be considered in Appeal and therefore, the Petitioner should have been more vigilant and filed crossobjections in time. iv. He pointed out roznama recorded for 26th March 2010, 6th October 2010 and 16th November 2010 and submitted that the said Appeal was fixed for arguments and therefore, there is exorbitant delay of about 7 years in filing cross-objections which have been ultimately filed along with delay condonation Application on 7th October 2017. v. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahadev Govind Gharge & Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, Jamkhandi, Karnataka[3] and submitted that as the Petitioner has appeared in the said

Appeal on 7th January 2009, the cross-objections should have been filed immediately. vi. He therefore, submitted that no interference in the impugned order is warranted.

5. In the rejoinder, Mr. Khaladkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted that the said Appeal was fixed for arguments on 6th October 2010 and on 16th November 2010 on Exhibit-31 Application and not on the main Appeal. He submitted that said Application bearing Exhibit-31 was filed on 29th June 2010 under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC seeking leave to bring on record additional evidence. Thus, he submitted that Appeal was never taken up for hearing.

6. Before considering the rival contentions, it is necessary to set out the factual position. i. The present Respondents i.e. Plaintiffs filed Civil Suit No.266 of 2006 against the Petitioner i.e. Defendant seeking renewal of lease period for 99 years from 22nd May 2006 on the basis of lease deed dated 22nd May 1907. In the said suit relief is also sought for permanent injunction that Defendants or any person on his behalf should not disturb the lawful possession of Plaintiffs of the suit property. ii. The Petitioner i.e. Defendant filed written statement cum counterclaim. In the counterclaim relief sought is that the structure on suit land be demolished, the vacant possession of suit land be handed over to the Defendant, the Plaintiffs be restrained from creating third party interest and mesne profit inquiry be conducted. iii. The Plaintiffs filed written statement to the counterclaim. iv. The learned Trial Court dismissed the suit and decreed the counterclaim by directing removal of construction on the suit land and further directing handing over vacant possession to the Defendants within three months. However, the learned Trial Court has refused to grant decree of mesne profits and not passed any order regarding prayer of injunction. v. The Plaintiffs filed Appeal on 20th December 2008 and along with the Appeal itself amendment Application bearing Exhibits-8 and 9 have been filed by the Appellants i.e. Plaintiffs seeking amendment in the plaint as well as in the written statement to the counterclaim. The said Appeal was registered on 1st January 2009. vi. By the order dated 2nd January 2009, the Appellate Court issued notice to the Respondents in said Appeal and made the same returnable on 7th January 2009. vii.On 7th January 2009, learned Advocate appeared for the Respondents in the said Appeal and inter alia time was sought to file reply to Exhibit-8 and Exhibit-9 Application. viii. On 16th February 2009, the Respondents in the said Appeal filed reply to the Exhibit-8 and Exhibit-9 Application. ix. Amendment Applications bearing Exhibits-8 and 9 filed along with the Appeal were decided and allowed on 20th April 2009. x. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned from time to time for a period of 20th April 2009 to 9th February 2010 for filing paper-book. xi. The said Appeal has been fixed for arguments on 26th March 2010 and 14th June 2010. xii. On 29th June 2010, the Appellant filed Application bearing Exhibit-31 seeking leave to produce the additional evidence and thus, the Appeal was adjourned for filing reply to Exhibit-31 Application on 29th June 2010, 13th July 2010, 21st August 2010 and 14th September 2010. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on 18th September 2010, 6th October 2010, 16th November 2010, 8th December 2010, 17th January 2011, 14th February 2011, 25th February 2011 and 16th March 2011 etc. for arguments on Exhibit-31 Application. xiii. In the meanwhile, the said order was challenged by the present Petitioner by filing Writ Petition No.9688 of

2010. The said Writ Petition was filed on 19th November

2010. A learned Single Judge by the order dated 8th 2011 passed in said Writ Petition No.9688 of 2010 granted stay to the hearing of the said Appeal No.9 of 2009. xiv. A learned Single Judge by the order dated 20th 2016 passed in Writ Petition No.9688 of 2010 set aside the order dated 20th April 2009 passed below Exhibits-8 and 9 in Civil Appeal No.9 of 2009 allowing amendment. xv. The Respondents filed SLP in the Supreme Court challenging the order dated 20th July 2016 of the High Court and the said SLP was dismissed on 16th December 2016. xvi. In the meanwhile, as the Appellant No.1 passed away on 29th September 2010 and Appellant No.2 passed away on 5th August 2011, Applications were filed in said Civil Appeal No.9 of 2009 bearing Exhibit-39 to 41 on 25th February 2011 to bring on record heirs and ultimately the said Applications were allowed by the order dated 27th July 2017. On 27th 2017, the matter was adjourned to 11th August 2017 for amended copy/arguments. xvii. The amended Appeal memo was served on the Petitioners on 11th August 2017 and the matter was adjourned to 15th September 2017 and 7th October 2017 for arguments. xviii. On 7th October 2017, cross-objections have been filed by the present Petitioners along with Application for condonation of delay.

7. The relevant provision is Order XLI Rule 22, which reads as under:

“22. Upon hearing, respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred separate appeal.—(1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree [but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-object] to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow. Explanation.—A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file
cross-objection in respect of the decree in so far as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent.] (2) Form of objection and provisions applicable thereto.— Such cross-objection shall be in the form of a memorandum, and the provisions of rule 1, so far as they relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal, shall apply thereto. (4) Where, in any case in which any respondent has under this rule filed as memorandum of objection, the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the objection so filed may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit. (5) The provisions relating to pauper appeals shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to an objection under this rule.” (Emphasis added)

8. At this stage only it is required to note the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Banarasi (supra) relied on by Mr Kanetkar, learned Counsel for the Respondents. Paragraphs 9 to 12 of the said decision are relevant and the relevant portion of the same is set out herein below: “9. Any respondent though he may not have filed an appeal from any part of the decree may still support the decree to the extent to which it is already in his favour by laying challenge to a finding recorded in the impugned judgment against him. Where a plaintiff seeks a decree against the defendant on grounds (A) and (B), any one of the two grounds being enough to entitle the plaintiff to a decree and the court has passed a decree on ground (A) deciding it for the plaintiff while ground (B) has been decided against the plaintiff, in an appeal preferred by the defendant, in spite of the finding on ground (A) being reversed the plaintiff as a respondent can still seek to support the decree by challenging the finding on ground (B) and persuade the appellate court to form an opinion that in spite of the finding on ground (A) being reversed to the benefit of the defendant-appellant the decree could still be sustained by reversing the finding on ground (B) though the plaintiff-respondent has neither preferred an appeal of his own nor taken any crossobjection. A right to file cross-objection is the exercise of right to appeal though in a different form. It was observed in Sahadu Gangaram Bhagade v. Special Dy. Collector, Ahmednagar [(1970) 1 SCC 685: (1971) 1 SCR 146] that the right given to a respondent in an appeal to file cross-objection is a right given to the same extent as is a right of appeal to lay challenge to the impugned decree if he can be said to be aggrieved thereby. Taking any cross-objection is the exercise of right of appeal and takes the place of cross-appeal though the form differs. Thus it is clear that just as an appeal is preferred by a person aggrieved by the decree so also a cross-objection is preferred by one who can be said to be aggrieved by the decree. A party who has fully succeeded in the suit can and needs to neither prefer an appeal nor take any cross-objection though certain finding may be against him. Appeal and cross-objection — both are filed against decree and not against judgment and certainly not against any finding recorded in a judgment. This was the well-settled position of law under the unamended CPC.

10. The CPC amendment of 1976 has not materially or substantially altered the law except for a marginal difference. Even under the amended Order

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41 Rule 22 sub-rule (1) a party in whose favour the decree stands in its entirety is neither entitled nor obliged to prefer any cross-objection. However, the insertion made in the text of sub-rule (1) makes it permissible to file a cross-objection against a finding. The difference which has resulted we will shortly state. A respondent may defend himself without filing any cross-objection to the extent to which decree is in his favour; however, if he proposes to attack any part of the decree he must take cross-objection. The amendment inserted by the 1976 amendment is clarificatory and also enabling and this may be made precise by analysing the provision. There may be three situations:

(i) The impugned decree is partly in favour of the appellant and partly in favour of the respondent.

(ii) The decree is entirely in favour of the respondent though an issue has been decided against the respondent.

(iii) The decree is entirely in favour of the respondent and all the issues have also been answered in favour of the respondent but there is a finding in the judgment which goes against the respondent.

11. In the type of case (i) it was necessary for the respondent to file an appeal or take cross-objection against that part of the decree which is against him if he seeks to get rid of the same though that part of the decree which is in his favour he is entitled to support without taking any cross-objection. The law remains so post-amendment too. In the type of cases (ii) and (iii) pre-amendment CPC did not entitle nor permit the respondent to take any crossobjection as he was not the person aggrieved by the decree. Under the amended CPC, read in the light of the explanation, though it is still not necessary for the respondent to take any cross-objection laying challenge to any finding adverse to him as the decree is entirely in his favour and he may support the decree without cross-objection; the amendment made in the text of sub-rule (1), read with the explanation newly inserted, gives him a right to take cross-objection to a finding recorded against him either while answering an issue or while dealing with an issue. The advantage of preferring such cross-objection is spelled out by sub-rule (4). In spite of the original appeal having been withdrawn or dismissed for default the crossobjection taken to any finding by the respondent shall still be available to be adjudicated upon on merits which remedy was not available to the respondent under the unamended CPC. In the preamendment era, the withdrawal or dismissal for default of the original appeal disabled the respondent to question the correctness or otherwise of any finding recorded against the respondent.

12. The fact remains that to the extent to which the decree is against the respondent and he wishes to get rid of it he should have either filed an appeal of his own or taken cross-objection failing which the decree to that extent cannot be insisted on by the respondent for being interfered, set aside or modified to his advantage. The law continues to remain so post-1976 amendment. ……”

9. Mr. Kanetkar, learned Counsel on the touchstone of the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Banarasi (supra) submitted that as the learned Trial Court has partly allowed the counterclaim and has refused to grant decree of mesne profits and not passed any order regarding prayer of injunction, the Petitioner is required to file Appeal or cross-objection and without the same could not have assailed the decree of the learned Trial Court in that regard without filing the cross-objection. There is substance in the said contention. This is not a case where the Petitioner could have supported the decree passed against the Respondents by making contentions concerning the rejection of prayer for injunction and mesne profits. Thus, it is absolutely essential for the Petitioner to file the cross-objections.

10. Thus, it is necessary to decide the aspect whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, the delay caused in filing the crossobjection needs to be interfered with. For considering the same, it is necessary to consider the observations of a learned Single Judge in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Kalu Ladku Mhatre (supra). The learned Single Judge has held as follows in paragraph Nos.[6] and 7: “6. Thus, under sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 of Order XLI of the said, Code, a power has been conferred upon the Appellate Court to extend the time to file Cross Objection. The Appellate Court can grant such further time as it may see fit to allow. The sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 does not lay down that sufficient cause is required to be shown by the respondent. As the said Code vests the power to extend the time to file Cross-Objection in the Appellate Court, it is not at all necessary for the respondent in Appeal to invoke section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads thus: “Extension of prescribed period of certain cases - Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”

7. The last part of sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 of Order XLI deals with the grant of extension of time for filing of Cross Objection and section 5 of the Limitation Act deals with the extension of time to prefer an Appeal. Section 5 of the Limitation Act incorporates a condition precedent of the appellant satisfying the Appellate Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the Appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 of Order XLI does not incorporate the stringent requirement of establishing a sufficient cause. Thus, a wide power to extend the time to file Cross- Objection has been vested in the Appellate Court. Though there is no requirement of establishing sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act, in the application for seeking extension of time to file Cross-Objection, brief reasons for delay will have to be set out. A wider discretion has been conferred on the Appellate Court under the sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 than what is conferred by section 5 of the Limitation Act. The power to extend time under sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 of Order XLI of the Code has to be liberally exercised in case where a Cross-Objection is sought to be filed before the Appeal is heard for final hearing.”

11. Thus, the learned Single Judge has held that a wide power to extend the time to file cross-objection has been vested in the Appellate Court. Though there is no requirement of establishing sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in the application for seeking extension of time to file Cross- Objection, brief reasons for delay will have to be set out. A wider discretion has been conferred on the Appellate Court under the sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 than what is conferred by section 5 of the Limitation Act. The power to extend time under sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 of Order XLI of the Code has to be liberally exercised in case where a Cross-Objection is sought to be filed before the Appeal is heard for final hearing.

12. Thus, it is necessary to consider the correctness of the impugned order on the touchstone of the law laid down by this Court in Kalu Ladku Mhatre (supra) and in the facts and circumstances of this case.

13. The perusal of the record shows that the Respondents/Plaintiffs filed Appeal on 20th December 2008 and along with the Appeal itself amendment Application bearing Exhibits-8 and 9 have been filed by the Appellants i.e. Plaintiffs seeking amendment in the plaint as well as in the written statement to the counterclaim. Amendment Applications bearing Exhibits-8 and 9 filed along with the Appeal were decided and allowed on 20th April 2009. The said order was challenged by the present Petitioner by filing on 19th November 2010 Writ Petition No.9688 of 2010. A learned Single Judge by the order dated 8th February 2011 passed in said Writ Petition No.9688 of 2010 granted stay to the hearing of the said Appeal No.9 of 2009. By the order dated 20th July 2016 passed in Writ Petition No.9688 of 2010 this Court set aside the order dated 20th April 2009 passed below Exhibits-8 and 9 in Civil Appeal No.9 of 2009 allowing amendment. The Respondents filed SLP in the Supreme Court challenging the order dated 20th July 2016 of the High Court and the said SLP was dismissed on 16th December 2016. Thus, it is clear that from 20th December 2008 till 16th December 2016 i.e. for a period of 8 years, the proceedings in said Appeal were pending for consideration of amendment application filed at the Appellate stage for amending plaint and the written statement to the counterclaim. Admittedly, the proceedings in said Appeal were stayed by this Court by order dated 8th February 2011 till 20th 2016 i.e. for about 5 and 1/2 years. In the meanwhile, as the Appellant No.1 passed away on 29th September 2010 and Appellant No.2 passed away on 5th August 2011, Applications were filed in said Civil Appeal No.9 of 2009 bearing Exhibit-39 to 41 on 25th February 2011 to bring on record heirs and for setting aside abatement and ultimately the said Applications were allowed by the order dated 27th July 2017. The amended Appeal memo was served on the Petitioners on 11th August 2017 and on 7th October 2017, cross-objections have been filed by the present Petitioners along with Application for condonation of delay. Thus, it is clear that in the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that there is exorbitant delay in filing the cross-objections. In fact the said Appeal could not have been taken up for the hearing till 16th December 2016 i.e. when said amendment applications filed at the Appellate stage were finally decided and thereafter till 27th July 2017 when the heirs of the Appellant were brought on record.

14. It is further significant to note that on 29th June 2010, Application has been filed by the Appellant bearing Exhibit-31 under Order 41 Rule 27 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) seeking to produce on record the additional evidence and thereafter, the matter was adjourned for filing reply and thereafter, on 18th September 2010, reply has been filed to the Application seeking additional evidence at Exhibit-37. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned for arguments on said Exhibit-31 filed by the Appellant i.e. present Respondents. As already noted herein above, the said Application has been filed for filing additional evidence. The said Appeal was adjourned from time to time for hearing arguments on said Exhibit-31 Application filed for additional evidence by the present Respondents and in the meanwhile, the High Court granted stay to the said Appeal vide order 8th 2011 passed in Writ Petition No.9688 of 2010. By the order dated 20th July 2016, High Court set aside the order allowing amendment Application and said order has been upheld by the Supreme Court by the order dated 16th December 2016. Thus, it cannot be said that said Appeal was taken up for final hearing.

15. Although, it is the contention of Mr. Kanetkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents that, on 26th March 2010, Appeal has been adjourned for arguments, as a matter of fact, the final arguments were never heard. In fact, as noted earlier, thereafter, on 29th June 2010, an application bearing Exhibit-31 has been filed by the Respondent in said Appeal under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. Seeking permission to lead additional evidence. The matter was adjourned for hearing on said Application and in the meanwhile, as noted herein above, the High Court has stayed the proceedings by the order dated 8th

2011. It is also admitted that the said stay was operating till the year 2016. Thus, perusal of the record shows that at no point of time, the Appeal was taken up for final hearing.

16. Mr. Kanetkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahadev Govind Gharge (supra) and more particularly, on paragraph No.59 of the same, which reads as under:

“59. If we examine the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code in its correct perspective and in light of the abovestated principles then the period of limitation of one month stated therein would commence from the service of notice of the day of hearing of appeal on the respondent in that appeal. The hearing contemplated under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code normally is the final hearing of the appeal but this rule is not without any exception. The exception could be where a party-respondent appears at the time of admission of the appeal, as a caveator or otherwise and argues the appeal on merits as well as while passing of interim orders and the court has admitted the appeal in the presence of that party and directs the appeal to be heard finally on a future date, actual or otherwise, then it has to be taken as complete compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code and thereafter, the appellant who has appeared himself or through his pleader cannot claim that the period mentioned under the said provision of the Code would commence only when the respondent is served with a fresh notice of hearing of the appeal in the required format. If this argument is accepted it would amount to travesty of justice and inevitably result in delay while causing serious prejudice to the interest of the parties and administration of justice. Such interpretation would run contra to the legislative intent behind the provisions of Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code which explicitly contemplate that an appeal shall be heard expeditiously and
disposed of as far as possible within 60 days at the admission stage. All the provisions of Order 41 of the Code have to be read conjunctively to give Order 41 Rule 22 its true and purposive meaning.”

17. However, paragraph Nos.60 and 61 of the said decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahadev Govind Gharge & Ors. (supra) are very relevant and the same read as under:

“60. Having analytically examined the provisions of
Order 41 Rule 22, we may now state the principles
for its applications as follows:
(a) The respondent in an appeal is entitled to receive a notice of hearing of the appeal as contemplated under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code.
(b) The limitation of one month for filing the cross-objection as provided under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code shall commence from the date of service of notice on him or his pleader of the day fixed for hearing the appeal.
(c) Where a respondent in the appeal is a caveator or otherwise puts in appearance himself and argues the appeal on merits including for the purposes of interim order and the appeal is ordered to be heard finally on a date fixed subsequently or otherwise, in presence of the said respondent/caveator, it shall be deemed to be service of notice within
the meaning of Order 41 Rule 22. In other words the limitation of one month shall start from that date.
61. Needless to notice that the cross-objections are required to be filed within the period of one month from the date of service of such notice or within such further time as the appellate court may see fit to allow depending upon the facts and circumstances of the given case. Since the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code itself provide for extension of time, the courts would normally be inclined to condone the delay in the interest of justice unless and until the cross-objector is unable to furnish a reasonable or sufficient cause for seeking the leave of the court to file crossobjections beyond the statutory period of one month.”

18. In above paragraph No.60, after analytically examining the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22, the principles for its applications have been set out by the Supreme Court. Clause No.(c) of the said paragraphs 60 is very relevant. It has been held by the Supreme Court that where a Respondent in the Appeal is a Caveator or otherwise puts in appearance himself and argues the Appeal on merits including for the purposes of interim order and the Appeal is ordered to be heard finally on a date fixed subsequently or otherwise, in presence of the said Respondent/Caveator, it shall be deemed to be service of notice within the meaning of Order 41 Rule 22. In other words the limitation of one month shall start from that date.

19. Perusal of the Roznama of this case do not show that the Appeal has been heard at any point of time on merits including for the purpose of interim order as along with Appeal, the Application for amendment has been filed and the said proceeding concerning amendment application have been finally disposed of in December 2016 by the Supreme Court. It has also come on record that thereafter, the Application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC seeking leading of additional evidence has been filed and the same is pending for hearing. Thus, even as per the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahadev Govind Gharge & Ors.(supra), the Appeal was never ordered to be heard finally on the date fixed subsequently and in any case, not taken up for final hearing.

20. In any case, it is an admitted position that the Appellant No.1 passed away on 29th September 2010 and the Appellant No.2 passed away on 5th August 2011, application for bringing their heirs on record was allowed on 27th July 2017. Amended Appeal memo was served on the Petitioner on 11th August 2017 and immediately on 7th October 2017 cross-objections have been filed by the Petitioner along with Application for condonation of delay.

21. As held by the learned Single Judge in Kalu Ladku Mhatre (supra) that a wide power to extend the time to file cross-objection has been vested in the Appellate Court for considering the application for seeking extension of time to file Cross-Objection. The power to extend time under sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 of Order XLI of the Code has to be liberally exercised in case where a Cross- Objection is sought to be filed before the Appeal is heard for final hearing.

22. It is significant to note that even in Mahadev Gharge (supra) which has been heavily relied on by Mr. Kanetkar, learned Counsel for the Respondents, it has been held in paragraph 61 that the cross-objections are required to be filed within the period of one month from the date of service of such notice or within such further time as the appellate court may deem fit to allow depending upon the facts and circumstances of the given case. Since the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code itself provide for extension of time, the courts would normally be inclined to condone the delay in the interest of justice unless and until the cross-objector is unable to furnish a reasonable or sufficient cause for seeking the leave of the Court to file cross-objections beyond the statutory period of one month.

23. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of this case and on the touchstone of the law laid down by a learned Single Judge in Kalu Ladku Mhatre (supra) and by the Supreme Court in Mahadev Gharge (supra), case is made out for condonation of delay in filing cross-objection and thus allowing Application bearing Exhibit-54 in Civil Appeal No.9 of 2009.

24. Accordingly, the following order is passed: ORDER (a) The order dated 4th August 2018 passed by the learned District Judge-5, Pune below Exhibit-54 in Civil Appeal No.9 of 2009 is quashed and set aside. (b) Application bearing Exhibit-54 filed in Civil Appeal No.9 of 2009 for condonation of delay and for taking on record cross-objection is allowed.

25. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is disposed of in above terms with no order as to costs. [MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J.]