Full Text
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.286 OF 2019
IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.286 OF 2019
M/s.N.K Proteins Limited (Formerly known as NK Proteins Ltd.) Through Mr. Nilesh K
Patel
.. Petitioner
Unit V) and Competent Authority (Through
Office of Deputy Collector Land
Acquisition)
.. Respondents
…
Mr.Subodh Desai, Sr. Advocate, i/b Amit Ghag for the Appellants.
Ms.Rebecca Gonsalvez, SPP for respondent nos.1 and 2.
Ms.S S Kaushik, APP for the State.
JUDGMENT
1. The Appeal filed under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1999, raise a challenge to the order passed on 1/01/2019 (Exhibit 2) by the designated MPID Court of Sessions for Greater Mumbai, in Miscellaneous Application No.1512 of 2017, in MPID Special Case No.1 of 2014, thereby accepting the reasons and justification advanced by the Competent Authority, in filing an affidavit as contemplated under Section 5(3) of the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 under Exhibit 256, beyond period of 30 days.
2. We have heard learned senior Advocate Mr. Subodh Desai, along with Mr. Amit Ghag for the appellant and Ms. Rebecca Gonsalvez, the Special Public Prosecutor for respondent nos.[1] as well as the Competent Authority i.e. respondent no.2. A short question arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the Limitation Act, 1963 can be made applicable to the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 and in specific to Section 5 (3) thereof. An ancillary question, which falls for consideration is if the Act so applies, whether the application filed by the Competent Authority to the designated Court accompanied with the affidavit informing that the State Government had issued an order under Section 4, beyond the prescribed period of 30 days from the date of publication of order deserve condonation of delay.
3. The learned senior counsel Mr. Desai, has taken us through the scheme of the MPID Act of 1999, which is an enactment to protect the interest of depositors of the financial establishments and by inviting our attention to its statement of objects and reasons, in light of the scheme and said provisions, he would submit that upon a default by the ‘Financial Establishment’ in repayment of deposit on maturity along with the benefit in form of interest, bonus, profit, or in any other form as promised, every person including the promoter partner, director, manager, or any other person or an employee responsible for management of or conducting of the business or affairs of such financial establishment is liable for a penalty under Section 3 thereof. By inviting our attention to Section 4, Mr. Desai would urge that upon the complaint received from the depositors or otherwise, the Government is satisfied that any financial establishment has failed to return the deposit after maturity or on demand by the depositor or to pay interest or other assured benefit or to provide the service promised against such deposit or where the Government has reason to believe that the financial establishment is acting in the calculated manner detrimental to the interest of the depositors with an intention to defraud them and if the Government is satisfied that the financial establishment is not likely to return the deposits, or make payment of interest or other benefits assured or to provide services against which the deposit is received, in order to protect the interest of the depositors, it shall issue an order by publishing it in the official gazette, attaching the money or the property believed to have been acquired by such financial establishment either in its own name or in the name of any other person from out of deposits, collected by financial establishment, or if it transpires that such money is not available then such other property of the financial establishment or that of the promoter, director, partner as the government may think fit. Upon publication of the order under sub-section (1) all the properties and assets of the financial establishment and the persons covered under sub-section (1) of Section 4 shall forthwith vest in the Competent Authority appointed by the Government, pending further order from the Designated Court.
4. While taking his argument ahead, Mr. Desai, would submit that the Competent Authority, which is appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 5, shall have such powers as may be necessary for carrying out the purpose of the Act and the Competent Authority, under sub-section (3) of Section 5 shall, within 30 days from the date of publication of the order, apply to the Designated Court, accompanied by one or more affidavits stating the grounds on which the Government has issued the order under section 4 and the amount of money or other property believed to have been acquired out of the deposits and the details of the persons in whose name such property is believed to have been invested or acquired for further orders as found necessary.
5. Relying upon the mandate stipulated above, it is the submission of Mr. Desai, that the word ‘shall’ is indicative of the imperative mandate and with no power being conferred to condone the delay by the Designated Court, as according to him the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be made applicable and therefore, there is no power to condone the delay. In light of this submission, he is extremely critical about the impugned order passed by the Designated Court, when the competent authority filed the notification issued by the Deputy Secretary, Home Department of Government of Maharashtra under the purported exercise of power under Section 4(1) and Section 5(1) of the MPID Act, on 12/03/2015, 22/06/2015, 13/01/2016, 17/03/2016, 31/07/2017 and 24/05/2018.
6. The aforesaid notifications are issued, pursuant to the EOW Mumbai registering the First Information Report i.e. FIR No.216 of 2013 against the Directors and Key management personnel of National Stock Exchange Ltd, its borrowers and others under Section 409, 465, 467, 468, 471, 474, 477 (A) and Section 120 B of IPC and thereafter Section 3 and 4 of the MPID Act. The Competent Authority placed the notifications before the Designated Court under the MPID Act, along with an affidavit filed under Section 5(3) along with Miscellaneous Application seeking condonation of delay of 52 days for the reasons pleaded thereunder. The appellant filed its reply to the application on 15/02/2018, and contested the application on the ground that MPID Act, 1999 is a special statute with no authority or inherent power being vested in the Designated Court to condone the delay but this objection, by order dated 1/01/2019, was rejected and the designated Court allowed the Miscellaneous Application No. 1512 of 2017, and accepted the reasons advanced by the competent authority in not filing the application within 30 days as prescribed under Section 5(3) of the Act.
7. Mr. Desai has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Fairgrowth Investment Ltd Vs. Custodian (2004) 11 SCC 472, in relation to the Special Court (Trial of Offences, Relating to Transaction in Securities) Act of 1992, by submitting that the prescribed period for initiating for taking steps in legal proceedings, are intended to be abided by, subject to any power expressly conferred on the Court to condone the delay. He would also place reliance on the decision of the Apex Court, in case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer vs. M/S Borse Brother Engineers and Contractors Pvt Ltd (2021), 6 SCC 460, when the question arose as regards the limitation period for filing appeal, under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, in respect of cases falling under the Commercial Courts Act, and Section 5 of the Limitation Act is held applicable for condonation of delay in filing the appeals as the scheme of Commercial Courts Act, does not exclude applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to such appeals filed under Section 37. Contrasting, the provision contained in the Act as regards filing of written statement within period of 30 days with the grace period of further 90 days, and recording that beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file written statement, in contrast since there is no such provision contained in Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, the argument that the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded given the scheme of Commercial Courts Act was rejected.
8. According to Mr. Desai, Section 14 of the MPID Act, which is an overriding provision, providing that the provisions of the Act of 1999, shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therein contained in any other law for the time being in force is a game-changer as it excludes the applicability of any other Act/statute in its applicability. He attempted to draw a distinction from the provisions in the National Investigation Agency Act, when the Division Bench of this Court had decided an issue in case of Faizal Mirza vs. State of Maharashtra (2023) SCC Online Bombay 1936, by holding that the Limitation Act, would apply to the NIA Act because there is no provision like Section 14 in the statute.
9. Ms. Gonsalvez in support of the impugned order would place reliance upon the observations of the Madras High Court in the backdrop of the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1997, which is a parimateria statute as the MPID Act, and she has placed before us the decisions of the Madras High Court in case of K Veeraswamy Vs. Secretary to Government, (2012 (1) CTC, 138), and the decision in case of T.S. Kannaiyan vs Competent Authority (2012 (1) MWN (Civil) 830). In addition, she has also drawn our attention to the decision of this Court in case of Faizal Hasanali Mirza vs State of Maharashtra, when a question fell for consideration before the Court as regards applicability of the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963, to Section 21(5) of NIAAct, 2002.
10. In order to find an answer to the question which we have formulated above, we must refer to the statutory scheme contained in the Limitation Act, 1963. We deem it appropriate to reproduce Section 3 of the Act:-
11. Another provision, which is relevant for our purpose is Section 29(2) which reads thus:-
12. It is the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant through Mr. Desai that no power is vested in the MPID Court to condone the delay and assuming that there was a power, the application for seeking condonation of delay of 52 days was unfounded. Per Contra Ms. Gonsalvez, has urged that Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to special statutes and is subjected two stipulations viz, the Special Law prescribe for a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule and the applicability of the provisions of Section 4 to 24 is not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
13. At the outset, we must consider the purpose of Rule of limitation, which is succinctly highlighted in case of N Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy,[1] and we must quote the relevant observations:-
14. In Fairgrowth Financial Services (Supra), the Apex Court has further observed thus:- “23.The decision by a larger Bench in L.S. Synthetics Ltd. (supra) holding that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the Act may not have, by itself, concluded the question formulated by us at the outset. That case was, as has been rightly contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, limited to a consideration of Section 11 of the Act and the proceedings by the Special Court thereunder. It was in that context that the Court had said that the Act had not provided for any period of limitation. But for the reasons already stated by us we concur in the final conclusion reached by the Court in L.S. Synthetics to the extent that the provisions of the Limitation Act 1963 have no application in relation to a petition under Section 4(2) of the Act.
24. Finally, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act speaks of application of the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 "only in so far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local laws". This language, together with our earlier reasoning, particularly with regard to L.S. Synthetics, would answer the further question raised by the appellant, namely, whether the question of exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act must be separately considered with reference to different provisions of a Special/Local Act or in connection with the provisions of the Special/Local Act, as a whole, by affirmation of the first alternative. We are therefore not called upon to decide whether claims either preferred for the first time before the Special Court or transferred to the Special Court under Section 9-A(2) would attract the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. It is enough for the purpose of this appeal to hold that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to proceedings under Section 4(2) of the Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities), Act 1992. Since the appellant's petition of objection had been filed much beyond the period prescribed under that Section, the Special Court was right in rejecting the petition in limine. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.”
15. It is not in dispute that the MPID Act is a Special Enactment and when its scheme is carefully perused, one find that the procedure by which the offences under the said enactment are to be tried is the one prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 13 of the said Act categorically prescribe so. Thus it is evidently clear that MPID is not a Code by itself but it must fall back on the Code of Criminal Procedure, as far as the procedure, for trial is concerned. As far as Section 14 is concerned, it gives an overriding effect to the Special Act over other laws, but it is only to the effect of anything inconsistent contained in any law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. The Perusal of the scheme of the enactment by no stretch of imagination oust the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 and we do not find any express exclusion and particularly when we have noted that the Act of 1999 is not a complete code in itself, which prescribe the time limit for every stage for process to be adopted under Special enactment.
16. The Madras High Court while dealing with Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors Act, identically framed statute with a similar provision contained in Section 4(3) by relying upon the judgment of LS Synthetics, and Mangu Ram (supra) observed thus:- “13. Applying the above principles to the present dispute, it is amply clear that Section 13 descriptively states that the Act follows the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, the said Act is not self-contained Act but depending upon the other law for disposal of the cases. Similarity on a careful consideration of Section 4 of the Act, it is evident that Section 4(3) stipulating 30 days time does not specifically exclude the Application of Limitation Act or devise the consequence of not filing the Application within the time limit stipulated therein. In the absence of such provision which does not disclose the consequence of not filing Application within the time stipulated, Section 29 of the Limitation Act comes for rescue, which specifically mentions two circumstances under which the said provision could be utilized. Firstly, there must be a provision for period of limitation under any special law or local law in connection with the Suit. Appeal or Application. Secondly, such prescription of limitation under the special lave or local law should be different from the limitation period prescribed under the Limitation Act and thereby expressly excludes the provisions contained under Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.
14 Further it is to be seen that Section 4(3) fully qualifier the first qualification at the period of limitation has been prescribed under the Act whereas the second qualification that the period of limitation as limitation different from the ane as per the Schedule of the Limitation Act but the same does not expressly excludes under Section 4(3) of the Act. Therefore, Limitation Act is applicable and Application under Section 3 of the Limitation Act is absolutely maintainable. Court also laid emphasis on the aims and object of the act to further justify its conclusions 18 ….The Government is empowered to pars an ad interim order of attachment of properties of the defaulted financial establishments and the Special Courts are empowered to make absolute the said order. The Competent Authorities are given powers to control the said properties. The Governments, the Competent Authority and the Special Court are the Designated Authorities whose functions are earmarked to initiate Recovery proceedings and safeguard the interests of the depositors if those financial establishments, as defined commit default in returning the deposits after maturity. The aim of the Act is to protect the interest of the depositor's money without driving the depositors to take Civil action against the defaulting financial institutions in the said exercise in cumbersome in addition to time consuming. Therefore, in order to achieve the above object, the Act is specifically provided to safeguard the interest of the innocent depositors and such object cannot be defeated in any form.
19. It is to be noticed that once the property is ordered to be attached, it shall remain under attachment till an appropriate order is passed consequently. The main purpose for ordering attachment by invoking Section 4(3) of the Act is far the purpose of discharge of the liability of the notified person who defaulted to pay the money to the depositors Therefore, it con he stated that so long as the claims or other proceedings initiated before the Special Court in order to safeguard the interests of the innocent depositors for discharge of liability of the notified person continue, the attachment remains in force and therefore, such proceedings before the Special Court are extraordinary in nature As such, once there is statutory attachment of the property: the Court is duty-bound to make it absolute for the purposes of distribution. There can be no period of limitation for the acts which a court is bound to perform.”
17. Similar observations are to be found in case of T.S. Kannaiyan vs Competent Authority[2]:-
13. Therefore, in the light of the above decision, I hold that there is no express exclusion of the Indian Limitation Act and the Indian Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings initiated under the Act. Further, a perusal of the records would also reveal that the Competent Authority has assigned justifiable reasons for condonation of the delay and therefore also, I hold that the learned Special Judge under TNPID Act is right in exercising his discretionary powers to condone the delay in filing the application.”
18. In case of Faizal Hasamali Mirza v. State of Maharashtra[3], the Division Bench of this Court has considered, whether an appeal filed under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act (NIA Act), 2008, can be entertained beyond period of 90 days, in view of second proviso appended to the said section, and whether it has the power to condone the delay. On hearing the rival contentions advanced in determining the aforesaid question, as to whether after the statutory period of 90 days, the appeal could be entertained and by drawing comparison with the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the provisions in question was analyzed threadbare, which had prescribed that the appeal under the provision shall be preferred within 30 days from the date of judgment, sentence or order appealed from, but by virtue of the proviso, it was permissible for the High Court to entertain an appeal after expiry of the said period of 30 days, if sufficient cause was shown. The second proviso however, prescribe a outer limit by stating that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of 90 days. By referring to diversion of the opinion expressed by distinct High Courts, the said provision was taken up for comparison with Section 14A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act, with a specific provision in form of section 20 of the Act, which gave an overriding effect to the statute, it was observed that the legislature clearly intended to exclude other laws, but in absence of any such provision like this in the NIA Act, it was specifically held that the harsh sweep of Section 14 A (3) cannot be applied to NIAAct, in absence of any such provision.
19. By referring to the relevant provisions in the Limitation Act, 1963 and specific in Section 3, 5, and 29, and by referring to the plethora of judgments on the said issue, the Division Bench observed thus:-
20. In determining the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the scheme of special law, it is a consistent view that, if there is no expressed exclusion in the local or special law, then the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply, in the wake of the Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. In Mangu Ram vs. MCD[4], the question came up for consideration, whether the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is to be excluded and whether peremptory or imperative language of the special or local law can exclude the application of Section 5, if not otherwise explicitly excluded. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi against the acquittal order, filed an application in the High Court of Delhi under Section 417, sub-section (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal. Section 417 (7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure required that application for special leave should be filed before the expiry of sixty days. The application for special leave should have been filed on 25/08/1971, but it was filed on 27/8/1971. The argument was raised that time-frame is sixty days as prescribed in Section 417 (4) for making an application for special leave under sub-section (3) of that section was mandatory and inexorable time-limit which could not be relieved against or relaxed, as it excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It has also been held that the provision of a period of limitation in a howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act have been held to be applicable to condone the delay in applying under Section 417 (4), Code of Criminal Procedure and we deem it appropriate to reproduce the relevant observation:- “29… … … When we consider the scheme of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005, it is apparent that its scheme is not ousting the provisions of the Limitation Act from it ken which makes principles of Section 5 applicable even to an authority in the matter of filing an appeal but for the said provision the authority would not have the power to condone the delay. By implication also, it is apparent that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act have not been ousted; they have the play for condoning the limitation under Section 48 of the 2005.” Hence, the question to be seen is that in absence of express exclusion is to ascertain whether the scheme of the Act is such that it is a complete code in itself not only providing forum but also prescribing timelimit within each forum.
21. In case of M/S Borse Brother Engineers (Supra), when the applicability of limitation period for filing Appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in respect of the cases falling under the Commercial Courts Act, was under consideration, the question was specifically formulated to the effect ‘whether the limitation period for filing an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, would be governed by limitation provided in Section 137 of the Limitation Act or under Section 116 and 117 of Limitation Act, and whether the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 is excluded by the scheme of the Act. The Apex Court held as under:- [ “23. Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, when read with section 43 thereof, makes it clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act will apply to appeals that are filed under section 37. This takes us to Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act, which provide for a limitation period of 90 days and 30 days, depending upon whether the appeal is from any other court to a High Court or an intra-High Court appeal. There can be no doubt whatsoever that section 5 of the Limitation Act will apply to the aforesaid appeals, both by virtue of section 43 of the Arbitration Act and by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
24. This aspect of the matter has been set out in the concurring judgment of Raveendran, J. in Consolidated Engg. (supra), as follows:
42. The AC Act is no doubt, a special law, consolidating and amending the law relating to arbitration and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The AC Act does not prescribe the period of limitation, for various proceedings under that Act, except where it intends to prescribe a period different from what is prescribed in the Limitation Act. On the other hand, Section 43 makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to proceedings—both in court and in arbitration—under the AC Act. There is also no express exclusion of application of any provision of the Limitation Act to proceedings under the AC Act, but there are some specific departures from the general provisions of the Limitation Act, as for example, the proviso to Section 34(3) and sub-sections (2) to (4) of Section 43 of the AC Act.
43. Where the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation for appeals or applications to any court, and the special or local law provides for filing of appeals and applications to the court, but does not prescribe any period of limitation in regard to such appeals or applications, the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act will apply to such appeals or applications and consequently, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 will also apply. Where the special or local law prescribes for any appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, then the provisions of Section 29(2) will be attracted. In that event, the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act will apply, as if the period of limitation prescribed under the special law was the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for the appeal or application by the special law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 will apply to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special law. The object of Section 29(2) is to ensure that the principles contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply to suits, appeals and applications filed in a court under special or local laws also, even if it prescribes a period of limitation different from what is prescribed in the Limitation Act, except to the extent of express exclusion of the application of any or all of those provisions.”
22. The reasoning adopted in the said decision equally apply to the provision in the MPID Act, as it was noted that in Section 13 (1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, do not contain any provision akin to Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as it only provides for limitation period of 60 days from the date of the judgment or order appealed against, without further prescribing whether delay beyond a particular period can or cannot be condoned. Referring to Section 14 of the Commercial Act, which made the period of six months directory and not mandatory, it was concluded that in contrast Section 16 of the Commercial Act read with schedule thereof and the amendment made to order 8 Rule 1 of CPC, would make it clear that defendant in a commercial suit is given 30 days to file a written statement, which period cannot be extended beyond 120 days, from the date of service of summons, and on expiry of the said period, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement. In contrast, it was noted that there is no such specific provision contained in Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act.
23. In light of the aforesaid discussion, when we have turned our attention to sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the MPID Act, we must note that there is no upper limit prescribed for filing of an affidavit by a competent authority, as it is permissible to be filed within 30 days from the date of publication of the order. Further, the said provision do not have any indication of exclusion of the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the submission of Mr. Desai, that Section 14 of the Act, overrides other laws, when carefully read, do not indicate presence of a non-obstante clause but contemplate ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Act’, the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therein contained in any law for the time being in force. The wording in the said provision is distinct from the one, which we find in Section 14 A of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, which begin with the non-obstante clause to the effect “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force” and in addition there is also a specific bar in entertaining an appeal after expiry of period of 180 days in totality though the first proviso permit the High Court to entertain an appeal after expiry of period of 90 days as prescribed in sub-section (3) if the appellant had demonstrated sufficient cause in not preferring the appeal in the prescribed period of 90 days.
24. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in case of Mohd. Abaad Ali and anr vs. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence[5] the Apex Court reaffirmed the decision in case of Mangu Ram vs. MSD[6] and Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, is explained by distinguishing it with the earlier Act of 1908, with the specific observations:- “11. The crucial difference here is applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In both the Limitation Acts i.e., the Limitation Act of 1908 and the present Limitation Act of 1963, the provision of extension of time of limitation is given by Section 5 of the two Acts. Whereas the 1908 Act specifically states that Section 5 will not apply when the period of limitation is given in special Acts, the 1963 Act makes Section 5 applicable even in the special laws when a period of limitation is prescribed, unless it is expressly excluded by such special law.”
Hence, it is only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5, that is would stand displaced. Para 16 further reads as below:- “There can be no quarrel with the argument that where a special law prescribes a period of limitation, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would have no application, subject only to the language used in the special statute. The language prescribing a period of limitation is an important factor as well.” The Court distinguished the judgments of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v/s Lalit Narain Mishra,[7] and Gopal Sardar v/s Karuna Sardar[8] on facts as the statutes involved in these cases had put an expressed limit on application of Limitation Act, 1963 which was seen through the language of the respective statutes in question. However, the Court did not find any such exclusionary provision under Section 378 Cr.P.C and held that the benefit of Section 5 of Limitation Act could be availed.
25. When we turned our attention to the impugned order, we find that on the sufficiency of the cause being explained for filing the affidavit beyond 52 days, the Special Judge has condoned the delay, once he had arrived at the conclusion that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 apply to the MPID Act and in specific sub-section (3) of Section 5. Since we are not persuaded by the argument of Mr. Subodh Desai to the contrary, finding no merit in the Appeal, the same is dismissed by upholding the impugned order. In view of the dismissal of Appeal, Criminal Application and Interim Applications do not survive and are disposed of. (MANJUSHA DESHPANDE J) (BHARATI DANGRE, J)