Dheeraj Wadhawan v. Directorate of Enforcement

5.1. He would submit that the provision of Section 436-A do not provide an absolute right of bail like default bail under Section 167 of CrPC and the Court adjudicating Bail Application based on the ground of Section 436-A reserves the authority to deny the relief if trial is being delayed at the instance of Applicant himself. In support of this submissions he would refer to and rely on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). He would submit that although the maximum period of punishment prescribed under the law for the relevant offence is 7 years out of which Applicants have been incarcerated for a period of about 5 years (thereby making it a case for consideration under 436-A) but the peculiar facts of the case and more particularly Applicants themselves having filed several Interim Applications before various forums should

Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 7 of 32 be considered a ground for delay while deciding the present Applications. He would submit that when the said period is accounted for and reconciled, the period of incarceration of Applicants falls below the threshold of 3 and half years and therefore provisions of Section 436-A would be squarely inapplicable. He would submit that filing of interim Applications is a strategy based on the belief of ‘Judicial Gamble’ where the accused, especially ones hailing from financially strong backgrounds make attempts to exhaust all chances available at their disposal with an endeavor to secure their liberty. He would submit that although there cannot be any legislation to restrict individuals from availing their legal remedies, Courts have adopted the approach of imposing costs on such vexatious proceedings when determined. He would argue that when liberty is at stake and in such grave economic offences as the present one where pockets are filled with embezzled funds, costs are not a deterrent to such accused persons. He would submit that hence economic offences should be dealt with on a different footing than other offences while granting bail. In support of his submissions he would draw my attention to paragraph Nos.34 and 35 in decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI 5 which read thus:-

5.2. Next, he has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal 6 wherein the Supreme Court while considering the long term ramifications of economic offences laid down basis for distinct treatment of such offender. Paragraph No.5 therein reads thus:-

5.3. He has next drawn my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nimmagadda Prasad Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation 7 wherein in paragraph Nos.24 and 25 the Supreme Court has observed as under:-

Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 9 of 32

5.4. In view of the above, he would submit that in that view of the foregoing submissions, courts should not be liberal in calculating the period of incarceration since such a practice would open floodgates for litigation across forums of the country and practically cut the sentence of each offence in half. He would thus pray for both the Applications to be rejected.

6. Mr. Dedhia, learned APP appearing for the Respondent No.2 – State has adopted and supported the submissions made by Mr. Venegavkar and urged the Court to reject both Applications.

7. The relevant applicable statutory provision in the present case i.e. Section 436-A of CrPC reads thus:- Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 10 of 32 “436-A. Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained - Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties; Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties; Provided further that no such person shall in any case be detained during the period of investigation inquiry or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law.”

8. As the offence invoked in the present case is under Section 3 of the PMLA, it will be appropriate to refer to provisions of Section 45 of PMLA which read thus:-

9. Considering the above twin provisions, it will be fruitful to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) wherein in paragraph Nos. 316 to 322 the Supreme Court has observed that Section 436-A having come into force on 23.06.2006 which is subsequent to the enactment of PMLA will prevail and apply despite rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA. Paragraphs Nos. 316 to 322 read thus:-

318. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it was stated thus: “There had been instances, where undertrial prisoners were detained in jail for periods beyond the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the alleged offence. As remedial measure Section 436-A has been inserted to provide that where an undertrial prisoner other than the one accused of an offence for which death has been prescribed as one of the punishments, has been under detention for a period extending to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the alleged offence, he should be released on his personal bond, with or without sureties. It has also been provided that in no case will an undertrial prisoner be detained beyond the maximum period of imprisonment for which he can be convicted for the alleged offence.”

319. In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98: 1980 SCC (Cri) 40], this Court stated that the right to speedy trial is one of the facets of Article 21 and recognised the right to speedy trial as a fundamental right. This dictum has been consistently followed by this Court in several cases. Parliament in its wisdom inserted Section 436-A under the 1973 Code recognising the deteriorating state of undertrial prisoners so as to provide them with a remedy in case of unjustified detention.

320. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India [Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731: 1995 SCC (Cri) 39], the Court, relying on Hussainara Khatoon [Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 13 of 32 Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98: 1980 SCC (Cri) 40], directed the release of prisoners charged under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act after completion of one-half of the maximum term prescribed under the Act. The Court issued such direction after taking into account the non obstante provision of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which imposed the rigours of twin conditions for release on bail. It was observed: (Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners case [Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731: 1995 SCC (Cri) 39], SCC pp. 747-48, para 15) “15. … We are conscious of the statutory provision finding place in Section 37 of the Act prescribing the conditions which have to be satisfied before a person accused of an offence under the Act can be released. Indeed we have adverted to this section in the earlier part of the judgment. We have also kept in mind the interpretation placed on a similar provision in Section 20 of the TADA Act by the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899]. Despite this provision, we have directed as above mainly at the call of Article 21 as the right to speedy trial may even require in some cases quashing of a criminal proceeding altogether, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], release on bail, which can be taken to be embedded in the right of speedy trial, may, in some cases be the demand of Article 21. As we have not felt inclined to accept the extreme submission of quashing the proceedings and setting free the accused whose trials have been delayed beyond reasonable time for reasons already alluded to, we have felt that deprivation of the personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial would also not be in consonance with the right guaranteed by Article 21. Of course, some amount of deprivation of personal liberty cannot be avoided in such cases; but if the period of deprivation pending trial becomes unduly long, the fairness assured by Article 21 would receive a jolt. It is because of this that we have felt that after the accused persons have suffered imprisonment which is half of the maximum punishment provided for the offence, any further deprivation of personal liberty would be violative of the fundamental right visualised by Article 21, which has to be telescoped with the right guaranteed by Article 14 which also promises justness, fairness and reasonableness in procedural matters.”

321. The Union of India also recognised the right to speedy trial and access to justice as fundamental right in their written submissions and, thus, submitted that in a limited situation right of bail can be granted in case of violation of Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 14 of 32 Article 21 of the Constitution. Further, it is to be noted that Section 436-A of the 1973 Code was inserted after the enactment of the 2002 Act. Thus, it would not be appropriate to deny the relief of Section 436-A of the 1973 Code which is a wholesome provision beneficial to a person accused under the 2002 Act. However, Section 436-A of the 1973 Code, does not provide for an absolute right of bail as in the case of default bail under Section 167 of the 1973 Code. For, in the fact situation of a case, the court may still deny the relief owing to ground, such as where the trial was delayed at the instance of the accused himself.

322. Be that as it may, in our opinion, this provision is comparable with the statutory bail provision or, so to say, the default bail, to be granted in terms of Section 167 of the 1973 Code consequent to failure of the investigating agency to file the charge-sheet within the statutory period and, in the context of the 2002 Act, complaint within the specified period after arrest of the person concerned. In the case of Section 167 of the 1973 Code, an indefeasible right is triggered in favour of the accused the moment the investigating agency commits default in filing the charge-sheet/complaint within the statutory period. The provision in the form of Section 436-A of the 1973 Code, as has now come into being is in recognition of the constitutional right of the accused regarding speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. For, it is a sanguine hope of every accused, who is in custody in particular, that he/she should be tried expeditiously — so as to uphold the tenets of speedy justice. If the trial cannot proceed even after the accused has undergone one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment provided by law, there is no reason to deny him this lesser relief of considering his prayer for release on bail or bond, as the case may be, with appropriate conditions, including to secure his/her presence during the trial.” (emphasis supplied)

10. The right to bail has been effectively summarised as far back as in the year 1923 in the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of In Re: Nagendra Nath Chakravarti 8 by stating that the principal object of bail is to secure the attendance of the Accused at the trial.

11. It is settled law by a plethora of cases passed by the Supreme Court that a Court while deciding a Bail Application has to keep in

Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 15 of 32 mind the principal rule of bail which is to ascertain whether the Accused is likely to appear before the Court for trial. Though there would be consideration for the other broad parameters like gravity of offence, likelihood of Accused repeating the offence while on bail, whether he would influence the witnesses and tamper with the evidence which will have to be considered. However juxtaposed that with the fact that almost 4 years 9 months of incarceration and trial having not commenced is required to be seen especially when trial has indeed not commenced.

12. Argued before me is the case of the Applicants concerning their right to speedy justice and liberty who are undertrial - accused having been incarcerated almost 4 years 9 months, a situation impacting their right conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution of India to speedy justice as also personal liberty further extended by the provisions of Section 436-A. In so far as the power of High Court to grant bail is concerned, the Allahabad High Court as far back as in the year 1931 in the famous Meerut Conspiracy case of Emperor Vs. H. L. Hutchinson[9] laid down that when the case involves a question of personal liberty of an under-trial who is incarcerated for a very long period, the powers of the Court are wide and unfettered by the conditions and the principle rule being that bail is the rule and refusal is the exception should be applied. In that said case, it held that 9 AIR 1931 ALL 356. Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 16 of 32 legislature has given the High Court and the Court of Session discretion unfettered by any limitation other than that which controls all discretionary powers vested in a Judge, viz. that the discretion must be exercised judiciously. The Court has given primacy to the fact that accused person if granted bail will be in a much better position to defend himself. In this very case, it was delineated that grant of Bail is the Rule and refusal is an exception. Justice Mukerji writing the judgment for himself and on behalf of Justice Boys in paragraph No.9 of the aforesaid decision observed thus:-

13. The above judgment is approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation10 and in paragraph Nos.[6] to 15 the Supreme Court has considered the prevailing situation of prisons in India, definition of trial and bail, principle of presumption of innocence and reiterated the well recognised principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception in bail jurisprudence on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of

Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 17 of 32 India. Paragraph Nos.[6] to 15 of the said judgement read as under:- “Prevailing situation

6. Jails in India are flooded with undertrial prisoners. The statistics placed before us would indicate that more than 2/3rd of the inmates of the prisons constitute undertrial prisoners. Of this category of prisoners, majority may not even be required to be arrested despite registration of a cognizable offence, being charged with offences punishable for seven years or less. They are not only poor and illiterate but also would include women. Thus, there is a culture of offence being inherited by many of them. As observed by this Court, it certainly exhibits the mindset, a vestige of colonial India, on the part of the investigating agency, notwithstanding the fact arrest is a draconian measure resulting in curtailment of liberty, and thus to be used sparingly. In a democracy, there can never be an impression that it is a police State as both are conceptually opposite to each other. Definition of trial

7. The word “trial” is not explained and defined under the Code. An extended meaning has to be given to this word for the purpose of enlargement on bail to include, the stage of investigation and thereafter. Primary considerations would obviously be different between these two stages. In the former stage, an arrest followed by a police custody may be warranted for a thorough investigation, while in the latter what matters substantially is the proceedings before the court in the form of a trial. If we keep the above distinction in mind, the consequence to be drawn is for a more favourable consideration towards enlargement when investigation is completed, of course, among other factors.

8. Similarly, an appeal or revision shall also be construed as a facet of trial when it comes to the consideration of bail on suspension of sentence. Definition of bail

9. The term “bail” has not been defined in the Code, though is used very often. A bail is nothing but a surety inclusive of a personal bond from the accused. It means the release of an accused person either by the orders of the court or by the police or by the investigating agency.

10. It is a set of pre-trial restrictions imposed on a suspect while enabling any interference in the judicial process. Thus, it is a conditional release on the solemn undertaking by the suspect that he would cooperate both with the investigation and the trial. The word “bail” has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edn., p. 160 as: Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 18 of 32 “A security such as cash or a bond; esp., security required by a court for the release of a prisoner who must appear in court at a future time.”

11. Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., p. 105 defines “bail” as: “to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance on a day and at a place certain, which security is called bail, because the party arrested or imprisoned is delivered into the hands of those who bind themselves or become bail for his due appearance when required, in order that he may be safely protected from prison, to which they have, if they fear his escape, etc. the legal power to deliver him.” Bail is the rule

12. The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception has been well recognised through the repetitive pronouncements of this Court. This again is on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India [Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1: (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 302], held that: (SCC pp. 22-23 & 27, paras 19 & 24)

29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118: 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that: (SCC p. 129, para 29) Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 20 of 32

30. In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edn., Vol. 8, p. 806, para 39), it is stated: “Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end.” It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail.’ * * *

24. Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India and other persons. It is the only article in the Fundamental Rights Chapter (along with Article 20) that cannot be suspended even in an emergency [see Article 359(1) of the Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is the repository of a vast number of substantive and procedural rights post Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248].”

13. Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI [Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26: (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397], has observed that: (SCC p. 52, paras 21-23)

23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.” Presumption of innocence

14. Innocence of a person accused of an offence is presumed through a legal fiction, placing the onus on the prosecution to prove the guilt before the court. Thus, it is for that agency to satisfy the court that the arrest made was warranted and enlargement on bail is to be denied.

15. Presumption of innocence has been acknowledged throughout the world. Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 acknowledge the presumption of innocence, as a cardinal principle of law, until the individual is proven guilty.”

14. The Supreme Court in a landmark decision of 1978 in the case of Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. Vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh11 observed as under:- “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve.

Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 22 of 32 When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve sentence in the event of the court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective…” (emphasis supplied)

15. Thereafter the Supreme Court in a plethora of judgements have discussed the rights conferred by Article 21 qua grant of bail and that such rights cannot be taken away unless the procedure is reasonable and fair and in cases where there is unreasonable delay in trial it would undoubtedly impact the rights of an undertrial. Some of the important decisions of the Supreme Court and some of the High Courts are discussed herein under:-

15.1. In the landmark judgement of Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India12, the Supreme Court held that the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 is not limited to mere animal existence but includes the right to live with dignity. The court emphasized that the procedure established by law must be fair, just, and reasonable, and it cannot be arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable.

15.2. In the case of Hussainara Khatoon Vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar13 the Supreme Court held as under:- “Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a

Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 23 of 32 reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.”

15.3. The Supreme Court in the case of Shaheen Welfare Association Vs. Union Of India14 dealing with a Public Interest Litigation seeking relief for under-trial prisoners charged under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 due to gross delay in disposal of cases qua Article 21 of the Constitution of India held as under:-

15.4. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb15 while commenting upon the possibility of early completion of trial and extended incarceration held as under:-

16. Applicants in present case are in custody since 4 years 9 months. There is no possibility of the trial commencing in the near future. Detaining an under-trial prisoner for such an extended period further violates his fundamental right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. At this juncture I deem it appropriate to list certain observations of the Supreme Court shedding light on concerns underlying the “Right to speedy trial” from the point of view of an accused in custody whose liberty is affected. In the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. Vs R.S. Nayak & Anr.16 the Supreme Court held as under:-

17. The Supreme Court has also held in a series of judgements and orders that in situations where the under-trial-prisoner / accused persons have suffered incarceration rather long incarceration for a considerable period of time and there is no possibility of the trial being completed within the foreseeable future, Constitutional Courts can exercise power to release the accused under-trial on bail, as bail is the rule and jail is the exception.

18. In the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing undertrial prisoners) Vs. Union of India17, the Supreme Court has held that:-

19. In the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr.18, the Supreme Court while granting bail to accused incarcerated for 4 years in paragraph Nos.16 and 17 held as under:-

20. In the case of Balwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Anr.19, in a case under Sections 302 and 307 of IPC the Supreme Court granted bail to the accused who was behind bars for 4 years citing unlikelihood of completion of trial in the near future as also on parity with the co-accused.

21. In this regard, support is also drawn from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Chandra Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation 20 wherein the Supreme Court has held that in economic offences while considering an application for bail, the nature of charge may be relevant but at the same the punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted is also a significant aspect and therefore both, the seriousness of the charge and the severity of the punishment should be taken into consideration for arriving at decision of grant of bail. It further observed that deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment unless it is absolutely necessary in the interest of justice and that object of bail is merely to secure appearance of accused at the trial.

22. In the present case it is seen that Applicants have been indicted in the predicate offence under Section 120-B read with 420 of the IPC for which the maximum sentence which can be imposed is 19 SLP (Crl.) No.8523 of 2024

Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 28 of 32 imprisonment which may extend to 7 years alongwith fine. Even otherwise as the scheduled offence against Applicants falls under paragraph 1 of part A of the schedule to the PMLA, the maximum period for which the Applicants can be punished with imprisonment of 7 years. Applicants have been in custody in connection with the present offence since 14.05.2020 i.e. for almost 4 years and 9 months which is beyond the one-half of maximum period of imprisonment which can be imposed upon conviction.

23. In so far as the delay in conducting the trial is concerned, Applicants have placed before me the roznama of the trial in the PMLA Court which clarifies that Applicants have sought adjournments on only few occasions and hence the delay in trial cannot be solely attributed to them when admittedly ED has filed draft charges before the PMLA Court only on 10.05.2023 despite which charges have not been framed till date. There are in all 36 accused involved in the matter and as per the 3rd supplementary prosecution complaint there are total 51 witnesses in the case.

24. It is seen that statutory provisions of Section 436-A of CrPC if seen contain the word “shall” which clearly indicates that gravity of the offence is not relevant for considering bail neither it distinguishes that rigours of Section 45 of PMLA would be applicable. It is plain and simple on interpretation meaning that once the undertrial – accused Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 29 of 32 crosses one-half of the maximum sentence, the rigours of the twin conditions contemplated under Section 45(1) of PMLA would not apply and applicant will be entitled to be released on bail. It is a statutory provision which has to be read as it is without any fetter and must be applied based on applicable facts. Only if the Court feels that further incarceration of the undertrial – accused is required beyond the said period, the Court will have to give appropriate reasons. In the facts of this case in my opinion due to the observations made herein above, further incarceration of Applicants is not required and they are entitled to bail under Section 436-A of Cr.P.C. without entering into the merits of the case at this stage.

25. Considering the present status of the trial and no possibility of it being concluded in the foreseeable future coupled with the pretrial incarceration of the Applicants beyond one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment which can be imposed on them upon conviction, Applicants are entitled to bail.

26. In view of my above observations and findings and facet of pre-trial incarceration of Applicants beyond one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment which may be imposed on them upon conviction as delineated above and no probability of trial being completed in the foreseeable future, invoking the right to speedy justice and personal liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 30 of 32 Constitution of India, the Bail Applications stand allowed subject to following conditions:-

(i) Both Applicants are directed to be released on bail on furnishing P.R. Bond in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- each with one or two sureties in the like amount;

(ii) Applicants shall report to the Investigating Officer of ED once every month on the third Saturday of every month between 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon for the first six months after release and thereafter as and when called;

(iii) Applicants shall co-operate with the conduct of trial and attend the Trial Court on all dates unless specifically exempted and will not take any unnecessary adjournments, if they do so, it will entitle the prosecution to apply for cancellation of this order;

(iv) Both Applicants shall surrender their passport before the Trial Court within one week from their release;

(v) If the Applicants are required to leave the State of

Maharashtra for any reason, they shall inform the Investigating Officer the details of their travel, destination and reason for travelling outside the State of Maharashtra including their date of return, until the Corrected / Modified judgement as per order dated 21.02.2025. 31 of 32 completion of trial. It is clarified that if they have to travel in any exigency then details of travel shall be informed to the Investigating Officer even after the date of their travel within a reasonable period with all other relevant details;

(vi) Applicants shall not influence any of the witnesses or tamper with the evidence in any manner;

(vii) Applicants shall keep the Investigating Officer informed of their current address and mobile contact number and / or change of residence or mobile details, if any, from time to time; (viii)Any infraction of the above conditions shall entail cancellation of this order.

27. The aforesaid observations are prima facie on the basis of record of the case which have been argued before me and is an expression of opinion by this Court only for the purpose of enlargement of Applicant on bail and shall not influence the trial in the present case.

28. Bail Applications stand allowed and disposed.

H. H. SAWANT [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]