Vasanthi Hegde v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.

16. Admittedly, the Petitioner claims to have purchased the subject property after the issuance of Notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act. In Shiv Kumar and Another Vs. Union of India and Others (2019) 10 SCC 229, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that persons purchasing property after Section 4 Notification has been issued in respect of the same, have no right to question the acquisition.

17. Paragraphs 7 and 8 discuss this in detail, and they are transcribed below for convenience of reference. “...7. First, we advert to the legal position concerning the purchases made on 5-7-2001, made after Notification under Section 4 had been issued under the 1894 Act. Law is well settled in this regard by a catena of decisions of this Court that an incumbent, who has purchased the land after section

7.1. In U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman & Anr. v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd[1], it was observed:(SCC P. 127 para

3) “3…..That apart, since M/s. Kalra Properties, the respondent had purchased the land after the Notification under Section 4(1) was published, its sale is void against the State, and it acquired no right, title, or interest in the land. Consequently, it is settled law that it cannot challenge the validity of the Notification or the regularity in taking possession of the land before the publication of the declaration under Section 6 was published."

7.2. In Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P.[2] it has been laid down that subsequent purchaser cannot take advantage of land policy. It was observed: (SCC P. 430, para 5) “5. Though at first blush, we were inclined to agree with the appellant but on a deeper probe, we find that the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the Land Policy. It is settled law that any person who purchases land after the publication of the Notification under Section 4(1), does so at his/her peril. The object of publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) is notice to everyone that the land is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose, and the acquisition proceedings point out an impediment to anyone to encumber the land acquired thereunder. It authorizes the designated officer to enter upon the land to do preliminaries, etc. Therefore, any alienation of land after the publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) does not bind the Government or the beneficiary under the acquisition. On taking possession of the land, all rights, titles, and interests in land stand vested in the State, under Section 16 of the Act, free from all encumbrances, and thereby, absolute title in the land is acquired thereunder. If any subsequent purchaser acquires land, his/her only right would be subject to the provisions of the Act and/ or to receive compensation for the land. In a recent judgment, this Court in Union of India v. Shri Shivkumar Bhargava[3] considered the controversy and held that a person who purchases land subsequent to the Notification is not entitled to an alternative site. It is seen that the Land Policy expressly conferred that right only on that person whose land was acquired. In other words, the person must be the owner of the land on the date on which Notification under Section 4(1) was published. By necessary implication, the subsequent purchaser was elbowed out from the policy and became disentitled to the benefit of the Land Policy." 7.[3] In Meera Sahni v. State (NCT of Delhi)4 the Court had relied upon the decision described above and observed thus: (SCC P. 184, para 21). “21. In view of the aforesaid decisions, it is by now wellsettled law that under the Land Acquisition Act, the subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings and that he would be only entitled to get the compensation." 7.[4] In V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer[5], the Court has considered various decisions and opined that the purchaser after Section 4 Notification could not challenge land acquisition on any ground whatsoever. The Court observed: (SCC pp. 143-44, paras 15 & 18) “15. The issue of maintainability of the writ petitions by the person who purchases the land subsequent to a Notification being issued under Section 4 of the Act has been considered by this Court time and again. In Leela Ram v. Union of India[6], this Court held that anyone who deals with the land subsequent to a Section 4 Notification being issued, does so, at his own peril. In Sneh Prabha v. State of UP[7], this Court held that a Section 4 Notification gives a notice to the public at large that the land in respect to which it has been issued, is needed for a public purpose, and it further points out that there will be ‘an impediment to anyone to encumber

(2012 12 SCC 133: (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 136: (2013) 4 SCC (cri) 587: (2013 3 SCC (L & S) 416) the land acquired thereunder.’ The alienation thereafter that does not bind the State or the beneficiary under the acquisition. The purchaser is entitled only to receive compensation. While deciding the said case, reliance was placed on an earlier judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Shivkumar Bhargava[8]

18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that a person who purchases land subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4 Notification with respect to it, is not competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for the reason that the sale deed executed in his favour does not confer upon him, any title and at the most he can claim compensation on the basis of his vendor's title.” (emphasis supplied) 7.[5] In Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corpn. v. Subhash Sindhi Coop. Housing Society[9],it is laid down: (SCC p. 435 para 13) “13. There can be no quarrel with respect to the settled legal proposition that a purchaser, subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4 Notification in respect of the land, cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings, and can only claim compensation as the sale transaction in such a situation is Void qua the Government. Any such encumbrance created by the owner, or any transfer of the land in question that is made after the issuance of such a Notification would be deemed to be void and would not be binding on the Government. (Vide: Gian Chand v. Gopala and Ors10; Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan11; Jaipur Development Authority v. Mahavir Housing Coop. Society12; Jaipur Development Authority, v. Daulat Mal Jain13; Meera Sahni v. State of (NCT of Delhi)14; Har Narain Vs. Mam Chand15; and V. Chandrasekaran v. The Administrative Officer16 (emphasis supplied.)

7.[6] A ThreeJudge Bench in Rajasthan Housing Board v. New Pink City Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd.17, in the context of section 4 as well as section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which also prohibited the transactions from being entered into with SC/ST persons, has observed: (SCC pp. 625-27, paras 33-34). “33. The other decision relied upon by the Society is V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer18,wherein this Court laid down thus:( SCC p. 144, paras 17-18).

17. In Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of India19; Mahavir v., Gian Chand v. Gopala21 and Meera Sahni v. State (NCT of Delhi)22, this Court categorically held that a person who purchases land after the publication of a Section

4 Notification with respect to it, is not entitled to challenge the proceedings for the reason, that his title is void and he can at best claim compensation on the basis of vendor's title. In view of this, the sale of land after issuance of a Section 4 Notification is void, and the purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings. (See also: Tika Ram v. the State of U.P.23 )

18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that a person who purchases land subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4 Notification with respect to it, is not competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for the reason that the sale deed executed in his favour does not confer upon him, any title and at the most he can claim compensation on the basis of his vendor's title.

34. Reliance has been placed on Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M. Bharucha24 so as to contend that the 'person interested' in the land under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act would include a person who claims interest in compensation to be paid on account of acquisition of land and the interest contemplated Under Section 9 is not

(1995)5 SCC 335 restricted to legal or proprietary estate or interest in the land but such interest as will sustain a claim to apportionment, is the owner of the land. In our opinion, the decision is of no avail. The instant transaction being void as per Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, and the property was inalienable to non-SC. Obviously, the logical corollary has to be taken that no right in apportionment to compensation can be claimed by the Society." (emphasis supplied) 7.[7] In M. Venkatesh Vs. BDA, a threeJudge Bench has opined: (SCC pp. 8-9, para 16). “16. That brings us to the question of whether Prabhaudas Patel and other respondents in SLP (C) No. 12016 of 2013 were entitled to any relief from the Court. These respondents claim to have purchased the suit property in terms of a sale deed dated 22-8-1990, i.e., long after the issuance of the preliminary Notification published in July

1984. The legal position about the validity of any such sale, post-issuance of preliminary Notification, is fairly well settled by a long line of the decisions of this Court. The sale in such cases is void and non-est in the eye of the law giving to the vendee the limited right to claim compensation and no more. Reference may in this regard be made to the decision of this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd25, wherein this Court said: (SCC pp. 126-27, para 3) “3….It is settled law that after the Notification under Section 4(1) is published in the gazette, any encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the Government, and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. In this case, Notification under Section 4(1) was published on 24-3- 1973; possession of the land admittedly was taken on 5-7- 1973, and the pumping station house was constructed. No doubt, declaration under Section 6 was published later on 8- 7- 1973. Admittedly power under Section 17(4) was exercised dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A and on service of the notice under Section 9 possession was taken, since urgency was acute viz. pumping station house was to be constructed to drain out floodwater. Consequently, the land stood vested in the State under Section 17(2) free from all encumbrances. It is further settled law that once possession is taken, by operation of Section 17(2), the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances unless a Notification under Section 48(1) is published in the gazette withdrawing from the acquisition. Section 11-A, as amended by Act 68 of 1984, therefore, does not apply, and the acquisition does not lapse. The Notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6, therefore, remain valid. There is no other provision under the Act to have the acquired land divested, unless, as stated earlier, Notification under Section 48(1) was published, and the possession is surrendered pursuant thereto. That apart, since M/s Kalra Properties, the respondent had purchased the land after the Notification under Section 4(1) was published, its sale is void against the State, and it acquired no right, title, or interest in the land. Consequently, it is settled law that it cannot challenge the validity of the Notification or the regularity in taking possession of the land before the publication of the declaration under Section 6 was published. (emphasis supplied)"

8. It has been laid down that the purchasers on any ground whatsoever cannot question proceedings for taking possession. A purchaser after Section 4 Notification does not acquire any right in the land as the sale is ab initio void and has no right to claim land under the Policy.

18. In Shiv Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court has also referred to the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, "the Act of 2013") and held that the beneficial provisions of this new Act are intended to benefit the land owners mentioned in Notification under Section 4 and not the purchasers who purchase the land after it has been vested in the state. The court referred to Section 11 (4) of the 2013 Act, which was akin to Section 4 of the LA Act, contending a prohibition that no person shall make any transaction or cause any transaction of land or create any encumbrance on land from the date of publication of such Notification without seeking any exemption from the Collector. The Court noted that under the 2013 Act, without seeking exemption from the Collector, there was a total prohibition or any transaction of the land, which was the subject matter of Section 4 Notification. However, under the LA Act, a transaction effected after the Section 4 Notification was illegal and void.

19. There is no clarity about any exemption or permission from the Collector for the conveyance. The circumstances in which the conveyance was executed through the employee of Tanglin /power of attorney who, the Petitioner claims, was a power of attorney holder for the original landowners i.e Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 are also highly suspicious. Therefore, based upon the conveyance dated 02 August 2014, we cannot entertain any challenge to the acquisition at the behest of the Petitioner. Even the entertainment of such a challenge would be contrary to the legal provisions as interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Kumar (supra).

20. Thus, for the above reasons, the challenges to acquiring the subject property failed and are hereby rejected.

21. The next point for determination is whether the Petitioner has any right to challenge the consent award dated 07 April 2015, again, based upon the conveyance dated 02 August 2014. Admittedly, the consent award dated 07 April 2015 is based on the consent given by Respondent Nos. 4 to 6, who had both title documents as well as survey records supporting their claim. Their names were reflected in Section

4 Notification and Section 6 declaration under the LA Act. Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 have not received any amount from the Petitioner. The Petitioner claims to have paid Rs. 30 Lakhs to Naveen Nath, who, according to them, was a power of attorney holder of Respondent Nos. 4 to 6. All these are highly contentious issues that this Court cannot adjudicate in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

22. Tanglin or Naveen Nath have not been impleaded as parties. It cannot be expected of this Court to investigate the development agreements between Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 and Tanglin. It also cannot be expected of this Court to examine into the power of attorney based upon which the Petitioner claims the conveyance dated 02 August 2014. Admittedly, this conveyance was made much after the issuance of Notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6. In terms of Shiv Kumar (supra) such a conveyance would be void qua the Government or the Land Acquisition Authorities. Therefore, there could not be said to have been any obligation as such on the Land Acquisition Officer to take cognisance of the Petitioner’s claim and refrain from making a consent award when Respondents 4 to 6 had offered their consent to such an award.

23. Mr. Punde submitted that Shivkumar (supra) and the several decisions referred to in paragraphs 7.[1] to 7.[7] of Shiv Kumar (supra) hold that a subsequent purchaser would be entitled to receive compensation. He submitted that under Section 3(b), the Petitioner was a “person interested” since the Petitioner was claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the land acquisition under the L. A. Act.

24. The decisions do hold that a purchaser who purchases after the issue of Section 4 Notification cannot challenge the acquisition; at most, she can claim compensation based on the vendor’s title. However, in the present case's peculiar facts and considering the suspicious circumstances in which the conveyance dated 02 August 2014 was issued, we cannot upset the consent award dated 07 April 2015 at the behest of the Petitioner.

25. There are too many disputed questions of fact that cannot be adjudicated in the exercise of our extraordinary and summary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the decisions referred to in paragraphs 7.[1] to 7.7, there does not appear to have been any ownership dispute between the subsequent purchasers and their vendors. In the present case, there is a grave dispute. Respondents 4 to 6 do not appear to have received any consideration from the petitioner. There is a dispute about Naveen Nath’s authority to sell the subject property to the petitioner. The respondents allege that the Petitioner was a speculator only interested in making windfall earnings once the acquisition was announced. All such matters cannot be conveniently resolved in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

26. To resolve such a dispute, the Petitioner could have instituted civil proceedings before the Civil Court. In this Petition, however, it would not be appropriate for us to overlook the suspicious circumstances or to adjudicate into highly contentious factual disputes and upset the consent award dated 07 April 2015 under which the Land Acquisition Authorities have agreed to provide and, perhaps, have already provided a developed land by way of compensation.

27. There is no clear letter or demand from the Petitioner seeking any reference under Section 30, though Mr. Sachin Punde submitted that the letter dated 28 August 2015 rejects the Petitioner’s demand for a reference because of an apportionment dispute. The impugned letter dated 28 August 2015 merely states that nothing further can be done once the Land Acquisition Officer made the consent award regarding the Petitioner’s claim. This was mainly because the Petitioner claimed interest in the subject property based upon a conveyance executed after the issue of Section 4 Notification and Section 6 Declaration. Such a conveyance was void qua the State and there was no obligation for the State to take cognizance of the same.

28. In any event, as the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained in the case of Sharda Devi Vs. State of Bihar26, only a discretion is vested in the Land Acquisition Officer, when it comes to making a reference under Section 30 of the L.A. Act. The discretion, no doubt, must be exercised on sound principles. In the present case, which is bristling with so many suspicious circumstances, we can hardly fault the Deputy Collector for not making a reference under Section 30. This is assuming that any apparent reference was really sought by the Petitioner. The documents on record suggest that the Petitioner never applied for any such reference in clear terms.

29. In Sharda Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that in case the Collector refuses to make a reference under Section 30, the person adversely affected by the withholding of the reference or refusal to make the reference shall be at liberty to pursue such other remedy as may be available to him under the law, such as filing a writ petition or a civil suit.

30. The petitioner has instituted this writ petition. But no relief can be granted because resolving the several disputed questions of fact that arise is almost impossible. Even though the existence of disputed questions of fact may not be a bar to entertaining a writ petition. However, generally, where there are highly contentious factual issues that cannot be adjudicated under the summary and extraordinary jurisdiction, the parties are relegated to the remedy of filing a suit.

31. Thus, this is a case where there was no explicit request for reference under Section 30. In any event, there is no apparent refusal. Even if the impugned letter dated 28 August 2015 is regarded as a refusal to make a reference under Section 30 of the L. A. Act, no case is made out to interfere with the same. In the facts of the present case where the Petitioner has admittedly purchased the subject property post Section 4 Notification and even post Section 6 Declaration by prima facie paying nothing to the original landlords reflected in these Notifications and in the survey records. Based on these circumstances, the Deputy Collector could not be said to have exercised discretion perversely or for irrelevant considerations by refusing to make a reference.

32. Mr. Punde’s contention that the Petitioner would be rendered remediless is also entirely misconceived considering the clear and categorical observations in Sharda Devi (supra) to the effect that a person interested can always seek remedies inter alia by filing a civil suit to assert the compensation claim. As explained in Sharada Devi (supra), it is always open to the Collector to keep open the remedy of instituting independent legal proceedings for claiming compensation.

33. Mr. Punde then submitted that in terms of the consent award, the right to compensation was given up by Respondents 4 to 6 in lieu of being allotted a developed plot. A developed plot is also in lieu of compensation. Therefore, if the Petitioner believes that she has a right to compensation, she can assert a right to what Respondents 4 to 6 may have obtained in lieu of such compensation. We clarify that this is only a hypothetical answer in the context of Mr. Punde’s argument. By this, we do not mean that the Petitioner has established, at least before us, any right regarding the subject property and is therefore entitled to any reliefs qua the Respondents 4 to 6. All these are matters for the Petitioner to establish by taking out appropriate proceedings and leading proper evidence.

34. Therefore, we clarify that we are not and have not adjudicated upon the rival contentions regarding ownership, title, the validity of the conveyance, the existence of the power of attorney, scope of the power of attorney, whether any amounts have been received by the Respondents 6 to 8 and the host of all such highly contentious and disputed questions of fact.

35. For all the above reasons, we are satisfied that the Petitioner has made no case for quashing the acquisition proceedings, the consent award, or the impugned letter/order dated 28 August 2015. This Petition is thus liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.

36. However, the dismissal of this Petition will not preclude the Petitioner from taking out appropriate independent proceedings regarding her claims qua Respondents 4 to 6. All contentions of all parties in this regard are left open. Any observations in this judgment and order are only for deciding whether we should adjudicate factual disputes, and those observations are not intended to determine the factual disputes and entitlement issues one way or the other. Therefore, if the Petitioner does institute a suit or other proceedings that may be permissible under the law, the Court or the Authorities before whom such proceedings are instituted need not be influenced by the observations made.

37. This Petition is accordingly dismissed with liberty in the above terms. The Rule is discharged. No costs.

38. As noted earlier, the learned counsel for the Petitioner agreed that there is no substantial difference in the factual and legal issues in the remaining two Petitions. Therefore, based upon the above reasoning, we dismiss Writ Petition Nos.9171 of 2023 and 11594 of 2017 and discharge the Rule therein. The liberty granted to the Petitioner in Writ Petition No.8011 of 2017 will also apply in the remaining two Writ Petitions.

39. All pending Interim Applications, if any, are disposed of.

40. All concerned can act on authenticated copies of this judgment and order. (Jitendra Jain, J) (M.S. Sonak, J)