Dr. Feroze Homi Duggan v. Bilkish Yunus Namakwala

21) By a judgment dated 3rd August 2011, this Hon’ble Court granted Probate of the said Will in favour of her grandson, Dr. Feroze Duggan. The said judgment was affirmed by a detailed Appellate Judgment dated 27th October 2016, which, while affirming the genuineness of the Will, directed issuance of Letters of Administration with the Will annexed instead of Probate. These judgments inter alia record that: i. The deceased had the benefit of the best legal acumen in the drafting of her Will; ii. The Will was drafted by M/s. Kanga & Co., Advocates & Solicitors, her long-standing attorneys who had also represented her in litigation against Jean Nusly Duggan; iii. The Will was attested by Senior Counsel Mr. Nani A. Palkhivala and Ms. Roshan Master, both known personally to the deceased.

22) The Special Leave Petition (SLP) preferred against the appellate judgment dated 27th October 2016 was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by its order dated 13th January 2017. Consequently, the grant of Letters of Administration with the Will dated 4th April 1993 annexed, in favour of Dr. Feroze Duggan, has attained finality.

23) Mr. Chinoy submitted that the patently false and fraudulent nature of the alleged Will dated 6th April 1993, and the Respondent’s purported claim thereunder to the Lawnside property at Malabar Hill, is evident from her own conduct over nearly three decades.

24) Despite allegedly having the original of the said Will in her possession, the Respondent did not disclose its existence nor assert any claim over the Lawnside property for an inexplicable period of 29 years — from 1993 until the filing of Testamentary Petition NO. 639 of 2022.

25) The only explanation offered for this inordinate delay is found in Paragraph 12 of the said Petition, which reads: “That the delay, if any, in making the present Petition is on account of the fact that the Petitioner (Respondent herein) was ignorant and unaware of the requirement of obtaining legal representation. Recently, while taking search at home, the Petitioner has found the Will of the Deceased...”

26) This explanation, it is submitted, is inherently improbable and lacks any evidentiary or circumstantial support — particularly in light of the concurrent and long-drawn probate proceedings concerning the 4th April 1993 Will, which were ongoing in this very Court.

27) Moreover, this averment case in paragraph 12 of the Petition is belied by and is ex facie contrary to the Respondents case in her Affidavits in Reply that: Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified i. “that she had advanced Rs. 27 lakhs as loan to Lady Jena Duggan in 1980 for a period of 10 years, that Lady Jena Duggan had executed a Mortgage Deed dt 10th July 1980 in favour of the Respondent of her Lawnside property as security, ii. that as Lady Jena Duggan was not in a position to repay the Loan, she had made her will dt 6th April 1993 bequeathed the Lawnside property to the Respondent. iii. that “till the said Will was discovered [ in 2022], the Respondent have been making several attempts for securing the amount;... I say that as I was looking after Lady Jena there was no intent of any forceful action by the Respondent”.

28) Mr. Chinoy submitted that the Respondent’s case — that she had advanced a sum of Rs. 27 lakhs to Lady Jena Duggan in 1980, against execution of a Mortgage Deed dated 10th July 1980 over the Lawnside property, and that since the loan could not be repaid, Lady Jena had, by her alleged Will dated 6th April 1993, bequeathed the said property to the Respondent in recognition of her financial assistance and personal care — is wholly untenable and riddled with inconsistencies. i. First, this claim is belied by the Respondent’s own silence and complete inaction for a period of 29 years, from September 1993 (when Lady Jena passed away) until 2022, when she allegedly “found” the Will and filed Testamentary Petition No. 639 of 2022. If, as now alleged in her Affidavits, the Respondent was a mortgagee since 1980, and the testatrix had expressly bequeathed Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified the mortgaged property to her in satisfaction of the debt, there is no plausible explanation for her failure to assert any rights, stake a claim, or even disclose the existence of the Will — for nearly three decades. Her silence is wholly inconsistent with the conduct expected of a creditor-legatee in possession of a valid testamentary instrument. ii. Secondly, this claim contradicts her own averments in Paragraph 12 of the Petition, where she states: “That the delay, if any, in making the present Petition is on account of the facts that the Petitioner (Respondent herein) was ignorant and unaware of obtaining any legal representation. Recently, while taking search at home the Petitioner has found the Will of the Deceased. Thereafter, the Petitioner made inquiries for the purpose of transfer of the property mentioned in the Will and now the Petitioner has been recently advised to obtain a legal representation. Hence, this Hon’ble Court, in the interest of justice, may condone the delay.” This assertion — that the Will was recently discovered — is plainly inconsistent with the narrative now sought to be advanced, that the Respondent was both the mortgagee and sole beneficiary under the Will and had known of its terms all along. It is wholly inconceivable that a lady of considerable means, who could advance a loan of Rs. 27 lakhs would be unaware of the necessity of proper legal representation. Equally impossible is the narrative that, after a lapse of nearly three decades, she suddenly discovered a Will and thereafter initiated steps to transfer the property.

29) Mr. Chinoy submitted that, while the Respondent states in Paragraph 12 of the Petition that the alleged Will dated 6th 1993 was “recently” discovered, there is a conspicuous absence of any explanation — either in the Petition or in the affidavits filed in reply to the present proceedings — as to how, when, or under what circumstances the following crucial documents allegedly came to light: i. The purported Mortgage Deed dated 10th July 1980; ii. The alleged Deed of Declaration with No Objection Certificate dated 15th February 1993, purportedly executed by Lady Jena Duggan and Dr. Feroze Duggan; iii. The further alleged Deed of Declaration with No Objection Certificate dated 7th April 1993, purportedly executed by Lady Jena Duggan and Jean Nusly Duggan.

30) It is also pertinent to note that, despite repeated and specific requests, the Respondent and her advocates have failed to produce or allow inspection of the original versions of these documents. To date, no inspection has been furnished, thereby casting serious doubt on the authenticity, provenance, and very existence of these alleged instruments.

31) Mr. Chinoy further submitted that during the same 29-year period of alleged silence, the Lawnside property at Malabar Hill was the subject matter of multiple legal proceedings — which underscores Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified the improbability of the Respondent’s claim of ignorance. Specifically: i. In Suit No. 4847 of 1995, Dr. Feroze Duggan (grandson of Lady Jena Duggan) filed a suit against M/s. Benzer Pvt. Ltd. and others, seeking declaration and cancellation of an alleged Tenancy Agreement dated 6th June 1994, concerning the Lawnside Bungalow. He contended that said tenancy and other related documents had been fraudulently obtained. ii. The property was also the subject of Suit No. 258 of 1996, filed by Jean Nusly Duggan (now deceased), the wife of Nusly Duggan, for administration of Lady Jena Duggan’s estate. In 1998, this Hon’ble Court appointed a Court Receiver in respect of the Lawnside property, who took physical possession in 2001 and continues to remain in possession of the same till date.

32) Mr. Chinoy submitted that the Respondent was fully aware of these proceedings, including the fact that the Court Receiver had been appointed and was in possession of the Lawnside property. This is evident from her own purported Memorandum of Understanding dated 3rd January 2024 with one Mr. Vicky Rupchandani (Exhibit L, Page no.127 to the Respondent’s Affidavit dated October 2024 in reply to Interim Application No. 2057 of 2024), which expressly records: “The balance payments would be made to the Respondent after removal of the Court Receiver.” [Pg. 131]

33) Despite such knowledge, from 2001 to 2022, the Respondent did not assert any claim to the property. Even more significantly, after fraudulently obtaining Letters of Administration in 2022, she purported to transfer the Lawnside property to her own name, despite being fully aware that the Court Receiver was appointed and in actual possession.

34) Mr. Chinoy submitted that the mala fide and fraudulent conduct of the Respondent in propounding the alleged Will dated 6th April 1993 and in filing Testamentary Petition No. 639 of 2022 is conclusively established by her own pleadings.

35) Despite the Petition and the alleged Will expressly referring to Lady Jena Duggan’s grandchildren, the Respondent falsely averred in Paragraph 9 of the Petition that: “… that the deceased left her surviving as her only heirs and next of kin according to the Indian Succession Act as Applicable to Parsi, the following persons...” i.e. Lady Jena Duggan’s husband Jamshedji ( who had expired in 15.1.1957) and her two sons Homi and Nusly ( who had expired in 9.6.1985 and 31.5.1983) and that “The Petitioner states that there are no legal heirs of the Deceased or her husband’s side and mother’s side. Further there are no legal heirs of the deceased children of the Deceased. There are no legal heirs of the deceased sons.” [Emphasis Supplied]

36) Mr. Chinoy submitted that averment in paragraph no.9 that: “there are no legal heirs of the deceased children of the Deceased. There are no legal heirs of the deceased sons.”, was ex facie false to the knowledge of the Petitioner/Respondent herein, in view of her statement in paragraph no.7 of the Petition referring to the existence of Lady Jena’s “grandchildren”. “All cash, Jewelleries are already bequeathed to the children and grandchildren during the lifetime of the deceased.”

37) He further pointed out that the Respondent, by the averment made in paragraph no.7, mischievously omitted mention of moveable assets, though it included her bank accounts, shares and debentures, which, as of 1993, were collectively valued in excess of Rs. 1 crore. Moreover, the Respondent mischievously undervalued Lawnside property at Malabar Hill admeasuring 3,327 sq mtrs at Rs. 150 crores. Thus, the assertion that in February 1993 Lady Jena Duggan was unable to repay a sum of Rs. 27 lakhs to the Respondent, even assuming such a loan had been advanced is implausible.

38) It was on the basis of this false and fraudulent suppression of material facts, the Petitioner circumvented the statutory requirement of serving citation on any interested party. As a result, the Petition was treated as an “uncontested matter”. By an order dated 5th May 2022 the Addl. Registrar, Original Side treated the Testamentary Petition No. 639 of 2022 as an “uncontested matter” and the Letters of Administration along with the Will came to be Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified granted by order dated 3rd June 2022. Will of Jena Duggan dated 6th April 1993 39) Mr. Chinoy submits that a close examination of the alleged Will of Lady Jena dated 6th April 1993, annexed as Exhibit-B to the Petition no. 639 of 2022 reveals several glaring deficiencies. i. The alleged Will dated 6th April 1993 is not stated to have been prepared or drafted by any Advocate or Solicitor; ii. the language of the alleged Will dated 6th April 1993 discloses many grammatical errors for instance; iii. clause 4 uses “give” instead of the grammatically correct “given”; iv. clause 6 reads “after my death give my balance all immovable and movable properties ” which is syntactically and semantically flawed. v. The alleged Will dated 6th April 1993 is attested by two individuals merely identified “John” and “Mary”, with no indication of their full names, addresses or capacity- thereby casting a doubt on the validity of attestation; In paragraph 6 and 7 purports to state that: vi. I direct my executor of this Will that after my death give my balance all immovable and movable properties including Lawnside Harkness road Bombay Property to my donee Mrs. Bilkish Yunus Namakwalla.” vii. That Mrs. Bilkish Yunus Namakwalla is taking care of me and maintaining me.”

40) He submits that these clauses — apart from being vague and grammatically incorrect — appear contrived and inconsistent with the tone and form of testamentary documents expected from a Testatrix who had earlier engaged one of the city's most reputed law firms and eminent witnesses (as seen in the duly probated Will dated 4th April 1993). Affidavit dated 8th August 2022 41) Mr. Chinoy submitted that, having obtained the Letters of Administration, the Respondent sought to cover her tracks by filing an Affidavit dated 8th August 2022 in her capacity as Administrator and Sole Beneficiary, purportedly for rendering a true account of the properties and credits of the deceased under section 317 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

42) Interestingly, in paragraph no.4 of her Affidavit dated 8th August 2022, the Respondent herself admitted that the statement made in paragraph no.9 of the Petition — which were also reflected in paragraph no.7 of the Additional Prothonotary’s Order dated 5th May 2022 — were a “mistake”. She further stated: “The two sons did not die as bachelors and were survived by their concerned legal heirs at the time of filing of the Petition.”

43) The Respondent purported to cure this fatal suppression by producing alleged “No Objection Certificates” from the said “concerned legal heirs” — a wholly ineffectual and impermissible attempt to retrospectively sanitise a fraud played on this Hon’ble Court.

44) The said Affidavit annexes the following: i. a copy of a Deed of Transfer dated 17th June 2022 executed by the Respondent as the alleged Administrator/ Beneficiary of the estate of the late Lady Jena Jamshedji Duggan in favour of the Respondent as the alleged beneficiary under the Will and Testament of Lady Jena Jamshedji Duggan dt 6th April 1993 [Ref: Pg. 167 of Exh. G]. ii. “Deed of Declaration with NOC” dated 15th February 1993 allegedly executed by Lady Jena Duggan and her grandson Dr. Feroze Homi Duggan. This document claims that Lady Jena Duggan had mortgaged the Lawnside property for Rs. 27 lakhs on 10th July 1980 and that, being unable to repay the said loan, she and her grandson-Dr. Feroze Duggan had agreed to “give the said mortgaged property to the mortgagee ” namely the Respondent herein.

45) “Deed of Declaration with NOC ” dated 7th April 1993 allegedly Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified executed by Lady Jena Duggan and Jean Nusly Duggan records that: i. “Mrs Bilkish Yunis Namakwalla is taking care of me, maintaining me also helped me financially by giving me mortgage loan amount for my family survival and other necessary expenses”; ii. that Lady Jena Duggan had by her will dt 6th April 1993 bequeathed the Lawnside property to Mrs Bilkish Yunus Namakwalla and that Jean Nusly Duggan was aware of the Will dt 6th April 1993 and had no objection to the same.” 46) Notably, no declaration/NOC was even alleged to be executed by Lady Jena’s granddaughter Ms. Ferina Duggan (now Polichichook). Unquestionably, prior to the execution of the Will, both Ms. Ferina Duggan and Mrs. Jean Duggan, being successors, would have to provide such an “NOC” to the Respondent. This omission clearly demonstrates that the assertions in the Affidavit are not only flawed but are a belated and a flawed afterthought. Affidavit in Reply dated 21st October 2024 to present Interim Application

47) Mr Chinoy further submits that the Respondent in her Affidavit in Reply dated 21st October 2024 to the Interim Application in the Petition has alleged that she had advanced Rs. 27 lakhs as loan to Lady Jena Duggan in 1980 for a period of 10 years, that Lady Jena Duggan had executed a Mortgage Deed dated 10th July 1980 in favour of the Respondent of her Lawnside property as security, that as Lady Jena Duggan was not in a position to repay the loan she had by her Will dated 6th April 1993 bequeathed the Lawnside property to Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified the Respondent.

48) In her Affidavit-in-Reply to the Petition the Respondent has stated as follows in paragrpah no. 4(iii) at page no.7 states that, “I say that till the said Will was discovered, the Respondent have been making several attempts for securing the amount but initially on account of her camaraderie with late Lady Jena and subsequently the abrupt raise of hands by the Petitioner and particularly by one Jean Nusly Duggan, whom the Respondent contacted through her representatives. I say that as I was looking after Lady Jena there was no intent of any forceful action by the Respondent.”

49) In this Affidavit the Respondent has also impugned the Will of Dr. Feroze Duggan dated 30th December 1994 and consequently the Applicants entitlement in law to maintain the present Petition.

50) Mr. Chinoy submitted that the Respondent’s attempt to impugn the Will dated 30th December 1994 of Dr. Feroze Duggan is a mala fide effort to challenge the locus of the present Petitioners in maintaining the present revocation proceedings. Such a challenge is a transparent diversionary tactic aimed at deflecting from the fraudulent nature of the Letters of Administration obtained by the Respondent.

51) He further submitted that the Respondent has no caveatable interest in the estate of Dr. Feroze Duggan and therefore lacks the standing to assail his Will or the testamentary proceedings for grant of probate in respect thereof. Consequently, she cannot be heard to question the locus of the Petitioners in the present proceedings.

52) In any event, and without prejudice to the Petitioners’ rights as executors and beneficiaries under the Will, even assuming (whilst denying) that section 213 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 bars them from asserting rights as executors prior to the grant of probate, it is undisputed that Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 are the Class II legal heirs of Dr. Feroze Duggan, under the law of intestate succession. Accordingly, they undeniably have the locus standi to maintain the present Petition for revocation of the Letters of Administration fraudulently obtained by the Respondent.

53) Mr. Chinoy submitted that it is well settled in law that in a Petition for revocation, any person who is aggrieved by the grant and who had no knowledge of the proceedings, or where proper citation was not issued, is entitled to seek revocation of the probate or Letters of Administration on such grounds as may be available to them.

54) He relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basanti Devi v. Ravi Prakash Ramprasad Jaiswal[1], where it was held that non-issuance of citation to interested parties vitiates the grant and entitles such parties to move for revocation.

55) This Hon’ble Court, in George Harris v. Millicent Spencer[2], held that: “An interest, however slight, or even a bare possibility of interest, is sufficient to entitle a person to seek revocation of a grant.”

56) It was further held that even a person who acquires an interest

AIR 1933 Bom 370 (at para 7) Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified in the estate after the testator’s death, in a case of intestacy, is entitled to apply for revocation. In essence, all persons having an interest in the estate are entitled to apply.

57) The Calcutta High Court, in Dinanath Shah v. Surati Devi & Ors.,[3] affirmed the above position by following George Harris and reiterated that: “The object of section 263 is to protect the interest of persons who might have a claim in the estate of the deceased, and who have been prejudiced by the grant, especially where they come to know of it only subsequently, and the grantee asserts rights based on it.”

58) In view of the foregoing facts, circumstances, and legal position, it is respectfully submitted that the present Petition for Revocation be allowed, and this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to: (a) Revoke and annul the Letters of Administration dated 3rd June 2022 granted in Testamentary Petition No. 639 of 2022, in respect of the alleged Will dated 6th April 1993 of Lady Jena Duggan; and (b) Cancel and annul all steps taken by the Respondent Bilkish Namakwala pursuant to the impugned grant, including the execution and registration of the Deed of Transfer dated 17th June 2022 purporting to transfer the Lawnside Property to herself, and the mutation of her name in the Property Card;

(c) Direct that a certified copy of the order be forwarded to

(2003) 107 CWN 353 (Ref: Paras 6, 6.1, and 8.[2] of the judgment) Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified the Registrar of Assurances, under section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, for appropriate cancellation and rectification of the registered instrument, and to take steps for removal of the Respondent’s name from the records. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents 59) The Respondent contends that the status of the Petitioners to claim the present relief is affected by section 213 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. It is alleged that the Petitioners are third parties to the testamentary proceedings and have preferred the present revocation petition without first establishing their rights or entitlement under the Will of Dr. Feroze Duggan, as required under section 213 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

60) The Respondent further submits that the Petitioners are barred under section 213 of Indian Succession Act, 1925, as they are neither the legal representative of Lady Jena Duggan, nor have they obtained probate in their favour to prima facie establish any right in respect of her estate. On this ground alone, the Miscellaneous Petition preferred by the Petitioner is not maintainable.

61) The Respondent further states that the alleged Will of Late Dr. Feroze Duggan, under which the Petitioners claim rights, is itself fraudulent and inauthentic, and is presently under challenge in the Testamentary Suit No. 199 of 2024.

62) The Respondent submits that the Petitioners cannot be Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified permitted to approach this Hon’ble Court by circumventing the statutory requirements laid down under applicable law. It is contended that prior to passing any orders affecting the grant obtained by the Respondent, this Hon’ble Court must first: i. examine the credentials of the Petitioners, ii. verify the bona fides of their claim, and iii. ascertain the true nature of their standing before this Court.

63) The Respondent further submits that, in the interest of justice and judicial economy, all connected matters—including the present Miscellaneous Petition, the Testamentary Petition for grant of probate of the Will of Dr. Feroze Duggan, and Testamentary Suit No. 199 of 2024—ought to be heard and decided together, so as to comprehensively determine the rights, interests, and title over the subject property.

64) It is submitted that no prejudice will be caused to the Petitioners in adopting such a course, since: i. their interests are already protected by the Interim Order dated 10th February 2025 passed by this Hon’ble Court; ii. the Lawnside property is in the custody of the Court Receiver; and iii. the Respondent undertakes not to alienate or create any Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified third-party rights in the said property, pending adjudication.

65) The Respondent submits that the locus of the Petitioners is seriously disputed and stands challenged by the claim of the alleged wife of the deceased Dr. Feroze Duggan, who has since set up a competing testamentary instrument.

66) It is alleged that the wife of Dr. Feroze Duggan has been deliberately ignored by the Petitioners for reasons best known to them. The Petitioners, in their pleadings, have not even acknowledged her as a legal heir to the estate of the deceased, and have consciously omitted any reference to her or her claims in the present proceedings.

67) The said wife has independently approached this Hon’ble Court, asserting rights based on a purported Will and Last Testament of Dr. Feroze Duggan dated 9th March 2020, which is currently sub judice in separate proceedings. The Respondent contends that the existence of this alleged subsequent Will renders the Will propounded by the Petitioners (dated 30th December 1994) redundant and, consequently, demolishes the very basis of the Petitioners’ claim and locus in the present proceedings.

68) It is submitted that unless and until the Petitioners establish their rights before this Hon’ble Court, they cannot be permitted to seek revocation of the grant issued in favour of the Respondent.

69) The Respondent further submits that the deceased Dr. Feroze Homi Duggan had expressly renounced his rights in respect of the property known as ‘Lawnside’, Malabar Hill, in favour of the

70) It is the Respondent’s case that on 10th July 1980, Lady Jena Duggan obtained a loan of Rs. 27,00,000 from the Respondent, Mrs. Bilkish Yunus Namakwala, against a mortgage of the Lawnside property. The terms of the mortgage allegedly stipulated that, in the event of non-repayment within ten years (i.e., by 1990), the Respondent would become entitled to full rights in the said property.

71) It is alleged that the mortgage amount remained unpaid even as of 1993, and that Lady Jena discussed this issue with her grandson, Dr. Feroze Duggan, who declined to repay the loan. Thereafter, on 15th February 1993, Lady Jena and Dr. Feroze Duggan allegedly executed a Deed of Declaration with No Objection, wherein Dr. Feroze purportedly waived all his rights in the property.

72) Subsequently, on 6th April 1993, Lady Jena is alleged to have executed a Will and Codicil bequeathing the Lawnside property to the

73) On 7th April 1993, she purportedly executed another Deed of Declaration, this time with a No Objection from Mrs. Jean Nusly Duggan, confirming the bequest in favour of the Respondent.

74) The Respondent claims that these documents were duly Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified executed in the presence of court officers and are validly executed instruments.

75) The Respondent contends that the said documents — namely the mortgage, declarations, and NOCs — are not being challenged on their substance, but merely on the timing of their presentation before this Hon’ble Court. It is submitted that their veracity and authenticity have not been specifically disputed. Miscellaneous

76) The Respondent submits that the challenge to the impugned Grant is entirely misconceived, being based on frivolous grounds such as the language, grammatical errors, or the presumption that the Will was not drafted by a competent legal professional. Such objections, it is submitted, are neither maintainable nor legally sustainable grounds for revocation. Further, the delay in filing the Petition for Revocation has already been condoned by the predecessor Bench, and no challenge to the credibility or competence of the learned Judge ought to be entertained under the guise of questioning such procedural aspects.

77) The Respondent states that on 4th September 2023, Petitioner No.1 filed Third Party Application (L) No. 25070 of 2023 seeking certified copies of Testamentary Petition No. 639 of 2022 and the Grant issued therein. The said application was opposed by the Respondent but came to be allowed by Order dated 5th December

2023. Upon obtaining the documents on 21st October 2023, the Petitioners then filed Testamentary Petition No. 4292 of 2023, seeking Probate of the Will dated 30th December 1994 of Dr. Feroze Homi Duggan.

78) It is the Respondent’s case that the Petitioners, despite being aware of the subsisting Grant in favour of the Respondent in respect of Lady Jena Duggan’s estate, have suppressed the pendency of Third Party Application No. 25070 of 2023 as well as the issuance of the Grant, in the pleadings of the Probate Petition and in the present Revocation Petition (Petition No. 240 of 2025), thereby misleading this Hon’ble Court.

79) The Respondent further states that she was not heard prior to the passing of the ad-interim and interim orders dated 24th July 2024 and 10th February 2025, in Interim Application No. 2057 of

2024. Despite having issued instructions via WhatsApp to her erstwhile Advocate to file a Reply, the said advocate wrongfully represented to the Court that there were no instructions, thereby causing the Court to proceed without hearing the Respondent. The Respondent has, as a result, initiated disciplinary proceedings against her former counsel for such unprofessional conduct.

80) It is submitted that the Will of Dr. Feroze Duggan dated 30th December 1994, relied upon by the Petitioners, is of dubious veracity. The said Will was never referred to by Dr. Feroze Duggan Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified himself in any pleadings before the Hon’ble Apex Court up to 2017, even in proceedings where title to the Lawnside property was directly in issue. According to the Petitioners’ own case, the said Will anticipates a bequest of the Lawnside property, which had not vested in Dr. Feroze Duggan as on 30th December 1994 — rendering such bequest legally untenable.

81) Furthermore, the Will is silent as to any contingent bequest in the event of the premature demise of the beneficiary or testator, and does not name any alternate trustee, which raises doubts as to its genuineness and legal enforceability.

82) The Respondent reiterates that the only property forming part of Lady Jena Duggan’s estate — namely the bungalow “Lawnside” — was bequeathed to the Respondent under the Will dated 6th 1993 and relevant Declarations. Necessary contemporaneous documentation was executed in that regard.

83) The present Revocation Petition, it is submitted, proceeds merely on surmise, conjecture and conflicting testamentary documents, with two rival claimants — the Petitioners and the widow of Dr. Feroze Duggan — now asserting rights on the basis of two separate Wills nearly three decades apart. The Respondent prays that: (a) All related proceedings may be heard together; (b) No party’s rights would be prejudiced, especially since: Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified i. The subject property is in the custody of the Court Receiver; ii. The Petitioners are protected by the interim orders dated 10th February 2025; iii. The Respondent undertakes not to alienate or encumber the subject property in the interim.

84) In view of the above it is submitted that the petition be disposed of and the Hon’ble Court be pleased to take up all the matters and club and hear the same together and simultaneously. Reasons and Conclusion:

85) Having heard both Counsel and perused the record, I draw the following conclusions: Second Letters of Administration with Will annexed 86) At the outset, I am of the view that the Letters of June 2022 obtained in favour of the Respondent is a nullity. Probate of the Will dated 4th April 1993 had already been granted in favour of Dr. Feroze Duggan by this Court’s order dated 3rd August 2011, which was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court when the grant was converted into Letters of Administration with Will annexed on 13th January 2017.

87) There exists no statutory provision in law including Part IX of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 for a second Letters of Administration in respect of the same deceased and the same property; founded upon another Will. Any party seeking such a grant must necessarily apply for revocation of the earlier Letters of Administration in accordance with Chapter III or Chapter IV in Part IX of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. On this ground alone, the second Letters of Administration obtained by the Respondent deserves to be set aside.

88) Moreover, a clear case of fraud practiced on this Court has been demonstrated by Mr. Chinoy, this is another count where this Petition succeeds as “nothing … nothing … and nothing, obtained by fraud, can be sustained, as fraud unravels everything.” 4 The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with fraud practiced on the High Court[5] observed as under:

89) Although the Petition could be allowed on the above grounds alone, in order to obviate any grievance that the other contentions were left unaddressed, I proceed to deal with them hereinbelow. Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 4 SCC 1 A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221: 2007 SCC OnLine SC 317 Caveatable Interest

90) I find merit in the submission of Mr. Chinoy that the Petitioners would have caveatable interest and locus to maintain the Petition being heirs of Dr. Feroz Duggan based on entitlement under intestate succession. The principles laid down in Basanti Devi vs. Ravi Prakash Ramprasad Jaiswal (supra), George Haris vs.. Millicent Spencer (supra), and Dinanath Shah vs. Surati Devi and Ors. (supra) are expressly applicable in this case.

91) Dr. Warunjikar’s contention that (i) the locus of the Petitioners is challenged by wife of Dr. Feroze Duggan, and (ii) that Dr. Feroze Duggan has declared and renounced his rights to the ‘Lawnside’ property in favour of the Respondent, appears calculated to manufacture yet another controversy where none exists. These arguments seem intended more to obfuscate rather than assist the Court in a fair adjudication. Such submissions are wholly unwarranted, if not deliberately raised with the object of securing a finding capable of later challenge, thereby prolonging the final resolution. Be that as it may, these contentions would not presently detain me from deciding whether Letters of Administration dated 3rd June 2022 and Deed of Transfer dated 17th June 2022 deserve to be annulled and cancelled. The primary issue for the Court’s consideration is whether the Respondent could at all have been granted a second Letters of Administration without first seeking Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified revocation of the earlier one. Delay and Latches

92) I find considerable merit in Mr. Chinoy’s submission that there has been an inexplicable delay of 29 years in seeking Letters of Administration. Suspicious Circumstances 93) I also find merit with Mr. Chinoy’s contention that it is inconceivable that a lady, who had the benefit of the finest legal expertise, would prepare a Will independently or through another Advocate, rather than have another Will drawn by the same Solicitor, assuming she had a change of heart. Such a conduct would be wholly inconsistent with normal human behavior as observed by the Hon’ble that “a circumstance would be ‘suspicious circumstance’ when it is abnormal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person.”

94) In my view, it is equally inconceivable that her Solicitors would have been unaware of, or disregarded, a sizeable debt of Rs. 27 lakhs – an enormous liability in those days – allegedly secured by mortgage over the deceased property. It is further difficult to accept that such a mortgage was neither registered nor reflected in the property records by way of entry of the mortgagee’s name. The narrative sought to be advanced by Dr. Warunjikar is to say the least, Indu Bala Bose v. Manindra Chandra Bose, (1982) 1 SCC 20, paragraph 8 Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified unconvincing and unpalatable. Purported Mistake

95) I am also unable to accept the so-called mistake pleaded in the Petition and purportedly sought to be rectified in the subsequent affidavit with respect to the children and grandchildren. It is inconceivable that a person who claims to be a caretaker of the deceased, presumably for a prolonged period, during the presumed absence of family, and who is alleged to have advanced a large sum as a loan, intended to be a beneficiary of her property, would be unaware of her children, grandchildren and daughter-in-law. It clearly appears to be a fabricated narrative devised to serve her own self-interest.

96) Viewed in the totality of Dr. Warunjikar’s submissions, the attempt appears to be nothing short of a conspiracy to usurp the property by employing the machinery of this Court as an instrument.

97) It is difficult to believe that an individual entitled to a valuable property in Mumbai would wait nearly three decades to have it transferred in her name. Equally impossible is the suggestion that such a person would remain unaware of litigation concerning the same property initiated by the deceased’s successors. Against this backdrop, the contention that family disputes or other constraints prevented her from filing a Petition appears patently false.

98) The argument that all proceedings were initiated by Constituted Attorneys and that Dr. Feroze Duggan himself never verified or attested any document himself, will have no bearing on the present challenge to the grant of Probate in favour of the Petitioner. The contention is nothing else but a smokescreen, designed to deflect this Court’s attention from the core issue. The attempt to question the locus of the Petitioner is contrived strategy, aimed solely at clouding the record and diverting focus from the real matter at hand. Bar under section 213 of Indian Succession Act.

99) The contention that section 213 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 would bar the Petitioner, on the ground that they are neither legal representatives nor have obtained probate, may at first appear plausible. However, the submission overlooks the principle laid down in George Harris vs. Millicent Spencer (supra) where Court held that a person acquiring an interest in the estate after the Testator’s death, in case of intestacy, is entitled seek revocation. It also ignores the ruling in Dinanath Shah vs. Surati Devi (supra) where the Court observed that section 263 protects the interest of those adversely affected by the grant, particularly where knowledge of such grant arises only subsequent to its issuance. Claim of the alleged Wife 100) Likewise, the claim of the alleged wife of Feroze Duggan seeking Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified to challenge the locus of the Petitioner, is of no assistance. The Petitioner’s case is that Dr. Feroze Duggan was a bachelor. The burden, therefore, rests upon an alleged wife to establish her marriage before she can legitimately question the Petitioner’s locus. It raises a doubt more particularly when the Respondent makes an assertion that Dr. Feroze Duggan left India after the Mumbai bomb blasts, though uncertain whether it was on 12th March 1993, 11th July 2006 or 13th July 2011 and the other question; how did the wife marry Dr. Feroze Duggan “prior to his demise” in India when he was away. In any event, adopting the contention of the wife is not a ground available to the Respondent. Renouncing rights to Lady Duggan’s estate by Dr. Feroze Duggan

101) The contention that Dr. Feroze Duggan had renounced his rights to the Lawnside property is wholly untenable. It stands contradicted by the three-decade-long litigation culminating in a final adjudication declaring Dr. Feroze Duggan’s entitlement to the property under the Will of Lady Jena Duggan. It is equally inconsistent with assertion that he had given a “no-objection” on 15th February 1993 for transferring rights to the Respondent. The fact that Dr. Feroze Duggan litigated persistently for nearly three decades, against his aunt Jean Nusly Duggan renders the suggestion of such a prior renunciation wholly illogical and unacceptable.

102) Though, as a general rule, a Will cannot be invalidated merely Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified on account of language or grammatical errors, the present case must be viewed in context, considering the social standing of the deceased, and the fact that she had the access to the finest legal expertise, it is improbable that she would, within two days of executing a formal Will, prepare another Will independently or through an unknown advocate, with attesting witnesses of unverified and unfamiliar origin.

103) Some other questions that arise for consideration is: i. Why no steps were adopted against Jean Nusly Duggan who was residing in the property until she expired on 22nd November 2020? Assuming that the Respondent could not find the purported Will of deceased Lady Jena Duggan, the Respondent does not suggest that the mortgage deed too was misplaced. ii. Why were no steps initiated against removal of the Court Receiver appointed in 1998? iii. Does the Respondent have a right to challenge the authenticity of Dr. Feroze Duggan’s Will in absence of any caveatable interest? Conduct of Respondent during the present proceedings 104) Besides the above, it would be pertinent to note the conduct of the Respondent.

105) Despite Court Order dated 10th February 2025, the Respondent failed to deposit the Letters of Administration with the Testamentary

106) Every attempt was made to scuttle the hearing of the matter on one ground or the other as duly recorded in the orders on the Court record. Even costs imposed for adjournments were blatantly disregarded.

107) The Advocates conduct too was noted, which clearly demonstrate the intent of the Respondent to thwart hearings of proceedings and willfully breach the orders of the Court. The Orders from 10th February 2025 to 11th July 2025 are evidence to the blatant disrespect to this Court and its orders.

108) Referring to the retraction of statements in the subsequent Affidavit filed by the Respondent as noted above, I am convinced that false statements were made for obtaining the Letters of Administration with an intent to deceive the Court. In my view, the purported Will dated 6th April 1993 relied upon by the Respondent would certainly impact the administration of justice, cause a substantial injury to the Petitioners, and deprive the Petitioners of a very valuable property. The existence of such a document would compel Courts to require the parties to lead evidence to prove it.

109) Furthermore, having heard the arguments, I am convinced that in the interest of justice, an inquiry should be conducted into the Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified offences committed by the Respondent in relation to the forged Will dated 6th April 1993, annexed to the Letters of Administration granted by the Court. Reliance is placed on the recent judgement of this Court in the case of Hila Homi Dadi vs. Hoshang Jehangir Khan[7] which considers the law on section 340 read with section 195 of the Criminal Code Procedure in turn relying on the full bench of Supreme Court in State of Punjabi vs. Jasbir Singh[8] which decided the issue, that the purpose of a preliminary inquiry under section 340(1), Criminal Procedure Code was not to find whether a person is guilty or not but only to decide whether it was expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence. The ratio of the Full-Bench decision in Jasbir Singh’s (supra) squarely applies to the facts of this case.

110) In KD Sharma vs. SAIL[9] the Supreme Court held that suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy, it is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation. If a party does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the Court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the Court does not reject the Petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. It went on to state that the Court must initiate contempt proceedings for abusing the process 2025:BHC-OS:13699

Sumedh 902-mpt-240-2025-J.doc modified of the Court. The conduct of the Respondent in present case squarely fits to the one described in the said judgement. I am therefore inclined to initiate contempt proceedings against the Respondent.

111) I am inclined to also saddle the Respondent with exemplary costs as commended by the Supreme Court in the case of Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik vs. Pradnya Prakash Khadekar10 which held that Court must view with disfavour any attempt by a litigant to abuse the process and Courts of justice will not be allowed to be disrupted by litigative strategies designed to profit from the delays of the law. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below for ready reference:

112) In view of the above, I am convinced that the Letters of Administration granted in favour of the Respondent deserves to be set aside with exemplary costs. Accordingly, I pass the following order: i. the Petition is allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b), the Registrar of Sub-Assurances – City-I, is directed to cancel the registration of Deed of Transfer dated 17th June, 2022 registered under Sr. No. BBB-6974-2022 and record its cancellation in his books as per section 31(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. ii. the Respondent is directed to pay to the Petitioner a sum of Rs.. 25,00,000/- within a period of two weeks from the date of this order; iii. this Court takes Suo motu cognizance of the breach of the Order dated 10th February 2025 and directs the Registry to issue a show cause notice to the Respondent seeking explanation why no action should be taken against her for willful breach of the order dated 10th February 2025. iv. The Prothonotary and Senior Master through his representative shall lodge an appropriate Complaint before the jurisdictional Magistrate in respect of the offences punishable under sections 233, 236, 237, 336, 340 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 for the offences alleged to have been committed by the Respondent. Such Complaint shall be filed in accordance with section 379(1)(b) and (c) read with section 379(3)(a) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,

2023.

113) The Prothonotary and Senior Master to report compliance and status of the complaint every three months to this Court.

114) In view of the disposal of the Miscellaneous Petition No.240 of 2025, all interlocutory applications are disposed of accordingly.

115) List matter for compliance on 15th December 2025.

116) All concerned to act on an authenticated copy of this Order. (KAMAL KHATA, J.) Cases Referred:

1. (2008) 1 SCC 267.

2. AIR 1933 Bom 370 (at para 7).

3. (2003) 107 CWN 353 (Ref: Paras 6, 6.1, and 8.[2] of the judgment).

4. Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 4 SCC 1.

5. A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221: 2007 SCC OnLine SC 317.

6. Indu Bala Bose v. Manindra Chandra Bose, (1982) 1 SCC 20, paragraph 8.

7. 2025:BHC-OS:13699.

8. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1240.

9. (2008) 12 SCC 481.

10. (2017) 5 SCC 496: (2017) 3 SCC (civ) 189: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 211. Note: This Judgment is corrected/modified as per speaking to the minutes of Order dated 1st October 2025. The corrections are shown in italics.