Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Mumbai Mahanagarpalika Karyalayeen Karmachari Sanghatana

4.2. He would submit that another circular dated 16.04.2004 was also issued to Respondent – members which specified production of requisite certificate despite which there was no compliance on the part of Respondent – members. He would submit that these rules were not altered unilaterally as the same were effective from the year 2001 and in furtherance to which in the year 2003 candidates were selected as Clerks as per the said qualifications. He would submit that same is confirmed by Respondent’s - witness in his cross - examination that none of the twelve (12) members of Respondent complied with the 5 of 25 said condition within the stipulated period of 2 years. Hence, he would submit that there is no commission of unfair labour practice.

4.3. He would submit that Respondent – witness admitted that twelve (12) members of Respondent were appointed as Clerks as per circular dated 29.09.2003. He would submit that the said conditions were not hidden or introduced subsequently but were expressly made part of the recruitment process which was well within the knowledge of Respondent-members. He would submit that Respondent-members voluntarily applied under these very conditions and accepted appointments and are therefore estopped from now disputing the validity of such conditions. He would submit that the said circular was never challenged by them. Hence he would submit that if at all Respondent - members were aggrieved by new conditions / rules then the said members ought to have challenged the said circular / office order at the inception which is not done.

4.4. He would submit that such reversion was not punitive but a natural consequence of non-fulfilment of essential conditions of appointment. He would submit that after waiting for more than 3 years, the Municipal Commissioner passed order dated 30.08.2007 to revert the said 27 employees to their original posts as mentioned in the earlier circulars. 6 of 25

4.5. He would submit that contention of Respondent – members that relaxation was given to some employees to produce the certificate as required to hold the post of Clerk is not corroborated by any substantial or cogent evidence. All appointments were made strictly under these terms. Hence the said contention of Respondent – members is unsubstantiated and falls to the ground. He would submit that it is well settled that an employer is competent to prescribe qualifications for recruitment and judicial interference is permissible only if the rules are arbitrary, discriminatory, or contrary to statutory provisions, none of which are demonstrated here.

4.6. He would submit that the rules framed are not promotion rules for the post of Clerk and allied cadre however the posts were to be filled in by selection, by direct recruitment, appointing preferential treatment candidates and from selection amongst the lower cadre employees in Corporation in the ratio of 1:1:1. Hence, he would submit that the rules framed under the circulars / office order are purely recruitment rules prescribed for selection to the post of Clerk and not service conditions.

4.7. In support of his submissions he has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Pushpa Rani and Others.[1] wherein the Court has held that matters relating to creation, abolition of post, formation, structuring /

7 of 25 restructuring of cadres, prescribing the source / mode of recruitment, qualifications, criteria of selection, evaluation of service records of the employees fall within the exclusive domain of the employer. Also what steps should be taken for improving efficiency of the administration is also the preserve of the employer.

4.8. He has drawn my attention to Exhibit A at page No.5 of the Additional Affidavit filed by Petitioner – Corporation and would submit that Recruitment Norms of 1979 for the post of Clerk have been modified and revised by the Municipal Commissioner as per the power vested in him from time to time.

4.9. He would submit that these rules were applicable to all the candidates who applied for the post of Clerk. He would submit that appointment of candidates to the post of Clerk is made by selection on merits and not by promotion as seniority of the employee in his present post is not considered during the selection process.

4.10. He would submit that since these are purely recruitment rules prescribed for the post of Clerk, it is competent for the employer to frame the said rules which do not fall within the ID Act. Hence, provisions of Section 9A of the ID Act is not applicable to the present case, therefore the question of following process under Section 9A does not arise. 8 of 25

4.11. He would submit that period of probation i.e. 3 years was prescribed vide circular dated 07.02.2003 issued by the Competent Authority as per the provisions of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which has not been challenged by Respondent – members. He would submit that there is no fresh appointment in the department and 3 months probation as stated in the Model Standing Order would be applicable to those who are fresh appointees only. However in the present case there is no fresh appointment as the employees were working with the Corporation and selection was by way of promotion to the post of Clerk.

4.12. He has drawn my attention to the cross-examination of Petitioners – witness dated 01.06.2009, who worked as Chief Personnel Officer wherein he deposed that notice of change is not required as the said changes / amendments are made to recruitment conditions.

4.13. Mr. Bukhari, learned Senior Advocate has drawn my attention to the Additional Affidavit dated 24.07.2025 and 07.08.2025 filed by Ms. Surekha Ghadge, on behalf of the Petitioner – Corporation which has been taken on record. He would submit that total 127 candidates were appointed as Clerk as per circular dated 29.09.2003. However out of 127 employees 27 employees failed to submit the Certificates within the stipulated period and hence they were reverted 9 of 25 to their original post.

4.14. He would submit that it is pertinent to note that one employee namely Sandip Walawalkar was granted extension to submit the certificates as he was a State Level Sports Person as per sanction of the Commissioner. However he submitted the required Certificates on 15.09.2008 before completion of 1 year extended period. He would submit that 3 employees have been selected as Market Inspector in the Market Department on 16.04.2004. He would submit that out of the reverted 27 employees only 12 employees filed the said ULP Complaint through Respondent – Union.

4.15. He would further submit that Industrial Court has failed to consider that out of 12 employees involved in the present Petition, 4 employees were re-appointed as Clerk as they submitted required typing Certificates pursuant to order passed by this Court dated 21.04.2008. He would submit that one employee was appointed as Clerk on 26.04.2009 through recruitment for the year 2008 from lower cadre employees and one employee refused re-appointment. He would submit that one employee passed away on 30.04.2021. However one employee is superannuated from service on 01.06.2023. Hence, he would submit that effectively today only 4 employees have remained for prosecuting the present Petition. 10 of 25

4.16. In support of his submissions he has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court and this Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India, Bombay Vs. C.T. Dighe and Ors.[2] and Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Anr. Vs. Pandurang Dinkar Katkar and Ors.[3]

4.17. He would submit that in the facts of the present case there is no violation of Section 33 of the said Act and also there is no violation of service conditions by Petitioners in reverting the employees due to non-compliance of conditions stated in the circulars / office order.

4.18. He would submit that the allegation of unfair labour practices under Items 5 and 9 of Schedule IV is wholly misconceived. He would submit that Respondent-members were reverted solely for their own failure to comply with conditions of appointment, and not on account of any arbitrary or discriminatory act of Petitioners.

4.19. Hence, he would urge the Court to quash and set aside the impugned order and allow the present Petition.

5. Mr. Devdas, learned Advocate for Respondent – Union would support the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court. He would submit that the Industrial Court has rightly held that the unilateral imposition of new conditions amounts to alteration of service conditions without compliance of Section 9A of the ID Act. He would

3 1998 (4) L.L.N. 174 11 of 25 submit that Petitioners failed to issue any notice of change before altering the promotion/recruitment rules of 1979. Such unilateral changes are impermissible in law and constitute an unfair labour practice under Item Nos.[5] and 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act.

5.1. He would submit that Petitioners themselves admitted in evidence that the Rules of 1979 existed and governed promotions to the post of Clerk. He would submit that these Rules envisaged that 33% of Clerk posts would be filled by promotion from lower cadre employees. He would submit that the contention of Petitioners that these were only recruitment rules and not service conditions is contrary to record and has been rightly rejected by the Industrial Court.

5.2. He would submit that employees belonging to reserved/backward classes were recruited under preferential treatment schemes as mandated by the State Government. He would submit that for such categories, the condition of passing typing test and computer certificate was neither mandatory nor enforceable. He would submit that the Trial Court therefore correctly concluded that imposition of such conditions upon these employees was discriminatory and illegal.

5.3. He would submit that Petitioners’ own witness admitted that as per Government Resolution dated 01.12.1999, special training facilities were required to be provided to reserved category employees. 12 of 25 He would submit that no such training or infrastructure was extended. He would submit that Petitioners, having failed to discharge their statutory obligation, cannot now penalize employees for not producing certificates which they themselves were bound to facilitate.

5.4. He would submit that relaxation was arbitrarily granted to certain employees such as Mr. Sandip Walawalkar, while other similarly placed employees were reverted. He would submit that extension given to Mr. Walawalkar while some others were fully exempted from producing certificates. He would submit that such selective relaxation amounts to favoritism and discrimination, thereby establishing unfair labour practice under Item 5 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act.

5.5. He would submit that the comparative table annexed at page 5 of the affidavit clearly shows the appointment dates, certificate submission dates, and reversion dates of employees Sr. No. 1 to 11. He would submit that the said table demonstrates that while some employees were reverted despite timely compliance, others were retained despite delay. He would submit that such arbitrary treatment fortifies the finding of the Industrial Court.

5.6. He would submit that Petitioners themselves downgraded certain employees by placing them in the cadre of Dog Catching Sub- Inspector. He would submit that the affidavit clarifies that the post of 13 of 25 Dog Catching Sub-Inspector is inferior to Clerk, with a lower Grade Pay of Rs. 1950/- as against Rs. 2400/- for Clerk. He would submit that this action itself demonstrates the arbitrary and mala fide approach of Petitioners in demoting eligible clerks to an inferior cadre without justification.

5.7. He would submit that during the pendency of conciliation proceedings, Petitioners altered service conditions and effected reversions, which is expressly prohibited under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He would submit that consequently, such orders of reversion are void ab initio.

5.8. He would submit that Petitioners failed to prescribe or decide a uniform cut-off date for submission of certificates. He would submit that employees who submitted certificates prior to 21.04.2008 were not allowed to continue, whereas others who submitted later were permitted. He would submit that this inconsistency and arbitrariness, as reflected in the affidavit and tables annexed, vitiates the entire action of Petitioners.

5.9. In support of his submissions he has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Paradeep Phosphates Limited Vs. State of Orissa and Ors.4.

5.10. He would submit that the Industrial Court, after considering all material evidence, rightly directed that the employees be continued in the post of Clerks with consequential benefits, and further fixed a reasonable timeline for submission of certificates. He would submit that these directions balance equities and protect the rights of employees who were otherwise unfairly discriminated against.

5.11. Hence, he would submit that the impugned order be upheld and the Writ Petition be dismissed.

6. I have heard Mr. Bukhari, learned Senior Advocate for Petitioners, Mr. Devdas, learned Advocate for Respondent - Union and perused the record of the case. Submissions made by both the learned Advocates at the bar have received due consideration of the Court.

7. At the outset, it is seen that the controversy in the present Petition essentially concerns the reversion of Respondent-members from the post of Clerk to their original posts on the ground of nonsubmission of certain certificates, namely typing in Marathi and English and MS-CIT qualification. Petitioners contend that such conditions were recruitment norms duly notified through circulars, whereas Respondent–Union asserts that the same amounted to unilateral alteration of service conditions without compliance of Section 9A of the ID Act. Thus, the central issue is whether the imposition and enforcement of these conditions was legally valid or 15 of 25 whether it constituted unfair labour practice under Items 5 and 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, the main issue being whether such amendments are to be treated as mere recruitment norms or whether they amount to changes in existing service conditions.

8. It is seen from the record that Petitioners had issued Circulars dated 23.10.2001 and 29.09.2003 prescribing qualifications of degree, typing and computer certification. Respondent-members applied under these circulars and were appointed as Clerks. Petitioners relied upon evidence of their witness and office orders showing that Respondent-members were directed to comply within two years and that repeated reminders were issued. Despite this, several employees failed to produce the requisite certificates, leading to their reversion by order dated 30.08.2007. Prima facie, the contention of Petitioners that Respondent - members failed to comply with the stipulated conditions cannot be ignored.

9. However, Respondent-Union is justified in contending that Petitioners overlooked the Rules of 1979 which provided for filling 33% of Clerk posts by promotion from lower cadre employees. Once such promotional avenues were created, prescribing additional qualifications without issuing notice of change under Section 9A of the ID Act would amount to altering service conditions. The Industrial Court has rightly noted this aspect, and Petitioners themselves 16 of 25 admitted the existence of the 1979 Rules during evidence. Hence, the argument of Petitioners that these were only recruitment rules, and not service conditions, is not wholly sustainable.

10. It further emerges from the record that Petitioners extended selective relaxation in favour of certain employees. The instance of Mr. Sandip Walawalkar, who was granted an additional year to comply on the ground of being a State-level sportsperson is illustrative. In contrast other employees similarly placed were denied such extension. The comparative chart annexed to the Affidavit filed by Respondent reveals that some employees were reverted despite timely compliance, while others were continued despite delay. Such inconsistency reflects arbitrariness and amounts to discrimination prohibited under Item 5 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act.

11. It is also relevant to note that Respondent-members belonging to reserved categories were appointed under preferential treatment schemes mandated by Government policy. As per Government Resolution dated 01.12.1999, special training facilities were required to be provided to such candidates to enable them to acquire the necessary qualifications. Petitioners’ own witness admitted in cross-examination that no such training or infrastructure was ever provided. Having failed to discharge their obligation to facilitate compliance Petitioners cannot now penalize such employees for non- 17 of 25 acquisition of certificates. This omission vitiates the action of reversion.

12. It is seen that one employee was reverted to the post of Dog Catching Sub-Inspector a cadre lower in grade and pay-scale compared to Clerks. It is seen that Grade Pay of Clerk is Rs. 2400/-, whereas that of Dog Catching Sub-Inspector is only Rs. 1950/-. It is the contention of Respondent - Union that employee was made to work as a Clerk however he was not given the Grade Pay which is that of Clerk. This reflects arbitrariness and mala fides thereby constituting unfair labour practice.

13. Further, it is seen that Petitioners proceeded to revert employees during the pendency of conciliation proceedings. Section 33 of the ID Act expressly prohibits employers from altering service conditions to the prejudice of workmen during such pendency. The record indicates that reversions were effected notwithstanding the pendency of conciliation. Such action is clearly impermissible and renders the orders of reversion void ab initio.

14. Attention is drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India, Bombay (2nd supra) wherein Court has held that a chance of promotion is not a condition of service. The change in the chances of promotion cannot be said to be a change in the condition of service. Paragraph Nos. 11 to 13 are reproduced below for immediate reference, which reads thus: 18 of 25 "11. Having reached this conclusion we should have sent the matter back to the National Tribunal for ascertaining the scope of the dispute referred to it for adjudication, if the assumption were correct that the alterations in the promotional scheme introduced by Circular No. 6 amounted to changing the conditions of service of the complainants; if not, remitting the matter to the Tribunal will be unnecessary. What Circular No. 6 did was to relax for stenographers and personal assistants the conditions they had to satisfy to be able to sit for the test. If they passed the test, they would get into the panel along with employees belonging to the clerical cadre who also had passed the test. Vacancies in the posts of staff officer Grade A are filled by recruiting employees from the panel. The panel, it appears from the award, is a permanent one. How those who come out successful in the test are to be fitted in the panel has been stated earlier. The panel is made up of employees belonging to different cadres. It is difficult to see how alteration of the conditions of eligibility governing employees belonging to a particular cadre can amount to changing the conditions of service of employees who belonged to another cadre, assuming for the present that the said conditions were conditions of service. The changes introduced in respect of the stenographers and personal assistants may have an impact on the promotional prospects of employees from another cadre who are already in the panel or even of those who were expecting to be included in the panel, but it is not possible to agree that this would amount to changing their conditions of service. It is difficult to think of the conditions of service of an employee as including an implied right to prevent the employer from altering the conditions of service of other employees. In a given case such alteration may be inequitable, and a way may be found in the Industrial Disputes Act to redress the grievance of the employees affected thereby, but in this case the question is whether it amounts to altering the condition of service of the complainants. In Reserve Bank of Indiav. N.C. Paliwal[(1976) 4 SCC 838: 1977 SCC (L&S) 82: AIR 1976 SC 2345: (1977) 1 SCR 377] this Court upheld the validity of the combined seniority scheme introduced by the Reserve Bank for the clerical staff. The first para of the headnote to the report summarises the facts on which challenge to the scheme was based: “At every centre of the Reserve Bank of India there were five departments, the General Department and four Specialised Departments. There was a separate seniority list for the employees in each Department at each centre and confirmation and promotion of employees was only in the vacancies arising within their Department at each centre. There were two grades of clerks in each Department, namely, Grade I and Grade II. The pay scale of Grade I and Grade II clerks in all the departments were the same and their conditions of service were also identical. There 19 of 25 was automatic promotion from Grade II to Grade I and when a clerk from Grade II was promoted to officiate in Grade I, he got an additional officiating allowance of Rs 25 per month. There were also several categories of non-clerical posts in the General as well as Specialised Departments, and their pay scale was the same as that of Grade II clerks. In view of expanding activities in the Specialised Departments, there were greater opportunities for confirmation and promotion for employees in the Specialised Departments than in the General Department. This gave rise to dissatisfaction amongst employees in the General Department and they claimed equal opportunities by having a combined seniority list for all the clerks for confirmation and promotion. The Reserve Bank, sought to justify the separate seniority lists on the ground that the work in each department was of a special nature and intertransferability was undesirable and hard to achieve. As a result of the recommendation of the National Tribunal, however, the Reserve Bank introduced the optee scheme of 1965 as a first step towards equalization of opportunities. Under the scheme, the option to go over to the Specialised Departments was confined to confirmed Grade II clerks and officiating Grade I clerks in the General Department. If he exercised the option, he was eligible to be selected. If he was selected, he would be entitled to be absorbed only as Grade II clerk in one of the Specialised Departments with the result that if he was an officiating Grade I clerk in the General Department at the time of the exercise of the option, he would lose the benefit of officiation in Grade I in the General Department as also the monetary benefit of Rs 25. His seniority in the cadre of Grade II clerks in the Specialised Department in which he was absorbed would be determined on the basis of his length of service calculated from the date of his recruitment if he was a graduate when he joined service, or from the date of his graduation if he became a graduate whilst in service.”

12. It was argued inPaliwal case that the combined list was invalid because it discriminated against the petitioners vis- à-vis other Grade II clerks who had opted under the optee scheme of 1965. This Court held: [SCC p. 851: SCC (L&S) p. 95, para 13] “The contention of the petitioners was that some of the Grade II clerks who had opted under the optee scheme of 1965 were promoted as Grade I clerks, while the petitioners continued as Grade II clerks 20 of 25 and before their turn for promotion could arrive, the combined seniority scheme was brought into force and that prejudicially affected their promotional opportunities and thus brought about unjust discrimination between persons belonging to the same class. This contention has no force and must be rejected. We have already discussed and shown that it was competent to the Reserve Bank to introduce the combined seniority scheme for the purpose of integrating the clerical staff in all the departments and the Reserve Bank was not bound to wait until all the transferee Grade II clerks under the optee scheme of 1965 were promoted as Grade I clerks in their respective specialised departments. There was no such assurance given by the Reserve Bank when it introduced the optee scheme of 1965. What it did was merely to equalise the opportunities of Grade II clerks in the general department with those of Grade II clerks in the specialised departments. The Reserve Bank did not undertake that it will not take any steps for bringing about total integration of the clerical services until all the transferee Grade II clerks were promoted. The Reserve Bank was entitled to introduce the combined seniority scheme at any time it thought fit and the validity of the combined seniority scheme cannot be assailed on the ground that it was introduced at a time when some of the transferee Grade II clerks still remained to be promoted and was discriminatory against them. It may be that some transferee Grade II clerks had already obtained promotion as Grade I clerks by the time the combined seniority scheme was introduced, while others like the petitioners had not. But that cannot be helped. It is all part of the incidence of service and in law, no grievance can be made against it.” These observations in Paliwal case are equally applicable to the case before us. It was competent for the Bank to introduce a combined promotional scheme for the clerical staff, stenographers, and personal assistants and the Bank was not bound to wait until all employees belonging to the clerical cadre whose names were already in the panel when Circular No. 6 was introduced had been promoted as staff officers Grade

13. The grievance of the complainants really relates to the changes affecting their chances of promotion. We have earlier quoted from the charters of demand to show that the complainants themselves looked upon the alterations made by Circular No. 6 as affecting their “chances of promotion”. It is well settled that a rule which affects the promotion of a person relates to his condition of service but this is not so if what is affected is a chance of promotion only. This Court in Mohd. Shujat Ali v.Union of India [(1975) 3 SCC 76: 1974 SCC (L&S) 454: AIR 1974 SC 1631: (1975) 1 SCR 449] held: [SCC p. 95: SC (L&S) p. 473, para 15] “But when we speak of a right to be considered for promotion, we must not confuse it with mere chance of promotion — the latter would certainly not be a condition of service... that though a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, mere chances of promotion are not.” In Shujat Ali case the respondents went down in seniority and it was urged that this affected their chances of promotion. In Shujat Ali reference was made to an earlier decision of this Court,State of Mysore v. G.B. Purohit [ CA No. 2281 of 1965, decided on 25-1-1967] where also it was held that though a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, mere chances of promotion are not and that a rule which merely affects chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service. The facts of Purohit case and what was decided in that case have been summarised inShujat Ali case as follows: (SC p. 95, para 15) “What happened in State of Mysore v.G.B. Purohit [ CA No. 2281 of 1965, decided on 25-1-1967] was that the district-wise seniority of Sanitary Inspectors was changed to State-wise seniority and as a result of this change, the respondents went down in seniority and became very junior. This, it was urged, affected their chances of promotion which were protected... This contention was negatived and Wanchoo, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of this Court observed: It is said on behalf of the respondents that as their chances of promotion have been affected their conditions of service have been 22 of 25 changed to their disadvantage. We see no force in this argument because chances of promotion are not conditions of service.”

15. With regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India (2nd supra) particularly paragraph Nos. 11 to 13 reproduced hereinabove, it is evident that the changes complained of cannot be construed as alteration of the existing service conditions of the Respondent–members. The Supreme Court has in clear terms drawn a distinction between a “right to be considered for promotion”, which constitutes a condition of service, and a mere “chance of promotion”, which does not. The grievance in the present matter essentially pertains to the impact of the revised eligibility norms on the promotional chances of the employees aspiring for the post of Clerk. However, such chances of advancement cannot be elevated to the status of service conditions. The substantive rights of the Respondentmembers in their existing cadre touching pay, tenure, or continuity of service remain unaffected. What stands revised is only the criteria for selection to the higher post of Clerk, which by the ratio in RBI v. C.T. Dighe (2nd supra), cannot be treated as alteration of service conditions attracting the rigour of Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

16. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that Respondent members were aware of the terms and conditions stipulated in the circulars at the time of their selection. They voluntarily applied under those conditions and accepted appointments subject thereto. Several 23 of 25 employees did not even attempt to obtain the requisite certificates within the prescribed period of two years, or even within the extended probation of three years. To that extent, Respondent - members cannot entirely escape responsibility for non-compliance. I am informed that only 4 employees as alluded to hereinabove stand affected.

17. The Industrial Court, while rightly identifying the unfair labour practices committed by Petitioners, erred in directing continuation of all employees as Clerks with consequential benefits. Such a blanket direction disregards the distinction between those who complied and those who did not. Equity demands that only those who have complied or who are willing to comply within a reasonable further period should be entitled to continuation while those who persistently fail to comply cannot be granted relief as a largese. In that case it would be wholly unfair to those who struggled to attain eligibility and qualification.

18. Therefore, on a holistic consideration of the record, the relief granted requires modification and molding by this Court in the interest of justice as well as equity. Petitioners cannot be allowed to revert employees arbitrarily or discriminatorily but at the same time, Respondent - members cannot be permitted to enjoy the benefits of the post without complying with the basic legitimate qualifications. The employees will have to acquire the said basic qualifications. Justice requires a balance between the two positions. 24 of 25

19. The impugned judgment dated 04.12.2009 passed by the Industrial Court, Mumbai in Complaint (ULP) No.447 of 2007 is upheld however it is partly modified to the extent as directed below:-

(i) Employees who have already complied with the requirement of submitting the eligibility certificates shall continue to work as Clerks with all consequential benefits and Corporation shall comply with the order;

(ii) Employees who have not yet complied with the requirement of submitting the eligibility Certificates are given a further period of one (1) year from today to qualify and produce the requisite certificates. On such compliance and submission of certificate, they shall be restored to the post of Clerk, if they achieve the qualification and they shall be entitled to all consequential benefits thereafter under the law; and

(iii) Employees who fail to qualify and comply even within the aforesaid extended period of one year shall stand reverted to their original post without any further reference to the Court.

20. Resultantly, the Writ Petition No.1039 of 2010 is partly allowed and disposed of in the above terms. [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ] Ajay 25 of 25 TRAMBAK UGALMUGALE