Sony Pictures Networks India Limited v. State of Maharashtra

16. Dr. Tulzapurkar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, in support of his above submissions placed reliance on the following decisions:-

(i) National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Deputy Inspector

(ii) State of U. P. & Ors. vs. Lalji Tandon (Dead) Through

(iii) Ashish Kumar vs. Deputy Commissioner (Stamp) & Ors.[3]

(iv) Gopal Swarup Chaturvedi vs State of UP & Ors[4]

(v) Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Pune & Anr. vs.

17. In the light of above, Dr. Tulzapurkar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner prayed for quashing of the Order- In-Appeal dated 20 January 2020, and consequently demand notice issued pursuant thereto. Submissions of the Respondents:-

18. Ms. Chavan, learned for the respondent Nos.[1] and 2 supported the orders passed by the original authority and the appellate authority. She submitted that under clause 3C of the lease, fourth, fifth and sixth terms have been defined as “extended term”. She, therefore, relied on the decision in the case of Union Bank of India Vs State of Maharashtra in WP (L) 7211/2020 and more particularly paragraphs 9, 21, 23, 25 etc., and submitted that the case of the petitioner is covered by the term “extended period” and consequently the decision in the case of Union Bank of India (supra) squarely Writ Petition No.5814 of 2022 (Bombay)

AIR 2010 (Allahabad) 132 2006 SCC OnLine All 1157 2016 (3) Mh.L.J.436 applies to the facts of the present case. She submitted that the Stamp Act is a fiscal statue and a strict construction is required to be given to the provisions of the Stamp Act. She also relied on Explanation II in support of her submission that the second nine year period should also be counted for determining the quantum of stamp duty and, therefore, the respondents are justified in levying stamp duty under Article 36 (iii) of schedule I. She further submitted that there is no dispute with respect to the market value of the property and the only dispute is whether the present lease falls under Article 36(ii) or Article 36(iii). She laid emphasis on the phrase “with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise” used in Article 36(ii) and (iii) and read with clause 3C, she defended the order challenged in the present petition.

19. Both the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents, except making the above submissions, have not made any other submissions.

20. I have heard learned senior counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents and with their assistance have perused the documents brought to my notice. Issue:-

21. The issue which arises in the present petition is whether Indenture of Lease executed on 19 December 2014 should be stamped under Article 36(ii) of Schedule I to the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 or under Article 36(iii)? This would in turn depend on whether indenture of lease dated 19 December 2014 is to be treated as lease for nine years or eighteen years. Both the parties agree that there are no direct precedent interpreting Article 36 (ii) and (iii) post 2005 amendment, which arises in the present petition. Analysis & Conclusions:- Provisions of the Stamp Act:-

22. The relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 for the present matter are reproduced hereunder:- “2 Definitions (l) “instrument” includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded, but does not include a bill of exchange, cheque, promisory note, bill of lading, letter of credit, policy of insurance, transfer of share, debenture, proxy and receipt; (n) "lease" means a lease of immovable or movable (or both)property, and includes also,-

(i) a Patta;

(ii)a Kabulayat, or other undertaking in writing not being a counterpart of a lease to cultivate, occupy or pay or deliver rent for immovable property; (iii)any instrument by which tolls of any description are let; (iv)any writing on an application for a lease intended to signify that the application is granted;

(v) a decree or final order of any Civil Court in respect of a lease:

Provided that, where subsequently an instrument of lease is executed in pursuance of such decree or order, the stamp duty, if any, already paid and recovered on such decree or order shall be adjusted towards the total duty leviable on such instrument; (na) "market value", in relation to any property which is the subject matter of an instrument, means the price which such property would have fetched if sold in open market on the date of execution of such instrument] [for the consideration stated in the instrument whichever is higher;]

3. Instrument chargeable with duty. Subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I, the following instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in Schedule I as the proper duty therefor respectively, that is to say-

23. The relevant Article 36 of Schedule I to the Maharashtra Stamp Act is reproduced hereunder:- “Article 36. LEASE, including under lease or sub- lease and any agreement to let or sub-let or any renewal of lease,— Description of Instrument Proper Stamp Duty Where such lease purports to be —

(i) for a period not exceeding five years.

The same duty as is leviable on a conveyance under clause (a), (b) or (c), as the case may be, of article 25, on 10 per centum of the market value of the property.

(ii) for a period exceeding five years but not exceeding ten years, with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise. on 25 per centum of the market value

(iii) for a period exceeding ten years but not exceeding twentynine years, with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise. (c), as the case may be of article 25, on 50 per centum of the market value

(iv) for a period exceeding twentynone years or in perpetuity, or does not purport for any definite period, or for lease for period exceeding twenty-nine years, with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise. on 90 per centum of the market value of the property.; Explanation I — Any consideration in the form of premium or money advanced or to be advanced or security deposit by whatever name called shall, for the purpose of market value be treated as consideration passed on. Explanation II — The renewal period, if specifically mentioned, shall be treated as part of the present lease. Explanation III — For the purpose of this article, the market value, for the instruments falling under section 2(n)(iii)(Toll Agreements) and article 5(g-e) (Hire Purchase agreement), shall be the total contract value and they shall be chargeable to duty same as under clause (a) of article 25. Phrase: “…with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise”:-

24. Article 36(ii) provides that the lease should purport to be for a period exceeding five years but not exceeding ten years, with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise. The phrase “with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise” would mean that the agreement is renewal during the period specified therein, i.e. five to ten years under the same instrument and on terms and conditions specified therein for not only the initial period but also for the renewal period. For example, the initial period may be for six years with a renewal clause of second term of three years and the terms and conditions agreed upon for the second term of the three year period are also specified in the same instrument. There may be a clause in the said lease agreement that after the expiry of six years period the parties may terminate, or they may continue beyond six years and the terms and conditions for the second three year period is also specified in the said instrument, then it would be a case of lease agreement with clause for renewal contingent or otherwise. It could also be a case where there is automatic renewal after the expiry of the initial period of six years and terms and conditions for the second term of three years are expressly specified and agreed upon. What is important to note is that the very same instrument which specifies more than one period governs the parties for the period subsequent to the expiry of the first period also, since terms are agreed upon for both the periods.

25. Now let me take a case of a lease instrument after providing for terms and conditions including the renewal clause for ten years, it further provides that after the expiry of the aggregate ten year period, the parties would be free to mutually agree upon a further period post expiry of the initial ten years and on mutually agreeable new terms and conditions the lease agreement can be renewed, then in that case, Article 36(iii) which provides for a period exceeding ten years but not exceeding 29 years with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise would not be applicable. This is so because for the period after expiry of the initial ten years, the original lease agreement does not provide for the terms and conditions for the period post the expiry of ten years but it will be the new mutually agreed terms and conditions between the parties which will govern and for which a separate instrument of lease will have to be executed because the earlier lease does not provide for the terms and conditions post expiry of the initial period of ten years.

26. The phrase “with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise” used in Article 36(ii) and 36(iii) would mean an automatic renewal without the parties having to agree upon fresh terms and conditions. For example, if a lease is executed for a lock in period of six years with a renewal clause of one year each for two terms thereafter and the terms and conditions of the first six years and the other two years are expressly agreed upon in that very document and after six years parties can terminate then such a lease document will be covered by the phrase “for a period of exceeding five years but not exceeding ten years, with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise”. It would mean that on expiry of six years, although there is a provision for automatic extension for one year each, the parties may terminate on the expiry of six years. In the instant case, there is no automatic renewal of the lease agreement executed on 19 December 2014 after the expiry of the first nine year period, but after the expiry of the nine year period, if the parties agree on fresh terms and conditions then a fresh document will be executed for a second nine year period. The renewal after expiry of first nine years is an option given to the petitioner-lessee and on terms and conditions to be mutually agreed upon in writing and to match a third party offer. Therefore, insofar as the period after expiry of the first nine years is concerned, it cannot be said that the parties executed a lease agreement on 19 December 2014 for a period of first nine years and second nine years aggregating to eighteen years.

27. Assuming the phrase “with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise” used in Article 36(ii) and 36(iii) is to be interpreted to mean automatic or dependent then also the period post the expiry of the first nine years would not be governed by this phrase because for the second nine year period parties have not agreed upon the terms and conditions in the present lease. The said phrase would apply only for those periods where the parties have agreed upon the terms and conditions, viz. rent, deposit, etc. Therefore, even on this count, the respondents are not justified in taking recourse to the said phrase for arriving at eighteen years period for determining the stamp duty under Article 36(iii) of Schedule I to the Stamp Act.

28. The expression “with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise” may be a comprehensive phrase to cover both scenarios- renewal depending on specific conditions and renewal being automatic or unconditional. Its interpretation would depend on a reading of the lease document as a whole which would show the intention of the parties. The said phrase cannot be read in isolation but should be read along with Clause 3C of the Lease Agreement. The said Clause 3C provides that on expiry of the first nine years period, if the petitioner-lessee desires, then on a mutually agreed terms and conditions the lease can be renewed. Therefore, there is uncertainty expressed in the present document with respect to intention of the parties to renew the lease after expiry of the first nine years’ period. Therefore, the phrase “with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise” has to be read in the context of Clause 3C of the Lease Agreement and if read so, in my view, the second period of nine years cannot be considered for determining the stamp duty payable under Article 36 and consequently the determination of stamp duty of the present lease deed would fall under Article 36(ii) of Schedule I to the Stamp Act. The phrase “with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise” is to be read in the context of Clause 3C which expresses the intention of both the parties that a fresh lease deed post the expiry of nine years would be executed on fresh terms and conditions. This is so because for the second nine year period, as observed by me above, there is no agreement between the parties on the terms and conditions which would govern them.

29. If the option is conditional that is subject to fresh terms as to rent or otherwise being agreed upon between the lessee and the lessor or if the lease provides that the same can be renewed for a further period if mutually to be agreed upon between the parties, the option is almost illusory because in such a case only if both the parties agree upon the terms and conditions of the new lease, the same can be granted or renewed. If the lease is renewed for a further period either under an option or by mutual consent, a fresh document of lease will have to be executed and a mere notice of renewal or agreement for extension may not be sufficient. Clause 3C provides for fresh terms in writing. If the agreement is subject to a contingent event which was indeterminate and it is not possible to know whether the event will happen or not, there cannot be a present lease. In considering the effect of the document one must enquire whether it contains unqualified and unconditional words of present demise and includes the essential terms of a lease. Generally, if rent is made payable under an agreement from the date of its execution or other specified date, it may be said to create a present demise. As in the case of construction of other documents so in the construction of an agreement of lease regard must be had to all the relevant and material terms, and an attempt must be made to reconcile the relevant terms if possible and not to treat any of them as idle surplusage.

30. Column 1 of the Schedule I to the Stamp Act describes the instrument and column 2 provides for quantum of stamp duty. The instrument in Article 36 of Schedule I describes lease to include under lease or sub-lease or any agreement to let or sub-let “or any renewal of lease” and it further provides for lease to be classified based on the number of years in clauses (i) to (iv). Clause (ii) and (iii) provides for certain period of years followed by …… “with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise”. The Schedule makes a distinction between “renewal of lease” and “lease with the renewal clause contingent or otherwise”. Clause (ii) and (iii) would apply to a case where after lock in period or initial period, the parties are given an option to renew the existing lease and the terms and conditions for the period covered by renewal is also specifically agreed upon in that very lease. The phrase “contingent or otherwise” would mean that the renewal is at the option of the parties but the terms and conditions are already agreed upon in that very agreement for the renewal period. This is in contradiction to the phrase “any renewal of lease”. The phrase “any renewal of lease” would mean that after the lease period is over, the parties would execute a fresh lease, if they desire to renew on terms and conditions to be mutually agreed upon after the expiry of the present lease and such terms and conditions are not specified in the instrument giving such option.

31. Applying the above distinction to the facts before me, the Indenture of Lease dated 19 December 2014 does provide for terms and conditions of renewal for second and third terms of three years each but it does not provide for terms and conditions for renewal after the expiry of first nine years. Therefore, the Indenture of Lease dated 19 December 2014 would be covered by Article 36(ii) and period of first nine years will have to be considered for determining the quantum of stamp duty since the terms and conditions for renewal of lease after the expiry of the first nine years is not specified. If the parties agree to renew the lease on mutually agreed terms and conditions on the expiry of the first nine years then that fresh instrument will be covered by the phrase “any renewal of lease”. If the contention of the respondent is accepted then it would run contrary to phrase “any renewal of lease” and said phrase will be otiose. Therefore, in my view, the petitioner is justified in contending that the present Indenture of Lease dated 14 December 2014 is rightly stamped under Article 36 (ii) and not Article 36 (iii). Analysis of Charging & other Sections:-

32. Section 2(l) of the Stamp Act defines “instrument” to include every document by which any right or liability is or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. It is also a settled position that the charging Section 3 of the Stamp Act levies duty on the instrument and the duty is calculated as per Schedule I to the Stamp Act and same is based on a period of lease and consideration specified for the said period. If a new document has to be executed for creating, transferring, extending, etc. of any right or liability then it is the new instrument on which stamp duty will have to be paid. In the instant case, post the expiry of first nine years, parties have agreed to execute fresh instrument based on mutually agreed terms and therefore post expiry of said period new instrument will be liable for stamp duty and in fact it is stamped on 11 December 2023.

33. Section 2(n) defines “lease” to mean lease of immovable or movable property. If on expiry of the aggregate period specified in the first lease document, parties have to execute a new instrument then as per Section 3 of the Stamp Act it is the second instrument which would be subjected to stamp duty for the period post expiry of the term specified in the first lease document.

34. In the instant case, on a perusal of the Indenture of Lease dated 19 December 2014, relevant clauses of which are reproduced above, the first lease period for which there is an agreement on terms and conditions specified therein between the parties is for nine years consisting of three terms of three years each. The lease rent for the three terms of three years each is specified in this agreement. Post expiry of the nine years, clause 3C of the lease agreement states that in case the petitioner-lessee desires to renew this lease deed for a further three terms of three years then the petitioner-lessee shall give prior intimation to the lessor of its intention to renew the lease on such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed between the parties in writing and such intention has to be communicated 12 months prior to the expiry of the negotiation period. In the said clause, there is also a provision of the right of last refusal by which the lessor would inform the petitioner-lessee about the terms and conditions offered by a third party and an option is given to the petitioner-lessee to match the said terms and conditions. If the lessee matches the terms and conditions of the third party and intends to renew then the lessor and lessee will execute fresh lease document and if not, then the lessor will be free to enter into an agreement with such third party on same terms as notified by the lessor to the lessee.

35. In my view, on expiry of the first nine year period, the provisions relating to the second nine year period are dependent upon new terms and conditions on which there has to be an agreement between the lessor and the petitionerlessee or to match the terms and conditions offered by a third party. In the present lease agreement with which I am concerned, post the expiry of the first nine year period there is no mention as to what would be the rent, what would be the deposit and what would be the other terms and conditions, which are very necessary for the period post the expiry of the first nine years. Therefore, it cannot be said that the lease agreement executed on 19 December 2014 is for a period of eighteen years. The period of the lease dated 19 December 2014 for the purpose of the Stamp Act is only for nine years for which there are express terms and conditions agreed and specified therein and for the next nine years the terms and conditions have to be mutually agreed upon and that too, if the lessee intends to renew. The renewal post expiry of the first nine years is not automatic but same is subject to what is specified in clause 3C.

36. Clause 3A of the lease provides for an initial term of 3 years as “first term” and thereafter as per clause 3B the petitioner-lessee has a right to automatically renew and extend the lease for an additional term of three years as “second term’ and prior to the expiry of the second term for a further additional term of three years as “third term” and for each of these terms, the terms and conditions like rent, deposit etc. as set forth in this deed would apply.

37. However, clause 3C of the lease agreement refers to the situation post expiry of the third term, i.e. on expiry of the first nine years. Clause 3C states and gives an option to the petitioner-lessee to renew the lease deed for a further term of three years as “fourth term”, further additional three years as “fifth term” and another term of three years as “sixth term” and the fourth, fifth and sixth terms together are defined as “extended term”. However, the option has to be exercised by the lessee by prior intimation and on terms and conditions to be mutually agreed between the parties in writing and by complying with duties and obligations specified in clause 3C of the lease. Merely because the second nine year term is defined as “extended term” it does not mean that in the absence of mutually agreed terms and conditions there is an extension of lease dated 19 December 2014 or there is an automatic renewal. It is also not the intent of the parties to extend or automatic renew on same terms and conditions.

38. The petitioner-lessee is also given a right to match a third party offer in the circumstances mentioned in clause 3C. The petitioner-lessee has an option to match a third party offer on same terms and conditions of the third party and as notified by the lessor to the petitioner-lessee. This clause, i.e. 3C clearly indicates the intention of the parties that post the expiry of the first nine year period, the parties if mutually agree will enter into a fresh deed for the second nine year period. Therefore, although clause 3C provides for fresh renewal, but it is not on the same terms and conditions which are referred to in clause 3A and/or 3B or that the terms for fourth, fifth or sixth terms are agreed upon, but it would be on fresh terms and conditions to be mutually agreed upon in writing as required by clause 3C. Therefore, the contention of the respondent to aggregate the first nine year and second nine year periods and arrive at eighteen years for the purpose of Article 36(iii) cannot be sustained. In my view, therefore, the respondents are not justified in contending that the Indenture of Lease dated 19 December 2014 is governed by Article 36(iii) and the petitioner is liable for deficit stamp duty.

39. Section 2(na) defines “market value”, which is relevant for determining the amount of stamp duty provides for percentage of stamp duty to be calculated based on the market value of the property. Section 2(na) provides that the market value in relation to any property which is the subject matter of an instrument means the price which such property would have fetched if sold in open market on the date of execution of such instrument or the consideration stated in the instrument, whichever is higher. If in the first lease agreement, there is no consideration provided which is agreed upon between the parties for the period post expiry of the aggregate term provided in the first lease instrument and there is a renewal clause based on terms and conditions to be mutually agreed upon, then it contemplates that the first lease agreement is not chargeable to stamp duty by considering the period post expiry of the first aggregate term specified in the lease agreement since post the expiry of the first aggregate term there is no agreement between the parties on consideration for the period post thereto. The comparison should be between market value and consideration should be specified for both the first term and the second term, then only clause (iii) can be said to be applicable which in the present case is absent.

40. The charge of duty on a conjoint reading of Section 3 read with Article 36 of Schedule I is on the market value of the property or the consideration specified in the instrument, whichever is higher. Therefore, if the contention of the respondents is to be accepted then in the lease agreement dated 19 December 2014 the consideration should have been specified for all the eighteen years. In the instant case, the consideration specified, viz. rent is for only the first nine years and no consideration is specified for the next nine years but the consideration for second nine years is to be agreed upon between the parties on the expiry of the first nine years. Therefore, this also indicates that specifying the consideration for all the eighteen years is necessary for invoking Article 36(iii) so that the definition of market value under Section 2(na) which requires comparison can be satisfied for determining duty under Article 36(iii), which in the instant case is not satisfied because there is no consideration specified for the second nine year period. Therefore, even on this count, Article 36(iii) cannot be made applicable.

41. Section 17 (1) (d) of the Registration Act provides for compulsory registration of lease document and the said section further provides that the rent should be specified for the lease. The registering authority will not permit registration unless the stamp duty on the document is correctly paid and such calculation of stamp duty is based upon the rent for the period specified in the document since same has to be compared with market value. Therefore, on a harmonious reading of the Stamp Act and the Registration Act, it would be necessary that the period for which the renewal is provided in the agreement should expressly state the quantum of the rent and/or consideration for such renewed period. If the rent or consideration is not agreed upon for the renewal period then, that period cannot be counted for the purpose of Article 36 of the Stamp Act. Since in the instant case, for the period post first nine years, there is no agreement between the parties on the rent or consideration and even the renewal is based on terms to be mutually agreed upon, the present Indenture of Lease dated 19 December 2014 cannot be stamped under Article 36 (iii) of the Stamp Act.

42. The present lease agreement is not between related parties and it is not the case of the respondent that the consideration specified therein is at a suppressed value. The genuineness of the agreement has not been disputed. In my view, for a comparison between the market value and the consideration specified in the agreement, so that the higher of the two can be considered for determining stamp duty it is sine-qua-non that there has to be an agreed rent or consideration between the parties for the second nine year period and unless the rent or consideration is agreed upon in the document of 19 December 2014 for the second nine year period, the stand of the respondents to stamp the document under Article 36(iii) cannot be accepted. Analysis of Explanation II:-

43. Explanation II to Article 36 provides that the renewal period, if specifically mentioned shall be treated as part of the present lease. In my view, the said Explanation would apply for considering the first three terms of three years each in which there is automatic renewal every three years and for which terms are agreed upon. Post the expiry of the first nine years, it cannot be said that the second nine year period will form a part of the present lease since for the second nine year period the terms and conditions are not agreed upon and same as observed by me above is at the option of the petitioner-lessee and subject to compliance and obligations specified agreed in clause 3C of the lease. The phrase “renewal period” in Explanation II would mean renewal period for which terms and conditions are agreed upon and not where same are to be mutually agreed in future. The phrase “ shall be treated as present lease” also indicates that it is a case of present demise of lease for which terms and conditions are already agreed upon in the deed containing renewal clause. Therefore, Explanation II would also not assist the case of the respondents to contend that Article 36(iii) would be applicable. Other Analysis:-

44. The petitioner has filed an additional affidavit dated 8 August 2025 and brought on record a fresh Indenture of Lease executed on 11 December 2023 between the petitionerlessee and the lessor on which stamp duty is paid as per Article 36(i) on the market value mentioned in the fresh Indenture of Lease since fresh lease is for only five years. The said stamp duty is accepted by the respondents. This also indicates that the parties never intended that the first lease agreement would govern the relationship between them after expiry of the initial nine years, but the second nine year period will be governed by fresh terms and conditions which now they have expressed in the Indenture of Lease dated 11 December 2023 and that too for only five years. Although this document did not form a part of the records of appeal since same is a subsequent event, which indicates intention of the parties to the lease and further being inter-se between petitioner and respondents and in absence of any objection, same is considered by me for present adjudication. This is also a public document and therefore rightly not objected to by the respondents for consideration by this Court.

45. There is a distinction between a “lease” and an “agreement to enter into an agreement of lease”. A lease is creation of right in immovable property made for certain time period and for a price whereas an agreement to enter into a lease is merely an agreement that such lease shall be entered into at a future date. An agreement to enter into an agreement to lease in the future based on terms and conditions to be agreed upon in the future cannot operate as a present lease. An instrument which only binds the parties, one to create and the other to accept a lease thereafter is an executory agreement for a lease but the legal relationship of lessor and lessee is not created. In other words, an agreement between the parties which entitles one of them merely to claim execution of a lease from the other on terms to be agreed upon in the future cannot be construed as a lease or an agreement to lease. The instant Indenture of Lease dated 19 December 2014 insofar as for the period post expiry of the first nine years is concerned and in view of clause 3C, is merely an agreement to enter into an agreement to lease on mutually acceptable terms on expiry of the first nine years and not a lease therefore, Article 36(iii) is not applicable, because for all eighteen years the instrument should be a lease or agreement to lease which is absent in the present case.

46. Let me test the contention of the respondents by taking the assistance of Article 60 of Schedule I to the Stamp Act which provides for determination of stamp duty on transfer of lease by way of assignment. In such a case the stamp duty is to be calculated as per Article 36 for the remaining period of lease. This contemplates that for the assignment for the remaining period of lease, the lessee should have a lease in its favour for the said period. If there is no lease in favour of the lessee for the remaining period, then there cannot be any assignment. In the instant case, for the period post expiry of the first nine years, on the date of execution of the present lease, i.e. 19 December 2014 there is no lease in favour of the petitioner- lessee for the period post expiry of nine years under this indenture. If the contention of the respondent- State is accepted then it will amount to granting of lease in favour of the petitioner-lessee for the second nine-year period which would be contrary to the agreement entered into between the petitioner-lessee and the lessor that post expiry of the first nine year period, the second nine year period would be governed by mutually agreeable terms and conditions to be agreed upon before the expiry of the first nine year period. Therefore, even on this count, the contention of the respondent cannot be accepted since same would be contrary to clause 3C of the lease agreement and such an interpretation which goes contrary to the agreement cannot be accepted. Analysis of Precedents:

47. In this connection, it is important to note certain paragraphs of the decision of this Court in the case of Union Bank of India (supra). Although the terms and conditions of the agreement which were the subject matter of the said writ petition were different than that before me but what is relevant is the analysis of the phrase “renewal” used in Article

36. Relevant paras of the said decision are reproduced hereunder:- “9. Clause VII of the Indenture, which happens to be the pivotal clause and is the bone of contention between the contenders i.e. the petitioner on the one hand and the State Government on the other hand, reads thus:

“VII. The Lessor doth hereby covenant with the Lessees that if the Lessees pay the rent hereby reserved regularly and if the Lessees have observed and performed all the covenants and conditions herein contained, the Lessor shall, on lessees’ request extend the period of the Lease on the same terms and conditions herein contained for a further period not exceeding FIVE years from the expiration of the term hereby granted.”

10. The Lease Deed with the aforesaid covenant was sent for adjudication to the Collector of Stamps i.e. respondent No.4 under Section 31 of the Stamp Act. Upon adjudication by the Collector about the stamp duty to be levied, a certificate was issued under Section 32 of the Stamp Act under the signature of respondent No.4 on the Lease Deed. The stamp duty was charged under Article 36(ii) of Schedule I to the Stamp Act and the contention in the petition is to the effect that since the lease was for a period of 10 years, the Collector properly adjudicated the stamp duty payable and the certificate endorsed on the Lease Deed under Section 32 of the Stamp Act evinced due payment of stamps as determined and it is pleaded that accordingly, the petitioner paid the stamp duty. The case set out in the petition is that on execution of the Lease Deed, the Lessee i.e. the petitioner took over possession of the said property and was in continuous use of the premises for undertaking it’s operation.

22. On a reading of Entry No.36, which determines the stamp duty to be paid upon the lease depending upon it’s nature, contemplates a lease for a period exceeding 5 years but not exceeding 10 years with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise and necessarily, it would be subjected to stamp duty at the rate of 25 per centum of the market value of the property whereas, if the lease is for a period exceeding 10 years but not exceeding 29 years, with renewal clause contingent or otherwise, the duty leviable is 50 per centum of the market value of the property.

24. Both Entry Nos.(ii) and (iii) of Article 36 with which I am concerned, since the dispute is, in which entry, the Lease Deed in question would fall, contemplates the original period of lease not exceeding a particular term with a renewal clause contingent or otherwise. The term ‘renewal’ is indicative of grant of fresh lease. Merriam English Dictionary defines the word ‘renewal’ as – To make like new, to do again and repeat; to grant or obtain an extension of. The Cambridge English Dictionary defines the word ‘renewal’ as – the act of making an official document, agreement or rule continue for more time; the act of making an agreement continue for an extra period of time after it has come to an end. The Dictionary meaning of the term ‘new’ thus postulate a situation in which something begins after having stopped for a period of time.

25. There is a succinct distinction between renewal and an extension, as in the case of renewal, new lease would come into existence, but in extension, the same lease continue to remain in force during an additional period by performance of stipulated act. A lease extension is an addendum to the original lease, while a lease renewal is a new lease agreement entirely. A renewal option allows for a lease to apply for a specified time period, but the lease can be extended for another term if agreed upon by the participating parties. Renewal options may have specifications or conditions such as when Lessee must let the landlord know, if they are renewing the lease. Lease renewal creates a new contract whereas, a lease extension is simply an appendage to the original lease and it’s terms. In simple words, in case of renewal, new lease is required while in case of extension, the same lease continues to be in force during additional period by performance of the stipulated act. In other words, the word ‘extension’, when used in it’s proper and usual sense in connection with a lease, means prolongation of the lease.

26. It is true that renewal of lease and it’s extension are two distinct aspects. Extension, in no manner, creates fresh/new lease but renewal does. Clause VII has used the word ‘extension’ and contemplates the extension of period of lease on the same terms and conditions for a period not exceeding 5 years from expiration of the term, already granted. This clause clearly indicates prolongation of lease, but not a renewal of lease, which would contemplate a new contract.

27. In case, the clause was of renewal, a new lease agreement would be required to be executed, but clause VII contemplates extension of period of lease by further period of 5 years and this extension is permissible on the Lessees’ request. The Lessee, upon making a request for extension of a term of lease, from the period of it’s expiration, shall be granted the same by the Lessor, provided the Lessee has adhered to the terms and conditions of the lease and performed all covenants and conditions stipulated therein. If the conditions and covenants are adhered to, and the Lessee makes a request for extension, the Lessor is duty bound to grant such an extension, subject to the same terms and conditions. The aforesaid clause thus contemplates extension / renewal of existing lease and as per Explanation II, the said period is liable to be treated as part of the present lease, which covered a period of 5 + 5 i.e. below 10 years. Since the extension, though not worded to be automatic, is at the Lessee’s request and subject to the Lessee following the terms and conditions of the lease must be granted in his favour. Clause VII contemplates extension of lease for a further period of not more than 5 years and would clearly fall within the ambit of Explanation II, which talks of presence of specific clause in the Lease Deed itself and, therefore, it shall be construed as part of the lease, meaning thereby, the lease period of 5 + 5 + 5 years, which is exceeding 10 years, but less than 29 years. Entry Nos.(ii) and (iii) stipulate a renewal clause either contingent or otherwise. Therefore, a clause like clause VII, in the Lease Deed, which though is contingent on certain stipulation would squarely fall within the purport of ‘renewal clause contingent or otherwise’.

28. For deciding the stamp duty, the court is not bound by the exterior facade of an instrument, but it shall look into it’s substance. It is a trite position of law, that duty is not levied upon the transaction but it is upon the instrument. Maharashtra Stamp Act is a taxation statute and must be interpreted strictly and amongst two equally possible views, meaning in favour of the subject must be given effect to, and the interpretation to be given will depend upon the terms of the document and not upon the evidence of the instrument. The language and purpose of a document may help to determine the true nature of the transaction comprised in the document and the document has to be construed in it’s entirety and the intention of the parties must be discerned from the reading of the entire document. The Stamp Act is a special measure, enacted to secure revenue for the State on certain classes of instruments. The provisions of the Stamp Act are, therefore, to be necessarily conceived and interpreted in the interest of the Revenue. Unlike the Indian Stamp Act, which contains a provision governing the stamp duty payable on lease by prescribing a period of which the lease is executed, the Maharashtra Stamp Act specifically provides for an explanation, where in order to avoid the mischief, it contemplates that if a renewal period is specifically mentioned in the lease period, it shall be treated as part of the present lease.

29. With a clause like clause VII, which contemplates extension of lease for further period of 5 years, respondent No.3 has rightly held it to be falling within clause (iii) of Entry No.36 since the period of the subject lease, is 15 years, with the aid of the same, read in reference to Explanation I appended to the said section. The reading of clause VII makes it explicit that the period of further extension of 5 years is expressed and since it specifically contemplates an extension of the existing period of 5 + 5 years, there is no need to execute a fresh lease, and, therefore, the total period of lease is conceptualized as 15 years. The mischief which was sought to be avoided is rightly plugged by the authorities and the petitioner is directed to pay the deficit levy of stamp duty, after following the due process prescribed under the Stamp Act, 1958 considering that clause VII of the Lease Deed is an express clause and the period of renewal is definite, subject to the same terms and conditions of the original Lease Deed.

48. In the above decision, the submission of the respondent- State that there was an extension of the first period of five years for a further five years on same terms and conditions and, therefore, the aggregate period of ten years should be considered was accepted. In the instant case before me, the terms and conditions for the second nine year period are not specified and, therefore, the analysis of the phrase “renewal” explained by the above decision supports that the case of the petitioner does not fall within Article 36(iii).

49. The aforesaid decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in the case of Union Bank of India (supra) is distinguishable. In the facts of that case clause VII which is reproduced in paragraph 9 of the decision expressly stated that the extended period would be governed by the same terms and conditions therein contained for a further period not exceeding 5 years from the expiration of the term thereby granted. In the present case, in clause 3C for the second 9 year period, there is no agreement on the date when the present lease document was executed i.e. 19 December 2014 on terms and conditions but on the contrary clause 3C expressly states that for the second nine year period the renewal will be on terms and conditions in writing to be mutually agreed upon and other conditions specified in the said clause. Therefore, in my view, the decision is distinguishable on facts. However, the said decision as observed by me above, analyses the phrase “renewal” and brings out difference between “renewal” and “extension” and since the case of the petitioner falls within renewal it supports the case of the petitioner. The said decision reiterates that for renewal, fresh instrument is to be executed which in the instant case has been done and stamp duty has been paid thereon.

50. There is no dispute that fiscal statute has to be construed strictly and unless a subject falls within the four corners of the statue, no tax or duty can be levied. In the instant case analysed by me above, the contention of the respondent that the lease document dated 19 December 2014 falls in Article 36 (iii) is not accepted. Therefore, by applying the strict construction principle, the contention of the respondent is required to be rejected.

51. A very similar issue came up for consideration before the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ashish Kumar vs. Deputy Commissioner (Stamp) (supra) although the Article therein was differently worded but analysis made by said decision supports the views expressed by me hereinabove. In these decisions of Allahabad High Court what is emphasised is execution of fresh document for renewal of lease which supports the view I have expressed in the case before me that new terms and conditions post expiry of first nine years as per 2014 Indenture will be agreed upon on mutually acceptable terms and conditions in writing. The relevant paras of the said decision are as under:- “2. Article 35 of the of Schedule 1-B of the Act provides for stamp duty on the lease as under: "35. Lease, including an under-lease or sub-lease and any agreement to let or subject - (a) whereby such lease the rent is fixed and no premium is paid or delivered - (i) … … … (ii) … … … (iii) … … … (iv) … … … (v) … … …

(v) where the lease purports to be for a term exceeding twenty years but not exceeding thirty years. The same duty as a Conveyance No.23 clause (a), for a consideration equal to six times the amount or value of the average annual rent reserved.

(vi) where the lease purports to be for a term exceeding thirty years or in perpetuity or does not purport to be for any definite term The same duty as a Conveyance No.23 clause (a), for a consideration equal to market value of the property which is the subject of the lease

6. The brief facts giving rise to the above question is that the document of lease, being document No. 836 of 2005 dated 23-4-2005 was executed by one Rahul Goel in respect of plot No. 1246 area 1296 square meter in favour of the petitioner Ashish Kumar. The lease is for a term of 29 years six months and it also contains a clause 3(b) which provides for automatic renewal of the lease for a further similar period. The aforesaid renewal clause is reproduced herein below: "b) The LESSOR agrees that at the expiration of the said terms of 29.[6] years this lease will automatically and without any further act of the parties hereto shall stand renewed for a further similar period, unless either party shall, prior to the expiration of the last mentioned term, have given to the other party 3 calendar month's previous notice in writing of its intention not to renew the lease. The renewed lease will be on a monthly rent as may be mutually agreed between the parties subject to the same covenants, conditions and agreement as are herein contained including the present covenant for renewal. It being clarified that at the time of such renewal the parties shall execute fresh lease deed."

11. I have perused the entire lease deed which has been filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. It purports to lease out the demise premises in favour of the petitioner for a period of 29 years six months commencing from 1st April, 2005 at a monthly rent of Rs. 1,500/-which is liable to be increased after 5 years at the rate of 5% per annum. It also specifically provides that the period of the lease would expire on 30th September, 2034. On a plan reading, it is a lease for a specific period which is less than 30 years.

12. The renewal clause provides that the lease will automatically be renewed without any further act of the parties for a similar period. The aforesaid renewal though automatic is not free from conditions. One of the conditions which goes with it is that either of the party may before expiry of the lease by giving 3 months previous notice in writing may express his intention not to renew the lease. Therefore, the automatic renewal of the lease is not unfettered and in effect is not virtually automatic. There would be no renewal of lease if parties are not agreeable to it and express their intention in the manner provided above.

13. Even otherwise, as a general rule, the parties are always entitle to revoke/cancel the lease before the expiry of its term and such revocation is not forbidden by any of the conditions of the lease.

14. The lease deed also contains a provision giving option to the lessor to purchase the premises at the fair marked value. There is also a possibility of land being acquired during the subsistence of the lease. In both these eventualities also there would be no question of renewal or automatic renewal of lease on the expiry of the term of the lease. Accordingly, the renewal clause in the lease deed, even if it provides for automatic renewal, is not certain until and unless the renewal takes place.

15. In this view of the matter, as the lease deed at the time of registration is only for a limited period of 29 years 6 months it shall remain valid for the period so specified unless the period expired or is renewed when the occasion arrives. Accordingly, it is chargeable to stamp duty as per the aforesaid period only under Article 35(a)(v) of Schedule 1-B of the Act and not under Article 35(a)(vi) by treating it to be automatically renewed.

16. It is also helpful to note that the renewal of a lease deed is not an extension of the period of lease. It is a fresh lease in itself independent of the previous one. Therefore, the period of the earlier lease as well as of the renewed lease cannot also be clubbed together for the purposes of levying stamp duty. The two documents have to be treated independently and chargeable to stamp duty independently.” (emphasis supplied)

52. Similarly the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case Gopal Swarup Chaturvedi vs State of UP & Ors. (supra) also supports the case of the petitioner and the relevant paras of the said decision read as under:- “11. Renewal of a lease is nothing but a grant of a fresh lease. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Durga Chand Kaushish, has held that while considering such an issue the terms and conditions incorporated in the lease have to be examined as a whole and effect has to be given to each and every term incorporated therein. The Court observed that it is called a renewal simply because it postulates the existence of a period lease which generally provides for renewed as of right. In all other respects it is really a fresh lease. Renewal is merely used to enable the Government to given preference to the previous, permit holders who are to be treated on a different footing from the new applicants.

12. In Gajraj Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that renewal is a fresh grant, though it brings life to the previous lease or licence granted as per the existing appropriate provisions of the statute and though it is not a vested or accrued right, an application for renewal has to be dealt with according to the law in operation after compliance with the preconditions. There is a distinction between the right acquired or accrued and a privilege, hope and expectations to get a right. However, a right to apply for renewal and to get a favourable order would not be deemed to be a right accrued, unless some positive acts are done.

13. In Pravash Chandra Dalul v. Viswanath Banerjee, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with a case under the provisions of Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, explained the distinction between extension and renewal of lease, observing that extension.

14. Similar observations that renewal is nothing but a fresh lease between the parties have been made by the Courts as is evident from the judgments in Dasarathi Kumar v. Sarat Chandra Ghose: Mahadeb Ram Kahar v. Tinkori Roy², and Chotey Lal v. Sheo Shankar.

15. The word 'renewed' has been used by the legislature in the provisions of section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and it had been interpreted by the Courts time and again as grant of fresh lease.

16. In Kai Khushro Bezonjee Capadia v. Bal Jerbal Hirjibhoi Warden, the Federal Court considered the provisions of section 16 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and explained the meaning of 'renewed', observing that it is nothing but a new lease drawn into existence by the bilateral act of the lessor and lessee.

17. Renewal has been given the meaning in various Dictionaries as to begin again, to repeat, to make again, to substitute new for, to acquire again, to restore, reestablish, to set up again, bring back into use or in existence, to take up again or recommence, to replace by some new or fresh thing of the same kind or a fresh supply. Thus, renewal of lease is nothing but a grant of lease for a fresh period.

18. In R.M. Mehta v. HPFM Co. Ltd., the Madras High Court considered a similar issue and placed reliance upon the Dictionary meaning of the "renewal of lease" given in Ballentine's Law Dictionary 2nd Edn. wherein it has been defined as under:- "There is a distinction between a stipulation in a lease to renew it for an additional term and one to extend it. In that stipulation, to re-new requires the making of a new lease, while stipulation to extend does not."

19. Thus, in view of the above, the inescapable conclusion that follows is that renewal of lease means grant of a fresh lease.

53. To the same effect is another decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Bachan Smarak High school vs. Additional Commissioner Nyayik Lucknow Division Lko. & Ors.[6] and the relevant para 19 reads as under:- “19. Accordingly, keeping in view the judgment of this Court in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (supra) along withs the case of Gopal Swaroop Chaturvedi (supra), what emerges is that admittedly, the lease-deed executed by the petitioner, was for the period of thirty years but clause-5 also provided for a renewal for the same period with the mutual consent of parties. However, the mutual consent was required for execution of a separate lease-deed. As such, once the lease-deed itself stipulates that it was executed for a period of thirty years yet also contains a renewal clause as such keeping in view the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gopal Swaroop Chaturvedi (supra) as well as Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (supra), the renewal has to be read separately inasmuch as, the lease-deed was to be examined as a whole and the effect has to be given to each an every term incorporated therein. In the instant case, the term incorporated in the lease-deed, was for a period of 2022 SCC OnLine All 876 thirty years and as such, the stamp duty payable was clearly in terms of the Schedule-1 Article 35 (a) (v) of the Act, 1899 and not in terms of the Schedule-1 Article 35 (a)

(vi) of the Act, 1899 as has been imposed by the competent authority by the impugned order dated 11.6.2010. As the said matter has not been considered in the proper perspective while rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner by the appellate authority dated 19.1.2013 as such, it is apparent that both the orders impugned order dated 11.6.2010 and 19.1.2013 are legally unsustainable in the eyes of law.”

54. The distinction between “renewal” and “extension” is explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 14 in the case of Provash Chandra Dalui & Anr. vs. Biswanath Banerjee & Anr.[7] which reads as under:- “14. It is pertinent to note that the word used is 'extension' and not 'renewal'. To extend means to enlarge, expand, lengthen, prolong, to carry out further than its original limit. Extension, according to Black's Law Dictionary, means enlargement of the main body; addition of something smaller than that to which it is attached; to lengthen or prolong. prolong. Thus extension ordinarily implies the continued existence of something to be extended. The distinction between 'extension' and 'renewal' is chiefly that in the case of renewal, a new lease is required, while in the case of extension the same lease continues in force during additional period by the performance of the stipulated act. In other words, the word 'extension' when used in its proper and usual sense in connection with a lease means a prolongation of the lease. Construction of this stipulation in the lease in the above manner will also be consistent when the lease is taken as a whole. The purposes of the lease were not expected to last for only 10 years and as Mr A. K. Sen rightly pointed out the schedule specifically mentioned the lease as "for a stipulated period of 20 years". As these words are very clear, there is very little for the court to do about it.”

55. In State of Maharashtra & Ors. vs. Atur India Pvt. Ltd.[8] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

28. In Hemanta Kumari Debi case a petition setting out the terms of an agreement in compromise of a suit stated as one of the terms that the plaintiff agreed that if she succeeded in another suit which she had brought to recover certain land, other than that to which the compromised suit related, she would grant to the defendants a lease of that land upon specified terms. The petition was recited in full in the decree made in the compromised suit under Section 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. A subsequent suit was brought for specific performance of the said agreement and it was resisted on the ground that the agreement in question was an agreement to lease under Section 2(7) and since it was not registered it was inadmissible in evidence. This plea was rejected by the Privy Council on the ground that the document did not effect an actual demise and was outside the provisions of Section 2(7). In coming to the conclusion that the agreement to lease under the said section must be a document which effects an actual demise the Privy Council has expressly approved the observations made by Jenkins, C.J., in the case of Panchanan Bose v. Chandra Charan Misra in regard to the construction of Section 17 of the Act. The document with which the Privy Council was concerned was construed by it as "an agreement that, upon the happening of a contingent event at a date which was indeterminate and, having regard to the slow progress of Indian litigation, might be far distant, a lease would be granted"; and it was held that 'until the happening of that event, it was impossible to determine whether there would be any lease or not'.

56. Dr. Tulzapurkar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner is justified in relying upon the decision of the Nagpur Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.5814 of 2022 in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. (supra), where on a very similar fact situation the High Court held that the period post the expiry of the initial 15 years cannot be treated as extension of the lease since as per clause (d) parties are given a discretion, if desirous of seeking renewal by making a request in writing to the lessor and on the rent to be mutually agreed upon. Relevant paras of brief order reads as under: “4. Thus, the whole controversy revolves around the clause (d) of the lease deed, which reads thus: Clause (d): “In case the Lessee shall be desirous of obtaining a renewal of the Lease of the demised premises for a further period of nine/ten/fifteen years and communicate its intention to the Lessor then and in such case the Lessor shall grant to the Lessee a renewal of the Lease of the demised premises for a further period of nine/ten/fifteen years on the same covenants, terms and conditions as herein contained except that the monthly rent which shall be decided at the rate mutually agreed upon.”

5. The above referred clause (d) does not speak about the renewal of lease for further period of 15 years after the lapse of initial period of 15 years.

6. The said clause (d) gives discretion to both the parties, more particularly to the lessee that if he is desirous of seeking renewal of lease for nine/ten/fifteen years he may make such request in writing to the lessor.

7. However, in any case said clause cannot be treated as extension of lease for further period of 15 yearsafter the expiry of the initial period of 15 years.

8. In the circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that, the respondent No.1 has committed error in considering the lease period as of 30 years (15+15). Whereas, it is only for 15 years.”

57. Dr. Tulzapurkar is also justified in relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lalji Tandon (Dead) Through Lrs. (supra) and more particularly paragraph 13 where the Supreme Court has explained the difference between “renewal” and “extension” of a lease. The Supreme Court observed that in the case of extension, it is not necessary to have a fresh deed of lease executed, as the extension of lease for the term agreed upon shall be a necessary consequence of the clause for extension. However, option for renewal consistent with the covenant for renewal has to be exercised consistently with the terms thereof and, if exercised, a fresh deed of lease shall have to be executed between the parties. Failing the execution of a fresh deed of lease, another lease for a fixed term shall not come into existence though the principal lease inspite of the expiry of the term thereof may continue by holding over for year by year or month by month, as the case may be.

58. In the instant case before me and on a perusal of various clauses of the agreement since after the expiry of the first nine year period the parties would be agreeing upon fresh term and conditions in writing which are mutually acceptable, a fresh deed of lease will have to be executed and in fact which they have executed and, therefore, the case of the petitioner does not fall within extension of lease, but would fall into execution of fresh deed of lease. Therefore, the contention of the respondent to treat the first nine years and subsequent nine years aggregating to eighteen years as total period of lease under lease document dated 19 December 2014 is to be rejected.

59. The contention of the respondent that the petitioner has executed fresh lease deed on 11 December 2023 and paid stamp duty will be subject to the benefit of Section 4 of the Stamp Act and should not be a factor for reversing the impugned order is required to be rejected. Section 4 provides for applicability in case of several instruments used in single transaction whereas in the present case before me it is not a case of single transaction but two different transactions namely first transaction of lease is for nine years period for which terms and conditions are agreed upon with a renewal option post expiry of nine years on new terms and conditions and second transaction of 11 December 2023 by which lease is created on fresh terms and conditions for five years. Therefore, provisions of Section 4 of the Stamp Act is not applicable to the facts of the present case before me.

60. The contention that object of 2005 amendment to Article 35 is to increase tax revenue cannot be a justification to levy duty on instrument under Article 36 (iii) if, as observed by me, the instrument falls under Article 36 (ii).

61. In view of above discussion and for all the above reasons the respondents are not justified in demanding deficit stamp duty by relying upon Article 36(iii) but the petitioner is justified in paying stamp duty as per Article 36(ii) since terms and conditions for the first nine years are agreed upon in Indenture of lease dated 19 December 2014 and for the next nine years fresh lease deed will have to be executed on mutually agreed terms and conditions at that point of time i.e post expiry of first nine years and in fact the parties have indeed executed fresh lease deed and paid stamp duty thereon. Relief Allowed:-

62. In view thereof, the petition is allowed in terms of amended prayer clause (a) which reads as under:pertaining to the impugned Orders dated 20.01.2020 (Exhibit.K-1) of Respondent No.4 dismissing the Appeal No.47 of 2017 of the Petitioner and confirming the demand for differential stamp duty of Rs.64,75,500/- and Notice dated 24.09.2020 issued by Respondent No.2 (Exhibit.K-3) and after going into the validity and legality

63. The Petition is allowed and Rule is made absolute. In view thereof, the Interim Application does not survive and is disposed of.

WRIT PETITION NO.3962 OF 2022

64. Since both the parties have agreed that reasoning given in above Writ Petition No.3960 of 2022 would also apply to the present petition, for the reasons stated above, the present petition is also allowed in terms of amended prayer clause (a) which reads as under:pertaining to the impugned Order dated 20.01.2020 (Exhibit.O-1) of Respondent No.4 dismissing the Appeal No.46 of 2017 of the Petitioner and confirming the demand for differential stamp duty of Rs.64,75,500/- and Notice dated 24.09.2020 issued by Respondent No.2 (Exhibit.O-3) and after going into the validity and legality

65. The Petition is allowed and Rule is made absolute. In view thereof, the Interim Application does not survive and is disposed of. (Jitendra Jain, J) Designation: PA To Honourable Judge