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ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 2655 OF 2023
Pawan Hans Limited …..Petitioner
:
Aviation Karmachari Sanghatana and Ors. ….Respondents
Mr. Lancy D’souza with Ms. Deepika Agarwal i/b Mr. V. M. Parkar for the Petitioner.
Mr. K. S. Bapat, Senior Advocate with Mr. G.R. Naik, Mr. Uresh
Sawant and Ms. Rutika Naik i/b M/s. G.R. Naik & Co. for the
Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
Mr. Mohit Jadhav, Addl. GP for the Respondent No.3/State.
ORAL JUDGMENT
1) Pawan Hans Limited has filed the present Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India taking exception to the order dated 27 June 2022 passed by the learned Authority under Section 33-C (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act) directing issuance of a Recovery Certificate for amount due to the Respondent-Union amounting to Rs.5,80,75,659/- with interest at the rate of 10 % per annum.
2) Petitioner is engaged in the business of providing Helicopter services and functions under the Ministry of Civil Aviation of the Government of India. It has employed about 275 regular employees and MONDAY, 17 NOVEMBER 2025 305 fixed-term contract employees. It appears that there are two unions formed by the regular employees viz. All India Civil Aviation Employees Union (AICAEU) and Civil Aviation Technical Employees Union (CATEU). It appears that the Petitioner executed Memorandum of Settlement dated 21 August 2019 with AICAEU agreeing for wage revision from 1 January 2017. Similarly, a separate settlement was executed with CATEU on 21 August 2019 for wage revision with effect from 1 January 2017. While the wages of the regular employees of the two Unions were revised, it appears that the benefit of wage revision was not extended to the contractual employees. Respondent No.1 is a Union espousing the cause of the contract employees. Respondent No.1-Union therefore approached Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) under Section 33-C (1) of the ID Act for issuance of Recovery Certificate complaining that the benefit of pay revision declared vide office orders dated 22 May 2018 and 22 August 2019 were not extended to the members of the First Respondent-Union on the ground that they are contractual employees. In their application, the First Respondent-Union relied on judgment of the Apex Court dated 17 January 2020 in Civil Appeal No. 353 of 2020 and contended that the Apex Court has treated them on par with the regular employees. Upon receipt of notice, Petitioner appeared before the learned Authority and filed its reply on 21 April 2022. Petitioner contended in its reply that the order passed by the Apex Court for payment of Provident Fund benefits on par with regular employees has been duly complied with. After considering the reply filed by the Petitioner, the learned Authority proceeded to pass order dated 27 June 2022 directing issuance of Recovery Certificate for recovery of amount of Rs.5,80,75,659/- together with interest. Order dated 27 June 2022 is subject matter of challenge in the present Petition.
3) When the Petition was first moved on 15 November 2022, the accounts of the Petitioner were frozen for making recoveries in pursuance of the impugned order. This Court therefore passed following order on 15 November 2022: Mr. D’souza, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the current bank account No.70010200000208 of the petitioner in the Bank of Baroda, Vile Parle Branch has been freezed by the competent authority for recovery of amount as per recovery certificate dated 06.07.2022. Mr. Naidu submits that dues of the workers-employees as on 31.10.2022 is approximately Rs.7,66,27,466/-. The petitioner is a public sector undertaking under the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In my opinion, instead of freezing the bank account in its entirety, Bank of Baroda could be directed to permit the petitioner to operate the bank account No.70010200000208 by retaining an amount of Rs.6,50,00,000/-. This would be subject to further orders that would be passed by this Court upon hearing the parties and the same is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. The petitioner is permitted to operate the aforesaid bank account in excess of Rs.6,50,00,000/-.
4) Thereafter on 30 October 2023, this Court virtually found no merits in the Petition after considering the Judgment of the Apex Court and confined the same only to the extent of computation of correct amount of dues under the impugned order. This Court passed following Order: In view of the above, the only short point required for consideration is whether the computation / calculation of arrears of salaries of the Respondent Union as claimed by them in their Claim Application dated 10.03.2022 is in consonance with the Memorandum of Settlement and whether they have rightly claimed the same. My attention is drawn to the order dated 15.11.2022 passed by this Court, inter alia, directing the Petitioner to retain an amount of Rs. 6,50,00,000/- in its bank account with respect to the above liability in the present case. Today the claim is in excess of Rs. 8,19,42,000/-. Considering the statement made by Mr. D’Souza, it is evident that the Petitioner would like to place on record the documentary evidence to support its calculation with respect to arrears of salaries of the workmen as claimed by them in the Claim Application dated 10.03.2022. I see substance in Mr. D’Souza’s submissions only to the extent of allowing the Petitioner to place on record any material evidence in the form of any documentary evidence with respect to refute the claim of the Applicants in Claim Application dated 10.03.2022 in so far as the calculation and computation of arrears of salaries is concerned. Though Mr. D’Souza would submit that the Recovery Officer would be required to decide and adjudicate the claim under Section 33- C(1), I expressly reject that submission of Mr. D’Souza considering the decision of the Supreme Court which is alluded to herein above and only so far as calculation and computation of the said claim is concerned considering that the said claim today is in excess of Rs. 8,19,42,000/-, I am inclined to permit the Petitioner to place on record before the Competent Authority its reply to the Claim Application dated 10.03.2022 subject to Petitioner securing the entire amount of Rs. 8,19,42,000/-. Hence, until the next date, action under Recovery Certificate be stayed. Mr. D’Souza seeks time to take appropriate instructions. At his request, stand over to 09.11.2023.
9. Needless to state that Petitioner would have to secure the differential amount between Rs. 6,50,00,000/- and Rs. 8,19,42,000/- in order to enable this Court to pass any further directions on the next date and this order of stay of the action under the Recovery Certificate is only given until 09.11.2023.
5) In pursuance of the Order dated 30 October 2023, Petitioner has secured the amount of Rs.8,19,42,000/- with Bank Guarantees.
6) Mr. Lancy D’souza, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner would submit that the impugned order passed by the learned Authority is without jurisdiction. Taking me through the provisions of Section 33-C (1) of the ID Act, Mr. D’souza would contend that the jurisdiction can be exercised by the learned Authority only when it is established that money due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or award or under the provisions of Chapters VA or VB of the ID Act is payable. He would submit that in the present case, there is no settlement executed between the Petitioner and Respondent-Union and therefore the learned Authority did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application preferred by the Union under Section 33-C (1) of the ID Act. He would submit that the two settlements dated 21 August 2019 executed with AICAEU and CATEU do not apply to the members of the First Respondent-Union. Therefore, the learned Appellate Authority ought to have first conducted an inquiry as to whether there is a settlement between the Petitioner and the First Respondent-Union. He would submit that even if Petitioner did not contend before the learned Authority that no settlement was executed with the First Respondent-Union, it was the duty of the learned Authority to make an inquiry into the aspect of existence of settlement as the same constitutes a jurisdictional fact. Relying on judgment of the Apex Court in Balraj Taneja & Anr. Vs. Sunil Madan and Anr.1, Mr. D’souza would submit that the learned Authority ought to have conducted an enquiry into the existence of a settlement even in absence of a contention to that effect raised in the reply filed by the Petitioner. He would rely upon judgment of the Apex Court in Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad Vs. Indian Oil in support of his contention that a settlement executed outside the conciliation proceedings does not apply to all the workers and its application is restricted only to the workers who are members of the union who have signed the settlement. Relying on judgment in Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories Vs. Dy. Labour Commissioner and Ors.[3] Mr. D’souza would contend that once the existence of right under Section 33-C(1) of the ID Act is disputed, the only remedy available to the party concerned is to raise an industrial dispute. He would submit that in the present case, an industrial dispute has in fact been raised by the First Respondent-Union and which is referred vide order dated 16 August 2019 to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-2, Mumbai. That the First Respondent- Union suppressed the factum of pendency of industrial dispute and mischievously filed an application under Section 33-C(1) before the learned Authority. He would rely upon judgment of the Apex Court in A.V. Papayya Sastry and Ors. Vs. Govt. of A.P. and Ors.[4] in support of his contention that a party indulging in suppression of facts is not entitled to be granted any relief.
7) So far as the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 17 January 2020 is concerned, Mr. D’souza would submit that the same has limited application in relation to payment of benefits under the Provident Fund Act. That the judgment has duly been complied with by the Petitioner and the same cannot be a reflection on the demand of the First Respondent-Union for parity in wage revision. He would submit that complicated questions of law cannot be decided in an enquiry under Section 33-C (1) of the ID Act and the same can only be raised and decided in an industrial dispute. On above broad submissions, Mr. D’souza would pray for setting aside the impugned order.
8) The petition is opposed by Mr. Bapat, the learned senior advocate appearing for the First Respondent-Union. He would submit that the learned Authority has rightly exercised jurisdiction under Section 33-C (1) of the ID Act in absence of any dispute being created by the Petitioner. That in its reply filed before the learned Authority, Petitioner never disputed existence of settlement. He would submit that the case of the First Respondent-Union is squarely covered by the findings recorded by the Apex Court in para- 6.[4] of the judgment dated 17 January 2020 where the members of the First Respondent-Union are treated on par with the other regular employees of the Petitioner. That the action of the Petitioner in restricting application of wage revision only to regular employees is in the teeth of the judgment of the Apex Court. He would submit that the Reference ordered vide order dated 16 August 2019 does not relate to demand of wage revision implemented by the Petitioner vide agreements dated 21 August 2019 and that therefore pendency of the said Reference can have no relation to the proceedings filed under Section 33-C(1) of the ID Act. Mr. Bapat would accordingly submit that no case is made out for interference in the impugned order.
9) In rejoinder, Mr. D’souza would submit that once a Reference is made in relation to disparity in wage revision implemented in two classes of employees for a particular period, the said reference would cover even the dispute relating to implementation of wage revision relating to subsequent period as well. That therefore the dispute relating to wage revision effected vide agreements dated 21 August 2019 would also be covered by the pending industrial dispute. He would therefore submit that the impugned order be set aside and parties be relegated to decision of Reference which would decide the claim of the First Respondent- Union with regard to parity in the wage revision.
10) Rival contentions of the parties now fall for my consideration.
11) By the impugned order dated 27 June 2022, the learned Authority has entertained the application filed by the First Respondent- Union under Section 33-C(1) of the ID Act. Perusal of the application filed by the First Respondent-Union on 10 March 2022 would indicate that following grievance was raised by the First Respondent-Union: The management of Pawan Hans Ltd. issued (two) office orders on 22.08.2019 & 22.05.2018 for revision of pay scale and allowances to the workmen non-executive (technical) and workmen non-executive (nontechnical) and below Board level executive (technical) who are on regular rolls of the company and extended the benefits but said benefits are not extended to our members under the guise that they are contractual employees. Hereto annexed and marked as
12) The First Respondent-Union thereafter referred to the judgment of the Apex Court dated 17 January 2020 rendered in their own case relating to disparity in Provident Fund benefits and complained that despite the Apex Court treating the members on par with regular and permanent employees, the Petitioner was still practising hostile discrimination.
13) The application dated 10 March 2022 filed by the First Respondent-Union was met with an interesting response by the Petitioner. In its terse reply dated 22 April 2022, the Petitioner chose to offer interesting justification for opposing the application of the First Respondent-Union: Please refer your office letter No. B-16(3)/2022-B-1 dated 22.03.2022 on the subject mentioned above. The Aviation Karamchari Sanghatana (Applicant) claimed the benefits of wage revision to the employees engaged on contract in the Company in compliance with the order passed by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No 353 of 2020.
2. In this connection it is clarified that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in its Judgment dated 17.01.2020 mentioned that the issue arises for consideration before the Hon'ble Court is whether the contractual employees of the Company are entitled for provident fund benefits under the Pawan Hans Employees Provident Fund Trust Regulations or under the Employees Provident fund Act and the Employees Provident Fund Act. Hon'ble Court further mentioned that the Pawan Hans Limited having framed its own PF Trust Regulations, claiming exemption for the applicability of the EPF Act and EPF Scheme under Section 16 of the EPF Act.
3. After hearing the submissions and argument of both the parties, vide Judgment dated 17.01.2020, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 353 of 2020 inter-alia directed (Para 8) that "the interest of justice would be best subserved if the benefit of Provident Fund is provided to the members of Respondent-Union, and other similarly situated contractual employees, from January 2017 when the Writ Petition filed before High Court.”
4. Pawan Hans Limited complied with the directions issued by the Hon'ble Court in the captioned matter and benefit of Provident Fund has been extended to the employees engaged on contract by the Company.
14) Thus far from creating any dispute before the learned Authority about execution of any valid settlement between the Petitioner and the First Respondent-Union, the Petitioner chose to contend before the learned Authority that the order of the Apex Court was fully complied with by paying the difference of Provident Fund benefits to the concerned employees.
15) The learned Authority thus faced a situation where the application filed under Section 33-C (1) of the ID Act was not opposed in real sense by the Petitioner by contending that the two settlements executed with AICAEU and CATEU do not cover the members of the first Respondent-Union. Faced with the stand taken by the Petitioner before it, the learned Authority was left with no other alternative but to direct issuance of Recovery Certificate. It is now sought to be contended that the order passed by the learned Authority is without jurisdiction on account of non-existence of any settlement between the Petitioner and First Respondent-Union. No doubt, the jurisdiction under Section 33-C (1) of the ID Act can be exercised by the learned Authority only when the amount is found to be due either under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter-VA and VB. Section 33-C of the ID Act provides thus: 33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.— (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA or Chapter VB, the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period.
16) In the present case, however, the First Respondent Union approached the learned Authority with a complaint that the two office orders dated 22 May 2018 and 22 August 2019 were issued by the Petitioner implementing the wage revision in respect of the workmen nonexecutive (technical) and workmen non-executive (non-technical) and below Board level executive (technical) who are regular on rolls of the company. The First Respondent-Union complained that the benefits are not extended to the members of the First Respondent-Union under the guise that they are contractual employees. The First Respondent-Union thus represented before the learned Authority that there was some sort of a settlement for implementation of the wages revision to the employees and the same is being denied to the members of the First Respondent- Union on the pretext of them being contractual employees. The First Respondent-Union relied upon judgment of the Apex Court dated 17 January 2020 placing the contractual employees under the same pedestal as that of regular employees and demanded implementation of wage revision by issuance of a Recovery Certificate.
17) Once the application for claiming benefits under Office orders dated 22 August 2019 and 22 May 2018 was presented before the learned Authority it was incumbent upon the Petitioner to plead in its reply that there was absence of any settlement, implementation of which was sought in the proceeding filed under Section 33-C (1). As observed above, Petitioner failed to raise any such contention before the learned Authority. The learned Authority thus had no material to believe that there is no settlement with the contract employees for implementation of the wage revision. Now before this Court, it is pointed out that the two settlements executed with CATEU and AICAEU contain a Clause that the said settlements do not apply to persons engaged on daily rated, part time, casual, contract, retainership basis and apprentice / trainees, etc. Clause-1.[1] of both the settlement read thus: 1.[1] The Wage Settlement will be applicable to all regular and probationary Non-Executive employees of the Company being member of the Union (AICAEU) but it excludes persons engaged on Daily Rated, Part Time, Casual, Contract, Retainership basis and Apprentice / Trainees, etc. However, this defence was not raised before the learned Authority.
18) Faced with the situation where the Petitioner failed to raise a defence before the learned Authority about absence of any agreement/settlement with the First Respondent-Union, Mr. D’souza has relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in Balraj Taneja (supra) in which the Apex Court has held in para-29 as under:
29. As pointed out earlier, the court has not to act blindly upon the admission of a fact made by the defendant in his written statement nor should the court proceed to pass judgment blindly merely because a written statement has not been filed by the defendant traversing the facts set out by the plaintiff in the plaint filed in the court. In a case, specially where a written statement has not been filed by the defendant, the court should be a little cautious in proceeding under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC. Before passing the judgment against the defendant it must see to it that even if the facts set out in the plaint are treated to have been admitted, a judgment could possibly be passed in favour of the plaintiff without requiring him to prove any fact mentioned in the plaint. It is a matter of the court's satisfaction and, therefore, only on being satisfied that there is no fact which need be proved on account of deemed admission, the court can conveniently pass a judgment against the defendant who has not filed the written statement. But if the plaint itself indicates that there are disputed questions of fact involved in the case regarding which two different versions are set out in the plaint itself, it would not be safe for the court to pass a judgment without requiring the plaintiff to prove the facts so as to settle the factual controversy. Such a case would be covered by the expression “the court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved” used in sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 8, or the expression “may make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit” used in Rule 10 of Order 8.
19) In my view, reliance by the Petitioner on the judgment in Balraj Taneja (supra) would not assist its case in any manner. The judgment in Balraj Taneja is an authority on the issue that the Courts should not blindly pass decree where no defence is presented by the Defendant or where the Defendant admits the claim of the Plaintiff and that the court must consider whether the decree is grantable even if the averments in the plaint are taken as correct. It is well settled that judgment is an authority for what it decides and not for what can be logically deduced therefrom. The judgment held that before passing the judgment against the Defendant, the Court must see to it that even if the facts set out in the plaint are treated to have been admitted, a judgment could possibly be passed in favour of the Plaintiff without requiring him to prove any fact mentioned in the plaint. In the present case, if averments in the Application filed by the First Respondent-Union before the learned Authority are taken as correct, can it be said that the Application still deserved rejection? The answer, to my mind, appears to be in the negative. The First Respondent-Union approached the learned Authority with a complaint that some settlement was effected which was not extended to its members. In absence of any objection by the Petitioner about non-applicability of settlement to the members of First Respondent- Union, the learned Authority proceeded to accept existence of settlement for implementation of wage revision to the members of the First Respondent-Union as well.
20) It appears that the mind of the learned Authority was also swayed by following observations of the Apex Court in the judgment dated 17 January 2020 in Pawan Hans Vs Aviation Karmachari Sanghatana: 6.3.. In the present case, the Respondent-Union submitted that even though the appointment letters refer to the employees as ‘contractual’ employees, they were not engaged through any contractor. They were being paid directly by the Company, which is evidenced from the pay-slips issued to them. It was submitted that about 250 contractual employees receive wages directly from the Company, and are eligible to be included under the PF Trust Regulations framed by the Company. 6.[4] We find that the members of the Respondent-Union have been in continuous employment with the Company for long periods of time. They have been receiving wages/salary directly from the Company without the involvement of any contractor since the date of their engagement. The work being of a perennial and continuous nature, the employment cannot be termed to be ‘contractual’ in nature. In our considered view, Clause 2.[5] of the PF Trust Regulations would undoubtedly cover all contractual employees who have been engaged by the Company, and draw their wages/salary directly or indirectly from the Company. (emphasis added)
21) No doubt the above findings are recorded by the Supreme Court in relation to dispute over parity in relation to payment of provident fund benefits. However, the First Respondent-Union canvassed before the learned Authority that the Supreme Court has refused to treat them as mere contractual employees and this is how the case was pitched before the learned Authority. The Union contended that its members are virtually like regular employees in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court and that therefore the wage revision agreed and settled with the two unions must also be made applicable to its members as well. However instead of opposing the Application of the Union, Petitioner virtually supported the same by making detailed reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court and contended that the judgment has duly been complied with. In my view therefore, there was no dispute created by the Petitioner before the learned Authority about existence of any enforceable right of members of the first Respondent Union. There was thus no lis before the learned Authority.
22) Reliance by Mr. D’souza on the judgment of the Apex Court in Hamdard (supra) far from assisting Petitioner’s case, actually militates against it. In para 38 of the judgment, the Apex Court has held as under:
38. An application under Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 must be for enforcement of a right. If existence of right, thus, is disputed, the provisions may not be held to have any application. In the present case, Petitioner failed to make out any dispute before the learned Authority,which could have prevented it from deciding the issue and relegating the parties to an industrial dispute.
23) So far as the allegation of suppression is concerned, it is seen that the order dated 16 August 2019 referring the disputes relating to wage settlement of fixed-term employees and disputes between the two set of employees is in relation to period prior to execution of the two settlements dated 21 August 2019. The contention that the said Reference would cover the demand for wages revision for subsequent period also is just a defence of the Petitioner, which it failed to raise before the learned Authority. The belief of the Petitioner that the pending Reference would cover demand for subsequent wages revisions (effected vide agreements dated 21 August 2019) does not mean that the same belief must be carried by the First Respondent-Union for the purpose of disclosure of that pending Reference in the Application filed before the learned Authority. Also, while Petitioner vociferously accuses the First Respondent-Union of suppression, it makes no attempt to explain, in any manner, as to what prevented it from raising the defence of pendency of Reference before the Labour Court. In my view, therefore there was no reason for the First Respondent-Union to disclose the pendency of the Reference in their application filed under Section 33-C(1). In that view of the matter, I am not inclined to accept that there was any suppression on the part of the First Respondent-Union. The judgment of the Apex Court in A. V. Papayya (supra) therefore would have no application to the facts of the present case.
24) So far as reliance by Mr. D’souza on judgment of the Apex Court in Barauni (supra) is concerned, the same draws distinction between the settlements outside conciliation proceedings and settlements during the course of conciliation proceedings. In view of non-raising of any dispute by the First Respondent-Union that the members of the First Respondent-Union are not covered by the two settlements (effected outside conciliation proceedings), in my view, the judgment would have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Also, the case of the First Respondent-Union before the learned Authority was that the Petitioner is not treating them on par with regular employees, with whom settlements are effected, despite the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pawan Hans Vs Aviation Karmachari Sanghatana. The case in the Application before the learned Authority was that the members of the First Respondent-Union are also governed by the two settlements.
25) Considering the overall conspectus of the case, what needs to be noted is that the Apex Court has virtually treated the contract workers of the Petitioner on same pedestal as that of the regular workers. Undoubtedly, the said findings are recorded in relation to payment of Provident Fund dues, I do not see any reason why the same yardstick would not apply in relation to implementation of wage revision as well. Thus, what the impugned order ultimately results in is to bring in parity in terms of the wages payable to regular workers and contractual workers. This is exactly what the Hon’ble Apex Court has expected in the judgment dated 17 January 2020. What is expected by the Petitioner is that the First Respondent-Union must undergo the rigmarole of another lengthy round of litigation for establishing parity with the regular workers by seeking a Reference or in the alternative to try their luck in the already referred Industrial Dispute pertaining to the past period. All the technical objections sought to be raised by Mr. D’souza are aimed at that direction. Since this Court is satisfied with the ultimate conclusion reached by the learned Authority, there is no point in driving the First Respondent-Union to another lengthy round of litigation, especially when the Petitioner is at fault in not raising any dispute before the learned Authority and in not remaining present in the proceedings. Since the impugned order results in situation of bringing in parity between the contract workers and regular workers as per the directions of the Apex Court in the judgment dated 17 January 2020, I do not see any valid reason to interfere in the impugned order.
26) It is well-settled principle that High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, need not correct each and every error of law or fact. So long as the High Court is satisfied with the ultimate outcome of the litigation and if it comes to a conclusion that the final result of the litigation is acceptable, mere error in decision-making process cannot be a reason to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand Goel[5]. In para 15, the Apex Court has held as under:
15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order 1 is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. (emphasis added)
27) This Court is satisfied with the ultimate result of the proceedings before the learned Authority. Though the learned Authority cannot ordinarily exercise jurisdiction when settlement does not exist at all or where there are serious disputed questions of law or fact, in the present case, no dispute was created by the Petitioner before the learned Authority. Therefore, in the peculiar facts of the case, no interference is warranted in the impugned order.
28) Considering the above position, I do not find any valid ground to interfere in the impugned order dated 27 June 2022. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. [SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
29) After the judgment is pronounced, Mr. D’souza would pray for stay of the judgment and for continuation of interim order dated 30 October 2023 for 8 weeks. He would submit that the amounts payable to the members of the First Respondent-Union are already secured through bank guarantees submitted to this Court. The request is opposed by Mr. Bapat. Considering the position that the amounts payable to the members of the First Respondent-Union are already secured by bank guarantees, the interim protection granted vide order dated 30 October 2023 shall continue to operate for a period of 8 weeks. [SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]