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ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO. 1127 OF 2018
ALONGWITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 15527 OF 2024
Hi Style India Pvt. Limited ...Petitioner
Mr. Avinash Wadhwani for Petitioner.
Mr. Dhruva Gandhi for Respondent.
JUDGMENT
1. This is a Petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) impugning an Arbitral Award dated May 9, 2018 (“Impugned Award”) passed by the Learned Sole Arbitrator appointed by the Mumbai Textile Merchants’ Mahajan (“Mahajan”).
2. The Impugned Award essentially directs the Petitioner, Hi Style India Pvt. Limited (“Hi Style”) to pay to the Respondent, Rakesh Corporation (“Rakesh”) a sum of Rs.15,80,895/-. The awarded amount November 19, 2025 comprises payment of Rs.~11.94/- Lakhs against the bill dated May 28, 2016 along with interest thereon in the sum of Rs.~3.76/- Lakhs until the date of the Impugned Award, and a further sum of Rs.10,500/being the cost of arbitration.
3. It is seen from the record that the Learned Arbitral Tribunal had given Hi Style multiple opportunities to present its say at hearings – those fixed on July 6, 2017, August 31, 2017, October 26, 2017, December 2, 2017 and February 27, 2018. Hi Style entered appearance on August 31, 2017 and thereafter did not attend any of the hearings. It is also seen from the record that between October 24, 2017 and March 1, 2018, in respect of the hearings scheduled, Hi Style, through e-mails sent by one Ram PS, styled as “Head Merchandiser” of Hi Style sought adjournment requesting for a new date, among others stating that Hi Style would appear in person with the “relevant documents and papers” and “provide necessary information and statements” in connection with the arbitral proceedings. One such letter dated October 24, 2017 is sent by one Sharon Kiron on behalf of Hi Style. The Impugned Award is therefore an ex parte award that had to be passed without the participation of Hi Style in the hearings, seeking of course, adjourments at every scheduled hearing. Purti Parab Facet of Limitation:
4. At the threshold, Mr. Dhruva Gandhi, Learned Advocate on behalf of Rakesh would submit that this Court is devoid of jurisdiction to deal with the challenge inasmuch as the challenge to the Arbitral Award has been filed way beyond the period of limitation statutorily provided for in the Act even after including the period in which this Court has been granted powers to condone the delay.
5. The Impugned Award is dated May 9, 2018 and is said to have been received from the Mahajan by way of covering letter dated May 15, 2018, which was eventually received on May 23, 2018. Accepting this date as the admitted date of receipt, the three-month period referred to in Section 34(3) of the Act would have expired on August 23, 2018. The further period of 30 days within which this Court would have jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the aforesaid period of three months, expired on September 23, 2018. Admittedly, the challenge under Section 34 of the Act had been mounted on October 5, 2018.
6. Therefore, Mr. Gandhi would contend that while there is not even a whisper of seeking any condonation of delay on the part of Hi Style, even if it had done so, the delay is of such an order that it is beyond the scope of condonation envisaged in the law.
7. To counter this contention, Mr. Avinash Wadhwani, Learned Advocate on behalf of Hi Style would contend that the Impugned Award is a complete nullity inasmuch as it is based on a non-existent arbitration agreement. The arbitration clause is merely set out in an invoice that is not signed by both parties, he would contend. Moreover, he would submit that Hi Style is not a member of the Mahajan and the arbitration has been powered on without Hi Style’s consent and imposed upon it. Mr. Wadhwani would contend that limitation would hardly matter when the Court is faced with situation of a nullity in law being forced on someone, and this Court can intervene to quash and set aside the Impugned Award. Towards this end, Mr. Wadhwani would point to various contents of the record to indicate that non-interference with the Impugned Award would lead to an abject situation of totally unwarranted and untenable injustice being meted out to Hi Style.
8. It is the case of Hi Style that it was taken by surprise when it received an e-mail on behalf of Rakesh on August 21, 2016, on the general “contact us” e-mail id of Hi Style following up on payment. On that day one Mr. Ram PS replied to the e-mail asking Rakesh to provide details of the invoice and copies of the invoice to examine internally what payment was made pursued by Rakesh. According to Hi Style, the documents forwarded by Rakesh contained Invoice No. 22841 dated May 28, 2016 along with Lorry Receipt No. 674344 dated May 30, 2016 and a letter dated September 23, 2016 from the transport company to Rakesh confirming delivery of the material purportedly delivered by the transporter to Hi Style on behalf of Rakesh. The invoice contains various terms and conditions. Clause 9 of the said terms and conditions provides that the sale covered by the invoice is subject to the resolution by arbitration under the rules of the Mahajan.
9. Mr. Wadhwani would contend that Hi Style had never received the invoice or the Lorry Receipt from the Respondent and that Rakesh may have been cheated by one Mr. Shivakumar who was a former employee of Hi Style who had no authority to represent Hi Style to place any orders. Mr. Wadhwani would rely upon certain letters written to the Tamil Nadu police in this regard and would contend that it is entirely upto Rakesh to pursue any claims against Mr. Shivakumar directly, leaving Hi Style out of it. It is Mr. Wadhwani’s contention that Hi Style has been arm twisted into an arbitration proceedings without there having been any agreement to arbitrate and without even a proper invocation of arbitration. He would also point to replies sent by Advocates of Hi Style to Advocates of Rakesh to indicate that Rakesh has been cheated and defrauded by a former employee Mr. Shivakumar who had left Hi Style in January 2016 and did not have authority to represent Hi Style and place any orders and make any commitments to counter parties in the market. It is Mr. Wadhwani’s contention that one M/s. Praveen Agency which is indicated as the agent on whose behalf the order had been placed, is also unknown to Hi Style.
10. Mr. Gandhi on behalf of Rakesh would point to the material on record and indicate that the invoice raised by Rakesh on Hi Style through the agent M/s. Praveen Agency would inexorably point to various bales of fabric that had been despatched by Rakesh to Hi Style with its specific address being indicated in the invoice and demonstrating that this had indeed been sent and delivered to Hi Style. He would indicate that the goods described in the invoice are contemporaneously indicated in the goods consignment note and freight charges of Rs.10,937/- are shown as being payable for the very goods covered by the invoice. The value of the goods indicated in the goods consignment note is in conformity with the value ascribed to the goods in the invoice.
11. Mr. Gandhi would also point to a specific receipt of a consignment sent by Air dated June 1, 2016 which would indicate receipt by one Mr. Ram who has signed the Proof of Delivery (“POD”) indicating that there is indeed a confirmation of receipt by the consignee in good order and condition. Mr. Gandhi would indicate that at this distance in time, it is apparent that the image sought to be created on behalf of Hi Style that it was unaware of the transaction, is untenable when Hi Style had multiple opportunities to point all this out to the Learned Arbitral Tribunal and indeed sought adjournments to do precisely that.
12. Mr. Gandhi would also point out that should Hi Style have been defrauded by its former employee Mr. Shivakumar as claimed by Hi Style, it is for Hi Style to pursue such action as deemed fit against the said Mr. Shivakumar but it cannot assume that it would be excused from its contracted obligations owed to counterparties. Mr. Gandhi would also point out that he would explain the contents on merits only to assuage the Court’s conscience to dispel the impression created that there was no transaction whatsoever and that Rakesh was being forced into an arbitration that it never agreed to conduct. That apart, Mr. Gandhi would point to a letter dated October 24, 2017 sent by one Mr. Sharon Kiron requesting for an adjournment in the arbitration indicating that Hi Style would desirous of appearing in person with the relevant documents and papers and to explain its stand. So also another e-mail dated February 24, 2018 seeking of postponement of the hearing was sent by one Mr. Ram, the Head Merchandiser on the premise that the representative of Hi Style was hospitalized due to high blood pressure and would be unable to attend the hearing. A third adjournment request dated March 2018 is pointed to, seeking a specific date and a confirmation so that Hi Style is able to attend the hearing along with requisite documents. This e-mail is marked to multiple officials of Hi Style and in fact requests the Mahajan to confirm the final hearing date so that travel plans can be made and proceedings could be attended to. According to Mr. Gandhi, the stance now being adopted is an afterthought and a clever device in circumventing the execution of the Arbitral Award validly obtained by Rakesh against Hi Style. Analysis and Findings:
13. Having heard the parties and having examined the record with their assistance, it is apparent that the Petition has been filed well beyond a period within which Section 34 Court had powers to condone the delay in mounting a challenge to the Arbitral Award. This position is in fact admitted by Hi Style, but it is contended that this matters little to this Court’s power to quash the Impugned Award. Purported Absence of Arbitration Agreement:
14. Mr. Wadhwani relied upon the judgement of the Learned Division Bench of this Court in Mikesh Corporation[1] indicating that a mere arbitration clause in an invoice would not lead to existence of an Arbitration Agreement. In the facts of that case, the parties participated in the Arbitration Agreement and raised their objection and the decision in the award was considered in time on merits by Section 34 Court and the Learned Division Bench upheld that view.
15. The law on the need for an arbitration agreement to be in writing and not necessarily signed by both parties is clear right since the Arbitration Act, 1940 and was reiterated under the Act by the Supreme Court in Caravel Shipping[2]. In 2019, the Supreme Court endorsed the position of law holding the field even under the Arbitration Act, 1940 in way back in 1955, dealing with a bill of lading that is not signed by both parties, in the following words:-
8. In addition, we may indicate that the law in this behalf, in Jugal Kishore Rameshwardas v. Goolbai Hormusji, is that an arbitration agreement needs to be in writing though it need not be signed. The fact that the arbitration agreement shall be in writing is continued in the 1996 Act in Section 7(3) thereof. Section 7(4) only further adds that an arbitration agreement would be found in the Mikesh Corporation vs. Picotee Exports and Ors., MANU/MH/2025/2009 Caravel Shipping Services (P) Ltd. v. Premier Sea Foods Exim (P) Ltd. – (2019) 11 SCC 461 Jugal Kishore Rameshwardas v. Goolbai Hormusji – (1955) 2 SCC 187 circumstances mentioned in the three sub-clauses that make up Section 7(4). This does not mean that in all cases an arbitration agreement needs to be signed. The only pre-requisite is that it be in writing, as has been pointed out in Section 7(3).
16. More recently, in Glencore[4], dealing with an issue of whether an arbitration agreement was in existence in relation to a letter of credit, the Supreme Court held as follows:-
2. Is there a binding arbitration agreement between the appellant and respondent No. 1?
19. …..There is no denying the legal proposition that an arbitration agreement can be inferred even from an exchange of letters, including communication through electronic means, which provide a record of the agreement. The mere fact that Contract No. 061-16-12115-S was not signed by respondent No. 1 would not obviate from this principle when the conduct of the parties in furtherance of the said contract, clearly manifested respondent No. 1's acceptance of the terms and conditions contained therein, which would include the arbitration agreement in clause 32.[2] thereof. [Emphasis Supplied
17. The contention now being made at this belated stage that the arbitration agreement printed on the invoice could never apply is a contention that could have been made before the Learned Arbitral Tribunal. Evidently, this was not done, despite taking multiple Glencore International AG vs. Shree Ganesh Metals and Another – 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1815 adjournments. Indeed, this appears to be an afterthought to place yet another hurdle in the path of execution of the Impugned Award.
18. The reliance placed by Mr. Wadhwani on the decision by a Learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Divya Shivalik[5] is of no avail. In that case, the parties had an actual contract without an arbitration clause. Existence of an arbitration agreement was sought to be asserted solely in reliance upon invoices raised pursuant to the contract that had no arbitration clause. That is not the case in the matter at hand, where the invoice on its own contains an arbitration clause and that is the only agreement between the parties. Inherent Power of Courts:
19. In support of Hi Style’s contention that the Court has inherent powers to ignore the period of limitation and declare the Arbitral Award to be a nullity, Mr. Wadhwani relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.K. Pandey[6] to indicate that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, an Arbitral Award that was evidently a product of fraud and passed in the absence of an arbitration agreement was interfered with and set aside by the Supreme Court, although the Allahabad High Court had dismissed the challenge under Section 34 on Divya Shivalik vs. Shantilal Jamnadas, 1999 (2) Bom CR 734 State of Uttar Pradesh and Another vs. R.K. Pandey and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 52 the ground of having been barred by limitation and filed beyond the condonable period. The Supreme Court, on facts, held that the Arbitration Agreement in that case was completely non-existent but the Arbitral Tribunal had purported to conduct the proceedings in respect of an employment agreement between one Mr. Pandey and G.S.V.M. Medical College, Kanpur. All the awards had been passed ex parte. It was seen that there had been no case whatsoever of the employees and G.S.V.M. Medical College having entered into any agreement containing the arbitration clause.
20. Having examined the judgment closely, it is evident that Section 34 Court indeed did not deal with the matter, in view of the challenge having been filed way beyond the limitation period but the Supreme Court has narrated the factual matrix in detail on the premise that they were indeed peculiar and that intervention of the Supreme Court was necessary to prevent the enforcement of the Arbitral Award, which was null and void ab initio for the reasons set out in the said judgement.
21. To my mind, this is a power that was inherently available to the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Even if the Supreme Court did not explicitly invoke Article 142 of the Constitution of India for making the intervention, the Supreme Court had the fullest power to take notice of the extraordinary situation that emerged in the facts of that case. This Court’s jurisdiction is statutorily defined in Section 34 of the Act. That provision contains a limitation of a period beyond which condonation would not be permissible. The Supreme Court has nowhere stated that the Section 34 Court had the same powers and ought to have exercised its powers. There is no declaration of law to that effect.
22. The Supreme Court noted that said Mr. Pandey had himself filed Writ Petitions in the Allahabad High Court and had them withdrawn without any decision on the merits. Thereafter, the Arbitrator appointed by Mr. Pandey unilaterally conducted the arbitration proceedings and awarded amounts to Mr. Pandey against the G.S.V.M. Medical College and the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Supreme Court noted that the claims made before the purported arbitrator were themselves hopelessly barred by limitation. The Supreme Court also noticed the decision of the Constitutional Bench dealing with the unilateral appointment of arbitrators and taking the totality of circumstances into account, notwithstanding the expiry of time under Section 34 of the Act, took note of the fact that even at the enforcement stage the intervention could be made on the ground of absence of subject matter jurisdiction and the ground of fraud.
23. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that the powers that were exercised by the Supreme Court in R.K. Pandey were powers available inherently to the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court has taken care to ensure that no position of general application was declared for Section 34 Courts in the country to follow, to make interventions despite being barred by limitation. Instead, the Supreme Court thought it necessary to interfere with the Arbitral Awards in that case, which were found to be a product of fraud and a product of non-existent Arbitration Agreement. This stands in sharp contrast with the facts of the case at hand, which are discussed later below.
24. Mr. Wadhwani would also rely on Sushil Kumar Mehta[7], quoting Paragraph No.12 thereof, to submit that it is a well-established principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and the plea can be set up whenever and wherever the decree is sought to be enforced or relied upon, and even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. This again does not lead to this Court being Sushil Kumar Mehta vs. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) Through His LRS., (1990) 1 Supreme Court clothed with a power to ignore the statutory period of limitation stipulated in the Act and to ignore other declarations of the law by the Supreme Court, interpreting Section 34(3) to hold that Section 34 Court does not have the power to condone a delay.
25. Likewise, the reliance on the judgement of a Learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Mr. Mohammad Eshrar Ahmed[8] in which Learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court considered a Petition filed under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act seeking termination of the arbitration conducted by an Arbitrator without jurisdiction on the premise that the arbitration clause in the invoice would not constitute an arbitration agreement. This judgement too essentially turns on the issue of unilateral appointment of an arbitrator and noted that should the issuer of the invoice have sought to rely on the arbitration clause contained in the invoice, when the counter party refused to participate in the arbitration, the issuer of the invoice ought to have approached the Section 11 Court to appoint an arbitrator in view of the non-cooperation by a counterparty to the arbitration agreement. This is a ratio about unilateral appointment of arbitrator and stands on a footing completely different from the matter at hand. Mr. Mohammad Eshrar Ahmed vs. M/s. Tyshaz Buildmart India Private Limited, O.M.P. (T) (Comm.) 105/2023, I.A. 22122/2023 Section 34(3) of the Act:
26. In my opinion, each of these judgments is distinguishable as aforesaid inasmuch as they do not declare in absolute terms, a law of general proposition under Section 34 of the Act, and that too in a situation where the approach to the Court was after the condonable period provided under the limitation provisions in Section 34 of the Act.
27. It is now clear from numerous decisions of the Supreme Court not only in interpreting Section 34 of the Act but also in interpreting identically drafted provisions in other legislation, that the Section 34 Court has no power to condone the delay beyond the 30-day period after the three-month period. Section 34(3) is extracted below:- (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal: Provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. [Emphasis Supplied]
28. Even a plain reading of the foregoing would indicate that the period within which the challenge is to be mounted is three months and the Court’s power to condone delay beyond that period is restricted to a further period of 30 days. After such additional 30-day period, there is no power at all to condone the delay.
29. To cite just one judgement, in Haryana Federation[9], the Supreme Court summarised this position in the following words:
10. A perusal of Section 34(3) leaves no room for any doubt that an arbitral award has to be assailed within a period of 3 months, whereafter, condonation of delay is permissible only for a further period of 30 days. Delay beyond 3 months and 30 days is not condoned. This position has repeatedly been reiterated by this Court and was dealt with in extensive detail by the Additional District Judge, Panchkula, in the order dated 17-5-2014, by which the objections filed by the appellant were dismissed by concluding that “… on the basis of the well-settled propositions of law, which have been discussed and laid down as referred above, this Court has arrived at a definite conclusion that the application in question is not maintainable and delay cannot be condoned for filing the objections under Section 34…”. Haryana State Coop. L&C Federation Ltd. v. Unique Coop. L&C Coop. Society Ltd. – (2018) 14 SCC 248
30. Therefore, this is not a case where the contentions made on behalf of Hi Style can be considered, when the approach to the Section
31. To deal with this situation, Mr. Wadhwani would contend that the Impugned Award was never really received by Hi Style since the original award signed in the original by the Learned Arbitral Tribunal has not been served on Hi Style till date. He would submit that merely a copy has been sent by the office of the Mahajan and this does not constitute delivery of the arbitral award under Section 31(5) of the Act.
32. Towards this end, the judgement of a Learned Division bench of the Delhi High Court rendered in Kristal Vision Private Limited10 approving the ruling of a Learned Single Judge of that Court summarises the law clearly, and I am in respectful agreement with it. The following extracts are noteworthy:-
34. In Continental Telepower Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1859, the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that there is no requirement in Section 31(5) of the Act to deliver an ink signed copy of the award. Section 34 of the Kristal Vision Projects Private Limited vs. Union of India, FAO(OS) (COMM) 206/2024, CM APPL. 52678/2024 Act does not require the filing of any ink signed copy of the award along with petition, though the award would definitely be required by the Court to appreciate the contentions with respect thereto. It was further held that the photocopy of the signed award along with cover letter bearing signature in original of the arbitrator was sufficient authentication of the photocopy of the award enclosed. It was observed that Section 31(5) of the Act uses the expression "signed copy". Copy is generally understood as something different from the original. Legislature did not use the expression "signed award". Thus, the Arbitrator is not required to deliver to the parties award signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal, as mentioned in Section 31(1) of the Act, but merely a "copy" thereof. The purpose of qualifying the word "copy" with "signed" is that there must be some authentication of the "copy". If it were to be held that the "copy" must be "ink signed" by the arbitrators, then it will not be a "copy" but be the award signed by the arbitrators. That is the only possible meaning of the words "signed" and "copy" used in conjunction.
33. A Learned Single Judge of this Court dealing with a bunch of Writ Petitions raising the same issue about delivery of the Arbitral Award examined the declaration of the law by Learned Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Ltd.11, with approval in the following terms: National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. vs. M/s. R. Piyarelall Import and Export Ltd., AIR 2016 Calcutta 160
8.1. In National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of Indian Ltd. (supra) the learned Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court while considering the language of Section 31(5) of the A & C Act, held as under:- “25. There can be no doubt that the arbitral award would necessarily have to be signed by all the arbitrators or at least by the majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal. However, in our view, it was not the intention of legislature that all the copies of the award, dispatched to the respective parties would have to be separately signed by the Learned arbitrators. A certified photocopy of the original award along with the signatures of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal would suffice.
26. Had it been the legislative intent that all copies of the award required to be furnished to the respective parties to a multi party arbitration, should actually be signed by members of the arbitral tribunal themselves and/or in other words, each of the copies should contain the original signatures of the arbitrators, Parliament would, perhaps, not have used the expression ‘signed copy of the award’ but used the expression ‘a copy of the award, duly signed by the arbitrators’, in Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act.
34. Citing the same with approval, the Learned Single Judge inter alia ruled as follows: The delivery of the signed copy of the award, is therefore information, brought to the notice and knowledge of each party, as to the contents of the award, so as to make the ‘party’, aware that the limitation to raise a challenge, has started to run, which knowledge/information is equally available to the ‘party’, when it receives the certified copy of the award signed by the Arbitrator. The purpose of the provision, of imparting knowledge to the ‘party’, as to the contents of the award, is achieved whether a signed copy is delivered or the certified copy of the signed award is obtained by the ‘party’. In either case knowledge/information as to the contents of the award stands attributed to the ‘party’, and the time as provided in Section 33(1) and 34(3) of the A & C Act, begins to run therefrom.
35. I am in respectful agreement with the position articulated by the Learned Single Judge of our Court and the Learned Division Bench of the Delhi High Court and the Calcutta High Court. Admittedly, the Arbitral Award was received by way of the communication dated May 15, 2018 on May 23, 2018. Hi Style had knowledge of the Arbitral Award having been passed, with the time limit under Section 34(3) of the Act beginning to run from that date. Despite having notice of the award having been passed, Hi Style did not pursue the recourse available to it under Section 34 of the Act. Section 16 Application not Filed:
36. Another facet of the matter cannot be ignored. It was entirely open to Hi Style to file an application under Section 16 of the Act before the Arbitral Tribunal raising all the contentions now being raised about signatures of both parties not being contained on the arbitration agreement. This was not done. On the contrary, both Sharon Kiran and PS Ram have sought adjournments from the Learned Arbitral Tribunal, promising to appear on the next date, and did not at all attend to the arbitration. That apart, it is Sharon Kiran who is seen to have complained about Mr. Shivakumar to the Tamil Nadu Police and it is Ram PS who appears to have signed on the proof of delivery note with his mobile number as seen from his e-mail signature footer being handwritten on the proof of delivery acknowledgement. The credibility of the absence of delivery stands undermined. It is not for this Court to comment on merits in a challenge that is hopelessly barred by limitation. This observation is only being made to point to how the extreme contention about knowing nothing at all about the transactions contracted with Rakesh stands undermined on the face of the record. Of course, it was open to Hi Style to subject this to the trial in the arbitration but it chose not to, simply taking time every single hearing. Even if Hi Style had been of the view that there was no Arbitration Agreement in existence, this squarely fell within the ambit of Section 16 of the Act for pursuit before the Arbitral Tribunal. On at least three occasions Hi Style has positively written to the Mahajan asking for adjournments or for fixation of arbitration on specific date so that it could participate in the proceedings and yet it has not participated. Delay in Restoration of this Petition:
37. Even before this Court, the Section 34 Petition that was belatedly filed was allowed to be dismissed without removing office objections. It is seen from the record that even after filing of the Petition under Section 34 of Act, the challenge was not seriously pursued on behalf of Hi Style. Indeed, there is no application seeking condonation of delay. The Section 34 Petition as filed, came to be rejected on July 4, 2019 for non-removal of office objections and owing to non-appearance by advocates for Hi Style before the Prothonotary and Senior Master. On dismissal, Hi Style did not seek restoration in time and filed it with a delay of 2 years and 20 days for which condonation was sought.
38. The Restoration Application was filed when execution proceedings got underway before the jurisdictional Court in Tamil Nadu, A Learned Single Judge of this Court by an order dated March 12, 2024 restored the Section 34 Petition, with cost of Rs.30,000/- being payable to the charity named in that order. The said donation was made by Hi Style, and the Section 34 Petition got restored.
39. When one looks at the totality of the circumstances, the proposition that this Court should perceive an ex facie absence of jurisdiction much less a defect of jurisdiction and has powers to interfere despite the period stipulated under Section 34 having gone by, does not bend itself for acceptance by this Court. The conduct of Hi Style is evidently lackadaisical. It is settled law that the law does not protect the indolent.
40. Both before the Learned Arbitral Tribunal as well as before this Court, the matter has been conducted with scant regard for statutory timelines. Even during the time the arbitration was underway, Hi Style simply sought adjournments from time to time before the Arbitral Tribunal and did not even bother to file a Section 16 Application to take up the contentions now being taken.
41. While I am of the view that this Court indeed does not have the power to condone the delay beyond the period of 30 days after expiry of first three months, such conduct of Hi Style in its pursuit of these proceedings cannot be ignored.
42. Therefore, this Petition is dismissed as not being capable of being entertained, filed as it has been well beyond the period within which it should have been filed. Interim Applications, if any shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
43. All actions required to be taken pursuant to this order shall be taken upon receipt of a downloaded copy as available on this Court’s website. [SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.]