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ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
APPLICATION (L) NO. 24466 OF 2025 in
ELECTION PETITION NO. 18 OF 2025
Shri Anna Dadu Bansode, )
R/at Flat No. 23, Kakde Residency, )
Chinchwad Station, Chinchwad, )
Pune – 411019. )… Applicant
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN
Sulakshana Raju Dhar )
Having address at 6167, H.L.G., )
Sant Tukaram Nagar, Pimpri, )
Pune – 410018. )… Petitioner
R/at Flat No. 23, Kakde Residency, )
Chinchwad Station,Chinchwad, )
Pune – 411 019.
2. TIIF Returning Officer, )
206 – Pimpri Assembly Constituency, )
Dr. Hedgewar Bhavan, Sr No. 26 Nigdi )
411044.
3. The Chief Electoral Officer of Maharashtra,)
RAJGURU
Fort, Mumbai – 400 32. )
4. The Election Commission of India, )
Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, )
New Delhi – I 10001. )
5. District Election Officer/ )
District Collector, )
Having address at Collector Office, )
B Wing, 4th
Floor, Pune – 411 001. )..Respondents
Mr. Tejas Deshmukh i/by. Mayur Govind Sanap and Mikhil
Chate, for Applicant/Orig. Respondent No.1.
Ms. Sneha Bhange a/w. Mr. Swapnil L. Sangle and Ms. Divya Verma, for Respondent/Original Petitioner.
Ms. Naira Jeejebhoy a/w. Mr. Arun Panickar, Mr. Vinay Nair and Mr. Tanmay Pawar, for Respondent Nos. 3 to 5.
JUDGMENT
1. This application is filed by respondent no.1, under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (‘CPC’), for rejection of the election petition. The election petition is filed to challenge the election of the applicant as a member of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly from 206 (Pimpri- S.C.) Assembly Constituency in the election held on 20th November 2024. The applicant was declared elected on 23rd November 2024. The petitioner had also contested the said election and secured the second-highest votes.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT:
2. The applicant, i.e., the successful candidate, has raised an objection that no meaningful cause of action is pleaded in the election petition. Learned counsel for the applicant referred to the relevant averments in the petition to support his submissions that the petition is filed on vague allegations. In paragraph 6 of the petition, the petitioner has raised objections to the information regarding the applicant’s assets, as stated in Form 26, alleging that a false affidavit was filed. Copies of the 7/12 extracts are attached to the petition to allege that the applicant has concealed that he jointly owned agricultural land bearing Gat No. 1593, where his and his family members’ names appear in the 7/12 extract as shareholders of the society that owns the land. It is further alleged that when the applicant contested the election to the said constituency in the years 2009, 2014, and 2019, the liability of his spouse is seen from past affidavits. However, in the affidavit filed at the time of the present election, the applicant had made a false statement on oath, as the liability shown in the earlier affidavits is not explained. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the existing liability of the applicant’s spouse is not alleged, and the earlier forms are not annexed to the petition. Hence, there cannot be a fishing inquiry in the election petition.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant points out the allegations made in paragraphs 27 to 31 of the petition and submits that the allegations are vague and would not constitute any of the grounds for setting aside the applicant’s election. The verification clause in the election petition is not as per the prescribed format contemplated under Section 83(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (‘of the 1951 Act’), read with Order VI Rule 15 of the CPC. Considering the nature of the allegations in the petition, the petitioner was under an obligation to specify the paragraph number of the petition separately, stating which paragraphs are based on personal knowledge and which on information. The petitioner was also under an obligation to disclose the source of personal knowledge. According to the learned counsel for the applicant, all the allegations made in the petition cannot be based on personal knowledge, and thus, it was necessary for the petitioner to disclose the source of knowledge.
4. To support his submissions, learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jyoti Basu and Ors Vs. Debi Ghosal and Ors[1]. He relied on paragraph 8 of the judgment to support his submission that the election petition is neither an action at common law nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply, but only those rules which the statute makes apply. It is a special jurisdiction, and as such, it must always be exercised in accordance with the statute that created it. Learned counsel for the applicant thus submits that Section
5. On a similar proposition, learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hari Shanker Jain Vs. Sonia Gandhi 2. He points out that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said decision held that the petition which is hopelessly vague and completely bald in the allegations made and if the allegations are not possible within the personal knowledge of the petitioner but still verified as true to the knowledge without indicating the source would amount to pleadings without disclosing any cause of action and thus, would be liable to be rejected at the threshold.
6. Learned counsel for the applicant also relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Karim Uddin Barbhuiya Vs. Aminul Haque Laskar and Ors[3]. He submits that the Hon’ble Apex Court held that if the allegations contained in the petition did not set out the requirement of Sections 81 and 83 of the 1951 Act, the pleadings are liable to be struck out, and the election petition is liable to be rejected at the threshold. On a similar proposition of law, the learned counsel for the applicant also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kanimozhi Karunanidhi Vs. A. Santhana Kumar[4]. Learned counsel for the applicant, therefore, submits that the election petition deserves to be rejected at the threshold for non-compliance with Sections 81(1) and 83 read with Section 61 of the 1951 Act. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that this Court, in the decision of Anil Subhash Sawant Vs. Samadhan Mahadeo Autade and Others[5], held that allegations in respect of the functioning of EVM machines, merely based on conjectures and apprehensions, and without any clarity as to how and in which manner, it has resulted in an incorrect practice or an irregularity materially affecting the result of the election, would be liable to be
7. Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that the election petition suffers from defects of a substantial nature that cannot be cured. The petitioner neither states a concise statement of the material facts nor provides full particulars of the alleged corrupt practice. The petition has not been verified in accordance with the provisions of the CPC. Hence, there is a substantial defect in verification that cannot be cured. He further submits that there is a substantial defect in the affidavit required to be filed under the proviso to Section 83(1) of the 1951 Act, read with Rule
94 A of the Conduct of the Election Rules and Form No. 25 prescribed under the Rules. Hence, in view of the defects in the petition that cannot be cured, the petition cannot be said to be filed based on the disclosure of a meaningful cause of action.
8. Learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that the right to dispute the election, not being a common law right, the statutory right has to be confined to the provisions of the 1951 Act and the rules framed thereunder. Thus, if the statutory mandates are not complied with, the petition deserves to be rejected at the threshold. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the election petition is bereft of material facts and full particulars of the corrupt practices. None of the grounds specified under Section 100 of the 1951 Act is pleaded as contemplated by Section 81 of the 1951 Act. Hence, in view of the well-settled legal principles in the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the petition is liable to be rejected at the threshold.
9. All the allegations in the election petition are regarding corrupt practice as contemplated under Section 100(1)(b) of the 1951 Act, hence, learned counsel for the applicant referred to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the petition and submitted that in the absence of any material particulars to support the allegations as contemplated under Section 100 of the 1951 Act, the election petition based on vague allegations would not constitute any meaningful cause of action. Learned counsel for the applicant, therefore, submits that the election petition deserves to be rejected at the threshold.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegations in the election petition are based on material particulars pleaded, which would warrant a trial. Paragraphs 28 and 23 disclose the source of the allegations as the petitioner’s personal knowledge and observations. The petitioner has also pleaded that her request for further particulars under the Right to Information Act was denied. Hence, the particulars pleaded in the petition are based on her personal observations during the election and thus, the verification clause states that the contents are based on her personal knowledge. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the letter dated 1st January 2025, issued to the District Election Officer under Rule 93 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, for supplying copies of Form No. 17-C, pertaining to all polling booths in the constituency and supplying all complete recordings pertaining to the election process. However, her application was replied to on 2nd January 2025, and the information was denied. Both copies of the reply and letter are annexed to the petition to support her pleadings regarding the allegations made in the petition.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that all the documents referred to in the petition are annexed to the petition and are separately verified as required under Section 83(2) of the 1951 Act. Form No. 25, as required under the Rules, is duly verified and filed along with the election petition.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the various averments in the election petition and submitted that the material facts are pleaded and that all the particulars are not necessary as the petitioner would lead evidence to support the material facts that are pleaded. To support her submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Virender Nath Gautam Vs. Satpal Singh and Ors[6]. She submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the expression “material facts” is neither defined under the Act nor in the Code. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that what particulars could be said to be “material facts” would depend upon the facts of each case, and no rule of universal application can be laid down. It is, however, essential that all basic and primary facts which must be proved at the trial must be pleaded by the party to establish the existence of a cause of action or defence, and that they are material facts and must be stated in the pleading by the party. She thus submits that the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the particulars are required to be complete to ensure the conduct of a fair trial that would not take the opposite party by surprise. Hence, once the material facts are pleaded, the particulars can be brought on record in the trial through evidence.
13. On a similar proposition, learned counsel for the applicant also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ashraf Kokkur Vs. K.V. Abdul Khader and Others[7]. She submits that in the present case, the pleadings, if taken as a whole, would clearly show that they constitute the material facts so as to pose a triable issue. Hence, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said decision, the present petition, which contains basic pleadings that would warrant a trial, cannot be rejected at the threshold.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petition also raised grounds and objections on the nominations. The petitioner had raised objections to the nomination of the applicant. A copy of the objections raised at the time of accepting nomination is relied upon by the petitioner, and the same is annexed to the petition. All the particulars with regard to the objections raised on nominations are pleaded in paragraph 8 of the petition as contemplated under Section 100 (1)(d)(i) of the 1951 Act.
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the petition also contains allegations about the EVM machines. Hence, in view of the allegations on the EVM machine, a forensic assessment would be necessary, and thus, a trial would be warranted in the petition. To support her submissions on the requirement of the forensic assessment, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Balwan Singh Vs. Lakshmi Narain and Others[8].
16. With reference to the submissions made on behalf of the applicant by relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anil Subhash Sawant, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that no personal allegations were made in the facts of the said case, and the allegations were based solely on the EVM machines. Hence, the legal principles settled in the said decision would not apply to the facts of the present case, where personal allegations are also made, in addition to those regarding the EVM machines. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submits that the present petition would warrant a trial, and the facts pleaded to support the allegations are sufficient to warrant the trial. In view of the well-settled legal principles regarding want of sufficient pleadings, the material particulars would be proved by the petitioner at the time of trial. She therefore submits that the petition cannot be rejected at the threshold under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC.
CONSIDERATION OF THE SUBMISSIONS:
17. I have carefully perused the pleadings in the petition and the supporting documents. The allegations in the petition are twofold. Firstly, the allegations are personal, pertaining to the suppression of material facts regarding the applicant’s properties and financial liabilities. The allegations are pleaded in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the petition. Copies of the revenue records are relied upon to support the allegations. The allegations pertain to the objections raised by the petitioner regarding an alleged false affidavit and nomination papers filed by the applicant. A copy of the objections to the affidavit and nomination papers filed by the applicant at the time of scrutiny is produced on record. The petitioner has alleged that discrepancies exist between the applicant's affidavit and the relevant documents. Hence, the petitioner submitted the objections to the Election Commission via email. Copies of the objections and the emails are annexed to the petition. It is further pleaded that on the same day, objections were disposed of by holding that the objections cannot be considered as the same were filed after the scrutiny process was over. The petitioner has pleaded that she submitted objections on 30th October 2024 before 11:00 am, i.e., before the scrutiny process commenced. However, according to the petitioner, although the Returning Officer accepted the objection, it was rejected on erroneous grounds, as it was raised after the scrutiny was over.
18. Secondly, the petitioner has raised objections to noncompliance with the statutory requirements. She has made allegations regarding the EVM-VVPAT machines, which are pleaded in paragraphs 28 to 34. The petitioner has stated that the mandatory provisions for ensuring compliance with Section 61-A, as prescribed for the use of voting machines, were not followed. She has pleaded that the serial numbers/unique identification marks on the machines had stickers pasted on them, when in fact it is mandatory that the EVM machines have the serial numbers engraved on the cabinet or on a metal plate riveted to the cabinet. The petitioner has further pleaded that, in the absence of permanent, irreplaceable, and unique identification marks, the EVM machines cannot be used in the conduct of elections. Hence, the election of the applicant should be declared void on account of the fact that the EVM machines, including the ballot units, control units and the VVPAT printers used in the election process, did not have any permanent serial numbers/unique identification, or marks; instead, they had detachable stickers. It is therefore the petitioner’s case that, in view of the allegations made in the said paragraphs, a forensic assessment would be necessary. Hence, the petition would warrant a trial. So far as further particulars on the allegations are concerned, the petitioner has relied upon the application filed under Rule 93 of the Conduct of the Election Rules for the supply of necessary particulars. However, her application was rejected. A rejection letter is also produced on record.
19. The petitioner has verified the petition as contemplated under Section 83(1)(c) of the said Act of 1951, and all the annexures are independently verified as contemplated under Section 83(2) of the said Act of 1951. Form No. 25 is also duly filed as contemplated under Rule 94 of the Conduct of Election Rules 1961. Thus. The petition is filed as contemplated under Chapter II of the said Act of 1951.
20. To examine the rival contentions on whether the petition warrants a trial or should be rejected at the threshold, it is necessary to discuss the relevant, well-settled legal principles relied upon by both parties.
LEGAL POSITION:
21. In Jyoti Basu, the appellants before the Apex Court were the Chief Minister and two Ministers of the Government of West Bengal, who were impleaded as parties to an election petition challenging the election of the returned candidate on the grounds of alleged corrupt practices. They filed an application before the High Court to strike out their names. Their application was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that they were proper parties to the election petition. The Apex Court held that no one may be joined as a party to an election petition otherwise than as provided by Sections 82 and 86(4) of the Act and that a person who is not a candidate may not be joined as a respondent to the election petition. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that a challenge to an election is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply, but only those rules which the statute makes apply. It is held that the special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it, and no election may be questioned except in the manner provided by the Representation of the People Act. Therefore, the Representation of the People Act has been held to be a complete and self-contained code within which any rights claimed in relation to an election or an election dispute must be found.
22. In Hari Shanker Jain, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that “Material facts” required to be stated are those facts that can be considered as materials supporting the allegations made, that would afford a basis for the allegations made in the petition and would constitute the cause of action as understood in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is the duty of the court to examine the petition irrespective of any written statement or denial and reject the petition if it does not disclose a cause of action.
23. In Karim Uddin Barbhuiya, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that pleadings in an election petition have to be precise, specific, and unambiguous, and if the election petition does not disclose a cause of action, it is liable to be dismissed in limine. Section 83(1)(b) mandates that when the allegation of ‘corrupt practice’ is made, the petition shall set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice, including a statement of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of committing such corrupt practice. If the allegations contained in the petition do not set out the grounds as contemplated by Section 100 and do not conform to the requirement under Sections 81 and 83 of the Act, the petition is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11, read with Sections 83 and 87 of the RP Act.
24. In Kanimozhi Karunanidhi, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act, 1951 mandates that an Election Petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies. If material facts are not stated in an election petition, the same is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone, as the case would be covered under Clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order VII of CPC.
25. In Anil Sawant, this court held that following the mandate under various judgments of the Supreme Court, and particularly in the case of Kanimozhi Karunanidhi and Karim Uddin Barbhuiya, even a singular omission of a statutory requirement must entail dismissal of the Election Petition by having recourse to provisions of OrderVII Rule 11of the CPC.
26. In Virendra Nath Gautam, the judgment and order of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh was challenged, and the High Court upheld the preliminary objection that the election petition did not disclose material facts and was liable to be dismissed. The election petition alleged several irregularities, illegalities, and discrepancies in the voters' list and defective electronic voting machines. It is held that if all material facts in accordance with the provisions of the Act are not set out in the election petition, it is liable to be dismissed on that ground as the case would be covered by clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 83 of the Act read with clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code. The expression “material facts” is explained in paragraphs 31, 34 and 50 as under: “31. The expression “material facts” has neither been defined in the Act nor in the Code. According to the dictionary meaning, “material” means “fundamental”, “vital”, “basic”, “cardinal”, “central”, “crucial”, “decisive”, “essential”, “pivotal”, “indispensable”, “elementary” or “primary”. [Burton's Legal Thesaurus(3rd Edn.), p. 349]. The phrase “material facts”, therefore, may be said to be those facts upon which a party relies for his claim or defence. In other words, “material facts” are facts upon which the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's defence depends. What particulars could be said to be “material facts” would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. It is, however, absolutely essential that all basic and primary facts which must be proved at the trial by the party to establish the existence of a cause of action or defence are material facts and must be stated in the pleading by the party.” “34. A distinction between “material facts” and “particulars”, however, must not be overlooked. “Material facts” are primary or basic facts which must be pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in support of the case set up by him either to prove his cause of action or defence. “Particulars”, on the other hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative. “Particulars” thus ensure conduct of fair trial and would not take the opposite party by surprise.” “50. There is distinction between facta probanda (the facts required to be proved i.e. material facts) and facta probantia(the facts by means of which they are proved i.e. particulars or evidence). It is settled law that pleadings must contain only facta probanda and not facta probantia. The material facts on which the party relies for his claim are called facta probanda and they must be stated in the pleadings. But the facts or facts by means of which facta probanda (material facts) are proved and which are in the nature of facta probantia(particulars or evidence) need not be set out in the pleadings. They are not facts in issue, but only relevant facts required to be proved at the trial in order to establish the fact in issue.” emphasis applied by me
27. In Ashraf Kokkur, the Apex Court held that the limited inquiry under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the CPC is intended only to determine whether the petition should be thrown out at the threshold. In an election petition, the requirement under Section 83 of the RP Act is to provide a precise and concise statement of material facts. It is held that the expression “material facts” plainly means facts pertaining to the subject matter and which are relied on by the election petitioner, and if not proved, the election petitioner fails at the trial. The Apex Court referred to and relied upon the decision of the three- Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Hari Shanker Jain, where it is held that the expression “cause of action” would mean facts to be proved, and that the function of the party is to present a full picture of the cause of action with such further information to make opposite party understand the case he will have to meet. It was held that material facts would include positive statements of facts as well as positive averments of a negative fact, if necessary, and that material facts are such preliminary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action. The Apex Court discussed all the well-settled legal principles and concluded in paragraph 29 as under: “29. Finally, as cautioned by this Court in Raj Narain v.Indira Nehru Gandhi [(1972) 3 SCC 850], it was held that: (SCC p. 858, para 19) “19. Rules of pleadings are intended as aids for a fair trial and for reaching a just decision. An action at law should not be equated to a game of chess. Provisions of law are not mere formulae to be observed as rituals. Beneath the words of a provision of law, generally speaking, there lies a juristic principle. It is the duty of the court to ascertain that principle and implement it.” (emphasis supplied)”
28. The decision of the Apex Court in Balwan Singh is based on the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as it stood before the 1966 amendments. It was an appeal against the High Court's decision, which held that the corrupt practice had been proved and set aside the appellant's election. The election tribunal had dismissed the election petition after a full-fledged trial, holding that the alleged corrupt practice had not been proved. The Apex Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the High Court. In considering whether a corrupt practice described in Section 123(5) is committed, it is held with reference to the allegation in the said case being the hiring or procuring of a vehicle for the conveyance of the electors, that if full particulars of conveying by a vehicle of electors to or from any polling station are given, Section 83 is duly complied with, even if the particulars of the contract of hiring, as distinguished from the fact of hiring, are not given. In the facts of that case it was held that if particulars in support of the plea of the vehicle being hired or procured by the candidate or his agent or by another person was used for conveying voters to or from the polling station are set out, failure to set out particulars of the contract of hiring or arrangement of procuring will not render the petition defective.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS:
29. In view of the well-settled legal principles, all “material facts” must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him. The object and purpose are to enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with. However, “particulars” are the details of the case which is in the nature of evidence a party would be leading at the time of trial. The law requires only‘full particulars’ and not ‘material particulars’.
30. In the present case, the petitioner has challenged the election on the ground that it is void under Section 100(1)(b) and 100(1)(d)(i) and (iv) of the said Act. In paragraphs 4 to 7, the petitioner has pleaded the facts alleging that the applicant suppressed true and correct information regarding assets and liabilities in the affidavit, in terms of Rule 4A of the Rules of 1961, read with the prescribed Form 26. The petitioner provided full particulars of the alleged suppression, including details of the property and the liabilities suppressed by the applicant. The petitioner has annexed relevant revenue records to support the allegation of non-disclosure of the assets. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that the particulars regarding the alleged assets are not owned by the applicant, but his name is entered as the only office bearer of the society that owns the property. However, when examining whether the petition is liable to be rejected at the threshold under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC, the explanation or defence cannot be considered. The explanation or the defence of the applicant would be a matter of trial.
31. The petitioner has pleaded regarding the objections she filed to the nomination of the applicant and further challenged the Returning Officer’s rejection of those objections. She has pleaded that her objections were submitted much before the scrutiny process started. However, the returning officer, though he accepted her objection at that time, only to give undue benefit to the applicant, did not give an acknowledgement and later rejected her objection on the ground that it was received belatedly. The petitioner has annexed the relevant documents to support her allegations. The petitioner has thus raised an objection that the election result has been materially affected due to the improper acceptance of the applicant's nomination.
32. To substantiate the allegations, the petitioner has pleaded in paragraphs 30 to 39 that the Rules of 1981 and the guidelines, as well as the administrative Standard Operating Procedures, were not followed for the use of the EVM-VVPAT machines. She has alleged that the EVM machines did not contain permanent, irreplaceable, or unique identification marks, and instead had detachable stickers for the identification numbers. She has also pleaded that the Electoral Registration Officer appointed under the Representation of Peoples Act 1950 did not follow the mandatory procedure to ensure full and complete enrolment of women and voters in the age group of 18 and 19 years old. The petitioner has stated that she applied for copies of Form 17C, which is crucial for verifying and tallying total votes polled. However, her application for the supply copies of the forms was rejected. Hence, it is contended that, in view of the breaches committed on the polling day, the shifting and transportation of the EVMs and their storage, as well as the names of many voters missing from the voters’ list from various polling booths, have materially affected the election of the applicant. The petitioner has pleaded that the Election Commission of India did not comply with Section 61A of the said Act. Hence, the election is liable to be set aside under Section 100 (1)(d)(iv) of the said Act.
33. The petitioner pleaded that she had applied for copies of Form 17-C pertaining to all polling booths and for complete video recordings of the election process. However, her application was rejected by the District Election Officer. The petitioner has annexed a copy of her application and the rejection letter. Hence, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the contents of the petition are based on her personal knowledge and observations during the election process; hence, the verification of all the paragraphs of the petition is based on her personal knowledge. In view of the nature of the allegations in the petition, the petitioner has stated that the averments are based on her personal knowledge. Hence, there would be no question of disclosing the source of personal knowledge.
34. The petition is bereft of any pleadings to challenge the election on the ground contemplated under Section 100(1)(b) read with Section 123 of the said Act. However, the petition contains pleadings to support the allegations to challenge the election on the grounds contemplated under Section 100(1) (d)(i) and (iv) of the said Act. Whether or not the election petitioner can prove the said allegations is a matter of evidence, which can be considered only at the stage of trial. By no stretch of imagination, however, it can be said that the material fact, that is, the allegations regarding the challenge to the election on the grounds contemplated under Section 100(1)(d)(i) and (iv) of the said Act, has not been stated in the petition for rejecting the petition at the threshold. The petitioner has also pleaded that the applicant has secured 1,09,239 votes, and the petitioner has secured 72,575 votes, the second highest votes; hence, the grounds of challenge would materially affect the election result. The legal principles settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the decisions of Virendra Nath Gautam and Ashraf Kokkur, squarely support the arguments made on behalf of the petitioner. The legal principles settled in the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant would not be of any assistance to the applicant. The material facts which are required to be pleaded in the election petition as required by Section 83(1) of the Act, read with Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the Code, have been pleaded by the petitioner, and the cause of action has been disclosed. Therefore, the petition cannot be
35. Hence, for the reasons recorded above, the Interim Application (L) No. 24466 of 2025 is dismissed. (GAURI GODSE, J.)