Full Text
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPEAL NO. 1134 OF 2022
Jagannath Pandurang Waghare … Appellant vs.
The State of Maharashtra and another … Respondents
Mr. Pawan Mali for appellant (appointed through legal aid).
Ms. Sharmila S. Kaushik, APP for respondent No.1-State.
Mr. Rohan Surve for respondent No.2 (appointed through legal aid).
JUDGMENT
2. The prosecution case in brief is that the appellant being an agricultural labourer, was living with his wife, minor daughter and minor son in small house, having one room and an attached kitchen. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant indulged in sexual assault on his own minor daughter during the night time, while sleeping adjacent to her. The acts of sexual assault were repeated at least 4 to 5 times on various dates, which eventually led to the minor daughter becoming pregnant.
3. The minor daughter (victim) was stated to have intimated her mother (PW[2]) about such sexual assault by the appellant and she had said to the victim that she would be discussing the matter with the appellant. In any case, when the victim missed her monthly period, her mother PW[2] took her to a doctor (PW[3]), who carried out urine test and confirmed the fact that the victim was pregnant. Thereupon, the victim was referred to another doctor. i.e. PW[4], who was a general surgeon. He confirmed that the pregnancy was about 11 weeks and in the circumstances, referred her to Cama Hospital at Mumbai (the said hospital).
4. The victim was admitted in the said hospital. It is stated that the appellant himself had accompanied the victim to Mumbai. But later, he left the hospital and in these circumstances, the statement of the victim was recorded by police personnel from Azad Maidan Police Station, Mumbai. Medical termination of pregnancy was carried out and samples of foetus were retained for DNA analysis.
5. Since the victim named the appellant i.e. her own father, who had sexually assaulted her, resulting in pregnancy, the appellant was arrested and investigation was undertaken. The investigating officer (PW[6]) stated that the foetus samples along with blood samples of the victim as also the blood samples of the appellant, were sent for DNA analysis. The DNA analysis report (the said report) stated that the foetus was the product of conception between the appellant and the victim and that they were the biological parents. According to the investigating officer (PW[6]), this was the clinching evidence and the said report was heavily relied upon.
6. The appellant was charged with the aforesaid offences in the light of completion of investigation and filing of chargesheet. The prosecution examined 6 witnesses to prove its case, while the appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), raised the defence of false implication on the ground that his wife (PW[2]) and victim (PW[1]) had grudge against him and that they had connived with the maternal uncle of the victim to falsely implicate the appellant.
7. In the impugned judgment and order, the Trial Court considered the evidence of the six prosecution witnesses and various exhibits, upon which prosecution relied, particularly the said report. After considering such evidence and the material on record, the Trial Court concluded that the appellant was guilty and accordingly, he was convicted and sentenced in the aforesaid manner. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that this was a heinous offence, in which the father himself had sexually abused his own minor daughter and thereupon, it was recorded that no leniency could be shown to such accused person. As a consequence, the Trial Court sentenced the appellant for imprisonment for remainder of his natural life.
8. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court, the appellant filed the instant appeal. Upon record and proceedings and paper-book being received, the appeal was taken up for hearing. Respondent No.2 was put to notice. The appellant as well as respondent No.2 are represented by counsel appointed through legal aid and the State is represented by the learned APP.
9. Mr. Mali, learned counsel appointed through legal aid for representing the appellant, submitted that in the present case, even if the allegation against the appellant is extremely serious, the evidence led by the prosecution falls short of bringing home the guilt of the appellant. It was submitted that the sheet anchor of the prosecution case i.e. the said report deserves to be completely discarded, in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
10. By placing reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Irfan alias Bhayu Mevati vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [2025 SCC OnLine SC 359], Prakash Nishad alias Kewat Zinak Nishad vs. State of Maharashtra [(2023) 16 SCC 357] and Manoj and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2023) 2 SCC 353], it was submitted that the chain of custody of samples sent for DNA examination, assumes great significance in such cases. It was emphasized that the purity of process is extremely significant and that all relevant persons concerned with the chain of custody, are required to be examined. These include the doctor, who took the samples, the persons who stored such samples, the carrier who carried the samples to the laboratory and the expert who gave the DNA analysis report. It was submitted that in the present case, none of the persons involved in such acts constituting the chain of custody, were examined by the prosecution, thereby demonstrating that the said report ought to have been discarded by the Trial Court. It was submitted that in any case, as per the law laid down in the said judgments, the said report is necessarily a piece of evidence used for corroborating the main case of the prosecution and that the said report in itself cannot become the main stay for the prosecution. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses in Court, has to be given due importance and the said report has to used only for corroboration. It is submitted that these principles were ignored by the Trial Court, by blindly relying on the said report, thereby vitiating the findings against the appellant.
11. It was submitted that in any case, the said report, as an incriminating circumstance, was not put to the appellant, while recording his statement under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C., as a consequence of which the said report could not have been considered by the Trial Court. In this context, reliance was placed on paragraph No.20 of the judgment of the Supreme Court, in the case of Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam [(2013) 12 SCC 406].
12. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the prosecution, therefore, could rely only upon the evidence of the victim (PW[1]) and her mother (PW[2]). It was submitted that the evidence of these two witnesses was riddled with omissions and contradictions, thereby indicating that it was not of sterling quality and the Trial Court could not have relied upon the same. It was claimed that the evidence of these witnesses suffered from material contradictions as also omissions, which the Trial Court failed to appreciate. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) and others vs. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 13 SCC 657].
13. It was submitted that the crucial aspect of the actual incident of sexual intercourse and penetration, with necessary details of time and date, were completely missing in the evidence of the victim (PW[1]). It was submitted that even the statement regarding instances of actual penetration were missing and in the first instance, the victim (PW[1]) had not made reference to the same in her statement to the police. The said witness had also conceded that she and her mother had a grudge against the appellant. He was allegedly a drunkard and a violent person, thereby indicating false implication.
14. It was submitted that the appellant had specifically raised the contention that this was a case of false implication, involving maternal uncle of the victim (PW[1]), which was not explored at all by the prosecution and the Trial Court also completely ignored the same.
15. It was submitted that the prosecution evidence fell short of proving the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and hence, the impugned judgment and order ought to be set aside, as the appellant deserves to be acquitted.
16. On the other hand, Ms. Kaushik, learned APP submitted that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses itself was enough to name the appellant and that the lone witness i.e. victim (PW[1]) herself had given sufficient evidence of sterling quality against the appellant, which ought to sustain the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court. It was submitted that the evidence of the prosecutrix alone is enough in such cases and corroboration with other evidence, is not even necessary. Much reliance was placed on the evidence of the victim (PW[1]) and her mother (PW[2]) to sustain the conviction and sentence of the appellant.
17. It was submitted that during the course of investigation and recording of evidence, there appeared to be certain gaps and deficiencies as regards the said report. Therefore, it was submitted that even if the said report was to be ignored, the appellant cannot claim acquittal, as remaining part of the evidence was sufficient to prove guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It was submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) and others vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) itself comes to the aid of prosecution, as the alleged omissions and contradictions in the evidence of victim (PW[1]) and her mother (PW[2]), cannot be termed as material omissions or contradictions. Minor inconsistencies would not adversely affect the evidence of the said prosecution witnesses and hence, it was submitted that the appeal does not deserve to be allowed.
18. It was further submitted that the fact that the victim was a minor, was not even contested. She was only about 14 years old and her own father i.e. the appellant inflicted sexual assault on her, which resulted in pregnancy. In such circumstances, the Court ought not to show any leniency to the appellant.
19. But, as an officer of the Court, the learned APP, in all fairness, brought to the notice of this Court that sentencing to the extent of imprisonment for the remainder of life, may need a further look at the hands of this Court. In this context, the guidelines for life sentencing and premature release of the prisoners, were referred to, particularly the guidelines issued in the year 2010. By referring to the classification of the offences, it was brought to the notice of this Court that when a person is found guilty of having committed rape and the victim is minor, the period of imprisonment to be undertaken, including remissions, subject to the minimum of 10 years of actual imprisonment, is 20 years of imprisonment. It was submitted that this Court may take into consideration the said aspect of the matter, although it was vehemently submitted that the appeal deserved to be dismissed.
20. Mr. Surve, learned counsel appointed through legal aid for representing respondent No.2, supported the submissions made by the learned APP seeking dismissal of the appeal. He further relied upon a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhanei Prasad alias Raju vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1636), to invite attention to Section 29 of the POCSO Act, whereby a presumption is raised regarding guilt of the accused in such cases. It was submitted that foundational facts were clearly established by the prosecution evidence and therefore, onus was completely upon the appellant, to demonstrate how he was not guilty of the offence. By relying upon the said judgment, it was submitted that when a father commits such a reprehensible act on his own minor daughter, the law and the Courts cannot condone such act and that appropriate punishment has to be inflicted. It was submitted that in such circumstances, this Court may not show any indulgence to the appellant.
21. Having heard the learned counsel for the rival parties, this Court finds that in the present case, the prosecution recorded the evidence of only 6 witnesses. These include the victim, her mother, 3 doctors and the investigating officer. It is surprising that when the exercise of collecting the samples and sending the same for DNA analysis was undertaken by the investigating authority, the prosecution chose to ignore crucial witnesses, for establishing the chain of custody and the purity of process of movement of samples upto the laboratory for examination. The DNA analysis is, by now, a recognized tool of investigation and reports consequent to such DNA analysis, are heavily relied upon by the Courts, as material corroborating the case of prosecution. Considering the fact that these are highly scientific tests, the veracity of which has been recognized by the Supreme Court and High Courts on various occasions, the least that is expected from the prosecution, while relying on such evidence, is that the relevant witnesses are examined, to prove the chain of custody and also to establish that the purity of process was maintained, leading to the said report.
22. Before adverting to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, including the victim and her mother, it would be necessary to deal with the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant, with regard to the said report and the claim that the Trial Court ought to have discarded the same.
23. The Supreme Court, in the cases of Irfan alias Bhayu Mevati vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), Prakash Nishad alias Kewat Zinak Nishad vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) and Manoj and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), has considered the manner in which the investigating authority and the prosecution are expected to place before the Court the chain of custody, leading to the said report. In the said judgments and the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court, including Mukesh and another vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and others [(2017) 6 SCC 1], the Supreme Court has recognized the said report as a reliable piece of evidence, particularly when it is based on scientific analysis, with the results being almost 100% correct. But, in these judgments, it has been emphasized that the chain of custody has to be maintained, meaning thereby that the integrity of the samples sent for examination, has to be safeguarded. It is held that proper evidence is necessary and indispensable for maintaining the vitality of such evidence, so that there is no scope for the Court to suspect any chance of contamination of the samples. Although scientific analysis ensures almost 100% correct results, equally important is the purity of process, thereby ensuring that there is not even an iota of possibility of contamination of samples.
24. Hence, it has been laid down that before the Court accepts the said report as a strong incriminating circumstance against the accused, it is necessary for the prosecution to examine all the relevant witnesses to prove the chain of custody, the purity of process of collection of samples and transporting the same to the laboratory for examination by the expert. It is also necessary to examine the expert, who has given the said report, so that such report can be relied upon by the Court.
25. We find that on the touchstone of such stringent requirements recognized by the Supreme Court in the said judgments, the prosecution in the present case, has failed to prove the chain of custody and the fact that the purity of process indicated hereinabove, was duly maintained. The prosecution in the present case, failed to examine the doctor who collected the sample of the tissue from the foetus as also the blood sample of the victim (PW[1]), the police constable who carried the sample to the laboratory for examination and the expert who gave the said report. A perusal of the exhibits on record shows that while Exhibit No.34 i.e. the letter dated 22.10.2015 sent by the investigating officer to the laboratory, recorded that the blood sample and the sample of tissue from the foetus were sent with letter bearing outward No.2007/2015 dated 20.10.2015, the said report at Exhibit 42 recorded that the sample was received with reference to the document bearing No.2007/2015 dated 19.10.2015. The difference in the dates could not be explained by the prosecution.
26. In any case, the failure of the prosecution to examine the crucial players in the entire process of transport of the aforesaid samples from the point in time they were collected to the point in time they were delivered to the laboratory, coupled with failure to examine the expert who signed the said report, unfortunately leads to a situation, where this Court has no other alternative but to completely discard the said report. The learned counsel for the appellant is right in contending that the Trial Court committed an error in relying on the said report, despite such glaring discrepancies in the evidence to the prosecution on this aspect of the matter.
27. Even otherwise, the learned counsel for the appellant is justified in relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam (supra), for the reason that in the present case, the incriminating circumstance claimed by the prosecution regarding the said report, was never put to the appellant during the recording of his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. As per the said judgment of the Supreme Court, the circumstances which are not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., cannot be used against him and must be excluded from consideration. This is another ground why the said report has to be discarded, further demonstrating the error committed by the Trial Court in relying on the said report.
28. In such a situation, the correctness or otherwise of the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court, has to be examined on the basis of the remaining evidence, particularly the evidence of the victim (PW[1]) and her mother (PW[2]).
29. Before proceeding to analyse the said evidence, it would be necessary to consider as to the approach to be adopted by the Court in such cases, involving sexual offence against the victim, particularly when the victim is minor. It is settled law that in such cases, the testimony of the prosecutrix alone can be enough for proving the guilt of the accused, unless there are compelling reasons to seek corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix. If the evidence of the prosecutrix is sterling in quality and it does not suffer from any material omissions or contradictions, such evidence alone is enough to prove the guilt of the accused.
30. In this backdrop, we shall examine the evidence of the crucial witnesses of the prosecution. The victim (PW[1]) in her deposition before the Court, clearly stated that her date of birth is 27.04.2001. The investigating authority had placed documentary evidence on record in support of the said assertion. There was nothing to contradict the same and therefore, it is evident that at the time the incident occurred, the victim (PW[1]) was clearly a minor, aged about 14 years. Thus, the provisions of POCSO Act stood attracted, including presumption under Section 29 thereof. Such presumption, as per settled law, would arise upon the prosecution proving the foundational facts. In this context, the evidence of the victim (PW[1]) assumes significance.
31. She stated in her evidence before the Court that in the month of August 2015, the appellant i.e. her own father indulged in the acts of sexual assault 4 to 5 times during the night time, when she was sleeping adjacent to him. She stated that the appellant indulged in the act of penetration by removing her clothes. She further stated that she had informed her mother (PW[2]) about such incidents, who had said that she would be discussing the same with the appellant. The victim (PW[1]) then stated that after she became pregnant, she went to doctors (PW[3] and PW[4]), who, upon finding her pregnant, referred her to the said hospital, where her father had taken her. She clearly stated that after the appellant-father admitted her to the said hospital, he left. She was in the hospital for 15 days, where she was operated. Her statement was recorded in the hospital by the police personnel and the said statement was treated as FIR. Thereafter, when she returned to her place, Goregaon Police, District Raigad, recorded her statement in question-answer format in the presence of her mother (PW[2]) and a member of Dakshata Committee. Subsequently, her statement was recorded before the Magistrate under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.
32. In the cross-examination, the defence brought out certain omissions in the statement of the victim (PW[1]) about actual removal of clothes and the act of penetration by the appellant, as also her statement that she had informed her mother about such acts of the appellant. In cross-examination, certain questions were put to the victim (PW[1]) about disclosure about the incidents to classmates, teachers and relatives who had visited the house and her maternal uncle, to which the victim (PW[1]) said that she had not made any such disclosures.
33. Much emphasis was placed on behalf of the appellant on such apparent omissions and failure to disclose on the part of the victim (PW[1]). We have carefully considered the entire evidence of the victim (PW[1]). We do find that there are certain minor omissions in the evidence of the said witness. But, such omissions certainly do not qualify to be material omissions or discrepancies. In the case of Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) and others vs. State of Maharashtra (supra), the Supreme Court has recognized that minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters, without affecting the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground to reject the evidence in its entirety. It was vehemently submitted on behalf of the appellant that since the act of removal of clothes and actual act of penetration was not disclosed by the victim (PW[1]) in her statement in the said hospital, on the basis of which FIR was registered, this ought to be treated as a major omission and that her evidence ought to be discarded.
34. We are unable to agree with the said contention, simply for the reason that even in the statement recorded in the said hospital, the victim (PW[1]) described the manner in which the appellant i.e. her own father used to sleep adjacent to her, touch her inappropriately and that he indulged in forcible sexual assault on her. Such description by a 14 year old girl, in the context of her own father, is enough and insistence on actual description of the act of penetration, cannot be held as sine qua non for the Court to believe the case of the victim. In any case, in her statement recorded before the Magistrate under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., she had described in detail as to the manner in which the appellant had sexually assaulted her, including indulging in the act of penetration. The medical evidence also supported her version and therefore, we do not find any material omissions or contradictions in her evidence.
35. As regards non-disclosure of such incidents to her classmates, teachers and relatives, including her maternal uncle, the said factor can be of no consequence, for the reason that disclosing such an act on the part of her own father would have been extremely embarrassing for her. It was also argued on behalf of the appellant that she had herself conceded in cross-examination that since the appellant used to drink liquor and treat the victim and her mother violently, they had a grudge against him. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid aspect cannot be treated as a reason for the victim to make such a serious allegation of rape against her own father and therefore, the said argument is rejected.
36. In respect of failure to disclose the involvement of the appellant to the doctors, suffice it to say that the state of mind of a 14 year old minor girl has to be taken into consideration, particularly when the evidence on record does show that he was addicted to liquor and used to violently treat his wife and children, including the victim herself. The evidence of the victim (PW[1]) also shows that although the appellant did accompany her to the said hospital, he left the hospital, while she remained admitted in the hospital for 15 days. When the police recorded her statement, she specifically made allegations against the appellant regarding sexual assault, asserting that he was responsible for her pregnancy. It is not as if at that point in time, she was under the influence of any person, including her mother (PW[2]) or that she was tutored to falsely implicate the appellant. We find that the evidence of the victim-prosecutrix (PW[1]) itself is enough to nail the guilt of the appellant.
37. The evidence of mother of victim (PW[2]) corroborates the evidence of the victim (PW[1]). She has stated in detail about the fact that the appellant was addicted to liquor and that he used to violently beat her and the children. Much was sought to be made out of the said witness (PW[2]) remaining silent to certain questions put to her, with regard to the quarrels between her and the appellant as also the victim (PW[1]) with the appellant. But, we are not impressed by the same. The evidence of mother of the victim (PW[2]) clearly supports the version of the victim (PW[1]) and therefore, we find substance in the contention raised by the learned APP that the evidence of these two witnesses is sufficient to prove the guilt of appellant. Even the evidence of the said witness cannot be said to be hit by any material omissions or contradictions.
38. The appellant, in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., claimed that he had been falsely implicated at the behest of the maternal uncle of the victim (PW[1]), for the reason that he refused to shift to Mumbai. The evidence on record, in no manner, supports the claim of the appellant. We are unable to agree with the said contention, for the reason that even if the relations between the appellant and his wife i.e. PW[2] were strained, the said witness being the mother of the victim (PW[1]), would not use her own daughter for making such a serious allegation against her husband. The contention regarding false implication, in the backdrop of strained relations within the family, cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The defence of false implication was correctly rejected by the Trial Court.
39. In the case of Bhanei Prasad alias Raju vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (supra), the Supreme Court specifically laid down that the POCSO Act has evolved as a bulwark against predatory crimes targeting minor victims and that Section 29 thereof creates a statutory presumption of guilt, once the foundational facts are established. In the light of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in the present case, we find that the testimony of the minor victim (PW[1]), can be completely relied upon and therefore, the foundational facts were established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, as a consequence of which the presumption under Section 29 thereof stood triggered. In this situation, it was for the appellant to rebut such presumption. It is settled law that while rebutting the presumption, the accused is only required to prove his case on preponderance of probabilities. But even on the said touchstone, the appellant in the present case, has failed to rebut the presumption and hence, the conviction of the appellant under the provisions of the POCSO Act, is fully justified.
40. Such heinous crime, when committed by a father against his own daughter, has the tendency of destroying the basic fabric of familial life and trust. This has been adverted to by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhanei Prasad alias Raju vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (supra), in the following words: “13. When a father who is expected to be a shield, a guardian, a moral compass, becomes the source of the most severe violation of a child's bodily integrity and dignity, the betrayal is not only personal but institutional. The law does not, and cannot, condone such acts under the guise of rehabilitation or reform. Incestuous sexual violence committed by a parent is a distinct category of offence that tears through the foundational fabric of familial trust and must invite the severest condemnation in both language and sentence. The home, which should be a sanctuary, cannot be permitted to become a site of unspeakable trauma, and the courts must send a clear signal that such offences will be met with an equally unsparing judicial response. To entertain a plea for leniency in a case of this nature would not merely be misplaced, it would constitute a betrayal of the Court's own constitutional duty to protect the vulnerable. When a child is forced to suffer at the hands of her own father, the law must speak in a voice that is resolute and uncompromising. There can be no mitigation in sentencing for crimes that subvert the very notion of family as a space of security.”
41. We find that although the Trial Court did err in relying upon the said report, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the evidence of the prosecution, particularly the oral testimonies of the victim (PW[1]) and her mother (PW[2]), were enough to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, we find no merit in the present appeal.
42. On the question of sentence, the Trial Court found that no leniency could be shown to the appellant, as he had inflicted sexual assault on his own daughter and having convicted him under Section 376(2)(f) and (i) of the IPC, imposed sentence of imprisonment for life, meaning imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life.
43. In this context, the learned APP referred to the guidelines issued by the State, to place before this Court the fact that offence under Section 376 of the IPC, in the context of the victim being a minor, has been categorized under category 8(b), prescribing life imprisonment as imprisonment for 20 years, including remissions. It was brought to the notice of this Court that other categories such as offences against the State and offences by terrorists and extremists, longer periods of sentence were prescribed. It was submitted that this Court may consider the said guidelines in the case of the appellant also.
44. But, a perusal of Section 376 of the IPC shows that it was substituted with effect from 03.02.2013 by Act 13 of 2013. Subsequently, it was further amended by Act 22 of 2018, whereby clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 376, was deleted and subsection (3) was added with effect from 21.04.2018. Since we are concerned with Section 376 of the IPC, as it stood prior to the amendment in the year 2018, the provision as it then stood, has to be taken into consideration.
45. A perusal of the said provision shows that sub-section (1) of Section 376 of the IPC, while prescribing punishment for rape, specifically states that except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), who ever commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term, which shall not be less than 10 years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. As opposed to this, sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the IPC, prescribes that if an accused is found guilty of offence under clauses (a) to (n) thereof, such an accused shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than 10 years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for remainder of that person’s natural life and shall also be liable for fine.
46. We are of the opinion that substitution of Section 376 of the IPC with effect from 03.02.2013, applicable to the facts of the present case, must be given its full effect. In the present case, we have upheld the conviction of the appellant under Section 376(2)(f) and (i) of the IPC, as the appellant was certainly a person in authority over the victim and she was under 16 years of age. We are in complete agreement with the Trial Court that such an offence committed by the appellant, being the father of the victim, does deserve punishment of imprisonment for life. Once this conclusion is reached, there is no discretion left in the Court for applying the aforesaid guidelines framed by the State under Section 432 of the Cr.P.C., because the statute itself states that in such cases, imprisonment for life shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life.
47. It is also relevant to note that as per the subsequent amendment brought into effect from 21.04.2018, whereby clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the IPC, was deleted and subsection (3) was added, it was provided that when rape was committed on woman under 16 years of age, the minimum term for which rigorous imprisonment would be imposed, was 20 years. The same could extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for remainder of that person’s natural life. Therefore, the 2018-amendment increases the minimum sentence to 20 years and retains the statutory mandate that once the Court grants imprisonment for life, it shall mean imprisonment for remainder of that person’s natural life.
48. In these circumstances, we find that while the guidelines framed by the State would apply to sub-section (1) of Section 376 of the IPC, as substituted with effect from 03.02.2013, the same cannot apply to sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the IPC, in the context of imprisonment for life meaning imprisonment for remainder of that person’s natural life. In that light, the submission pertaining to sentencing made by the learned APP, cannot be accepted and hence, the judgment of the Trial Court, is required to be upheld in its entirety.
49. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed and the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court is upheld. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, J.) (MANISH PITALE, J.) Priya Kambli KAMBLI