Bhagwati Akshar Empire LLP v. City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd

10. Mr. Soham Bhalerao, learned counsel for the respondent nos.[1] to 3 opposed the petition and submits that the petition is not maintainable either on facts or in law. The respondent no.1 has challenged locus-standi of the petitioner on the ground that the bid for the subject plot was submitted by “Bhagwati Empire LLP” and the petitioner is not the same entity. As per clause 11 of the tender conditions, the bid document is non-transferable and the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that “Bhagwati Empire LLP” and “Bhagwati Akshar Empire LLP” are the same entities. The communication dated 17th May 2024 has been made to Bhagwati Empire LLP and the bid amount was refunded to the same entity. However, this writ petition has been filed by Bhagwati Akshar Empire LLP, which in the circumstances of the case cannot raise any objection to the communication dated 17th May 2024 by which Bhagwati Empire LLP was informed that eauction for the subject plot has been cancelled.

11. Mr. Bhalerao further submitted that the respondent no.1

1. (2024) 15 SCC 461

2. (2022) 16 SCC 527 has not issued a letter of allotment and there is no concluded contract between the parties. The respondent no.1 has exercised its right and discretion under the bid document and cancelled the tender for valid reasons. In the realm of contract, there is no law of universal obligation that the highest bidder has a vested enforceable right to claim the award of tender in his favour. A conditional offer or acceptance does not lead to a concluded contract. By making an offer and having been declared highest bidder, the petitioner does not acquire right in law to compel the Employer to award the tender in its favour. The respondent no.1, being an instrumentality of the State is entrusted with the planning and development of urban infrastructure and industrial areas in the State of Maharashtra. It is its duty-bound to ensure that no loss is caused to the public exchequer. The tender was cancelled as the petitioner’s bid was substantially below the market potential. The decision to cancel the tender is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. On 22nd August 2022, when the petitioner was declared the highest bidder, on that same day the Tribunal passed an interim order in Original Application No.74 of 2022 (WZ) restraining the respondents from proceeding with the tender process. On 11th October 2023, the Tribunal passed its final judgment directing the respondent no.1 not to grant leasehold rights for construction except for buildings within the area falling outside CRZ. After the respondent no.1’s Review Petition was dismissed on 22nd April 2024, the cancellation letter dated 17th May 2024 was issued and the petitioner’s EMD was sought to be refunded. Hence, the allegation of mala fides or arbitrariness is untenable. Mr. Bhalerao relied on the judgments in “Aditya Enterprises v. City Industrial and Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd.”3 and “Infinity Infra & Anr. v. City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Limited”4 passed by this Court and submits that the petition ought to be dismissed with costs. Reasons and Findings:

12. We have perused the record and heard the learned counsel for the parties. The objection raised by the respondent no.1 that the bid was submitted by “Bhagwati Empire LLP”, whereas the present petition has been filed by “Bhagwati Akshar Empire LLP”, on the premise that they are distinct entities, is wholly devoid of merit. As clarified by the petitioner in its affidavit in rejoinder dated 21st November 2025, the entity remains the same and has merely undergone a change of name in full compliance with the statutory procedure prescribed under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008. At page no.258 of the paper-book, the petitioner has placed on record a fresh Certificate of Incorporation dated 4th August 2022 issued consequent upon change of name under Rule 20(3) of the LLP Rules 2009. This statutory document confirms the new name of the Petitioner as “Bhagwati Akshar Empires LLP”. In our view, a mere change of name does not amount to any “transfer” of rights or liabilities under the bid document. We may note that the petitioner has not produced any document on record which shows that it intimated the name change to the respondent no.1. However, we have proceeded to decide this matter on merits.

3. 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 876

4. 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 434

13. The short question that arises for determination is whether this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ought to set aside/quash the cancellation of tender at the behest of a highest bidder? The answer must be in negative. It is well settled that the scope of judicial review in tender matters is extremely limited. Interference is warranted only where the petitioner can establish arbitrariness, mala fides, or perversity in the State action. Absent such grounds, this Court would not be justified in intervening in the tender process, much less quash an order of cancellation of tender or in other words, revive a cancelled tender by directing the authority to issue an allotment letter.

14. We note that the respondent no. 1 is incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It is a government company within the meaning of section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. It is entrusted with the responsibilities for planning and development of urban infrastructure and industrial areas in the State of Maharashtra. It has been notified as a New Town Development Authority and started functioning with the subscribed capital of Rs.10 lakhs. It was made a subsidiary of the State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Limited (in short, “SIICOM”), which provided a loan of Rs.270 lakhs. It has also borrowed Rs.16,60,068.05/- from SIICOM. The respondent no.1 has been conceived as a multi-disciplinary organization with the objectives to:–

(i) Reduce the growth rate of population in Greater

(ii) Reduce Traffic congestion and burden of Mumbai’s physical Infrastructure such as road, transport, mass transportation system, etc.

(iii) Provide physical and social services to raise living standards and mitigate disparities in amenities provided to different sections of the societies and to facilitate efficient and rational distribution of industries over industries and a balanced development of urban centers in the hinder land.

15. A Division Bench of this Court in “Hare Krishna Enterprises v. City Industrial and Development Corporation of Maharashtra Limited”5 whilst declining a similar challenge has considered the role of the respondent no.1 as a public authority and as a commercial entity. It is in performance of this dual role that the respondent no.1 is required to ensure that public resources are utilized efficiently and that it fetches the maximum possible rates for its land. The relevant portion read as below: “16.

CIDCO is a New Development Authority empowered by the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act, 1966 (“MRTP Act” for short). CIDCO has the authority to dispose of land for development as it deems expedient, subject to the terms and conditions it considers appropriate. This power is exercised by its Board of Directors. The New Bombay Disposal of Land Regulations, 1975, framed under the MRTP Act, govern these disposals, giving CIDCO the statutory authority to manage land disposal. Therefore, CIDCO’s actions must be viewed in the context of its dual role as a public authority and a commercial entity.

17. CIDCO’s actions are guided by public interest. The income derived from land disposal is used to build infrastructure and fulfil development commitments. Allowing competitive bidding ensures maximum returns for public benefit. In our opinion, the public interest has to supersede any private or personal interests. We are in agreement with Mr. Kapadia, learned Senior Advocate when he

5. 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 1252 contends that by rejecting the petitioner’s representation, CIDCO has taken a conscious decision in commercial terms and in the interest of general public. As a public body, CIDCO is responsible for ensuring that public resources are utilised efficiently and that it fetches the maximum possible rates for its land. In “Shree Ganesh Enterprises v. City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Limited” 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2346, it was held by this Court in paragraph 23 that the commercial aspect of the tender process cannot be lost sight of, and CIDCO is not at fault for trying to fetch maximum rates. In “Sterling Computers Limited v. M & N Publications Limited” (1993) 1 SCC 445, the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 held that when there are commercial elements, authorities need to have some discretion to enter into contracts, keeping in mind the goal of revenue augmentation. In “Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd.” (2000) 2 SCC 617, the Supreme Court in paragraph 7 held that the award of a contract/tender is a commercial transaction and commercial considerations are paramount. It is well settled that the Court should exercise restraint and avoid interfering in tender or contract matters, unless there is unmistakable evidence of arbitrariness, bias or irrationality. In “Tata Cellular v. Union of India” (1994) 6 SCC 651, the Supreme Court in paragraphs 91, 100 and 111 held that the Courts do not have expertise to correct administrative decisions and judicial review would amount to substituting the Court’s decision for the administrations. In “JSW Infrastructure Limited v. Kakinada Seaports Limited” (2017) 4 SCC 170 in paragraphs 8 to 10 Their Lordships held that superior Courts while exercising their power of judicial review must act with restraint while dealing with contractual matters so long as evaluation of tenders if the decision of awarding contracts, which is essentially commercial function, is bona fide and taken in the public interest.”

16. A perusal of the bid documents issued by the respondent no.1 reveals that the Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of the Corporation reserves the right to reject or cancel any or all bids/plots without assigning any reasons. The allotment letter to successful bidders is to be issued only upon approval of the Vice-Chairman and Managing Director. The final price of the plot is required to be paid in two equal instalments, after adjustment of the EMD. The time stipulated for payment of the final price was expressly declared to be the essence of the contract and any failure to adhere to the prescribed timeline rendered the allotment liable to cancellation with forfeiture of the EMD, though the Managing Director is vested with the power to extend the period for payment in deserving cases. It is further stipulated that possession of the plot will be handed over only upon receipt of full payment in the prescribed mode. The acceptance of any bid is at the sole discretion of the Corporation. The intending bidders were also specifically informed under clause 28, captioned “Risk Factors”, that the Corporation reserved the right to amend, revoke, or modify the conditions of the scheme or to reject or cancel any or all offers/plots without assigning any reasons, and that in the event of cancellation of the scheme, the bidders would have no say in the matter. Clause 3(d), 3(e), 11, 13, 15, 21, 27 and 28 are relevant and read as under: “3(d) The issue of this BID document does not imply that CIDCO is bound to allot the said Plots to the Bidder and it reserves the right to reject all or any of the Bids without assigning any reasons in respect thereof. 3(e) CIDCO reserves the right not to proceed with the Bidding Process as per time table without liability or to reject/cancel any or all plot/Bid(s) without assigning any reasons in respect thereof. “ “11) The BID DOCUMENT is non-transferable.

13) The Vice Chairman and Managing Director, CIDCO reserves all rights to reject/cancel any or all bids/plots without assigning any reason thereof.

15) The Allotment Letter will be issued to successful bidders after approval of Vice Chairman and Managing Director.

21) The possession of the Plot shall be given only on receipt of payments in full in accordance with the mode of payment prescribed.

27) Acceptance of offer: The acceptance of a Bid is at the sole discretion of the Corporation.

28) Risk Factors: The Corporation reserves the right to amend, revoke, modify the conditions of the scheme at its discretion or reject/cancel any or all offers/plots without assigning any reasons thereof. In case of cancellation of the scheme, the bidder will not have any say.”

17. Part-B of the e-tender expressly describes the process as an “Invitation to Offer”. In law, an invitation to offer creates no enforceable rights unless an unconditional acceptance results in a concluded contract. The tender contemplates execution of an Agreement to Lease in accordance with the Navi Mumbai Disposal of Lands (Amendment) Regulations, 2008, to be executed only upon payment of the entire lease premium and ancillary charges, with possession to follow thereafter. It is settled law that a tender is merely an offer and that the terms of an invitation to tender falls within the contractual domain, ordinarily beyond judicial review. Where the tender vests the respondent no.1 with discretion to accept or reject bids, no vested right accrues to the petitioner until all stipulated conditions are fulfilled and requisite approval is obtained. Partial compliance, part payment, or an assertion of readiness and willingness does not create an indefeasible right to award of the tender.

18. In the present case, the tender was cancelled prior to even the issuance of an allotment letter. Clause 27 explicitly provides acceptance of the offer at the sole discretion of respondent no. 1. Upon cancellation, the EMD was attempted to be refunded to Bhagwati Empire LLP. No contractual or vested right accrues in favour of the petitioner. A bidder’s enforceable rights are limited to equality, fairness, and transparency in the tender process. The decision to cancel the tender to secure higher revenue from the lease of the plots falls squarely within the commercial policy and discretion of the authority and does not warrant judicial interference. Notwithstanding its contractual liberty for not assigning reasons, the respondent no. 1 has disclosed that the bid was rejected as it is significantly below prevailing market rates, considering the development potential and location of the plots, and that cancellation was necessary to avoid loss to the public exchequer. In our view, this constitutes a valid and sufficient justification for the cancellation of the tender. The action of the respondents cannot be characterised as arbitrary, irrational, or capricious to warrant interference under Article

226.

19. We also find that the cancellation of tender does not defeat the petitioner’s substantive legitimate expectation as contended by Mr. Dubey. There is no promise at the bid stage. Hence there is no question of the petitioner acting upon it or altering its position on such promise. The mere fact that the petitioner was the highest bidder does not confer upon it any vested right to seek performance or award of the tender as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Meerut Development Authority v. Association of Management Studies” 6: “29. The Authority has the right not to accept the highest bid and even to prefer a tender other than the highest bidder, if there exist good and sufficient reasons, such as, the highest bid not representing the market price but there cannot be any doubt that the Authority’s action in accepting or refusing the bid must be free from arbitrariness or favouritism.”

20. In “Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited v. MB Power (Madhya Pradesh) Ltd.”7, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:

6. (2009) 6 SCC 171

7. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 26 “137. It could thus be seen that this Court in Air India case [Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 617: 2000 INSC 39] has held that the award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision, considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. It has been held that the State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It has further been held that the State can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. It has further been held that, price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It has been held that the State may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. However, the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the Court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. It has further been held that even when some defect has been found in the decision-making process, the Court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The Court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should intervene.

21. The reliance placed by Mr. Dubey on “Subodh Kumar” (supra) to contend that the cancellation of the tender is arbitrary is misplaced, as the factual matrix in that case was materially different. The challenge to the order of termination was made on a specific ground that the action taken by the respondentauthority was at the behest of the Minster in-charge. The judgment in “Subodh Kumar” provides a useful and illuminating guidance to the High Courts to deal with the contractual matters. It takes note of the plight of a bidder who might have made significant investments after the award of contract. It further held that arbitrary termination of contract is not in public interest since such termination create uncertainty and unpredictability and thus discourage public participation in the tender process. There, a letter of intent had been issued, a formal work order was executed, the contractor had commenced performance and thereafter the tender was cancelled at the behest of the Minister-in-charge. In that case, the file notings indicated that the tender was cancelled for extraneous consideration and was influenced by malice. It was in those circumstances that the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the scope of judicial review in contractual matters and the interplay of public law principles. The present case bears no such similarity.

22. The judgment in “Shishir Realty”, has no application to the present case as well. Mr. Dubey placed reliance on paragraph 61 of the judgment where the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “60. Ultimately, we need to consider whether there was any illegality or unfairness in the aforesaid transaction. The learned Senior Counsel representing the appellants have submitted that allowing sub-division of plots with change in land use, had caused substantive loss to the State largesse, as many people would have shown a proclivity to buy land with different land use. On the contrary, the learned Senior Counsel representing the respondent lessees have stated that the allotment, change in land use and transfer have taken place in accordance with law. There is no substantial deviation as sought to be projected by the appellants herein. The appellants herein have sought to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel to argue that Cidco could not have walked out of the bargain, merely because of the possibility of larger profits. It is pertinent to note that, Cidco has failed to prove any losses suffered.

61 When a contract is being evaluated, the mere possibility of more money in the public coffers, does not in itself serve public interest. A blanket claim by the State claiming loss of public money cannot be used to forego contractual obligations, especially when it is not based on any evidence or examination. The larger public interest of upholding contracts and the fairness of public authorities is also in play. The Courts need to have a broader understanding of public interest, while reviewing such contracts.”

23. Whilst there can be no dispute with this proposition, this judgment is distinguishable on facts. In Shishir Realty, the authority issued a letter of allotment in favour of the highest bidder, namely, M/s Metropolis Hotels. A request made by the bidder for change of user of the plot to commercial-cumresidential use was partly permitted and in respect thereto, the demarcation of the plot and assignment of the bidder’s right to Shishir Realty Pvt Ltd in respect of residential-cum-commercial user was permitted. The authority (CIDCO) accepted Rs. 321 crores as consideration and executed 2 separate lease deeds in favour of M/s Metropolis Hotels and Shishir Realty. There were certain complaints made regarding irregularities in the allotment of the plots and change of land user. After 3 years of the allotment, the authority sought to cancel both the lease deeds with a pre-determined mind. It was assailed by the parties that this was arbitrary and done without producing any evidence of breach or violation on the part of the bidder. The cancellation order was quashed inter alia on the ground that the change of land use and sub-division of the plot had taken place with the consent of the authority. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that no reasons were provided as to what legal provision was violated by the bidders. The observation at paragraph 61 is in the context and continuation of paragraph 60 where the bidders had invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel to argue that the authority could not have walked out of the bargain for larger profits. It is in the backdrop of the failure of the authority to justify the cancellation that the Hon’ble Supreme Court held mere possibility of more money in the public coffers does not in itself serve public interest when a contract is evaluated and the tender is awarded. The Hon’ble Court also noted that the facts revealed “regime revenge” as stated at paragraph 65 which is quoted: “65. From the contradictory submissions asserted before this Court and the concessions given regarding practice of Cidco to allow change in land use in other cases, clearly points to a “regime revenge”. Such conclusion reached herein is further buttressed by the fact that no inquiry or disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the earlier Vice-Chairman, whose orders have been annulled. Such phenomenon is clearly detrimental to the constitutional values and the rule of law.”

24. The facts in the present case are entirely different. In this case, letter of allotment is not issued to the petitioner. There is no concluded contract between the parties and no rights crystallized in favour of the petitioner.

25. The limited power of judicial review in tender matters is stated in several judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court including in “Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Orchid Infrastructure Developers Pvt. Ltd.”8, “Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India”9 and recently in “Indore Vikas

8. (2017) 4 SCC 243

9. (2020) 16 SCC 489 Praadhikaran (IDA) vs. Shri Humud Jain Samaj Trust”10, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “12. ……………………….. This Court in the case of State of Jharkhand v. CWE-SOMA Consortium (supra) while dealing with the similar issue of annulment of tender process, in paras 21, 22 and 23 has held as under:

23. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. In the case in hand, the respondent has neither pleaded nor established mala fide exercise of power by the appellant. While so, the decision of the Tender Committee ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court. In our considered view, the High Court erred in sitting in appeal over the decision of the appellant to cancel the tender and float a fresh tender. Equally, the High Court was not right in going into the financial implication of a fresh tender.”

13. This Court in the aforesaid case has held that while exercising power of judicial review, the Court does not sit as an appellate Court over the decision of the government but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651]. In the considered opinion of this Court, the Division Bench should not have interfered in the matter and could not have gone to the extent of fixing the base price/modifying the offer made by respondent and, therefore, in light of the aforesaid judgment as the High Court has virtually passed an order sitting in appeal over the decision of the government in absence of any mala fide exercise of power by the IDA, the judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court deserves to be set aside and is, accordingly set aside. This Court in the case of Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Orchid Infrastructure Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) again dealing with the cancellation of a bid of the highest bidder, in paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 30 has held as under: “12. Firstly, we examine the question whether there being no concluded contract in the absence of acceptance of bid and issuance of allotment letter, the suit could be said to be maintainable for the declaratory relief and mandatory injunction sought by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has prayed for a declaration that rejection of the bid was illegal. Merely by that, the plaintiff could not have become entitled for consequential mandatory injunction for issuance of formal letter of allotment. The court while exercising judicial review could not have accepted the bid. The bid had never been accepted by the authorities concerned. It was not a case of cancellation of bid after being accepted. Thus, even assuming as per the plaintiff's case that the Administrator was not equipped with the power and the Chief Administrator had the power to accept or refuse the bid, there had been no decision by the Chief Administrator. Thus, merely by declaration that rejection of the bid by the Administrator was illegal, the plaintiff could not have become entitled to consequential relief of issuance of allotment letter. Thus the suit, in the form it was filed, was not maintainable for relief sought in view of the fact that there was no concluded contract in the absence of allotment letter being issued to the plaintiff, which was a sine qua non for filing the civil suit.

13. It is a settled law that the highest bidder has no vested right to have the auction concluded in his favour. The Government or its authority could validly retain power to accept or reject the highest bid in the interest of public revenue. We are of the considered opinion that there was no right acquired and no vested right accrued in favour of the plaintiff merely because his bid amount was highest and had deposited 10% of the bid amount. As per Regulation 6(2) of the 1978 Regulations, allotment letter has to be issued on acceptance of the bid by the Chief Administrator and within 30 days thereof, the successful bidder has to deposit another 15% of the bid amount. In the instant case, allotment letter has never been issued to the petitioner as per Regulation 6(2) in view of non-acceptance of the bid. Thus, there was no concluded contract. Regulation 6 of the 1978 Regulations is extracted hereunder: “6. Sale of lease of land or building by auction. — (1) In the case of sale or lease by auction, the price/premium to be charged shall be such reserve price/premium as may be determined taking into consideration the various factors as indicated in sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 4 or any higher amount determined as a result of bidding in open auction. (2) 10 per cent of the highest bid shall be paid on the spot by the highest bidder in cash or by means of a demand draft in the manner specified in subregulation (2) of Regulation 5. The successful bidder shall be issued allotment letter in Form CC or C-II by registered post and another 15 per cent of the bid accepted shall be payable by the successful bidder, in the manner indicated, within thirty days of the date of allotment letter conveying acceptance of the bid by the Chief Administrator; failing which the 10 per cent amount already deposited shall stand forfeited to the authority and the successful bidder shall have no claim to the land or building auctioned. (3) The payment of balance of the price/premium, rate of interest chargeable and the recovery of interest shall be in the same manner as provided in sub-regulations (6) and (7) of Regulation 5. (4) The general terms and conditions of the auction shall be such as may be framed by the Chief Administrator from time to time and announced to the public before auction on the spot.”

14. We are fortified in our view by a decision of this Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Om Prakash Sharma [U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Om Prakash Sharma, (2013) 5 SCC 182: (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 737], wherein the questions arose for its consideration that: whether there is any vested right upon the plaintiff bidder until the bid is accepted by the competent authority in relation to the property in question? Merely because the plaintiff is the highest bidder by depositing 20% of the bid amount without there being approval of the same by the competent authority and it amounts to a concluded contract in relation to the plot in question; and whether the plaintiff could have maintained the suit in the absence of a concluded contract? Considering the aforesaid questions, this Court has discussed the matter thus: (SCC pp. 195-97, paras 30-31) “30. In support of the said proposition, the learned Senior Counsel for the defendant, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi has also placed reliance upon another decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh [State of U.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh, (1982) 2 SCC 365]. The learned Senior Counsel has rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Rajasthan Housing Board case [Rajasthan Housing Board v. G.S. Investments, (2007) 1 SCC 477] which reads as under: (SCC p. 483, para 9) ‘9. This being the settled legal position, the respondent acquired no right to claim that the auction be concluded in its favour and the High Court clearly erred in entertaining the writ petition and in not only issuing a direction for consideration of the representation but also issuing a further direction to the appellant to issue a demand note of the balance amount. The direction relating to issuance of the demand note for balance amount virtually amounted to confirmation of the auction in favour of the respondent which was not the function of the High Court.’ In State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal [State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal, (1972) 2 SCC 36] case, relevant paragraph of which reads as under: (SCC pp. 44-45, para

13) ‘13. … There is no concluded contract till the bid is accepted. Before there was a concluded contract, it was open to the bidders to withdraw their bids (see Union of India v. Bhim Sen Walaiti Ram [Union of India v. Bhim Sen Walaiti Ram, (1969) 3 SCC 146] ). [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in Avam Evam Vikas Parishad case, (2013) 5 SCC 182.] By merely giving bids, the bidders had not acquired any vested rights [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in Avam Evam Vikas Parishad case, (2013) 5 SCC 182.]’.

31. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi has rightly placed reliance upon the same in support of the case of the first defendant, which would clearly go to show that the plaintiff had not acquired any right and no vested right has been accrued in his favour in respect of the plot in question merely because his bid amount is highest and he had deposited 20% of the highest bid amount along with the earnest money with the Board. In the absence of acceptance of bid offered by the plaintiff to the competent authority of the first defendant, there is no concluded contract in respect of the plot in question, which is evident from letters dated 26-5-1977 and 8- 7-1977 wherein the third defendant had rejected the bid amount deposited by the plaintiff and the same was refunded to him by way of demand draft, which is an undisputed fact and it is also not his case that the then Assistant Housing Commissioner who has conducted the public auction had accepted the bid of the plaintiff.”

15. This Court in Om Prakash Sharma case [U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Om Prakash Sharma, (2013) 5 SCC 182: (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 737] has held that in the absence of a concluded contract which takes place by issuance of allotment letter, suit could not be said to be maintainable as there is no vested right in the plaintiff without approval of the bid by the competent authority. Thus, in the wake of the aforesaid decision, in the absence of a concluded contract, the suit could not have been decreed for mandatory injunction. It amounted to enforcing of contract in the absence thereof.”

26. We may also note that this Court has consistently followed the aforesaid principles in several judgments including in “Aditya Enterprises” (supra), “Infinity Infra” (supra) and “Diti Developers v. City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd.” (Writ Petition No.14294 of 2025, dated 18th November 2025). We cannot take a different view in this case.

27. The petitioner’s contention that it is at least entitled to the portion of the land falling outside the CRZ zone is equally devoid of merit. Once the tender is cancelled in its entirety, the petitioner cannot claim enforcement of a part of it. The alleged delay of 21 months in issuing the cancellation is justified by the fact that the tendered plot was the subject matter of proceedings before the Tribunal. The petitioner was declared the highest bidder on 22nd August 2022 and on the very same day the Tribunal granted an injunction restraining the respondents from proceeding with the tender process. This position was affirmed by the Tribunal in its judgment dated 11th October 2023, whereby the respondent no.1 was restrained from selling, transferring, or granting any leasehold rights in Plot No. 2A, Sectors 54, 56 and 58, Nerul (West), Navi Mumbai, for the construction of residential or commercial buildings/structures, except the areas falling outside the CRZ. Even in respect of the areas outside the CRZ, the Tribunal suggested that such areas should preferably be utilized for gardens or social facilities, in accordance with the Navi Mumbai Draft Development Plan. This litigation concluded only on 22nd April 2024 when the respondents’ review petition was dismissed. In less than a month thereafter, the respondents issued the cancellation letter and initiated the refund of the EMD. The petitioner did not intervene in the pending application or assail the Tribunal’s order before any forum. This appears to us that the petitioner was not interested in protecting its bid or so-called contractual rights.

28. As noted above, there is no letter of allotment or contract between the parties. No arbitrariness or mala fides can be attributed to the respondents. For the above reasons, there is no merit in this petition. Writ Petition No.7883 of 2024 is dismissed with no order as to costs. [GAUTAM A. ANKHAD, J.] [CHIEFJUSTICE]