Mr. Arun Kumar Ohri v. Mr. Rajendra W. Khanna

15. Ms. Dinkey Pawar defended the impugned order based on the reasoning reflected therein. She submitted that the filing of this Appeal is an abuse of the process of the Court, and the Appellant ensured that the original decree holder does not get the fruits of a decree during her lifetime. She submitted that this Appeal may be dismissed with exemplary costs.

16. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.

17. Section 24 of the Rent Act is part of the chapter which deals with the special provisions for the recovery of possession in certain cases. It provides that the landlord is entitled to recover possession of the premises given on a license on the expiry of the license period by making an application to the Competent Authority. Section 24(2) provides that any licensee who does not deliver possession of the premises to the landlord on the expiry of the period of license and continues to be in possession of the licensed premises till the Competent Authority dispossesses him, shall be liable to pay damages at double the rate of licensed fee or charge of the premises fixed under the agreement of license.

18. Thus, the liability of a licensee who overstays in the licensed premises to pay damages at double the rate of the licensed fee or charge of the premises fixed under the agreement of license is not and cannot be disputed.

19. Mr. Mehta’s only contention is that the licensor will have to approach the Civil Court separately for recovery of such damages quantified in Section 24(2) of the Rent Act. He submits that the Competent Authority, which has been given the powers to order the eviction of the licensee who has chosen to overstay, will not have the power or jurisdiction to make such licensee pay damages which are statutorily provided for under Section 24(2) of the Rent Act.

20. Apart from the harsh consequences that would ensue if the Appellant’s contentions were to be accepted, we note that the decision in Fundacio Privada Intervida (supra) relied upon by Mr. Mehta, in fact holds that the Competent Authority not only has the jurisdiction to determine and award damages as provided under Section 24(2) of the Rent Act but further, the duty to exercise such powers cannot be abdicated on the specious plea that during the pendency of the proceedings, the licensee whose term of license has expired, has, surrendered the possession of licensed premises to the licensor.

21. This Court held that even if the licensee delivers possession before initiation of eviction proceedings under Section 24(1), the Competent Authority will still have the jurisdiction to entertain and determine the claim under Section 24(2) of the Rent Act. The impugned judgment and order have followed this decision, and we see no ground to adopt any different view.

22. A licensee, who continues to occupy the licensed premises beyond the term for which it was granted, cannot insist that the proceedings for recovery of the damages statutorily prescribed under Section 24 (2) can be recovered only by filing some separate proceeding before the Civil Court. This means that after a licensor succeeds in obtaining an eviction order under Section 24 (1) of the Rent Act, such licensor will again have to initiate proceedings before the Civil Court to recover the amount which the licensee is made payable under Section 24 (2) of the Rent Act. Such an onerous interpretation will frustrate the objective of providing special provisions to address issues arising between licensors and licensees expeditiously.

23. Ultimately, we cannot forget that the legislature introduced the Special provisions because the licensors were entitled to some protection upon the expiration of the license period. The licensees, being very much aware that the Court process or proceeding before the Civil Court usually goes on for years, were emboldened to continue in the license premises beyond the expiry of the prescribed license period and that too, by paying only the license fees that may have been prescribed under the license agreement or many a times without paying anything at all.

24. This was not just a prejudicial situation faced by the licensors; as a result, they were even wary of licensing their premises, fearing they might not be able to recover possession within a reasonable time. The potential licensees, desirous of obtaining licences, were also finding it challenging to secure premises, as licensors were unwilling to provide them. The legislature intervened to remedy this mischief in the housing sector by finding a remedy that might be fair to both parties.

25. The provisions of Section 24 (4) were enacted to ensure that the licensee is aware of the liability to pay damages at double the license fee. This serves as a deterrent to licensees who overstayed on the licensed premises. If the Appellant’s argument is accepted, then the legislative intent would be undermined. The purpose of enacting such specific provisions would also be defeated. A reckless licensee would benefit unfairly by exploiting the unfortunate delays in the law and the legal process. Such reckless litigants contribute to delays in the legal system. Therefore, an interpretation favouring such a plea cannot be sustained.

26. The interpretation now proposed by Mr Mehta encourages mischief, which the law intends to suppress, by suppressing the remedy the law wants to advance. Accepting such an interpretation would conflict with the well-established rule of interpretation that any ambiguity in a statute should be interpreted to suppress mischief and promote the remedy. Here, there is no serious ambiguity in the statute. The appellant, to frustrate the licensors, the orders obtained by them from the competent authority in 2004, and the special and salutary provisions of the Rent Act, is bent on introducing some ambiguity.

27. The learned Single Judge who decided Fundacio Privada Intervida (supra) and the view in the impugned judgment and order delivered by A. S. Oka J. (as His Lordship then was) rejects the Appellant’s arguments now advanced. We see no good ground to take any different view and therefore, reject Mr Mehta’s contention about the absence of jurisdiction or authority in the Competent Authority to award damages provided under Section 24 (2) of the Rent Act.

28. The decisions in Sushil Mehta (supra), Isabella Johnson (supra) and Chiranjilal Goenka (supra), relied upon by Mr Mehta, only lay down that an issue of nullity can always be raised even during the execution proceedings. However, now that we find that the Competent Authority’s order was legal, proper and within jurisdiction, there is no question of stalling the execution proceedings any further based on this plea of nullity allegedly affecting the Competent Authority’s order.

29. Mr Mehta has advanced contradictory submissions regarding the execution of the Competent Authority’s order. On one hand, he contended that relying on Asmabi Shaikh (supra), he submitted that the Competent Authority has the power to execute its own orders, if necessary by force, and on the other hand he submitted that there is no machinery provided under the Rent Act for enforcement of the orders of the Competent Authority awarding damages under Section 24 (2). The decisions referred to by Mr. Mehta support neither of the propositions and the observations therein must be construed in the context of the issues raised and the facts involved.

30. In Asmabi Shaikh (supra), the issue of execution of the Competent Authority’s order awarding damages as provided under Section 24 (2) of the Rent Act was not even involved. The problem concerned the Competent Authority's powers to enforce its eviction order against the licensee. This is even though the licensor had applied to the Competent Authority for execution of its order to recover the decretal claim for payment of compensation. Subsequently, however, the execution application was amended to include a claim for recovery of possession.

31. In the above context and by reference to Section 47 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, the learned Single Judge held that the Competent Authority, which has issued a warrant of possession, is not powerless if any party obstructs the execution of the order. Now this observation cannot be read as supporting the Appellant’s case that the execution proceedings, which were initially filed before the Competent Authority, can never be transferred to some other Court for execution of the order or decree by invoking the provisions relating to transfer of decree or at least the principles analogous thereto.

32. As noted earlier, Mr Mehta did contend that the legislature provided no machinery to enforce the Competent Authority’s order awarding damages under Section 24 (2) of the Rent Act. Thus, whenever it is convenient, the Appellant urges that the execution proceedings transferred to this Court are incompetent because the Competent Authority has full powers to execute its own orders. However, in the same breath, the Appellant, who, it appears, is bent upon harassing the licensor or now the licensor’s legal representative, has no qualms about raising a contradictory plea that the Competent Authority has no power to execute its orders for payment of damages in terms of Section 24 (2) of the Rent Act.

33. In Fundacio Privada Intervida (supra) relied upon by Mr. Mehta, the learned Single Judge has held that a conjoint reading of Sections 24 and 40 of the Rent Act and the scheme of the Rent Act would make it absolutely clear that the Competent Authority is not only entitled to recover possession of the premises or dispossess the licensee but also has the power to award compensation as contemplated under Section 24 (2) of the said Act. The power to determine and award damages or compensation is not only incidental to the power to evict but a specific duty coupled with a power to decide this liability, which is bestowed upon the Competent Authority. This decision also holds that the orders passed under the Rent Act are executable as if passed by the Civil Court as a decree.

34. Now, the Appellant is deliberately trying to confuse the issue of whether a Court or an Authority has initial jurisdiction to execute a decree, and whether such a Court then orders the transfer of that decree to a Court that acquires jurisdiction to execute it. In any event, the ruling in Fundacio Privada Intervida (supra) speaks to the execution of orders issued by the Competent Authority as if they were decrees, exercised under the CPC by a Civil Court. This, to a great extent, answers Mr Mehta’s contentions about the inapplicability of the transfer of decree provisions contained in the CPC.

35. Prakash H. Jain (supra), relied upon by Mr Mehta, is an authority for the proposition that the Competent Authority under the Rent Act has no inherent power to condone delays in filing proceedings before it. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that this statement may not be entirely absolute because different provisions appear to have been made, conferring different authorities with varying degrees of powers in dealing with claims before such Authorities or Courts established for this purpose, as well as in relation to further avenues of remedies against the orders issued by the Original Authority. The decision states that the licensee to whom the summons is issued must contest the eviction petition by filing, within 30 days of service of the summons, an affidavit outlining the grounds for contesting the eviction application and seeking the leave of the Competent Authority to oppose the eviction. The legislature has also statutorily provided the consequences of failing to obtain such leave within the specified period. Considering that the primary aim of making substantive provisions is to regulate the relationship between licensors and licensees, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that provisions for condoning delays or extending time limits should not be read into the Rent Act when a licensee defends against an eviction action after overstaying the terms set out in the license agreement.

36. The argument that, because the insolvency proceedings initiated by the Respondents were dismissed since they were not based on a decree of a civil court, the Respondents are now estopped from contending that the Competent Authority’s order was a decree liable to be transferred for execution to this Court, is misconceived. The dismissal was based on the decision in Kishor K. Mehta Vs. HDFC Bank Ltd.8, which in turn relies on Paramjeet Singh Patheja sV. ICDS Ltd.9. These decisions proceed based upon the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909. The observations therein are mainly in the context of the provisions of the Insolvency Act, and they cannot assist the Appellant who seeks to obstruct the 2008 (1) Mh.L.J. 451 JT 2006 (10) SC 41 execution proceedings based upon several grounds, whether tenable or not.

37. The learned Single Judge has correctly relied upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in St. Ulai High School Vs. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh10, in the context of ancillary and incidental powers of an authority or the Tribunal. The decision cannot be distinguished merely because it concerned the provisions of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools Act, 1977. Ultimately, the principle laid down is important and the principle was that the orders made by the School Tribunal can be enforced under the provisions of the CPC.

38. The argument regarding paying double cheque amounts in proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, has no bearing on the issues raised in this Appeal. There is no verifiable material produced to back this submission. No evidence has been presented regarding the correlation between the cheque amount and the satisfaction of the decretal amount. If such amounts were paid at all, they must have been paid solely to avoid imprisonment or other criminal or quasi-criminal liability under the Act. Therefore, given the background of this case, based merely on a submission across the Bar, this argument cannot be accepted.

39. Nevertheless, the fact that the Appellant issued cheques but failed to arrange for his banks to honour them only 2007 (1) Mh.L.J. 597 demonstrates the extent to which the Appellant is willing to go to somehow or other deny the Respondents the modest sum of Rs. 3 to 4 Lakhs. It is all very well to raise multiple grounds and require the Courts to expend their most limited resource — time. However, it is an entirely different matter to expect the Courts to forget where the justice of the case truly lies.

40. The argument about the alleged bar of limitation was introduced only in the written submission and never argued. In any event, we do not, in facts of this case see how such a bar is attracted. The Appellant, it appears, is bent on creating every possible hurdle without any sense of responsibility. As was noted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Karia Vs. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL & Ors11, even in this case, the Appellant appears to be indulging in a speculative litigation to tire the Respondents and force them to settle the matter or in the fond hope that by flinging a lot of mud in the form of raising all sorts of pleas, at least some of the mud so flung would stick. In Vijay Karia (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the Appeals with INR 50 lakhs payable within 4 weeks.

41. The learned Single Judge has considered several provisions of the Rent Act that address the contentions raised by Mr Mehta in this Appeal. Several decisions have also been considered. We have independently considered the merits of the contentions now advanced before us. However, we are still inclined to agree with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge as reflected in the impugned judgment and order under Appeal. This is in addition to the independent reasons now given by us in this order.

42. The Appellant, by taking the most unfair advantage of the laws’ delays, has succeeded in frustrating the execution of the 2004 orders for over two decades and appears confident in delaying payment to the Respondents even further. Unfortunately, we get the impression that this is not because the Appellant has no money to pay, as his Advocate also describes it, a paltry amount, but because he has the money to pay for litigation and profit from the law’s delays. We clarify that we have not accepted the Appellant’s estimation of the amount payable under the 2004 order. We have only noted the submission made by the Appellant’s counsel.

43. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, time and again, made orders directing the expeditious disposal of execution proceedings. The Court has noted that if the decree holders are unable to obtain the fruits of their hard-earned decrees, frustration is bound to set in, affecting the administration of justice itself.

44. While acknowledging that Mr Mehta, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, was clear, precise and even brief, just trying to do his best for the Appellant, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where the Appellant must pay costs of Rs. 50,000/- to the Respondents within two months along with the other amounts payable under the 2004 order, from the date of uploading of this order.

45. In the result and for all the above reasons, we dismiss this Appeal with costs of Rs. 50,000/- as indicated above.

46. If the Appellant has deposited any amounts in this Court, the Respondents are permitted to withdraw the same unconditionally. If the Respondents have already withdrawn some of the sum deposited against the Bank guarantees, the Registry is directed to take suitable steps for the discharge of such Bank guarantees.

47. Necessary letters to this effect must be issued to the Respondents at the earliest, so that the Respondents do not have to pay any service charges to the Banks for keeping such bank guarantees alive.

48. Suppose there are any balance amounts payable by the Appellant over and above the amounts deposited by the Appellant in this Court. In that case, the Appellant must pay the same to the Respondents within two months from the date of uploading of this order, failing which, the Respondents would be at liberty to take out appropriate applications in the execution proceedings before the learned Single Judge for the recovery of the same. We genuinely hope and trust that no such occasion arises because, for the last 21 years, the Appellant has succeeded in keeping the Respondents at bay.

49. The Appellant must file a compliance report on the payment of the amounts under the 2004 order and costs of Rs 50,000/-, or the Respondents will once again be forced to take proceedings to recover this amount. We note that the argument about the adjustment of the amounts allegedly paid in the cheque-bouncing case has already been rejected by us. Such a compliance report must be filed by 16 January 2026, and an advance copy furnished to the learned Counsel for the Respondents.

50. As noted earlier, Ms Meera R. Khanna, in whose favour the Competent Authority made the order of 27 December 2004, has already expired, and her legal representatives are now pursuing this matter.

51. The Appeal is dismissed with costs, and the abovereferred directions are issued.

52. All concerned must act on an authenticated copy of this order. (Advait M. Sethna, J) (M.S. Sonak, J)