M/S. Kumar Beharay Properties LLP v. Shri Rajesh Chandrakant Shinde

1979. Be that as it may, thereafter several transactions have taken place as under: (I) 11 May 1989: Development Agreement in favour of (II) 23 February 1993: Registered sale-deed between Defendant Nos.[1] and 2 in favour of Defendant No.11 as confirmed by Defendant No.6 in respect of halfportion of land. Interestingly, Chandrakant Shinde was alive when this registered sale-deed dated 23 February 1993 was executed. (III) 28 January 2009: Registered sale-deed executed by Defendant Nos.[1] and 2 in favour of Defendant No.6 for balance area of land. Again, Chandrakant Shinde was alive when this transaction was effected. (IV) 26 March 2013: Registered sale-deed executed by which Defendant No.11 sold half portion of land to Defendant No.10 which was converted as LLP/ 14) Plaintiff claims that he discovered Will executed by his father on 23 May 2013, in which rights flowing out of MOU dated 15 January 1982 are allegedly bequeathed in favour by his father. Plaintiff served notice dated 7 February 2014 for specific performance of the MOU dated 15 January 1982 and has thereafter filed the present Suit.

15) It is well settled legal position that while deciding application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, the Court has to consider only the pleadings in the Plaint and documents produced therewith. However mechanical reading of the averments in the plaint is not sufficient and what the Courts need to undertake is an exercise of meaningful reading of the averments in the entire Plaint. If after meaningful reading of the averments in the entire plaint, it can be gathered that there is real cause of action for filing the suit, as contradistinct from a mere illusion of cause of action and that the suit prima facie appears to be not barred by limitation or by any express provisions of law, the Court can proceed to reject the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. The provision for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is made with the objective of throwing out vexatious litigation at the threshold rather than making the Defendant undergo the ordeal of a lengthy trial. Particularly when the Courts encounter a clever pleading in the plaint, about Plaintiff acquiring knowledge of an event on the pleaded date or about accrual of cause of action on the pleaded day, aimed essentially at saving the plaint from being rejected, the court is not bound to accept that statement as a gospel truth and retain the suit on its file. To paraphrase, mechanical reading of averment about cause of action is not expected for ruling in favour of retention of the plaint. If the suit is instituted after long delay, but the plaint therein is attempted to be saved by lawyer’s drafting ingenuity, the court is not expected to accept the clever pleading on the face and to take the suit for trial. In such cases, where the suit appears to be vexatious, court needs to be cautious and must read the entire plaint meaningfully to find out whether the pleadings make the cleverly pleaded case of acquisition of knowledge even believable. If it can be gathered from reading of the averments in the entire plaint, and documents produced therewith, that the cause of action had arisen much earlier than the cleverly pleaded date, Court is not bound to accept the pleaded date and send parties to the ordeal of long trial. If accrual of cause of action can be gathered from pleadings, leading of evidence becomes unnecessary and in such cases, plaint cannot be retained by invoking the general principle of limitation being a mixed question of law and facts.

16) At the same time, causally filed applications seeking rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11, aimed essentially at delaying the decision of the suit, equally need to be rejected in an expeditious manner once the Court is satisfied on a meaningful reading of the averments in the plaint, together with the documents produced therewith, that there is some cause of action for taking the suit to trial or that the suit is not barred by express provision of law or that the ground of limitation raised by Defendant is either baseless or requires leading of evidence.

17) I accordingly proceed to undertake the exercise of meaningful reading of the entire Plaint. After referring to the transaction of Development Agreement of Mr. Arun Bankar and Mr. Dalal and execution of MOU by them in favour of Plaintiff’s father, Plaintiff has pleaded in para-6 that after execution of the MOU, Mr. Bankar and Mr. Dalal passed away and his father was incapacitated due to old age and passed away on 20 February

2013. Plaintiff has pleaded that his father did not share information relating to execution of MOU dated 15 January 1982 with the family members. After his death, Plaintiff discovered Will dated 11 September 2009 and acquired knowledge of execution of MOU dated 15 January 1982. He also discovered copy of the said MOU. Plaintiff thereafter pleads in para-9 of the Plaint that he approached the suit land and discovered that Defendant No.6 had commenced construction thereon and was constructing buildings of 11 floors. Plaintiff discovered execution of registered agreement dated 11 May 1989 in favour of Defendant No.6 by Defendant Nos.[1] and 2. Plaintiff also discovered factum of execution of registered saledeed dated 28 January 2009 by Defendant Nos.[1] and 2. Plaintiff pleaded complete ignorance of transactions executed between various Defendants.

18) However, in para-13, Plaintiff pleads that wife of Mr. Bankar had executed the power of attorney in favour of the Plaintiff in 2007-08 to look after the court proceedings on behalf of her relating to the suit land. Plaintiff thus admits having dealt with disputes relating to suit land in capacity as constituted attorney of Mr. Bankar’s wife. He however feigns ignorance about execution of MOU dated 15 January 1982 in favour of his father. Plaintiff claims that after acquisition of knowledge of execution of MOU dated 15 January 1982, he sent notice dated 7 February 2014 seeking specific performance of the said MOU and on account of refusal on the part of the Defendants to act of the notice, the suit is filed. This is the broad frame of Plaintiff’s suit.

19) Meaningful reading of the averments in the Plaint would make it abundantly clear that the Plaintiff has admitted the fact that the Development Agreement dated 11 May 1989 executed by Defendant Nos.[1] and 2 in favour of Defendant No.6 is a registered instrument. He has specifically admitted the fact that what is executed on 28 January 2009 by Defendant No.1 and 2 is also registered instrument. By that sale-deed dated 28 January 2009, Defendant Nos.[1] and 2 had sold half portion of the land in favour of Defendant No.6. The Plaint is however silent about another transaction in the form of registered saledeed dated 23 February 1993 by which Defendant No.11 acquired ownership in respect of half portion of the land from Defendant Nos.[1] and 2 with consent of Defendant No.6. It is also an admitted position that all the three registered documents of Development Agreement dated 11 May 1989, sale-deeds dated 23 February 1993 and 28 January 2009 were executed when Plaintiff’s father was alive. He admittedly did not raise any objection or initiated contemporaneous proceedings for cancellation of the above documents. Thus, the cause of action had arisen for Plaintiff’s father during his lifetime for filing suit seeking cancellation of registered instruments dated 11 May 1989, 23 February 1993 and 28 January 2009. Plaintiff’s father however failed to file any proceedings during his lifetime.

20) Since the three instruments of 11 May 1989, 23 February 1993 and 28 January 2009 are registered, it needs to be assumed that Plaintiffs’ father had notice thereof. Here, the facts of the present case appear to be similar to the one before the Apex Court in Uma Devi (supra). In case before the Apex Court, Plaintiff had filed suit for partition in the year 2023 in which Defendants sought rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code contending that he suit properties were already partitioned in the year 1968 through family settlement, which was given effect to vide revenue entries. It was further contended that based on such partition, some of the Defendants have sold the land vide registered sale-deeds executed in the year 1978. In the above factual background, the Apex Court referred to its judgment in Suraj Lamp Industries Pvt. Ltd. Versus. State of Haryana and Another,[6] in which it is held that registration of a document gives notice to the world that the document has been executed. It further held in Suraj Lamps (supra) that registration provides safety and security to transactions relating to immovable property and gives publicity and public exposure to the documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with the property as to the nature and extent of rights which persons may have, affecting that property. It enables people to find out whether any particular property in which they have any interest are subject to any legal obligations and liability and who are those persons claiming right, title and interest in the property. The Apex Court in Uma Devi has held in para-10 to 13 as under:-

10. The Trial Court, considering these facts, allowed the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and dismissed the suit, finding no cause of action for filing the suit. However, the appellate court found that there were triable issues that required consideration. The appellate court was of the opinion that the plaintiffs had a legitimate claim over the joint family properties, and in the absence of any notice to the plaintiffs regarding the partition, the suit was remanded back to the Trial Court for fresh consideration.

11. The sole argument advanced by the respondents/plaintiffs is that the suit was only for partition, filed in the year 2023 and was within the limitation period as the limitation will be counted from the date of their knowledge of the sale deed. However, upon examining the pleadings before the Trial Court and appellate court, it is evident that the plaintiff failed to address the crucial question of when they became aware of the registered sale deeds. If they had prior knowledge of the sale deeds, they failed to specify the exact date of such knowledge. Additionally, the pleadings suggest suppression of essential facts by the plaintiffs.

12. In the case at hand, partition took place way back in the year 1968, which is evident from the revenue record entries. The suit is filed in the year 2023, i.e. after a period of 55 years. Further, many of the family members had executed registered sale deeds in the year 1978. These sale deeds have been attached, and on perusal it is observed that these were in fact registered sale deeds. A registered document provides a complete account of a transaction to any party interested in the property. This Court in the case of Suraj Lamp Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Anr. (2012) 1 SCC 656 held as under: “Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed. Registration provides safety and security to transactions relating to immovable property, even if the document is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and execution of documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with a property, as to the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. In other words, it enables people to find out whether any particular property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to any legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person(s) presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovable property can rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and complete account of all transactions by which the title to the property may be affected and secure extracts/copies duly certified”.

13. Applying this settled principle of law, it can safely be assumed that the predecessors of the plaintiffs had notice of the registered sale deeds (executed in 1978), flowing from the partition that took place way back in 1968, by virtue of them being registered documents. In the lifetime of Mangalamma, these sale deeds have not been challenged, neither has partition been sought. Thus, the suit (filed in the year 2023) of the plaintiffs was prima facie barred by law. The plaintiffs cannot reignite their rights after sleeping on them for 45 years. (emphasis added)

21) Thus, in Uma Devi, the registered instruments were executed during lifetime of Mangalamma, who did not challenge the same nor sought partition. The suit filed by Plaintiffs after 45 years was held to be prima facie barred by limitation and the Apex Court upheld rejection of plaint and dismissal of suit. As was the case before the Apex Court, Plaintiff in the present case is also attempting to reignite the case after his father slept over the same during his lifetime for 24 long years. Plaintiff’s father had notice of registered instruments dated 11 May 1989, 23 February 1993 and 28 January 2009. During the lifetime of his father, the said registered instruments were not challenged. Thus, the suit filed by Plaintiff’ after the death of his father would clearly barred by limitation as Plaintiff’s father slept over the first registered Development Agreement dated 11 May 1989 for over 24 long years.

22) Thus, Plaintiff’s prayer for specific performance of MOU dated 15 January 1982 is clearly barred by limitation. Under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the limitation for filing suit for specific performance is 3 years from the date fixed for performance and if no date is fixed, when the Plaintiff notices that the performance is refused. Even if it is assumed that MOU dated 15 January 1982 did not indicate any specific time for performance, Plaintiff’s father clearly acquired knowledge of refusal of performance when registered Development Agreement dated 11 May 1989 was executed by Defendant Nos.[1] and 2 with Defendant No.6, after terminating the Development Agreement executed in favour of Mr. Bankar and Mr. Dalal vide notice dated 20 October 1984. Through another registered instrument of 23 February 1993, Plaintiff’s father once again acquired knowledge of refusal of performance. Plaintiff is not the person in whose name MOU dated 15 January 1982 is executed. His own pleadings indicate that the father did not disclose anything to him or to the family members about execution of MOU. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot and rightly has not pleaded that the father had no knowledge of execution of registered instruments. Plaintiff’s alleged absence of knowledge about registered instruments is inconsequential. What he seeks to enforce is his father’s right allegedly bequeathed to him under the alleged Will. Therefore, he ought to have demonstrated through pleadings as to when cause of action for father had accrued to file the suit. His father slept over the said MOU for over 31 long years till he passed away on 20 February 2013. He did not take any steps for specific performance of the said agreement. In that view of the matter, Plaintiff’s suit for specific performance of the MOU dated 15 January 1982 is hopelessly barred by limitation.

23) Mr. Abhijit Kulkarni submits that even if specific performance can be denied to the Plaintiff by reason of limitation, his other prayer for payment of damages needs to be decided on merits. I am unable to agree. The prayer for damages is nothing but alternate mode of performance of the MOU dated 15 January 1982. If the prayer for specific performance is barred by limitation there is no question of entertaining the prayer for damages by way of alternate performance. Similarly, the prayer for injunction flows out of the prayer for specific performance of MOU dated 15 Janaury 1982. The injunction is not sought on claim for possession. The Plaint does not contain an averment of Plaintiff’s father being put in possession of any portion of land. On the other hand, Plaint contains an admission that Defendants were constructing 11 storey building on the land when Plaintiff visited the same. Therefore, the prayer for injunction is not an independent or a standalone prayer which can be considered or decided sans the prayer for specific performance or sans the prayer for setting aside registered instruments.

24) Thus, on meaningful reading of the Plaint as a whole, there is no manner of doubt that the suit instituted by the Plaintiff is a vexatious litigation which needs to be brought to an instant halt. In Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust (supra) the Apex Court has held that Courts cannot brush aside the issue of limitation under the pretext of the question of limitation being mixed question of law and fact. The Courts must undertake the exercise of meaningful reading of the Plaint and after disseminating the vices of clever drafting creating an illusion of cause of action, if the suit is found to be hopelessly time barred, the Plaint must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. The Apex Court has held in paras-24 and 41 as under:-

24. On a reading of the plaint averments, it is clear that the plaintiff was well acquainted with the counsel Mr Godge. If the plaintiff was already acquainted with Mr Godge, whom upon verification of the records from the status of the suit, we find to have entered appearance in the suit for the 20th respondent on 21-7-2005 itself, would have acquired knowledge much prior to 2-3-2007. We also find that Civil Application No. 1562 of 2006 was not filed by Mr Godge. Therefore, it is a clear case where the plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands. We have no hesitation to hold that 2-3-2007, is a fictional date, created only for the purpose of this suit. As such, the judgment in T. Arivandanam v. T.V. Satyapal 14 squarely becomes applicable.

41. However, the trial court erroneously dismissed the application filed by the appellants under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. The High Court also erred in affirming the same, keeping the question of limitation open to be considered by the trial court after considering the evidence along with other issues, without deciding the core issue on the basis of the averments made by Respondent 1 in the plaint as mandated by Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. The spirit and intention of Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC is only for the courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex facie appears to be a clear abuse of process. The courts by being reluctant only cause more harm to the defendants by forcing them to undergo the ordeal of leading evidence. Therefore, we hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold.

25) Recently in Dhananjay Shivram Mapare and Ors. Versus. Vilas Eknath Kapre and Ors.7, I have highlighted the need for nipping in the bud vexatious litigation. This Court has directed rejection of plaint by having recourse to the provisos of Order VII Rule 11 after noticing that the real intention behind filing of the suit was to bring the Defendants to settlement table. This Court considered the judgment of the Apex Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through legal representative[8],

7 Civil Revision Application NO. 87 of 2019 decided on 11 November 2025 that the suit is manifestly vexatious without exhibiting Plaintiff’s real right to sue, such suit needs to be nipped in the bud instead of making the Defendants undergo the ordeal of the lengthy trial. These legal principles have been stated in various judgments of the Apex Court. It would be apposite to refer to few of them

26) In the present case also, it is abundantly clear that the suit instituted by the Plaintiff is a vexatious litigation initiated under the hope of bringing Defendants to settlement as they had already commenced construction of 11 storey buildings on the land. Court’s jurisdiction cannot be permitted to be abused for the purpose of filing of such a vexatious litigation which is ex-facie barred by limitation. The trial court has erred in not appreciating this position. In every case, the issue of limitation cannot be brushed aside holding that the same is a mixed question of law and fact. In the present case, it is difficult to comprehend as to how the issue of limitation would depend on leading of evidence. Plaintiff’s father did not take any steps for specific performance of MOU dated 15 January 1982 during his lifetime for over 31 long years. After his death, the Plaintiff has instituted the suit which is hopelessly barred by limitation as Plaintiff’s father must have secured notice of execution of several registered instruments during his lifetime. The prayer for cancellation of instruments of 11 May 1989 and 28 January 2009 is also barred by limitation. The prayer for cancellation of sale-deed dated 26 March 2013 is premised on challenge to the main instrument of 11 May 1989. If prayer for challenging Development Agreement dated 11 May 1989 is barred by limitation even the prayer for challenge to sale-deed dated 26 March 2013 would not survive.

27) In that view of the matter, the Trial Court has clearly erred in not making meaningful reading of the Plaint and by going with the cleverly drafted averment in the Plaint about date of accrual of cause of action.

28) What remains now is to deal with judgments cited by Mr. Abhijit Kulkarni.

(i) In P. Kumarakurubaran (supra), the issue before the

Apex Court was about prior notice of transaction by the Plaintiff. In the facts of that case, the Apex Court held that Plaintiff had taken various steps immediately after becoming aware of registration of documents and thereafter filed a suit seeking declaration and consequential reliefs. In the facts and circumstances of that case, the Apex Court held that the question of limitation involved disputed facets and hinged on the date of knowledge of execution of transactions. The facts of the judgment in P. Kumarakurubaran are clearly distinguishable and the facts of the present case are more or less similar to the one involved in Uma Devi, where Plaintiff’s father did not take any steps for specific performance of MOU dated 15 January 1982 for 31 long years nor challenged various registered instruments executed during his lifetime.

(ii) The judgment of the Apex Court in Karam Singh

(supra) involved claim of title through succession which was resisted by the Defendants therein by relying on a Will. The Will was apparently not probated. The suit was not merely for declaration of Will being void but the same was also for possession. The Apex Court held that when the suit for possession of immovable property is based on title, the limitation period was 12 years under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. It is in the facts of that case that the Apex Court ruled that the Plaint in the suit could not be rejected on the ground of suit being barred by limitation. Thus, the facts in the case of Karam Singh are clearly distinguishable and do not have application to the facts of the present case.

(iii) The judgment in Ramesh Desai (supra )is relied on in support of the contention that in every case limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law de-horse from facts. In case before the Apex Court, the Company Court had determined the question of limitation in filing company petition under Section 155 of the Companies Act, 2013 as a preliminary issue and had dismissed the petition as being barred by limitation. The Apex Court applied the principle of demurer and held that facts disclosed in the Company Petition did not indicate that the petition was barred by limitation. That Judge had referred to the affidavit in reply while deciding the issue of limitation at preliminary stage. In the facts of that case, the Apex Court held that the issue of limitation hinged on disputed questions of facts. The judgment therefore has no application to the facts of the present case.

29) Considering the overall conspectus of the case, I am of the view that the Trial Court has erred in rejecting the Applications filed by Defendant No.10. The suit filed by the Plaintiff is ex-facie barred by limitation. It is a vexatious piece of litigation which must be nipped in its bud rather than making Defendants undergo the ordeal of lengthy trial. The land in question has already been developed and third-party rights of flat purchasers are created. Several innocent flat purchasers are residing in the flats constructed on the suit land. Plaintiff cannot be permitted to create an illusion of cause of action by clever drafting by raising the averment of alleged disclosure of Will executed by his father on 23 May 2013 for the purpose of bringing the suit within limitation. The Trial Court ought to have undertaken meaningful reading of the entire Plaint for the purpose of ascertaining its real nature. No disputed questions of facts are involved in the suit for deciding the issue of limitation. The trial court therefore ought to have rejected the Plaint in the suit by having recourse to the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

30) The impugned order passed by the Trial court is thus indefensible and liable to be set aside

31) I accordingly proceed to pass the following order:

(I) The impugned order dated 9 September 2016 is set aside and Application at Exhibits-41 and 85 are allowed in terms of prayers made therein.

(ii) Accordingly, the Plaint in Special Civil Suit No. 650 of

32) Both the Civil Revision Applications are allowed in above terms. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. [SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]