Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 01.11.2023
RIDDHIMA SINGH THROUGH HER FATHER SHAILENDRA KUMAR SINGH ..... Appellant
Through: Appellant in person.
Through: Ms. Seema Dolo, Advocate for CBSE.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, CJ. (ORAL)
JUDGMENT
1. The present LPA arises out of judgement dated 12.09.2023 passed in W.P.(C) No. 8383/2023 tiled Riddhima Singh Through her father Shailendra Kumar Singh vs. Central Board of Secondary Education whereby the Ld. Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the Appellant herein on grounds of forum non-conveniens without expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter (the „Impugned Judgement‟).
2. The facts of the case to the extent relevant for the present appeal are that the Appellant was a student in Respondent No.3 School (the „Respondent School‟). However, on 02.04.2018, the Appellant‟s father received a message from the Respondent School that due to non-payment of fees for the academic year 2017-2018, the Appellant was debarred from attending the Respondent School.
3. Being aggrieved, the Appellant preferred W.P.(C) 6007/2019 (the „First Writ Petition‟) before this Court seeking issuance of directions against Respondent No. 1 („CBSE‟) to permit the Appellant to appear for Class X and Class XII examinations. During the pendency of the aforenoted writ proceedings, this Court, through interlocutory orders, directed the Respondent School to readmit the Appellant and directed the school to conduct Grade VII and Grade VIII examinations for the benefit of the Appellant. Both the examinations were conducted by the Respondent School and was cleared by the Appellant. It is pertinent to note that the Grade VIII examinations were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
4. Vide judgement dated 04.06.2021, the First Writ Petition was dismissed by the Ld. Single Judge on grounds that this Court was not the most appropriate forum to adjudicate the dispute. The Court considered that the Appellant was a resident of Uttar Pradesh and that the Respondent School was also located in Uttar Pradesh. As the grievances of the Appellant primarily pertained to the Respondent School, the Court held that the mere inclusion of CBSE as a respondent was not sufficient to enable this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Aggrieved, the Appellant preferred a review petition against this judgement which was also dismissed with costs of INR 30,000 imposed on the Appellant.
5. Subsequent to the events of the First Writ Petition, the Appellant preferred the underlying writ petition seeking compensation from CBSE for alleged “intentional harassment, mental trauma of holding back the Petitioner in Class VII for two academic years in violation of RTE Act.” Without adjudicating on the merits of the matter, the Ld. Single Judge vide the Impugned Judgement placed reliance on the binding dictum of this Court in M/s Sterling Agro Industries Ltd vs. Union of India &Ors[1]. and dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of non-conveniens, noting that the Appellant has attempted to found territorial jurisdiction in Delhi merely because CBSE is headquartered in Delhi.
6. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that the Ld. Single Judge erred in not considering that Clause 18.3.[2] of the CBSE Affiliation Bye-Laws explicitly states that the legal jurisdiction for suits filed against the CBSE shall be the Union Territory of Delhi. Learned Counsel submits that the grievance caused to the Appellant is due to the actions of CBSE in not conducting Grade VIII examinations within an appropriate period of time and therefore, as the cause of action arose in the Union Territory of Delhi, the appropriate forum for adjudication of the matter is this Court.
7. Heard Learned Counsel for the Appellant and perused the record. With the consent of the parties, this matter is being disposed of at the motion hearing stage.
8. On an examination of the peculiar facts and circumstances that have led to the present appeal, it is evident that the grievance of the Appellant emerges from the actions of the Respondent School which is located in Uttar Pradesh. This Court had directed the Respondent School to conduct Grade VIII examinations for the Appellant, not the CBSE. Therefore, contrary to the contention of the Appellant, in effect, the Appellant is seeking compensation from the CBSE not for any decision/action taken by the CBSE but instead due to an alleged failure of the CBSE to regulate the actions of the Respondent School.
9. It is a settled position of law that where only a small part of the cause of action arises in the territorial jurisdiction of a Court, the same cannot automatically clothe the Court with jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In such cases, the Court is obligated to follow the doctrine of forum conveniens. The doctrine of forum conveniens was elucidated by a full bench of this Court in Sterling Agro (supra) where it was held as follows:
10. This principle was further reiterated by a Division Bench of this Court in Sachin Hindurao Waze vs. UOI &Ors.[2] wherein the Court held as under:
11. More significantly, a Division Bench of this Court in Shristi Udaipur Hotels vs. Housing and Urban Development Corp[3] dealt with a similar issue and observed that where the most vital parts of the cause of action have arisen elsewhere, the mere presence of the registered office of the Respondent in Delhi would be irrelevant in determining territorial jurisdiction as it amounts to a miniscule part of the cause of action. Relevant portions of the judgement are as under:
12. The principle emerging from Shristi Udaipur (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. In essence, the basis of the Appellant‟s claim for compensation is the loss of an academic year due a delay in examinations for Grade VIII. As the responsibility for conducting the examinations fell on the Respondent School, it is plain that the most vital part of the cause of action arose in Uttar Pradesh, where the Respondent School is located. Moreover, it must also be noted that the Appellant is a resident of Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, on a holistic examination of these circumstances, as the Appellant has failed to produce any material establishing that the grievance caused to her is directly attributable to the actions of the CBSE, we cannot but conclude that this Court is not the appropriate forum for adjudication of this matter.
13. At this stage, it is pertinent to address Clause 18.3.[2] of the CBSE Affiliation Bye-Laws (the „Clause‟) which has been relied upon by the Appellant. The clause reads as under: “18.[3] Jurisdiction to file suits 18.3.[2] The legal jurisdiction for the suits to be filed against the Board shall be the Union Territory of Delhi only.”
14. The contention furthered by the Appellant relies on a strict interpretation of the Clause which would in effect, defeat the doctrine of forum conveniens and is therefore not acceptable to this Court. It must be noted that the doctrine of forum conveniens is invoked to determine the most appropriate forum for adjudication of a dispute and this exercise is undertaken not only for the convenience of the parties but also in the interest of justice. Therefore, this Clause cannot be read in a matter that would permit all cases filed against the CBSE, regardless of the existence of a more appropriate forum, to be adjudicated in the Union Territory of Delhi; the existence of such a clause cannot exempt Courts from invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens especially in cases like the present where no direct actions of the CBSE have been impugned by the Appellant. Thus, the Clause has to be interpreted purposively to include within its ambit only those cases where the cause of action is attributable to the CBSE. This position is also supported by the stand of the Learned Counsel for the CBSE before the Ld. Single Judge to the effect that this Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain this matter.
15. In light of the aforesaid, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the Impugned Judgement. Accordingly, the present LPA is dismissed. It is needless to state that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the subject matter.
SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, CJ TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J NOVEMBER 1, 2023