Sanjay Sanyal v. The State of Maharashtra

16. Disciplinary Authority found Respondent No. 2 guilty of misconduct and imposed a penalty of a reduction in salary. Respondent No. 2's appeal under the NPCIL (Discipline and Appeal) Rules was dismissed by the Appellate Authority. Respondent No. 2 took premature retirement.

17. Mr. A. Mundargi, learned Amicus Curiae, submits that the sum and substance of the allegations made by the Respondent No. 2 in the complaint relate to the Respondent No. 2’s suspension and the disciplinary proceedings that allegedly targeted him because he was a whistleblower, even though the parties knew him as a member of the Scheduled Caste. He submits that, according to the impugned FIR, the acts and omissions alleged against the Petitioners, as well as the other persons named in the complaint, were committed because the Respondent No. 2 belongs to the Scheduled Caste. He submits that the allegations in the FIR indicate that the Petitioner had a grievance regarding the denial of promotion and the disciplinary proceedings held against him. He submits that, although the offence alleged is under Section 3(1)(viii) of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (now Section 3(1)(p)), the ingredients of the offence charged would not be attracted, and it is difficult to fit the case alleged by the Respondent No. 2 under the said provisions. He submits that the disciplinary proceedings would not fall within the words “other legal proceedings”. He relies on the decision of this Court in the case of Prabhakar Ramchandra Desai V/s the State of Maharashtra and Anr.[2]

18. Mr. Sunip Sen, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, submits that the allegations in the disciplinary proceedings initiated by NPCIL against Respondent No. 2 were based on material constituting misconduct against Respondent No. 2. He submits that the misconduct proceedings against Respondent No. 2 were initiated in 2013. He further submits that Respondent No. 2 was suspended on 23.08.2013 and a chargesheet was issued on 10.09.2013. He further submits that the complaint was filed on 24.05.2016, just prior to the date of retirement of Kailash Chandra Purohit, which was due on 31.05.2016. He further submits that the disciplinary proceedings concluded with a finding of guilt against Respondent No. 2 and a salary reduction. He further submits that an appeal filed by Respondent No. 2 against the said order was dismissed, as was the review. He further submits that the charges and the punishment imposed on Respondent No. 2 were maintained and upheld by the Appellate Authority under the Rules. He further submits that Respondent No. 2 alleges that the suspension and chargesheet are the result of a report by third parties. He 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1081 further submits that in his complaint dated 28.05.2016, Respondent No. 2 made allegations against A S. Shinde (H.R.), Dr. Mary Kutty, Dr. Uma Gupta and Dr. R. M. Wankhede in the context of the disciplinary proceedings, but they were not joined as Accused. He further submits that Respondent No.2 does not allege that the factual matrix of the disciplinary proceedings is malicious or vexatious. He further submits that the provisions of Section 3(1)(viii) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, now Section 3(1) (p) of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended), are not attracted. He further submits that the complaint dated 24.05.2016 was filed on account of a service-related grievance of Respondent No.2, namely, either the denial of a promotion or the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him for his misconduct. He submits that the complaint dated 24.05.2016 is mala fide, mischievous and an abuse of the process of law. He relies on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto v. State of Bihar & Anr.[3] in support of his contention that knowledge of a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to invoke the provisions of the Atrocities Act, 1989.

19. Mr. T. G. Khan, learned APP for the Respondent – State, submits that the allegations in the complaint dated 24.05.2016 constituted an offence, and therefore the Respondent No. 1 registered the impugned FIR. Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petiton (Crl.) No. 12144 of

2025.

20. Arguments heard. Records perused with the assistance of the learned Senior Counsels and the learned APP.

21. Considering the facts of these petitions, the question for consideration is whether the allegations and contents of the complaint dated 24.05.2016/impugned FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and satisfy the ingredients of Section 3(1)(viii), now Section 3(1)(p), of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended)?

22. Section 3(1)(viii) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, as originally enacted, reads as follows:

3. Punishments for offences atrocities.—[(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,

(viii) institutes false, malicious or vexatious suit or criminal or other legal proceedings against a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe;

23. Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended) reads as follows:-

3. Punishments for offences atrocities.—[(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, (p) institutes false, malicious or vexatious suit or criminal or other legal proceedings against a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe;

24. On a plain reading of Section 3(1) (viii) or, for that matter, 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended), to make out an offence, the following would be necessary: (a) whoever is not a member of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes; (b) institutes a false, malicious, or vexatious suit against a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe; or (b) institutes false, malicious, or vexatious criminal proceedings against a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe; or

(c) institutes false, malicious or vexatious other legal proceedings against a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.

25. The case at hand concerns the institution of false, malicious or vexatious “other legal proceedings” against a member of a Scheduled Caste.

26. The facts that the Respondent No.2 is an employee of the NPCIL; that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the Respondent No.2 under the NPCIL (Discipline and Appeal) Rules; and that the Respondent No.2 availed of the remedies under the NPCIL (Discipline and Appeal) Rules by filing an appeal against the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority, as available, and also filing a Revision / Review Application (Page 192 of the paper book), are not in dispute.

27. Useful reference can be made to the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Dilip Kumar Ray.[4] In paragraph nos. 15 to 21, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:

15. Malice and malicious prosecution as stated in Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn. by P. Ramanatha Aiyar read as follows: “Malice.—Unlawful intent. Ill will; intent to commit an unlawful act or cause harm. Express or actual malice is ill will or spite towards the plaintiff or any indirect or improper motive in the defendant's mind at the time of the publication which is his sole or dominant motive for publishing the words complained of. This must be distinguished from legal malice or malice in law which means publication without lawful excuse and does not depend upon the defendant's state of mind. (1) The intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act. (2) Reckless disregard of the law or of a person's legal rights. (3) Ill will; wickedness of heart. This sense is most typical in non-legal contexts. ‘Malice means in law wrongful intention. It includes any intent which the law deems wrongful, and which therefore serves as a ground of liability. Any act done with such an intent is, in the language of the law, malicious, and this legal usage has etymology in its favour. The Latin malitia means badness, physical or moral— wickedness in disposition or in conduct— not specifically or exclusively ill will or malevolence; hence the malice of English law, including all forms of evil purpose, design, intent, or motive. [But] intent is of two kinds, being either immediate or ulterior, the ulterior intent being commonly distinguished as the motive. The term malice is applied in law to both these forms of intent, and the result is a somewhat puzzling ambiguity which requires careful notice. When we say that an act is done maliciously, we mean one of the two distinct things. We mean either that it is done intentionally, or that it is done with some wrongful motive.’ ‘Malice in the legal sense imports (1) the absence of all elements of justification, excuse or recognised mitigation, and (2) the presence of either (a) an actual intent to cause the particular harm which is produced or harm of the same general nature, or (b) the wanton and wilful doing of an act with awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result…. The Model Penal Code does not use “malice” because those who formulated the Code had a blind prejudice against the word. This is very regrettable because it represents a useful concept despite some unfortunate language employed at times in the effort to express it.’ ‘MALICE’, in the legal acceptance of the word is not confined to personal spite against individuals but consists in a conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another. In its legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. ‘Malice’, in its legal sense, does not necessarily signify ill will towards a particular individual, but denotes that condition of mind which is manifested by the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. Therefore the law implies malice where one deliberately injures another in an unlawful manner. Malice means an indirect wrong motive. ‘… “malice” in its legal sense means, malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause.’ Malice, in ordinary common parlance, means ill will against a person, and in legal sense, a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or reason. It is a question of motive, intention or state of mind and may be defined as any corrupt or wrong motive or personal spite or ill will. ‘Malice’ in common law or acceptance means ill will against a person, but in legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. It signifies an intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse or an action determined by an improper motive. ‘ “Malice”, in common acceptation, means, ill will against a person; but in its legal sense, it means, a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse’ … Malice in its common acceptation, is a term involving some intent of the mind and heart, including the will; and has been said to mean a bad mind; ill will against a person; a wicked or evil state of the mind towards another; an evil intent or wish or design to vex or annoy another; a wilful intent to do a wrongful act; a wish to vex, annoy or injure another person or an intent to do a wrongful act; a condition of the mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief. ‘ “Malice” means wickedness of purpose, or a spiteful or malevolent design against another; a purpose to injure another; a design of doing mischief, or any evil design or inclination to do a bad thing, or a reckless disregard to the rights of others, or absence or legal excuse, or any other motive than that of bringing a party to justice.’ ‘The meaning of the term malice in English law, has been a question of much difficulty and controversy; and those who made through the many disquisitions on the subjects in textbooks and judicial opinions are almost tempted to the conclusion that the meaning varies almost infinitely, and that the only sense which the term can safely be predicated not to have in any given legal context is that which it has in popular language viz. spite or ill will. It certainly has different meanings with respect to responsibility for civil wrongs and responsibility for crime; and even with respect to crime it has a different sense according as it is used with reference to murder, libel, or the capacity of an infant to commit crime, expressed by the rule malitia supplet act item.’ (Ency. of the Laws of England.) Ordinarily, the absence of reasonable and probable cause in instituting a proceeding which terminates in favour of the plaintiff, would give rise to the inference of malice. Malice has been said to mean any wrong or indirect motive but a prosecution is not malicious merely because it is inspired by anger. However, wrong-headed a prosecutor may be, if he honestly thinks that the accused has been guilty of a criminal offence he cannot be initiator of a malicious prosecution. Malice means the presence of some improper and wrongful motive—that is to say an intent to use the legal process in question for some other than its legally appointed and appropriate purpose. It means an improper or indirect motive other than a desire to vindicate public justice or a private right. It need not necessarily be a feeling of enmity, spite or ill will; it may be due to a desire to obtain a collateral advantage. * * * Malice in fact is malue animus indicating that action against a party was actuated by spite or ill will against him or by indirect or improper motives. MALICE: HATRED: AVERSION: ANTIPATHY: ENMITY: REPUGNANCE: ILL WILL: RANCOUR: MALEVOLENCE: MALIGNITY: MALIGNANCY. Hatred is a very general term. Hatred applies properly to persons. It seems not absolutely involuntary. It has its root in passion, and may be checked or stimulated and indulged. Aversion is strong dislike. Aversion is a habitual sentiment, and springs from the natural taste or temperament which repels its opposites, as an indolent man has an aversion to industry, or a humane one to cruelty. Antipathy is used of causeless dislike, or at least one of which the cause cannot be defined. It is found upon supposition or instinctive belief, often utterly gratuitous. Enmity is the state of personal opposition, whether accompanied by strong personal dislike or not; as ‘a bitter enemy’. Repugnance is characteristically employed of acts or courses of action, measures, pursuits, and the like. Ill will is a settled bias of the disposition. It is very indefinite, and may be of any degree or strength. Rancour is a deep-seated and lasting feeling of ill will. It preys upon the very mind of the subject of it. While enmity may be generous and open, rancour is malignant and private. Malice is that enmity which can abide its opportunity of injuring its object, and pervert the truth or the right, or go out of its way, or shape course of action, to compass its ends. ‘Malevolence commences with some idea or evil belonging to and connected with the object; and it settles into a permanent hatred of his person and of everything relative to him’ — (Gogan). Malignity is cruel malevolence, or innate love of harm for the sake of doing it. It is malice the most energetic, inveterate, and sustained. * * * Malice in fact.—‘Malice in fact’ means express malice. Malice in fact or actual malice, relates to the actual state or condition of the mind of the person who did the act. Malice in fact is where the malice is not established by legal presumption or proof of certain facts, but is to be found from the evidence in the case. Malice in fact implies a desire or intention to injure, while malice in law is not necessarily inconsistent with an honest purpose. Malice in law.—‘Malice in law’ means implied malice. ‘Malice in law’ simply means a depraved inclination on the part of a person to disregard the rights of others, which intent is manifested by his injurious acts. * * * Malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause. S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India [(1979) 2 SCC 491: 1979 SCC (L&S) 216: AIR 1979 SC 49], AIR at p. 51. * Malicious.—Done with malice or an evil design; wilful; indulging in malice, harboring ill will, or enmity malevolent, malignant in heart; committed wantonly, wilfully, or without cause, or done not only wilfully and intentionally, but out of cruelty, hostility of revenge; done in wilful neglect of a known obligation. ‘Malicious’ means with a fixed hate, or done with evil intention or motive; not the result of sudden passion. * * * Malicious abuse of civil proceedings. —In general, a person may utilise any form of legal process without any liability, save liability to pay the costs of proceedings if unsuccessful. But an action lies for initiating civil proceedings, such as action, presentation of a bankruptcy or winding-up petition, an unfounded claim to property, not only unsuccessfully but maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause and resulting in damage to the plaintiff. (Walker) Malicious abuse of legal process.—A malicious abuse of legal process consists in the malicious misuse or misapplication of process to accomplish a purpose not warranted or commanded by order of court — the malicious perversion of a regularly issued process, whereby an improper result is secured. There is a distinction between a malicious use and a malicious abuse of legal process. An abuse is where the party employs it for some unlawful object—not the purpose which it is intended by the law to effect; in other words, a perversion of it. Malicious abuse of process.— Wilfully misapplying court process to obtain object not intended by law. The wilful misuse or misapplication of process to accomplish a purpose not warranted or commanded by the writ. An action for malicious abuse of process lies in the following cases. A malicious petition or proceeding to adjudicate a person an insolvent, to declare a person lunatic or to wind up a company, to make action against legal practitioner under the Legal Practitioners Act, maliciously procuring arrest or attachment in execution of a decree or before judgment, order or injunction or appointment of receiver, arrest of a ship, search of the plaintiff's premises, arrest of a person by police. Malicious abuse of process of court.— * * * Malicious act.—Bouvier defined a malicious act as ‘a wrongful act, intentionally done, without cause or excuse’. A malicious act is one committed in a state of mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief—a wrongful act intentionally done, without legal justification or excuse. * * * ‘A malicious act is an act characterised by a pre-existing or an accompanying malicious state of mind. …’ Malicious prosecution—Malice.— Malice means an improper or indirect motive other than a desire to vindicate public justice or a private right. It need not necessarily be a feeling of enmity, spite or ill will. It may be due to a desire to obtain a collateral advantage. The principles to be borne in mind in the case of actions for malicious prosecutions are these:—Malice is not merely the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but it must be established that the defendant was actuated by malus animus, that is to say, by spite or ill will or any indirect or improper motive. But if the defendant had reasonable or probable cause of launching the criminal prosecution no amount of malice will make him liable for damages. Reasonable and probable cause must be such as would operate on the mind of a discreet and reasonable man; ‘malice’ and ‘want of reasonable and probable cause,’ have reference to the state of the defendant's mind at the date of the initiation of criminal proceedings and the onus rests on the plaintiff to prove them. Other definitions of ‘Malicious Prosecution’.—‘A judicial proceeding instituted by one person against another, from wrongful or improper motive and without probable cause to sustain it.’ ‘A prosecution begun in malice, without probable cause to believe that it can succeed and which finally ends in failure.’ ‘A prosecution instituted wilfully and purposely, to gain some advantage to the prosecutor, or through mere wantonness or carelessness, if it be at the same time wrong and unlawful within the knowledge of the actor, and without probable cause.’ ‘A prosecution on some charge of crime which is wilful, wanton, or reckless, or against the prosecutor's sense of duty and right, or for ends he knows or is bound to know are wrong and against the dictates of public policy.’ The term ‘malicious prosecution’ imports a causeless as well as an illintended prosecution. Malicious prosecution is a prosecution on some charge of crime which is wilful, wanton, or reckless, or against the prosecutor's sense of duty and right, or for ends he knows or its bound to know are wrong and against the dictates of public policy. In malicious prosecution there are two essential elements, namely, that no probable cause existed for instituting the prosecution or suit complained of, and that such prosecution or suit terminated in some way favorably to the defendant therein.

1. The institution of a criminal or civil proceeding for an improper purpose and without probable cause. 2. The cause of action resulting from the institution of such a proceeding. Once a wrongful prosecution has ended in the defendant's favor, he or she may sue for tort damages— Also termed (in the context of civil proceedings) malicious use of process. (Black's, 7th Edn., 1999) ‘The distinction between an action for malicious prosecution and an action for abuse of process is that a malicious prosecution consists in maliciously causing process to be issued, whereas an abuse of process is the employment of legal process for some purpose other than that which it was intended by the law to effect—the improper use of a regularly issued process. For instance, the initiation of vexatious civil proceedings known to be groundless is not abuse of process, but is governed by substantially the same rules as the malicious prosecution of criminal proceedings.’ 52 Am. Jur. 2dMalicious Prosecution S. 2, at 187 (1970). The term ‘malice,’ as used in the expression ‘malicious prosecution’ is not to be considered in the sense of spite or hatred against an individual, but of malus animus, and as denoting that the party is actuated by improper and indirect motives. As a general rule of law, any person is entitled though not always bound to lay before a judicial officer information as to any criminal offence which he has reasonable and probable cause to believe has been committed, with a view to ensuring the arrest, trial, and punishment of the offender. This principle is thus stated in Lightbody case [1882, 9 Rettie, 934]:‘When it comes to the knowledge of anybody that a crime has been committed a duty is laid on that person as a citizen of the country to state to the authorities what he knows respecting the commission of the crime, and if he states, only what he knows and honestly believes he cannot be subjected to an action of damages merely because it turns out that the person as to whom he has given the information is after all not guilty of the crime. In such cases to establish liability the pursuer must show that the informant acted from malice i.e. “not in discharge of his public duty but from an illegitimate motive,” and must also prove that the statements were made or the information given without any reasonable grounds of belief, or other information given without probable cause; and Lord Shand added (p. 940):“He has not only a duty but a right when the cause affects his own property.” ’ Most criminal prosecutions are conducted by private citizens in the name of the Crown. This exercise of civic rights constitutes what with reference to the law of libel is termed a privileged occasion; but if the right is abused, the person injured thereby is, in certain events, entitled to a remedy. (See H. Stephen, Malicious Prosecution, 1888; Bullen and Leake, Prec. P[1]., Clerk and Lindsell. Torts, Pollock, Torts; LQR, April 1898; Vin., Abr., tit. ‘Action on the Case’ Ency. of the Laws of England.) Malicious prosecution means that the proceedings which are complained of, were initiated from a malicious spirit i.e. from an indirect and improper motive, and not in furtherance of justice. (Sri Nath Shaha v. L.E. Ralli [(1905-06) 10 CWN 253 (FB)] ) [The performance of a duty imposed by law, such as the institution of a prosecution as a necessary condition precedent to a civil action, does not constitute ‘malice’. (Abbott v. Refuge Assurance Co. [(1962) 1 QB 432: (1961) 3 All ER 1074: (1961) 3 WLR 1240 (CA)] )] [‘malicious prosecution thus differs from wrongful arrest and detention, in that the onus of proving that the prosecutor did not act honestly or reasonably, lies on the person prosecuted’ (per diplock, l.j. in dallison v. Caffery [(1965) 1 QB 348: (1964) 2 All ER 610: (1964) 3 WLR 385 (CA)] )]. (Stroud, 6th Edn., 2000)” (emphasis in original)

16. “[‘Malice’ means and implies spite or ill will.] Incidentally, be it noted that the expression ‘mala fide’ is not meaningless jargon and it has its proper connotation. Malice or mala fides can only be appreciated from the records of the case in the facts of each case. There cannot possibly be any set guidelines in regard to the proof of mala fides. Mala fides, where it is alleged, depends upon its own facts and circumstances.” (See Prabodh Sagar v. Punjab SEB [(2000) 5 SCC 630: 2000 SCC (L&S) 731], SCC p. 640, para 13.)

17. “12. The legal meaning of malice is ‘ill will or spite towards a party and any indirect or improper motive in taking an action’. This is sometimes described as ‘malice in fact’. ‘Legal malice’ or ‘malice in law’ means ‘something done without lawful excuse’. In other words, ‘it is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard of the rights of others.’ ” (See State of A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti [(2003) 4 SCC 739], SCC p. 744, para 12.)

18. “[T]he word ‘malice’ … in common acceptation means and implies ‘spite’ or ‘ill will’. One redeeming feature in the matter of attributing bias or malice and is now well settled that mere general statements will not be sufficient for the purposes of indication of ill will. There must be cogent evidence available on record…. In Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens [(1955) 1 QB 275: (1954) 3 All ER 677: (1954) 3 WLR 953 (CA)] the Court of Appeal has stated upon reliance on the decision of Lumley v. Gye [(1853) 2 E&B 216: 22 LJQB 463: 118 ER 749] as below: (Stevens case [(1955) 1 QB 275: (1954) 3 All ER 677: (1954) 3 WLR 953 (CA)], All ER pp. 679 H-680 A) ‘For this purpose maliciously means no more than knowingly. This was distinctly laid down in Lumley v. Gye [(1853) 2 E&B 216: 22 LJQB 463: 118 ER 749] where Crompton, J. said that it was clear law that a person who wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same thing, with notice, interrupts the relation of master and servant by harbouring and keeping the servant after he has quitted his master during his period of service, commits a wrongful act for which he is responsible in law. Malice in law means the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse—Bromage v. Prosser [(1825) 1 C&P 673: 171 ER 1362 and 4 B&C 247: 107 ER 1051]. “Intentionally” refers to the doing of the act; it does not mean that the defendant meant to be spiteful, though sometimes, as for instance to rebut a plea of privilege in defamation, malice in fact has to be proved.’ ” (See State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna [(2001) 2 SCC 330: 2001 SCC (L&S) 1010], SCC p. 336, para 5)

19. “[Malice in law.] Malice in law is, however, quite different. Viscount Haldane described it as follows in Shearer v. Shields [1914 AC 808: 83 LJPC 216: 111 LT 297 (HL)]: ‘A person who inflicts an injury upon another person in contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with an innocent mind; he is taken to know the law, and he must act within the law. He may, therefore, be guilty of malice in law, although, so far the state of his mind is concerned, he acts ignorantly, and in that sense innocently.’ Thus malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause.” (See S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India [(1979) 2 SCC 491: 1979 SCC (L&S) 216: AIR 1979 SC 49], SCC p. 494, para 5.)

20. “21. [Malice per common law.] Malice in common law or acceptance means ill will against a person, but in the legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse.” (See Chairman and MD, BPL Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaja [(2003) 8 SCC 567: JT 2003 Supp (2) SC 515], SCC p. 580, para 21.) 21.“11. While it is true that legitimate indignation does not fall within the ambit of malicious act, in almost all legal inquiries, intention, as distinguished from motive is the all-important factor. In common parlance, a malicious act has been equated with intentional act without just cause or excuse.” [See Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) v. Stevens [(1955) 1 QB 275: (1954) 3 All ER 677: (1954) 3 WLR 953 (CA)], Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant [(2001) 1 SCC 182: 2001 SCC (L&S) 189], SCC p. 190, para 11.]

28. Intriguingly, it is not the case of Respondent No. 2 that any of the allegations in the disciplinary proceedings are false or malicious. Mr. Sunip Sen, learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioners, has submitted that in the full-fledged inquiry conducted against Respondent No. 2 pursuant to the memorandum dated 10.09.2013, the Petitioner was punished by a salary reduction. Respondent No. 2 failed in the appeal filed challenging the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, which right of appeal was availed of by Respondent No. 2 in terms of the NPCIL (Discipline and Appeal) Rules governing his employment. The decision of the Disciplinary Authority, NPCIL, attained finality. Respondent No. 2 accepted the decision of the Disciplinary Authority, NPCIL, and subsequently applied for premature retirement. The request for premature retirement was allowed, and Respondent No. 2 was relieved of his services with NPCIL with effect from 06.05.2021 (Page 195 of the paper book).

29. The contents of the complaint dated 24.05.2016 and the impugned FIR do not satisfy the ingredients or the test for the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the Respondent No.2 to be either false, malicious, or vexatious.

30. The issue is whether disciplinary proceedings initiated against Respondent No. 2 under the NPCIL (Discipline and Appeal) Rules would fall within the expression “other legal proceedings” in Section 3(1)(viii) of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended), now Section 3(1)(p).

31. This Court, in Prabhakar Ramchandra Desai (supra), had occasion to consider the expression “other legal proceedings” in 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act, 1989. In that decision, after framing a specific question, “Are the departmental proceedings ‘other legal proceedings' under Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act?”, this Court held that departmental proceedings are not “legal proceedings”. Paragraph nos. 67 to 84 of the decision are reproduced below:

67. Are the Departmental Proceedings “other legal proceedings” under Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act? Disciplinary Proceedings:

68. We will revisit Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act: Section 3 - Punishments for offences of atrocities: (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-(a)...... (p) (p) institutes false, malicious or vexatious suit or criminal or other legal proceedings against a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe;... (zc) imposes or threatens a social or economic boycott of any person or a family or a group belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine....

69. If a person not belonging to Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe institutes a false, malicious, or vexatious suit, or criminal or other legal proceedings against a member of either community, he shall face imprisonment for not less than six months, extendable to five years and with fine. Indeed, the right to legal recourse is not only a facet of common law remedies but also a constitutional imperative. The concept of ‘access to justice’ as an invaluable human right, also recognized in most constitutional democracies as a fundamental right, has its origin in common law, as well as Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Rights, 1948 and Article 2 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

1966. So holds the Supreme Court in Anita Kushawa v. Pushap Sudan18. It has further held that the right is so basic and inalienable that no system of governance can possibly ignore its significance, leave alone denying it to its citizens. Then, when will that basic right—that of judicial recourse to legal remedies—become an offence?

70. If a person institutes a false, malicious, or vexatious suit or criminal or “other legal proceedings” against a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, he commits an offence—an offence under Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act. To categorise what a Civil or a Criminal proceeding is, we face no decisional problems. Then, to attract Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act, all that we need to see is that a civil or a criminal proceeding must have been instituted “falsely, maliciously, or vexatiously”. Granted, falsity, maliciousness, and vexatiousness are matters of adjudication, depending on the facts and circumstances of each proceeding. That felicity of categorisation, however, is unavailable with “other legal proceedings.”

71. To know about “other legal proceedings”, first we should conceptually know what legal proceedings are. In Black's Law Dictionary a “legal proceeding” is defined as any proceeding authorized by law and instituted in a court or tribunal to acquire a right or to enforce a remedy. Judicially interpreted, ‘legal proceedings’ means proceedings regulated or prescribed by law in which a judicial decision may be given. It means proceedings in a court of justice by which a party pursues a remedy which law provides. But those proceedings do not include administrative and departmental proceedings. So held the Supreme Court in S.V. Kondaskar, Official Liquidator v. V.M. Deshpande, I.T.O., as quoted in General Officer Commanding v. CBI. We will discuss this latter decision in a while.

72. An employee in the Archaeology Department of Gujarat State went on leave without prior sanction. That has led to the disciplinary authority's initiating disciplinary proceedings. Initially, he was suspended; later, suspension revoked, he was asked to discharge other functions than what he had already been discharging. In the disciplinary proceedings, he was charged with misconduct. Ultimately, the disciplinary proceedings resulted in a “warning” on the employee. In that background, the employee lodged a complaint against his superior officer, for offences under Sections 166 and 114 of IPC and Section 3(1) (p, q, r, u, zc) of the Atrocities Act. He contended that to harass him, the officer concerned made him face disciplinary proceedings on false, vexatious charges, supported by bogus witnesses. He also maintained that, even after revoking his suspension, the officer continued to harass him.

73. The Departmental Head wanted the High Court of Gujarat to quash the criminal proceedings against her. Then, a learned Single Judge of the Court, in Madhulika Samanta v. State of Gujarat, has held that “the institution of the disciplinary proceedings will definitely fall” under the expression “legal proceedings”. The disciplinary proceedings though will fall under the expression “legal proceedings” the same do not attract the rigours of the “criminal proceedings” or “suit”, but stand on a different pedestal, meant for the departmental concerns governed by the service rules. Then, on facts, Madhulika Samanta found no grounds to hold that the disciplinary proceedings were instituted for a false reason with vexatious intention to humiliate the first informant. Besides that, Madhulika Samanta has cautioned that “[i]f such allegations are allowed to be maintained then each and every misconduct committed by the member of the schedule caste and schedule tribe will be encompassed by the provisions of Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act.”

74. That said, I must note that Madhulika Samanta, with great respect, contains no elaboration on what “legal proceedings” are and how the disciplinary proceedings amount to legal proceedings. So let us examine other precedents. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Guntur v. Ramdev Tobacco Company, (“Assistant Collector of Central Excise”), fell for consideration the expression “other legal proceedings”. And that was in the context of Central Excise Act.

75. A proprietary concern, with a misnomer of a “Company”, dealt in tobacco, having a licenced warehouse at Guntur. It was liable to pay duty on the tobacco received at its warehouse and transported to another dealer. In course of time, after following the due process, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise demanded duty and penalty from the dealer. Then, the dealer filed a writ petition. It contended that the penalty proceedings were barred by time. In fact, the unamended Section 40(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act lays down that “no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding” could be instituted beyond six months from the date the cause of action arises.

76. Under these Circumstances, the Supreme Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise has interpreted “other legal proceedings.” The question, in that case, is whether issuing a show cause notice and initiating the consequential adjudication can be termed ‘other legal proceedings’ within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 40 of the Act. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, to begin with, has acknowledged that there can be little doubt that the phrase ‘other legal proceeding’ is wide enough to include adjudication and penalty proceedings under the Act. But it has accepted the appellant's contention that “this wide expression is preceded by particular words of a certain genus; namely, words indicating reference to proceedings taken in Courts only. So, the wide words must be limited to things ejusdem generis and must take colour from the preceding words. They should, therefore, receive a limited meaning to exclude proceedings of the type in question: departmental proceedings. There can be no doubt that ‘suit’ or ‘prosecution’ are those judicial or legal proceedings which are lodged in a Court of law and not before any executive authority, even if a statutory one. The expression ‘instituted’ in Section 40(2), Assistant Collector of Central Excise felt, strengthens this belief.

77. A departmental proceeding like penalty proceedings, further holds Assistant Collector of Central Excise, are placed outside the scope of Section 40(2). According to that decision, calling upon the dealer to show cause why duty should not be demanded, why penalty should not be imposed, and also the “consequential adjudication proceedings by the appellate authority” would not be called “other legal proceedings”, in the context of that statute.

78. Moving ahead, we may examine another decision: General Officer Commanding v. CBI. In a village in Jammu & Kashmir, terrorists killed about two scores of people. In the combing operations that immediately followed, five persons, purported to be terrorists, were killed by Rashtriya Rifles (RR) personnel in an “encounter”. The earlier massacre was attributed to those five slain terrorists. Then the RR personnel came to face the charge of staging a fake encounter. The CBI investigated the crime and filed a chargesheet. The Army officers applied to the CJM, asserting that they could not be prosecuted except with the previous sanction of the Central Government because of Section 7 of the Armed Forces J & K (Special Powers) Act, 1990. On CJM's rejecting to entertain that objection, the matter eventually reached the Supreme Court.

79. To begin with, Section 7 of the Act 1990 protects the persons acting in good faith under that Act: No prosecution, suit or “other legal proceeding” shall be instituted, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person regarding anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act. In General Officer Commanding, the Supreme Court has exhaustively analysed the expression “other legal proceedings”. It has held that the phrase ‘legal proceeding’ connotes a term which means the proceedings in a court of justice to get a remedy which the law permits to the person aggrieved. It includes any formal steps or measures employed; it is not synonymous with the ‘judicial proceedings’. Every judicial proceeding is a legal proceeding but not vice-versa, because there may be a ‘legal proceeding’ which may not be judicial at all. There are, as examples, the statutory remedies like assessment under Income Tax Act, Sales Tax Act, or arbitration proceedings. Thus, the ambit of expression ‘legal proceedings’ is much wider than ‘judicial proceedings’.

80. The expression ‘legal proceeding’ is to be construed, according to General Officer Commanding, in its ordinary meaning. But it quite differs from the departmental and administrative proceedings; for example, proceedings for registration of trademarks, etc. The terms used in Section 7— that is, suit, prosecution, and legal proceedings—are neither inter-changeable nor do they convey the same meaning. The phrase ‘legal proceedings’ is to be understood in the context of the statutory provision applicable in a particular case, and considering the preceding words used. After referring to Assistant Collector of Central Excise with approval, General Officer Commanding has further held that ‘Legal proceedings’ do not include the administrative proceedings.

81. The combined holding of Assistant Collector of Central Excise and General Officer Commanding precedentially establish these aspects: (1) If particular words of a certain genus precede a wide expression, that wide expression must be limited to things ejusdem generis; that is, it takes colour from the preceding words. It must receive a limited meaning. (2) ‘Suit’ or ‘prosecution’ are those judicial or legal proceedings before a Court of law—but not before any executive authority, even if a statutory one. (3) The phrase ‘legal proceedings’ is to be understood in the context of the statutory provision applicable in a particular case, and by considering the preceding words if any. (4) A departmental proceeding stands outside the scope of “legal proceedings.” (5) In the departmental proceedings, the “consequential adjudication proceedings by the appellate authority” would not fall within the expression “other legal proceedings”. (6) The ‘legal proceedings’ are the proceedings in a court of justice to get a remedy which the law permits to the person aggrieved. (7) And the legal proceedings quite differ from the departmental and administrative proceedings.

82. Here, the employee is not a public servant; he has no protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. He does, however, have statutory protection under the Maharashtra University Act, 1994. Section 58 of that Act mandates that there shall be one or more university and college Tribunals to adjudicate the disputes between the employees and the employer university, and between the employees of the affiliated colleges or recognised institutions and their respective managements. The appeal must concern the matters specified in sub-section (1) of section 59.

83. Section 59 provides for the appellate remedy. Any employee, both teaching and non-teaching, in any university, college, or recognised institution can file an appeal before the University and Colleges Tribunal. As preconditions, first, the recognised institutions must not be under the management of the State Government, Central Government or local authority. Second, the aggrieved employee must have been dismissed, or removed, or reduced in rank, or had his or her services otherwise terminated.

84. Thus, once we hold that the departmental proceedings are not “other legal proceedings”, the “consequential adjudication proceedings by the appellate authority” would not fall within the expression “other legal proceedings”, either.”

32. The next issue would be whether the knowledge of Respondent No. 2, belonging to a Scheduled Caste, would be sufficient to invoke the provisions of the Atrocities Act, 1989.

33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Keshaw Mahto (supra), while dealing with a case under Sections 3(1) (r) and 3(1) (s) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, in Paragraph Nos. 13 and 14, observed as follows:

13. To put it briefly, first, the fact that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. Secondly, any insult or intimidation towards the complainant must be on the account of such person being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.

14. With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity, we deem it appropriate to mention that even mere knowledge of the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r).

34. Applying the above principle, mere knowledge that Respondent No. 2 is a member of the Scheduled Caste is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(viii), now Section 3(1)(p), of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended). To attract the said provisions, Respondent No. 2 had to show that the Petitioners had instituted proceedings that would fall under the expression “other proceeding” and that such proceedings were false, malicious or vexatious, on account of the Petitioner being a member of the Scheduled Caste. No case to that effect is disclosed in the complaint dated 24.05.2016 / impugned FIR.

35. The impugned FIR refers to the following: त्यामुळे मी फिदनांक २१/०८/२०१३ रोजी मी तारापूर अणुशक्ती क ें द्र कॉ#नी हॉस्पिस्पट# चे मेडि!क# सुफिप्रटें!ंट !ॉ. पी. क े. यादव यांचं ऑफि स मध्ये जाऊन बस#ा व त्यांना म#ा सी. एम. !ी. यांना भेटण्यासाठी जाऊन द्या नाही तर तुम्ही माझे प्रश्न सो!वा असे सांफिगत#े तेव्हा माझे #क्षात आ#े की, म#ा फिन#ंफिबत करणेसाठी अगोदरच प्#ान बनफिव#ा असून तेथे सिसफिनयर मॅनेजर एच. आर. ए. एस. शिंशदे, तसेच !ॉ. मेरीक ु ट्टी, !ॉ. उमा गुप्ता, !ॉ. आर. एम. वानखे!े यांनी फिमळून माझा चुकीचा रिरपोट बनवून पाठफिव#ा त्यामुळे फिदनांक २३/०८/२०१३ रोजी म#ा फिन#ंफिबत क े #े बाबत म#ा आदेश फिमळा#ा त्या नंतर फिद. १०/९/२०१३ रोजी म#ा माझे वरी# दोषारोप फिमळा#ा. English translation of the above text, as furnished by the Advocate on record for the Petitioners.: Therefore on 21st August 2013, I went to Office of Medical Superintendent Dr P K Yadav of Tarapur Atomic Energy Centre and sat there. I told them that I may be allowed to meet CMD or solve my questions/problems. Then I came to know that plan was prepared to dismiss me Senior manager HRA S Shinde, Dr. Mary Kutty, Dr. Uma Gupta, Dr. R M Wankhede all made my adverse report and sent to higher authorities Therefore on 23rd August 2013, I received Order regarding my suspension and therefore on 10th September 2013, I received charge sheet against me

36. Respondent No.2, though alleges in his complaint dated 24.05.2016 that the disciplinary proceedings against him were initiated pursuant to a conspiracy by HR A S. Shinde, Dr. Mary Kutty, Dr. Uma Gupta and Dr. R. M. Wankhede, who made an adverse report and sent it to the higher authorities, has not insisted on making the said persons as accused in the impugned FIR. Apparently, Respondent No.2 has been selective in choosing the accused. This conduct of Respondent No.2 speaks volumes.

37. At face value, the allegations in the impugned FIR do not disclose the ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(viii), now Section 3(1)(p), of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended), against the Petitioners. The present case squarely falls within the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal[5] for the exercise of powers under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Surakhsa Sanhita, 2023, to quash the impugned FIR to prevent abuse of the process of law.

38. Mr Sunip Sen, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners, would be right in his submissions that the present case is a glaring example of the harassment and humiliation of the Petitioners at the instance of an employee seeking to settle a score with them on account of his grievance that he was denied a promotion or that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him.

39. Accordingly, Rule in both these petitions is made absolute in terms of the prayer clause (a). Consequently, the impugned FIR bearing No. II-1/2016, dated 24.05.2016, registered with Tarapur Police Station, District Palghar, is quashed.

40. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs.

41. This Court acknowledges the assistance rendered by 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 learned Senior Counsel Mr. A. P. Mundargi, learned Senior Counsel Mr. S. Sen, and Mr. T. G. Khan, learned APP.. [ASHWIN D. BHOBE, J.]