Shri Balaji Enterprises & Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr.

1. The Petitioners have approached this Court challenging the orders dated 14.10.2023, 21.10.2023, 01.11.2023, 04.11.2023, 06.11.2023 & 16.11.2023 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, North, Rohini Court, Delhi, in various Arbitration petitions filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the Arbitration Act").

2. The Orders challenged in the present Writ Petition are as under: "i. Order dated 21.10.2023 passed in Arbitration Petition No. 2336/2023 by Ld. ADJ Sh. Kishore Kumar, North, Rohini Court, Delhi; ii. Order dated 21.10.2023 passed in Arbitration Petition No. 2337/2023 by Ld. ADJ Sh. Kishore iii. Order dated 21.10.2023 passed in Arbitration Petition No. 2338/2023 by Ld. ADJ Sh. Kishore iv. Order dated 21.10.2023 passed in Arbitration Petition No. 2339/2023 by Ld. ADJ Sh. Kishore v. Order dated 21.10.2023 passed in Arbitration Petition No. 2340/2023 by Ld. ADJ Sh. Kishore vi. Order dated 16.11.2023 passed in Arbitration Petition No. 2452/2023 passed by Ld. ADJ Sh. Deepak Dabas, North, Rohini Court, Delhi; vii. Order dated 14.10.2023 passed in Arbitration Petition No. 2133/2023 passed by Ld. ADJ Sh. Deepak viii. Order dated 04.11.2023 passed in Arbitration Petition No. 2054/2023 passed by Ld. ADJ Sh. Deepak ix. Order dated 06.11.2023 in Arbitration Petition NO. 2445/2023 passed by Ld. ADJ Sh. Vikram Bali, North, Rohini Court, Delhi; x. Order dated 01.11.2023 passed against Petitioner No.11, Mohd. Amjad in Arbitration Petition NO. 2444/2023 passed by Ld. ADJ Ms. Shivali Bansal, Rohini Court, Delhi."

3. Petitioner No.1 is a dealer of E-rickshaws and Petitioners No.2 to 10 are the purchasers of E-rickshaws from the Petitioner No.1. Respondent No.2 herein which is a finance company. It is stated that Respondent No.2 filed Arbitration Petitions bearing No. 999/2023 and 1002/2023 under section 9 of Arbitration Act seeking interim relief in nature of ex-parte appointment of receiver for repossession of vehicles on the ground that a hire purchase agreement was entered into between Petitioners No.2 to 10 and Respondents No.2 & 3 and a further loan and hypothecation agreement was entered into between the parties and the said agreement provides for arbitration as a remedy for resolution of disputes arising from non-discharge of obligations by either of the parties. By the Orders impugned herein, the learned ADJ has allowed the applications filed by the Respondent No.2.

4. The Writ Petition listed on 04.12.2023 and on a pointed query by this Court as to why the Petitioners have not filed an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, it was stated by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that he has not received the certified copies of the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act with all the annexures and the order, which would have enabled him to file an appeal. This Court, therefore, requested Mr. Satyakam, learned ASC for the GNCTD, to look into the matter and take instructions from the District Judge to assist this Court. Thereafter, the matter was listed on 11.12.2023 when Mr. Satyakam informed this Court that there is no difficulty in Petitioners getting the application under Section 9 and all annexures by filing the application in this Court for filing an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. Faced with the submission made by the learned Counsel for the GNCTD, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners drew the attention of this Court to the Order dated 03.08.2023, passed by this Court in CM(M) 1234/2023 which was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the similar orders, as has been passed in the present case by the Trial Court. This Court vide Order dated 03.08.2023 has granted an interim relief to the Petitioner therein. In the said case, this Court while disposing of the application for interim relief held that since the petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act has not been disposed of the Trial Court was directed to treat CM(M) 1234/2023 as a reply of the Petitioner and deal with the contentions raised therein including the prayer for restitution of the vehicles. CM(M) 1234/2023 is still pending before this Court. In the present case, the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act has been disposed of.

5. The remedy for the Petitioners lies in filing an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. Section 37 of the Arbitration Act provides for an appeal against an order granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.

6. It is well settled that High Courts do no entertain writs in cases where an equally efficacious alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved party and the aggrieved person has approached the High Court without availing off the said remedy. The Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors vs. Chhabil Dasss Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603, has observed as under:

Court to grant relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. (See State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh [AIR 1958 SC 86], Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433: 1983 SCC (Tax) 131], Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 107] and State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 499] )

12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission [AIR 1954 SC 207], Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal [AIR 1955 SC 425], Union of India v. T.R. Varma [AIR 1957 SC 882], State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh [AIR 1958 SC 86] and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1089] have held that though Article 226 confers very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ is absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice or the procedure required for decision has not been adopted. [See N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar [AIR 1959 SC 422], MunicipalCouncil, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar [AIR 1965 SC 1321: (1965) 2 SCR 653], Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das [(1984) 2 SCC 436: 1984 SCC (Tax) 133], S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan [(1988) 1 SCC 572], Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [(1995) 5 SCC 75: 1995 SCC (L&S) 1207: (1995) 31 ATC 110], Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293], A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan [(2000) 7 SCC 695], L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2001) 6 SCC 634], Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of Maharashtra [(2001) 8 SCC 509], Pratap Singh v. State of Haryana [(2002) 7 SCC 484: 2002 SCC (L&S) 1075] and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO [(2003) 1 SCC 72].]

13. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India [(2011) 14 SCC 337: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 947], this Court has held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, the party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief and observed as follows: (SCC pp. 343-45, paras 12-14)

14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [(1997) 5 SCC 536] B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77) „77. … So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226—or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32—is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.‟” (See G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. [(1952) 1 SCC 334: AIR 1952 SC 192], CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. [(1985) 1 SCC 260: 1985 SCC (Tax) 75], Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura [(1999) 1 SCC 472: 1999 SCC (L&S) 295], Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra [(1999) 3 SCC 5], C.A. Abraham v. ITO [AIR 1961 SC 609: (1961) 2 SCR 765], Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433: 1983 SCC (Tax) 131], Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath and Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312], Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1], Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar [(1998) 8 SCC 272], Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh [(1999) 1 SCC 209] and Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan [(2001) 6 SCC 569].)

14. In Union of India v. Guwahati Carbon Ltd. [(2012) 11 SCC 651] this Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle and observed: (SCC p. 653, para 8)