Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: - 02.02.2024
UNION OF INDIA & ANR ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, CGSC
Through: Mr. A.K. Behra, Sr. Advocate
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GIRISH KATHPALIA REKHA PALLI, J(ORAL)
JUDGMENT
1. The present writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India seeks to assail the order dated 24.12.2014 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned Tribunal’) in O.A. No.4250/2013. Vide the impugned order, the learned Tribunal has, by relying on its earlier decision dated 09.01.2007 in OA No.673/2004 titled Shri A.P. Srivastava vs. Union of India & Ors., allowed the claim of the respondent/applicant by holding that her Annual Performance Assessment Report (hereinafter referred to as ‘APAR’) for the period between 01.04.2009 to 28.02.2010, having not been reviewed by any reviewing officer, was liable to be treated as non est.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is wholly perverse as the learned Tribunal has, while allowing the O.A of the respondent, erred in relying on its earlier decision in Shri A.P. Srivastava (Supra), without appreciating the fact that the factual matrix of the two cases was different. Unlike in the present case, where the respondent’s aforesaid APAR written by the reporting officer was considered by a Referral Board, in Shri A.P. Srivastava (Supra), the APAR of the concerned employee was not examined/considered by any Referral Board. He submits that as per rules, the Referral Board is the final authority for considering representations against APARs and therefore, once the Referral Board had considered the representation of the respondent against the aforesaid APAR, it could not be said that the APAR, having written only by the reporting officer, was non-est.
3. On the other hand, Mr. A.K. Behra, learned senior counsel for the respondent supports the impugned order. He submits that taking into account that this APAR, wherein the respondent was, for the first time, downgraded to ‘Good’ as against her ‘Outstanding’ or ‘Very Good’ gradings during her entire service career, was written only by a reporting officer, the learned Tribunal was justified in relying on its earlier decision in Shri A.P. Srivastava (Supra) to hold the same as non-est. This decision was not only unsuccessfully assailed before the Apex Court but was also followed by the learned Tribunal in Ashok Kumar Aneja vs. Union of India, O.A. No. 24/2007 and Mrs. Swati
4. In order to appreciate the aforesaid rival submissions of the parties, we may begin by noting the relevant extracts of the impugned order, paragraph nos. 8 to 10, whereof read as under:
36. The said Bench has also referred to the decision of the Apex Court in R.Viswanathan vs. Rukh-Ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, (1963) 3 SCR 22, Mohinder Singh Gill vs. The Chief Election Commissioner & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 851, Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, AIR l988 SC 1416, Olga Tellis & Ors., vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation &, Ors., AIR 1986 SC 180, East India Commercial Co. vs. Collector of Customs, AIR 1962 SC 1893, D,K. Yadav vs. JMA Industnes Ltd., (1993) 3see 259, Canara Bank & Ors. vs. Debasis Das & Ors., 2000(3) SCC (L&S) 507, Canara Bank vs. V.K. Awasthy, (2005) 6 SCC 321, Mohd. Sartaj & Anrs. vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (2006)2 SCC 315 and discerned the following principles: (a) The principles of natural Justice are not a straight Jacket formula. (b) There are three matters which should always be borne in mind while considering whether the principle audi alteram partem should be complied with or not. First, what is the nature of property, the office held, the status enjoyed or services to be performed by the complainant of injustice. Secondly, in what circumstances or upon what occasions is the person claiming to be entitled to exercise the measures of control entitled to intervene. Thirdly, when the right to intervene is proved, what sanctions in fact is the latter entitled to impose upon the other. It is only upon a consideration of all these matters that the question of the application of the principle can properly be determined.” c) Whether there was a right or interest or some legitimate expectation which it would not he fair to deny.
(d) An 'order involving civil consequences must be made consistent with the principles of natural Justice Everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts civil consequences. (e) Notice is the first requirement of Audi Atteram Partem rule. One should not be deprived of an opportunity to present his side of the case, (f) A corollary to the rules of natural Justice particularly the audi alteram partem rule is that justice should not only be done hut should manifestly he seen to be done. (g) A departure from Audi Alteram Partem may he presumed to have been intended by the legislature only in circumstances which warrant it. Such circumstance must he shown to exist, when so required, the burden being upon those who affirm their existence.” This we find supported by decisions in Ashok Kumar Aneja versus Union of India & Others (supra) and Mrs, Swati S. Patil Versus Union of India & Others (Supra).
5. What emerges from the aforesaid findings of the learned Tribunal is that the learned Tribunal has accepted the respondent’s plea that the defect in the recording of her APAR on account of the reviewing officer’s failure to review the remarks endorsed by the reporting officer, was fatal and could not be cured on account of the consideration of her representation by the Referral Board. Taking into account that both the reporting officer and reviewing officer are expected to put their remarks in the APAR after watching the performance of the employee during the relevant period, we are inclined to accept the respondent’s plea that the consideration of the APAR by the Referral Board cannot be a substitute for the remarks of the reviewing officer. The Referral Board, howsoever impartial, does not have the opportunity to watch the performance of the employee during the relevant year and therefore, their consideration of the APAR would be based only on the remarks given by the reporting officer as also by the reviewing officer.
6. In a case like the present, where there was no reviewing officer, the consideration of the respondent’s representation by the Referral Board would naturally be based only on the remarks by the reporting officer, thereby defeating the very purpose of having a two-tier system for recording of an APAR. A two-tier system, in our view, not only ensures objectivity in the recording of the APAR, but also acts as a cushion from subjective remarks of one officer harming the employee. We have, therefore, no hesitation in concurring with the view taken by the learned Tribunal that the defect in the respondent’s aforesaid APAR, on account of the absence of remarks by the reviewing officer, could not be cured by a mere consideration of her representation against the APAR by a Referral Board, who admittedly did not have personal knowledge about her performance.
7. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in the petition, which is, accordingly, dismissed. The petitioner is directed to comply with the directions issued in the impugned order within six weeks from today.
(REKHA PALLI) JUDGE (GIRISH KATHPALIA)
JUDGE FEBRUARY 2, 2024