Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 13.02.2024
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS ..... Petitioners
Through: Ms.Avnish Ahlawat, SC, GNCTD
Mr.Mohnish Sehrawat, Advs.
Through: Mr.Manish Vashisht, Sr. Adv. Mr.Vanshay Kaul, Ms.Harshita Nathrani &
Mr.Ajesh Luthra, Advs.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNISH BHATNAGAR
REKHA PALLI, J (ORAL)
JUDGMENT
1. The present writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India seeks to assail the order dated 30.01.2017 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) in O.A. No.941/2015. Vide the impugned order, the learned Tribunal has allowed the Original Application (O.A) filed by the respondent/applicant by setting aside the Charge Memorandum dated 18.06.2014 issued to him.
2. The brief factual matrix as may be necessary for adjudication of the present petition may be noted at the outset.
3. In May, 1995, the respondent was appointed as a Grade II officer of the Delhi Administrative Subordinate Services (DASS). In March, 1999, he W.P.(C) 5083/2018 Page 2 of10 was posted as Grade II Inspector in the Office of Registrar Co-operative Societies, where he remained till November, 1999 and was thereafter posted to the Sales Tax Department. It appears that in 2007, much after the petitioner had been posted out from the Office of Registrar Co-operative Societies, allegations of having submitted an incorrect verification report in respect of some sample resignations were levelled against him and the matter was referred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). However, after examining the material available on record, the CBI on 02.07.2007, recommended that disciplinary proceedings be initiated against the respondent.
4. It is the petitioner’s case that upon receiving the aforesaid recommendation from the CBI, correspondence was made with it from 2007 till 2013 with a request to finalise the draft charge sheet and also to forward the authenticated copies of all the relevant documents. However, certified copies of the requisite documents were not received and therefore, the petitioners could not issue any charge memo to the respondent till 18.06.2014. It is this Charge Memorandum which has been quashed by the learned Tribunal on the ground of inordinate delay by observing that even though the relevant documents as forwarded by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) were available with the petitioner since 2007, the petitioner did not take steps for another seven years to issue a Charge Memorandum to the respondent. Being aggrieved, the present petition has been filed.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this presumption drawn by the learned Tribunal that the necessary documents were available with the petitioner since 2007 was factually incorrect as repeated W.P.(C) 5083/2018 Page 3 of10 correspondences were made with the CBI during the period between 2007 to 2014 and it is only in 2014 that the petitioner was provided with authenticated copies of the relevant documents, whereafter the Charge Memorandum was issued without any delay.
6. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondent supports the impugned order and submits that the learned Tribunal has, after perusing the entire record, found as a matter of fact that copies of all the relevant documents were available with the petitioner way back in 2007 but the petitioner did not deem it appropriate to initiate any action against the respondent at that stage. He further submits that the very fact that the CBI did not find any criminality in the charges levelled against the respondent, was also taken into account by the learned Tribunal. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be dismissed.
7. Having considered the rival submissions of the parties and perused the record, we may begin by noting the relevant extracts of the impugned order, as contained in para nos. 11 to 15, 19 to 21 and 23. The same read as under:-
21. Summarizing the entire case law on the subject, the Hon'ble Apex Court in in Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P.Education Society and Others, (2013) 6 SCC 515 held as follows: “Enquiry at belated stage:
14. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that the W.P.(C) 5083/2018 Page 8 of10 court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question, must be carefully examined, taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The Court has to consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the Court must weigh all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come to the conclusion, which is just and proper considering the circumstances involved. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the said proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of a delay in their conclusion. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma & Ann, AIR 1987 SC 943; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Anr., AIR 1990 SC 1308; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Chaman Lai Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570; State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, AIR 1998 SC 1833; M.V. Bijiani v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3475; Union of India & Anr. y. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906; The Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Ors. v. Prabash Chandra Mirdha, AIR 2012 SC 2250; and Chairman, LIC of India & Ors. v. A.Masilamani, JT (2012) 11 SC 533).” * * * * *
23. Admittedly, with respect of the charge, which pertains to the year 1999, the respondents issued the Charge W.P.(C) 5083/2018 Page 9 of10 Memorandum, after an abnormal delay of 15 years, i.e., on 18.06.2014. The charge is that the applicant, without physically verifying the genuineness of resignations of certain members, submitted the inspection/verification report dated 20.05.1999. The reasons given by the respondents for such an abnormal delay are unacceptable in view of the specific stand of the CBI in furnishing the relevant documents to the respondents, way back in 2007, itself. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the circumstances of the case, allowing the respondents to proceed further with the inquiry would be very prejudicial to the applicant and would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned.”
8. From a perusal of the aforesaid, it clearly emerges that the learned Tribunal was conscious of the fact that the Charge Memorandum should generally not be interfered with. However, after perusal of the record including the CBI’s letter dated 02.07.2007 addressed to the petitioner, the learned Tribunal found that the petitioner was provided with all necessary documents in the year 2007 itself but chose not to issue any Charge Memorandum for another seven years, for which there was no satisfactory explanation. In these circumstances, it was found that though the incident pertained to year 1999, a charge memo was sought to be issued almost 15 years thereafter and therefore, the learned Tribunal was of the considered view that it was a fit case where the Charge Memorandum issued against the respondent was liable to be quashed.
9. Even before us, the petitioner has not been able to give any worthwhile justification for this inordinate delay of more than eight years in issuing the Charge Memorandum from the date of receiving the W.P.(C) 5083/2018 Page 10 of10 recommendations from the CBI. We can also not lose sight of the fact that the respondent was posted in the office of Registrar Co-operative Societies for a very short period between March 1999 to November 1999 and therefore, grave prejudice would be caused to him at this belated stage if he were to be tried for his purported negligence/misconduct, which even the CBI did not find worth proceeding with.
10. We, therefore, find no infirmity with the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal. The writ petition being meritless is, accordingly, dismissed.
(REKHA PALLI) JUDGE (RAJNISH BHATNAGAR)
JUDGE FEBRUARY 13, 2024