Full Text
MAC. APP. NO.183/2007
JUDGMENT
Through: Mr.Pankaj Seth, Adv.
Through: Mr.Zainul Abedin, Adv. for respondent Nos.1 to 4.
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes KAILASH GAMBHIR, J. Oral: * The present appeal preferred under Section 173 of The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, arises out of the award dated 11th 2007:DHC:1563 December, 2006 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, whereby the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 6,29,000/- along with interest @ 7% per annum to the claimants from the date of filing of the petition till its realisation. The brief facts relevant for deciding the instant case are that on 20/5/1999, the deceased Sh. Shambu Rai was travelling on a scooter along with his friend Sh. Jitender Rai. At about 12 noon when they were plying on National Highway No. 8, Opposite Hotel Royal Palace, their scooter was hit by a truck bearing registration no. HR 38 8037, driven in a rash and negligent manner by its driver. As a result, Sh. Shambu Rai received fatal injuries and was removed to the Safdarjung Hospital from the accident site, where he was declared as “brought dead”. A claim petition was filed by widow and children of the deceased before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and award was made on 11/12/2006. Aggrieved with the said award present appeal is preferred by the appellant insurance company. Present appeal is limited to the question of multiplier in as much as the deceased was aged 29 years and the learned tribunal adopted a multiplier of 18. Sh. Pankaj Seth, counsel for the appellant insurance company contends that the tribunal has erred in applying the multiplier of 18. Per contra, Sh. Zainul Abedin, counsel for respondents no. 1 to 4 has vehemently denied the said contention of the counsel for the appellant. The counsel urged that the award made by the tribunal is just and fair and even otherwise the present appeal is not maintainable as the defence under section 170 of MV Act was not been taken over by the appellant before the tribunal. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. On the preliminary objection raised by the respondents to the very maintainability of the appeal, I am of the view that the contention of the respondent is correct in this regard. Counsel for the respondent contends that the appellant had not taken over the defence of the owner and driver as envisaged under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act and, therefore, is debarred from challenging the impugned award so as to assail the findings of the Tribunal on the quantum of compensation. The contention of counsel for the respondent is that right to file an appeal is a statutory right and the insurer can assail the findings of the Tribunal only under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Counsel further contends that it is only in a case where there is collusion between the claimants and the insured, the insurer can assail the findings of the Tribunal on the grounds of quantum as well as negligence subject however to the condition that the insurer had taken permission of the Court to take over the defence of the owner or driver as the case may be as envisaged under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. No such permission was sought by the appellant under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act by the Tribunal and, therefore, in the absence of the same, the appellant being the insurer of the offending vehicle cannot maintain the present appeal on grounds other than those available to it under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Per contra, counsel for the appellant vehemently disputes this position and contends that the insurer cannot be rendered remedlyless especially in a case where the Tribunal has awarded an excessive amount of compensation in favour of the claimants ignoring all basic principles of law for the award of compensation. Counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2007 (9) Scale 216, New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Shanti Pathak & Ors. to contend that the Apex Court had interfered to lower down the compensation amount even in a case where the insurer had not taken any permission from the Court under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Counsel for the appellant also contends that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has already referred the said issue of lack of competence of the insurer to assail the findings of the Tribunal on the ground of quantum of compensation and negligence to a larger Bench and, therefore, this Court may follow the decision of the Supreme Court in this regard. After having given my thoughtful and conscious consideration to the issue involved in the present case, I am of the view that the issue is no more res integra as in the judgments cited by the respondent, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has authoritatively held that in the absence of permission sought from the Court as envisaged under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurer has no right to file an appeal to challenge the quantum of compensation or finding of the Tribunal as regards the negligence or contributory negligence of offending vehicles is concerned. It would be appropriate to refer Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act as under:- “170. Impleading insurer in certain cases- Where in the course of any inquiry the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that - (a) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (b) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, It may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in subsection (2) of section 149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made.“ It is an admitted case between the parties that no such permission under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act was sought by the appellant which clearly means that the procedure laid down under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act was not followed. In the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1998) 3 SCC 140, Shankarayya Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., the Supreme Court has held that the insurance company when impleaded as a party by the Court can be permitted to contest the proceedings on merits only if the conditions mentioned in Section 170 are found to be satisfied and for that purpose the insurance company has to obtain an order in writing from the Tribunal and such an order should be a reasoned order of the Tribunal. In such circumstances unless the said procedure is followed, the appellant insurer cannot have a wider defence on merits than what is available to it by way of a statutory defence. RElevant part of Para 4 of the said judgment in this regard is referred as under:-