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Through: Mr. RajshekharRao,Sr. Advocatewith Mr. Afzal B. Khan and Mr. Debjyoti Sarkar, Advocates.
Through: Mr. Harish Vaidyanathan, CGSC
Mr. Chander M. Lall, Sr. Adv.
JUDGMENT
1. This appeal has been filed under Trade Marks Act, 1999 (‘the Act’) assailingimpugned order dated 3rd January, 2018 underRule53 of the Trade C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 2/15 Marks Rules,2002(‘2002Rules’), now Rule48 of Trade MarksRules, 2017, passed bytheRegistrarofTrademarks (‘Registrar’)in TrademarkOpposition No. Del-T-3509/60503to Trademark Application No.589487 in Class 34. Question for Consideration
2. The essential issue in the appeal pertains to rejection by the Registrar of the Interlocutory Petition filed by appellant to place on record further evidence under Rule 53 of the 2002 Rules in support of their opposition to trademark application filed by respondent no.3. Chronology of Events
3. Respondent no.3 had filed an application on 28th January, 1993 for registration of trademark ‘HERO’ device being represented as (‘said application’).
4. Examination report was issued by the Trademark Registry on 16th October, 1998 andsaid applicationwaspermitted toproceed for advertisement on 29th January, 2001. Said mark was published in TradeMarksJournalNo. 1263 on 16th January, 2002 subsequent to which a notice of opposition was C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 3/15 filed by theappellant(FormTM-5)on 11th April, 2002. A counter statement by respondentno.3(Form TM-6)followed on 14th April, 2003. Theappellant choseto filea letter dated 5th August,2003,relyingon factsandgroundsstated in notice of opposition. Vide order dated 20th February 2004, the Assistant supportof opposition;however, cancelled the aboveorder on 28th June, 2004 reinstatingthesaid opposition and invitingrespondent no.3 tofile evidence in terms of Rule 51 of 2002 Rules. The evidence was then filed by respondent no.3 under Rule 51 on 18th November, 2004.
5. InterlocutoryPetitionwas filed by theappellant on 23rd February,2006 for taking on record the appellant’s evidence in reply which was allowed on 14th May, 2007. Thereafter,no communicationwas received by theappellant regarding the hearing proceedings. In July, 2008 a request was made for change of address for service to appellant to ‘S Majumdar & Co.’, followed by letters dated 31st August, 2009 and 10th March, 2010 requesting the appellant, they were not informed of any proceedings.
6. On 15th November, 2012,appellantinformedtheTrade MarksRegistry that pursuant to a file inspection, an order of 14th May, 2007 came to their attention which had allowed registration of respondent no.3’s trademark as ApplicationNo.589487 in Class34.An Interlocutory Petitionwasfiled by the appellantfor cancellation oftheimpugned trademarkon 30th September, 2013 to which a reply was filed by respondent no.3 on 18th November, 2013.
7. After 2 further years, on 2nd November, 2015, appellant filed an C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 4/15 interlocutory petition for taking on record further evidence under Rule 53 of 2002 Rules and an affidavit was filed of further evidence in support of the opposition.
8. Regarding the petition for cancellation of respondent no.3’s registration, vide order dated 3rd November, 2015, the Registrar revoked the certificateofregistrationclearly premised onthebasisthatit had been granted inadvertently during the pendency of this opposition. Impugned Order
9. Subsequently,by way oftheimpugned order,InterlocutoryPetition for placingon record furtherevidencewas disallowed. Impugned orderpartially records this sequence of events, adverts to Rule 53 of 2002 Rules and finds that the appellant’s plea to place additional evidence, at this stage, cannot be allowed.
10. Factorswhich informed the opinion were:firstly, the last dateof filing of evidence, as per Rules, would havebeen 1st October, 2003, butwasfiled on 2nd November 2015 after a long gap of 12 years; secondly, appellant had not filed any evidence in support of opposition under Rule 50(1) initially and optedto rely on contentsofnoticeof oppositionthereby havingexhausted the said option; thirdly, Rule 53 was not intended to fill a gap, lacunae, or lapse on thepartofeither party; fourthly, Rule 53 may be invoked sparingly under peculiar circumstances by the Registrar in order to arrive at conclusion of a case during the adjudication of opposition proceedings; fifthly, by non-filing of evidence, if a legal right had been created in favour of the trademark C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 5/15 applicant, same may not be displaced; sixthly, appellant had shown repeated failures in meetingtheprescribed deadlines bearingoutdelayingtacticsofthe opposition proceedings; and seventhly, allowing the additional evidence would entitle the applicant to file further evidence as well, which would amount to repetition of entire opposition proceedings. Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
11. Arguments on behalf of the appellant were addressed by Mr. RajshekharRao, SeniorCounsel whosechallenge to the impugned orderwas based inter alia on the following points: 11.[1] The Registrar was wrong to simply reject the application on the assumption that the delay of 12 years was attributable only to the appellant. Thesequenceof events was advertedto, toshow thattherewas consistentand prolonged uncertainty in the trademark hearing proceedings before the Registry. First, the opposition was deemed as abandoned which was later reversed in 2004, then the evidence was filed thereafter in 2004 which was allowed later in 2007, and thereafter there was no information from the Registry regardingtrademark proceedings. Oncetheappellant becameaware of the registration of the mark in favour of respondent no.3, the petition for cancellation was moved in 2013 which was finally allowed in 2015. In this flow of events, additional evidence was filed in November, 2015 along with the application, once appellant became aware of registration of the mark in favour ofrespondentno.3. Thus,appellant was notawareaboutthestatus of the matter, therebeingno communication and only when in November, 2012 C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 6/15 the issue was revived, necessary steps were taken. Therefore, attributing the long gap of 12 years just to the appellant was not tenable. 11.[2] Asidefrom Rule 50 and 52 which give limited window for evidence in supportoftheopposition, Rule53 did not haveany timelines,as waspossibly intended by the legislature/ rule makingauthority. Rule 53 was, therefore, a standalone provision, not coloured or curtailed by Rules 50, 51, or 52. For this, heplaced relianceon theorderofSingle Judgedated 14th December,2012 of this Court in W.P. (C) 7766/2012 titled as Amrish Kumar Aggarwal v. Surinder Engineering Works and Ors. and decision of Intellectual Property Appellate Board (‘IPAB’) in OA/2/2016/TM/DEL dated 5th February, 2018 titled ITC v. Dy. Registrar of Trademarks andIndianTrading Corporation. 11.[3] The impugned order, in foreclosing the right of appellant for filing additional evidence, was technical in its reasoning, whereas the Hon’ble SupremeCourtand other Courtshaverepeatedly held thatprocedureis merely a handmaid of justice. For this, he relied upon Sugandhi (Dead) By Legal Representatives and Anr v. P. Rajkumar, (2020) 10 SCC 706 and Prabhu Shankar Agarwal v. Dy. Registrar of Trademarks and Ors. passed by the IPAB in 2008 (36) PTC 627 (IPAB). 11.[4] By precluding the appellant from placing additional evidence which supported their claim for prior user, Registrar was depriving itself of addressingtheroot of thedispute, thereal issuein the controversy, on which the new documents would have shed light. 11.[5] Impugned order ignored the fact that appellant is a large organization with multiple offices and, at the time of filing further evidence, documents C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 7/15 were not digitised or traceableand retrievingthesametook considerabletime and effort. Therefore, a reasonable cause existed in favour of appellant for delayed filing. Further, documentssoughtto beplaced on record wereof year 1993 and not digitised which further made them difficult to be procured. 11.[6] No prejudice was caused to respondent no.3, who is not using the subject markin India tilldate, whereastheappellant’s rightsin their markhad improved and grown considerably. 11.[7] Respondent no. 3 always could be given an opportunity to file documents in rebuttal to the additional evidence proposed to be filed and interest of justice would be secured in such a case. 11.[8] Theissuecould not beslotted under theprovisionofSection 131 ofthe Act which could only be attracted when a statute prescribed a particular timeline. Additional evidence was proposed to be placed under Rule 53, therefore, there would be no application of Section 131(2) of the Act in particular (which disallowedany appealsfrom a decision of a Registrarin an application for extension). Submissions on behalf of Respondent No.3
12. Arguments on behalf of respondent no.3 were addressed by Mr. ChanderM. Lall, Senior Counsel who vehemently refuted thesubmissionsof appellant and submitted as under: 12.[1] At the outset, there was an issue of maintainability of the appeal. As per Section 131 of the Act, any application for extension of time for which timelines are not provided in the Act could be considered by the Registrar. C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 8/15 However, as per Section131(2)oftheAct, no appealcould liefrom that order (granting an extension of timelines) of the Registrar. Accordingly, considering that Rule 53 did not provide a timeline and more so, was not a provision in theAct but in 2002 Rules, any orderby theRegistrarrejectingthe application for extension, was not appealable. 12.[2] Appealsto theIPAB (nowtheHigh Court, post2021)can beagainstan order or decision of the Registrar, however, in light of Section 131(2) of the Act, such an appeal would be excluded. 12.[3] Time limits provided by the Act are strict and reference was made to Section 21: ▪ Section 21(1): four months to file opposition; ▪ Section 21(2): two months for counter statement, failing which application will be deemed to have been abandonment; ▪ Section 21(4):evidenceto besubmitted within a prescribed time. Thesaid timelines werereflected in Rules 49, 50, 51and52 ofthe2002Rules. Thestrict timelines mandatedboth thetrademark applicant and theopposerto comply therewith;in default of which, the applicationwould deemed to have been abandoned. 12.[4] Attention was drawnto theomissionbyappellant in filingany evidence in support ofoppositionat thefirst opportunity(andrelyinginsteadupon their noticeof opposition in 2003);filing it later in 2004 under Rule52 which was later allowed in 2007. 12.[5] While the last opportunity, as per the Rules, would have been for the appellantto fileits evidenceonorbefore1st October, 2003, theappellantchose C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 9/15 not to fileit till March, 2015notwithstandingthatthehearingproceedings had not taken place, as contended by the appellant. 12.[6] There were fixed timeframes provided by the Act which were not extendable regarding notice of opposition and the counter statement. Some leeway/extendibility was provided by the Act for filing of evidence in terms ofRule105 of2002 Rules which applied tosituations where timehad notbeen prescribed in the Act. Appeals in regard to orders of extendibility were, therefore, not permitted by Section 131 and the only recourse, if at all, to an aggrieved party would be to come up in a writ petition before the Court, but certainly not in appeal. 12.[7] The prior user argument of appellant was untenable since respondent no.3 was user of ‘HERO’ mark globally since 1957. In the notice of opposition, the appellant first claims in para 3 ‘user since 1942’, then in the evidence in reply in para 9(e), improves its claim to ‘1905’, as used by appellant’s predecessors and then in interlocutory petition filed by the appellant, in para 8 it claims ‘since1993’. This would showthattheappellant was not clear of its own stand and was merely seeking to improve their case as the proceedings went along. 12.[8] Referencewas madetotheinterlocutorypetition filed in February, 2006 to place evidence on record under Rule 52 where it is stated by the appellant that they were a big corporation with branches in various parts of India and were in process of collecting evidence in consultation with their lawyers and preparationofthesame, which consumed time. Mr.Lall, therefore, contended that if this was the position and an extensive exercise had been undertaken, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 10/15 even as per the appellant in 2006, there could be no reason for attempting to submit further documents in 2015. In any event, in the application for filing theadditionaldocuments in respect ofwhich the impugnedorderwas passed, has provided no reason or any evidence of due diligence which the appellant would have undertaken. Submissions in Rejoinder
13. Submissions were made in rejoinder by Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Senior Counsel for the appellant in the following terms: 13.[1] Since timelines were not provided in Rule 53, applicability of Section 131 of the Act for pleading non-maintainability of the appeal was not sustainable. Section 131 applied only to situations where there prescribed timelines. Prescription in the Act for timelines was in Section 21(1), (2), and (4). 13.[2] It was pointed out that pursuant to the evidence placed on record in 2007, the Registry did not communicate of a hearing in the notice of opposition, despite a request for change of address in 2008. Attention was drawn to various letters addressed by appellant noting repeated communications of 6th March, 2010, 28th August, 2009, 5th November, 2008 and 7th July, 2008. This narration was foundin letter dated 10th March, 2010 which had also mentioned the word ‘REMINDER!!!’ in large, bold font. Thereafter,in 2012, pursuantto a file inspection, it transpired that respondent no.3 had been granted registration without a hearing and which, pursuant to steps taken by the appellant, was finally cancelled in 2015. Thus, it was not C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 11/15 as if the appellant was simply coming after 15 years. Having no communicationoftheproceedingsor statusofthematter and thislongperiod being interspersed withso manydevelopments, thebenefit ofextensionought to be given to the appellant. 13.[3] It was also averred thatground ofnon-maintainabilitywas being taken at a belated stage. 13.[4] Documents which were sought to be appended as additional evidence, were merely those which showed the user of the mark by the appellant since 1993 and would notcauseany prejudiceto therespondent no.3 in thatregard. Analysis
14. For easeofreference, therelevant provisionas incorporatedin the2002 Rules, and the latest 2017 Rules, is tabulated as under:
┌─────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ 2002 RULES │ 2017 RULES │ ├─────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ Further Evidence 53. No further │ 48. Further evidence.— No further │ │ evidence shall be left on either │ evidence shall be left on either side, │ │ side, but in any proceedings before │ but in any proceedings before the │ │ the Registrar, he may at any time, │ Registrar, he may at any time, if he │ │ if he thinks fit, give leave to │ thinks fit, give leave to either the │ │ either the applicant or the │ applicant or the opponent to leave any │ │ opponent to leave any evidence upon │ evidence upon such terms as to costs or │ │ such terms as to costs or otherwise │ otherwise as he may think fit. iling │ │ as he may think fit. 15. An issue │ evidence arose in Sun Pharma │ │ relating to timelines for f │ │ └─────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────────────┘
53. No further evidence shall be left on either side, butin anyproceedings before the Registrar, he may at any time, if he thinks fit, give leave to either the applicant or the opponent to leave any evidence upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as he may think fit.
48. Further evidence.— No further evidence shall be left on either side, but in any proceedings before the thinks fit, give leave to either the applicant or the opponent to leave any evidence upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as he may think fit.
15. An issuerelatingto timelines for filing evidence arosein Sun Pharma C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 12/15 Laboratories Ltd. v. DaburIndia Ltd. & Anr., 2024:DHC:946in thecontext of Rule 50 of the 2002 Rules (now Rule 45 in the 2017 Rules) prescribing timeline for evidence in supportoftheopposition. Theissuebeforethe Court was whether the timelines provided by the Act/Rules were directory or mandatory, elastic or strict. Observations and conclusions of the Court are evident in the relevant paragraphs extracted below: “32. The scheme of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is clearly to provide strict timelines for the purpose of opposition proceedings. Repeated extensions to delay the process of registration through extension oftime limits can hold up grantof trade mark registrations for a substantial period of time. The legislative intent behind the prescribed timelines in the Act and the Rules is to ensure that the registration of trade marks is not unduly delayed and Opponents are not able to delay the registration of marks.
33. If extension of time is granted for filing either pleadings or evidence in Opposition proceedings, without an outer deadline, the purpose of the Act and the Rules would be set at naught, inasmuch as the Opponents could indefinitely hold-up grant of registration of marks.
34. Thetransition from the 1959 Rulesto the 2002 Rulesand the 2017 Rules shows that the discretion, which was vested with the evidence has also been reduced. Initially, in the 1959 Rules, evidence was to be filed within two months from service by the to decide as to whether the opposition ought to be deemed as abandoned or not. …
37. The above transition and evolution of the Rules points to a clear intention to ensure that strict timelines are prescribed for conclusion of pleadings/evidence in opposition proceedings. Rules105 and 109ofthe2002 Rulesand 2017Rulesrespectively, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 13/15 would not be an aid in granting of extension as such extensions cannot be granted, when the time periods are specifically prescribed in the Rules. …
46. In the opinion of this Court, use of the term “one month aggregate” in Rule 50 of the 2002 Rules and removal of discretion “unlessthe Registrarotherwisedirects,” in Rule50(2) of the said Rules clearly points to the time limit prescribed as being mandatory. Thisposition wouldnotbedifferentin the2017 Rules, inasmuch as even if the one month extension period has been deleted from the said Rules, the discretion with the
47. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that upon the counter statement being received by the Opponent from the Applicant, the two months’ period begins to run. The counter statementneed notbeserved bytheRegistrarupon theOpponent. If the evidence is not filed within the two months’ period, the opposition would be deemed to have been abandoned as the Rules or Rule 45 of the 2017 Rules or Rules 101 and 109 of the 2002 Rules and the 2017 Rules respectively, to extend the time period.
48. This interpretation is also in line with the stand of the Trade Marks Registry i.e., to have strict timelines for opposition proceedings so that the Opponents cannot unduly and infinitely delay the processing of trade mark applications towards registration.” (emphasis supplied)
16. In Sun Pharma (supra), Court’sview wasclear and categorical, in that, time limits prescribedunder the Rules aremandatory, andin consonancewith the necessity for strict timelines. An extrapolation of this principle must also logically applyto Rule53 ofthe2002 Rules (now Rule48 ofthe2017 Rules). The inflexible and inductile quality ascribed to the Rules for filing evidence C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 14/15 in support of opposition cannot suddenly evaporate and dissipate when applying Rule 53 in a residual situation. While Rules 50-52 do not invite elasticity, it is difficult to accept that Rule 53 would. Rule 53 is prefaced by the phrase - “no further evidence shall be left on either side” - which exemplifies a situation thathas trulyprecipitated. Thephraseis followed by a “but” which is followed by a provision ofa residualpower oftheRegistrarto allow either party to leave evidence.
17. The residual power, therefore, is to be triggered when the Registrar himself feels that he requires certain evidence from the applicant or the opposerwhich is evident from thephrase “hemay at anytime, if he thinks fit, give leave…”. Exfacie thebarelanguageofthe Ruledoes not suggest thatthe residualpowercan betriggered by either party. TheRuleprovides play in the joints, a circumscribed discretion, to inviteevidenceif theRegistrar so thinks fit, akin to thesuo motu power exercised by courts as well as to seek evidence in varioussituations if they so desire for better and complete adjudication.
18. This Court is therefore of the opinion that Rule 53 is a standalone provision, however as stated above cannot be interpreted de hors, divested, detached from the framework of the Act and the spirit of other provisions. It is predicated on situations where parties have exhausted all opportunities available under the Act/Rules to file evidence.
19. Extendibility under Rule50, 51, and 52 to bemadeunder Form TM 56 requires, at serial no 4, a statement of purpose for which extension is required. In light of specific timelines provided in Rules 50, 51, and 52 read with Section 21 of the Act, Rule 53 cannot be interpreted as a further C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2022 Page 15/15 opportunity for extension. The power under Rule 53 ought to be used by the Registrarin extremely rarecircumstances andonlywhen theRegistrarherself feels there is necessity for additional evidence.
20. Rule 53, in the opinion ofthis Court, is not a valvewhich would allow a deluge at the last and final stages of adjudication / assessment. Allowing even a trickle of evidence at the behest of a party at such stage would render themandatorytimelines under Rule50-52 otiose, infirm, lame and vacuous.
21. To accept the appellant’s contention even de hors the sequence of events would bedisastrousto theschemeofthe Act and Rules. Forarguments sake, even if Rule53 was to beinterpreted aselastic(pertheappellant), in any event accounting for the sequence of events (as noted above), the appellant would falter miserably. Diligence is expected from both the trademark applicant and the opposer since the whole theme of intellectual property jurisprudence is based upon an energetic pursuit of one’s proprietary rights. The appellant cannot take advantage of delay in the proceedings before the transgress a mandatory timeline.
22. Appeal is accordingly dismissed.
23. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of as infructuous.
24. Judgment be uploaded forthwith on the website of this Court.
ANISH DAYAL (JUDGE) FEBRUARY 29, 2024/sm/sc