Kunj Behari v. K.D. Churiwala & Ors.

Delhi High Court · 11 Jan 2008 · 2008:DHC:77
A.K. Sikri
CS (OS) No. 227-A of 1984
2008:DHC:77
civil appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that disputes arising from agreements containing valid arbitration clauses must be referred to arbitration, while disputes from agreements lacking such clauses must be adjudicated by courts, partially allowing the petition for appointment of an arbitrator.

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
CS (OS) No. 227-A of 1984 Pronounced on : January 11, 2008
# Kunj Behari .....Petitioner ! through : Mr. Atul Batra, Advocate
VERSUS
$ K.D. Churiwala & Ors. .....Respondents ! through : Mr. Rajiv Saxena, Advocate
CORAM :- THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE A.K.SIKRI
JUDGMENT

1. Whether Reporters of Local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? A.K. SIKRI, J.

1. The respondent No.1, namely, M/s. K.D. Churiwala & Sons, is a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) and respondent Nos. 2 to 6 are its co-parceners. Respondent No.6 is the Karta of this HUF. This HUF owned one plot No. W-122, measuring 1299 sq.yds. in Greater Kailash Part-II, New Delhi. The said HUF, through its Karta, approached the petitioner for development and construction of the said plot, for which purpose a partnership under the name and style of M/s. Builder Associates (hereinafter referred to as the ‘partnership firm’) was formed on 3.12.1979. This partnership firm consisted of the petitioner, respondent No.6 and Shri Rishi Kumar, Karta of Radhey Lal Rishi Kumar 2008:DHC:77 originally petitioner No.2, but later on vide order dated 30.11.1987, he is transposed as respondent No.7 instead of petitioner No.2. According to the petitioner, disputes had arisen and since the partnership deed provided for settlement of disputes through arbitration, the petitioner filed the instant petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short, ‘the Act’) for appointment of an arbitrator and reference of disputes for adjudication by the said arbitrator. For some reason or the other, this petition is pending for all these years.

2. As per the averments made in the petition, an oral agreement was entered into for development of the said plot of land and terms thereof were reduced into writing in the agreement dated 3.2.1979. This agreement was executed between the respondent No.1 HUF and respondent No.6, Karta of respondent No.1 HUF on the one hand and the partnership firm on the other side. On behalf of the partnership firm, all the three partners signed the agreement, including the respondent No.6. Thus, respondent No.6 signed the agreement on both sides, namely, as Karta of HUF and as partner of the partnership firm. In furtherance of the collaboration agreement dated 3.2.1979, another agreement dated 6.2.1979 was also executed between the partnership firm and the HUF defining the role of various parties in the collaboration. Clause 7 of the latter agreement contained an arbitration clause.

3. Thus, on 3.2.1979 a partnership was entered into; on the same date partnership firm entered into the collaboration agreement agreement was entered into between the partnership firm and the HUF. In the agreement dated 6.2.1979, besides some other terms, a term about the payment of commission to the partnership firm was also inserted. According to the petitioner, this was done as the respondent No.6 stated that the purpose of this agreement was to bifurcate the profits to be earned by the HUF. It was subsequently understood between the parties that agreement dated 6.2.1979 had no effect on the main agreement between the parties and the same was entered into for the benefit of HUF only for the purpose of income-tax, etc.

4. Pursuant to the collaboration agreement, the partnership firm took up the project of developing the aforesaid land. Plans were got sanctioned, bookings of the flats were made, earnest money and other installments were realised from the purchasers of various flats. Entire money realised from the buyers was deposited with the HUF through its Karta. Accounts were also maintained by the said HUF and its Karta. The petitioner alleges that the money which was realised from the prospective buyers was being utilised and invested by the HUF in its sister concern instead of utilising the same for incurring expenses of construction on the said plot of land. The petitioner had to utilise his own resources in making the bookings, apart from spending his almost entire time looking after the aforesaid work of construction. In the petition it is alleged that the petitioners (reference is to both the petitioner and the respondent No.7 who was joint petitioner at the time of filing of this petition) were constructed. Booking in respect of 15 flats was done with the prospective buyers. However, the HUF got two flats from the prospective buyers surrendered to them.

5. The three partners also decided to take two flats each for themselves while the construction was going on and was in full swing. It was agreed between them that one flat would be free of cost and one against payment. In these circumstances, three agreements, all dated 12.8.1981, were entered into between the parties which provide for distribution of one flat each free of cost to all the parties to the collaboration agreement and one flat each at a specified (concessional) rate to all the parties. Free flat and the flat at concessional rate was to be given to the parties as consideration towards services rendered by the parties (share of profits) in making the collaboration a success.

6. The respondent Nos. 2 to 5, as co-parceners of the respondent No.1 HUF, filed a suit in February 1983 being Suit No. 65/1983, against the partnership firm and its three partners, namely, the petitioner, respondent No.6 and respondent No.7. In this suit declaration was sought to the effect that HUF was the absolute owner in possession of flat in question together with the constructions thereon and injunction was prayed for restraining the defendants in the said suit from interfering with their possession. Application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was also filed in which order of maintenance of status quo was passed. According to the petitioner, the co-parceners were not in possession of the injunction order, they took illegal possession of the flats and excluded the petitioners from the same. The contractor to whom the work had been entrusted and was in possession of the building was turned out by the co-parceners and a letter of surrender dated 7.8.1983 was also obtained from him. The architect engaged for the project was also discharged by them.

7. The respondent Nos. 2 to 5, as co-parceners of HUF, filed another suit for injunction against the petitioner, respondent No.6 and respondent No.7 seeking injunction against them from entering upon the building or disturbing their possession and also from negotiating any agreement or conducting sale or receiving/collecting any money.

8. Yet another and third suit was filed by the respondent No.6 against the partnership firm, the petitioner herein and the respondent No.7 for declaring that the agreement dated 3.2.1979 was illegal, void etc. and praying for an injunction restraining the defendants to the said suit from interfering with the possession/enjoyment of the property by the HUF. Injunction was also sought to restrain the petitioner and the respondent No.7 from acting as partners of the partnership firm. In this suit, the petitioner filed application under Section 34 of the Act alleging, inter alia, that there was an arbitration agreement between the parties and, therefore, the suit was liable to be stayed. This application was allowed vide order dated 26.3.1983 by the Sub-Judge, Delhi ordering stay of the said suit. The respondent No.6 filed appeal there against.

9. While all these proceedings were pending, the present petition was initially filed jointly by the petitioner and the respondent No.7, as mentioned above, under Section 20 of the Act alleging that disputes had arisen between the parties which needed to be referred for arbitration. In the petition, the petitioner mentions that the partnership deed dated 3.2.1979 contains arbitration clause No.15. Likewise, agreement dated 6.2.1979 also contains clause 7 which is an arbitration clause. Following disputes are stated to have arisen between the parties, as mentioned in para 27 of the petition:- “(i) That the so called partnership entered into by agreement dated 3.2.1979 between the petitioners and respondent No.6 is to be dissolved;

(ii) That the accounts of the project have to be rendered by the respondents and the petitioners' share of profits is to be paid to them. It may be stated that each of the petitioners have 1/3rd share in the profits and the respondents through respondent No.6 have 1/3rd share. The respondents are denying the share of the profits of the petitioners.

(iii) That the investments made by the petitioners as well as which were got made by them from their own relatives and friends have to be accounted for and paid by the respondents together with interest due thereon. The respondents are not doing the same.

(iv) That the respondents are denying the rights of the petitioners in the project in pursuance to which 22½ flats were constructed, although according to the agreement between the parties the petitioners are entitled to their shares therein.

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(v) That each of the petitioners had been alloted two flats each to the possession of which they are entitled but the respondents are depriving the petitioners of the possession thereof. The petitioners are entitled to the possession of the said flats.

(vi) That the whole construction was to cost at the rate of Rs.72/- psf. as per the agreement with the Contractor but the respondents had dispensed with the services of the contractor without the consent of the petitioners to which they are not entitled and they are liable to reimburse the petitioners for the

10. In the aforesaid backdrop, this petition contains the following prayers:- “(i) that the aforesaid agreements dated 3.2.1979 and 6.2.1979 may kindly be directed to be filed in this Hon'ble Court and further proceedings in the matter of appointment of Arbitrator/Arbitrators may be taken;

(ii) costs of the proceedings be awarded to the petitioner and against the respondents;

(iii) Any other order or orders which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the petitioners.”

11. Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 have filed reply to the aforesaid petition stoutly contesting the same. It is pointed out that the suit is based on three agreements, namely, deed of partnership dated 3.2.1979, construction agreement dated 3.2.1979 and commission agreement dated 6.2.1979. Though the deed of partnership and commission agreement contain arbitration clause, there is no such arbitration clause provided in the construction agreement dated 3.2.1979. Therefore, the disputes relating to the construction agreement cannot be made subject matter of arbitration. It is also contended that three suits, as referred to in the petition, were pending before the competent courts of Sub-Judges, Delhi and the petition was not maintainable at the relevant time. The maintainability of the petition is also challenged on the ground that it is based on multiplicity of cause of action and contradictory claims. It is sought to be explained that originally the respondent No.1/HUF, which was the owner of W-122, Greater Kailash Part-II, Karta/respondent No.6, entered into a contract for development of plot, land and building of residential flats for a value assessed at Rs.7.0 lacs, for which purpose a construction agreement dated 3.2.1979 was entered upon between the parties. Admittedly, a partnership has been executed, by and between the petitioner and respondent No.6 individually with the partnership firm to avoid capital gains, taxes and expenses for stamp duty etc., as more specifically stated by the petitioner in para 6 of his plaint, which contention patently evince constitution of a business entity with illegal and unlawful purpose and in this regard neither the said entity can be said to be entitled for any equitable relief nor for that matter the document executed for constitution of such business for unlawful purposes can be acted upon for the same being void ab initio. Thus, it is argued on this basis that when the agreements have been admitted to be camouflage by the petitioner himself, such an agreement is not enforceable as it is not a valid contract and the maxim “ex turpi causa non oritur actis”, i.e. 'Out of a turpitude no cause of action arises', applies. It is further submitted that the Court cannot lend its aid to such a petitioner, who on its own stating alleges that the cause of action arises from ex turpi causa.

12. It is also submitted that as per clause 5 of the agreement dated 3.2.1979, it is clear that arrangement made therein was for construction of residential units/flats wherein the partnership there was no agreement for sharing of the construction portion or ownership or transfer of any portion in favour of the petitioner in any manner. As per clause 7 thereof, it is evident that payment of Rs. 7 lacs was to be made by the partnership firm to the respondents “in lieu of tendering the said plot for carrying out the project”. Thus, it is only a construction agreement and there was no intention, at any point of time, of the owners to part with either the possession of the property or to share the same, except for construction, and sale of the flats for which commission was payable to the petitioner. Likewise, the second agreement, which is a partnership deed, is entered into between the partners for development of the land only for a remuneration @ 15% p.a. on investments. Moreover, this deed has not been witnessed by any person nor was it a registered partnership. Likewise, even the agreement dated 6.2.1979 was only for preparation and arranging of sanctioning of plans, construction material, appointment of architect, construction of flats and its sale and for ensuring collection as collection agent of the HUF. Even this agreement does not give any right for any transfer of property in any manner whatsoever and the petitioner was only allowed to get 5% of the total installments from the purchasers upto 31.3.1980 and 2½ per cent thereafter besides financing @ 18% p.a. Thus, even by this agreement no right, title or interest in the property is vested in the petitioner.

13. It is stated that besides the aforesaid agreements, three further agreement dated 12.8.1981 regarding (i) Flat No. 4 & 6 (Ground Floor) for 1000 sq. ft. with 250 sq.ft. free for services rendered and (ii) 1000 sq.ft. at the rate of Rs.160/- per sq.ft. with a precondition that finances for construction are to be arranged for and contributed by the petitioner only and on these lines two further agreements regarding Shri Rishi Kumar for Flat No. SGF- 1, SGF-2 and the respondent No.6 for one flat, i.e. 1000 sq.ft. free UGF-4 sold @ 300 sq.ft. However, all the said three agreements were non-existent, inconsequential, invalid and were accordingly denied.

14. It is also claimed that all payments collected were spent on construction and related activities and the accounts were regularly verified by the petitioner, which contained his signatures as well. All commissions were paid to the petitioner commensurating with the collections. It is alleged that no money is due to the petitioner and on the contrary, it is the petitioner who is to pay a sum of Rs.1,65,562.50p. Besides, an amount of Rs.9,448.79p. is due from the partnership firm. It is also alleged that a bare perusal of the Local Commissioner report dated 3.5.1983 confirms that the construction was totally incomplete and as against the petitioner's alleged construction and booking of 22½ flats by 1982, only 15 flats were booked for which due and proper commissions, interest and investments etc. have all been paid. It is denied that any arrangement for allotment of flats have been made on account of the HUF or any of its co-parceners, as alleged by the petitioner. On the 12.8.1981 was false and has never been executed with the consent and knowledge of the co-parceners or for and on behalf of the HUF. It is also the contention of the respondents that assuming, though not admitting in any manner whatsoever, that the respondent No.6 entered into some deed of partnership or certain agreement with his partners by virtue of the alleged agreement dated 12.8.1981 or constitution of the partnership firm have got no bearing on the interest or rights of the coparceners of the respondent No.1/HUF insofar as in case of debts contacted by the Karta/Manager in pursuance of his implied authority in the ordinary course of family business there is a distinction between the liability of the Karta/Manager and the liability of his co-parceners. The Manager is liable not only to the extent of his share in the joint property but being a party to the contract he is liable personally, i.e. to say, his separate property is also liable. However, as regards the other coparceners, they are liable only to the extent of their interest in the family property, except in the case of adult co-parcener, that too in certain circumstances. However, when contracting for a new business, the Karta/Manager is not entitled to encumber the joint family estate for starting a new business {See – Gurmukh Singh v. Shiv Ram, (1936) 17 Lahore 53; and AIR 1938 AP 40}.

15. During the pendency of this petition, the respondent Nos. 2 & 6 died. This fact was disclosed by learned counsel for the The petitioner, in these circumstances filed an application for bringing the LRs of these two deceased respondents on record along with an application for condonation of delay in the year

1996. The same were hotly contested by the respondents. However, vide orders dated 19.10.2001, delay was condoned and LRs were brought on record. The respondents even filed appeal before a Division Bench against that order, which was also dismissed on 2.12.2004. Thereafter, the respondent No.3 also died and another application was filed for bringing the LRs of the respondent No.3 on record, which was allowed on 20.9.2005.

16. In support of the petition, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that raising of the dispute by the respondents by filing suits itself suggests that there are disputes between the parties. Since these disputes have arisen, the matter should be referred to arbitration and merits of the disputes can be gone into by the arbitrator only. Referring to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Nandram Hanutram v. Raghunath & Sons Ltd., AIR 1954 Cal 245, it is contended a dispute implies an assertion of a right another. The repudiation by the other party may be either express or implied and may be by words or by conduct. Failure to perform the contract and to pay the amount claimed may justly lead to the inference of repudiation and denial of the right of the other part. Coupled with other circumstances failure to pay a claim may constitute of difference between the parties. Failure to pay under claim of right is certainly a dispute. constituted with any illegal or unlawful purpose and, therefore, the agreements are not void, inasmuch as, it was perfectly legal to have formed a partnership for development of the said plot in Delhi and for that purpose to also enter into a collaboration agreement. Since the property was to be sold after development, there was no need for transferring the same to the partnership firm. The capital accounts, in any case, would have to be paid by the respondents once the property/flats were sold and stamp duty would have been levied and paid at that stage. Referring to the judgment of the Patna High Court in the case of Saudagar Chaudhary & Ors. v. Smt. Bipati & Ors., AIR 1986 Patna 211, learned counsel relied upon the following observations:- “....Courts of Law will not come in aid of person enforcing the performance of an illegal contract..... However, an issue for which the plaintiff... is not required to rely on illegality to make out his claim... can be granted by the court”. He also relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Sita Ram v. Radha Bai & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 534.

18. Learned counsel for the respondents contended on the same lines on which the reply is filed contesting the petition, note whereof has already taken above. He also submitted that insofar as agreement dated 6.2.1979 is concerned, between the HUF and the partnership firm, the petition raising the disputes arising out of the said agreement is not maintainable. It was further submitted that insofar as the partnership firm is concerned, not only the agreement is illegal, but in any case the arise out of the construction agreement dated 3.2.1979 which does not contain any arbitration clause and, therefore, the petition is not maintainable.

19. Various disputes, which according to the petitioner, have arisen and need to be referred to arbitration are already mentioned above. It is clear from the nature of disputes mentioned at S.Nos. 2 to 6 that the same have arisen out of the construction agreement dated 3.2.1979. This construction agreement does not contain any arbitration clause. Therefore, these disputes cannot be referred for arbitration and the proper course for the petitioner was to file suit for adjudication of those disputes. However, dispute No.1, which relates to the dissolution of the partnership firm would arise out of the partnership agreement and, therefore, is referable to arbitration.

20. I do not agree with the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that arbitration agreement is illegal. The objective for which the partnership firm was entered into has to be seen. The said purpose was perfectly legal, namely, to develop the plot in question. This petition, therefore, succeeds partly. The respondents are directed to file original partnership agreement dated 3.2.1979 in the Court. Ms.Kanwal Inder, District Judge (Retd.), is appointed as the Arbitrator, who shall adjudicate the disputes relating to the partnership firm. Her fee is fixed at Rs.1,00,000/-, to be shared by the parties equally.

21. This petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

(A.K. SIKRI) JUDGE January 11, 2008 nsk