Full Text
CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994
Through: Mr. Anil K. Kher, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. P.K. Mohapatra, Advocate
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APAR REAL ESTATE … DEFENDANT
Through : Mr. A.N. Haksar, Advocate with Udain Jain and Kr. Shashank, Advocate
JUDGMENT
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment.?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? MR.
JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT:
1. In these proceedings, directions to file arbitration agreement and refer the disputes for adjudication have been sought. CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 1 2008:DHC:114
2. According to the Petitioner, two agreements were entered into by her with the Respondent in respect of property known as “Clifton, Ayarpatta”, Nainital measuring about 3346 sq.meters. The Respondent agreed to sell half portion of the said plot (hereafter referred to as “the Property”), develop it, re-construct it into cottages, thereafter divide them equally between the Petitioner and itself. It is averred that pursuant to discussions an agreement was entered into between parties on 9.9.1993 where the Respondent agreed to sell half of the area of the land and one half of the existing structures on the plot for a total sale consideration of Rs.9.[5] lakhs. The Petitioner paid Rs.[6] lakhs. It is averred that no partition of the property was ever done and that the Respondent started dismantling the existing cottages and other constructions; it also started reconstructing two cottages and completed one. Alleging that the Respondent was trying to sell the said cottages and that in the absence of the partition of the property in compliance with the Agreement between the parties, the Respondent could not deal with it as was sought to be done, the present petition under Section 20 was filed. CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 2
3. It is also alleged by the Petitioner that the Respondent failed to comply with terms and conditions agreed by the parties on 9.9.1993 and did not secure sanction for the Plans to construct upon the property; it did not also furnish accounts. The Petitioner relies upon Clause 16 of the Agreement to say that the disputes are to be resolved through arbitration. It is alleged that the cause of action arose against the Respondent due to its failure to obtain sanctions of the plans for construction of the proposed cottages and also upon its dismantling the existing cottages and seeking to re-construct them.
4. The Respondent in its reply disputes that there is arbitration agreement between the parties. It is also alleged that a claim for specific performance of Agreement to Sell cannot be referred to arbitration, in the absence of any arbitration agreement. It is further alleged by the Respondent that the Petitioner has not properly disclosed material facts and that the Agreement to Sell dated 9.9.1993 is neither binding nor operative against the Respondent. It is alleged that the Petitioner did not make the payments as stipulated in the Agreement to Sell on 9.9.1993; it was liable to pay Rs.9.[5] lakhs towards the part consideration on or before 31.12.1993 on which event the Agreement to Sell and subsequent agreement, for development, were to become operative. It is claimed that the CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 3 Petitioner paid only Rs.[6] lakhs into installments of Rs.3/- lakhs each as on 1.10.1993 and failed to pay the balance amounts of Rs.[3] lakhs.
5. The Respondent claims that the agreement cannot also be enforced because it does not place the parties in an equal footing and bargain is unconscionable and oppressive.
6. The Respondent alleges that originally land was purchased on 4.7.1991 for Rs.14 lakhs and that it actually costs Rs.17 lakhs. The Petitioner thereafter agreed to join the project and entered into contract containing terms and conditions on 9.9.1993. According to that agreement the Petitioner was to spend amounts equivalent to what Respondent had spend on the land and its development after which the parties would contribute equally and raise constructions to finalise the project “Cliftons Oaks”. The Petitioner did not pay any amount towards the project despite various demands; it was delayed resulting in heavy losses to the Respondents. It is claimed that the Respondent had to continue its activities on its own and spend a further further sum of Rs.20 lakhs. It is also alleged that the Respondent has already built two cottages and another structure and spend a sum CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 4 of Rs.30 lakhs towards the work.
7. The documents filed by the parties disclose that they entered into two agreements on 9.9.1993. The first is an agreement to sell, signed at NOIDA. It recites that the Respondent is owner of the property and agreed to sell to the Petitioner half of the existing construction for a total consideration of Rs.9.[5] lakhs. The further recital contains stipulations about the time by which the said amount was to be paid; the last instalment of Rs.[3] lakh was payable on or before 31.12.1993. The balance consideration of Rs.50,000/- was payable by the Petitioner at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed. In lieu of this consideration the Respondent agreed to sell the land to the Petitioner. The first agreement also states that the Petitioner joined the Respondent “to have joint possession of the said property (including structures and utilities thereunder) measuring 4000 sq.yds and henceforth both parties have co-possession of the said property and shall be deemed as go-owners (subject to full payment of consideration by the second party as per its agreement) notwithstanding the pendency in registration of sale deed to be executed by the first party in favour of the second party in performance of this agreement.” The first agreement also contains the following condition:- CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 5 “That the first party admits that after the execution of this Agreement to Sell and handing over the possession of the said land to the second party, it has left with no absolute right, title and/or interest in the said land except as co-owners and the second party has become co-owner of the said land but none of the parties to this agreement can transfer its/her share to the third party without mutual concern and plan.”
8. On the same date i.e 9.9.1993 another agreement was entered into in New Delhi in respect of the said property. This agreement notices the execution of the first agreement and states that the Petitioner had acquired 50% ownership right in the said Bungalow plot. Clause 16 (of the second agreement) reads as follows: “all disputes and differences between the parties hereto regarding interpretation, meaning or effect or a part of this agreement all with regard to performance or non-performance of any part of this agreement or with respect to claim or demand or of any party against the other in terms of this agreement either contingent or currently operative shall be referred to the sole arbitrator to be decided mutually and failing this, the sole arbitrator shall be a person provided by the Court having territorial jurisdiction.... for the removal of doubts, it is expressly agreed, declared and recorded by and between the parties hereto that the arbitrator shall be entitled to decide the matters whether of law or otherwise........”
9. The Respondent has filed copies and translations of the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Nainital in a Civil Suit filed by it namely, the Civil Suit CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 6 No.75/1998. It had claimed injunction to restrain from entering possession of the property in the suit. The Respondent had alleged that it was exclusive owner of the property and that the Petitioner unauthorisedly and forcibly took over possession of one cottage and that the two agreements executed on 9.9.1993 were not binding. The Additional District Judge after a trial by his judgment and order dated 17.7.2003 dismissed the suit after rendering findings against the Respondent. During the pendency of those proceedings, the Petitioner filed an application under Section 34 of the Act for stay of proceedings, alleging existence of arbitration agreement between the parties. That application was rejected.
10. The parties to these proceedings have filed affidavits of evidence that reflect the contents of their pleadings.
11. Mr. Anil Kher, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner submitted that on a consideration of the second agreement the only conclusion the Court can draw is that the parties agreed to resolve the differences through arbitration. With the execution of the first agreement, the Petitioner became co-owner of the property to the extent of 50% and also entered into joint possession with the Respondent. She had also paid substantial consideration and the balance amount of Rs.[3] lakhs CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 7 was deposited in Court. The respondents failed to obtain clearance including from Income Tax authorities, sanction of plans for construction from the Municipal Authorities and that the date fixed for balance payments was mutually extended; this was apparent from the Petitioner's letter dated 20.12.1993. Learned counsel relied upon other documents such as letter dated 27.4.1994 by the Petitioner stating her willingness to join the project and make payments for the construction of the flats. Yet the Respondent failed to take necessary steps for execution of the sale deed in reference to the property and also further failed to act reasonably. The development agreement of 9.9.1993 shows that the Respondent acknowledged the Petitioner having acquired 50% ownership rights in the property by virtue of the first agreement. Therefore, disputes as contemplated under Clause 16 of the Development Agreement arose which had to be referred to arbitration.
12. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as J.K. Jain Vs. Delhi Development Authority in 1995(6) SCC 571 to say that reference to disputes in relation to two agreements for arbitration, is permissible even though the arbitration clause is contained only one of them. He also CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 8 submitted that the claim raised not only for specific performance of the contract concerning immovable property but also for compensation for not respondent’s part in not fulfilling its part of the bargain. Learned counsel submitted that the objection as to jurisdiction of this Court are not well-founded; he adverted to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Hakam Singh vs. Gammon India Ltd. 1971(1) SCC 236, ABC Laminant Pvt. Ltd. A.P. Agencies 1989(2) SCC 163 and the judgment of this Court in Karan Mohindru Vs. Vatika Plantations Pvt. Ltd. 2004(74) DRJ 570.
13. Mr. A.N. Haksar, learned senior counsel for the Respondent submitted that the disputes sought to be raised are not arbitrable. His objections as to the maintainability of the present petition under Section 20 of the Act were projected on two principal aspects. Firstly, that the second agreement for arbitration clause was dependent on due performance to the mutual satisfaction of the parties of the obligations by both of them under the first agreement. Having failed to pay the amounts within the time stipulated, i.e. 31.12.1998, the Petitioner could not claim any rights towards joint possession or co-ownership. Therefore, the second contract, which contains the arbitration clause never, became operational. CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 9
14. Learned counsel contended that admittedly the total consideration paid pursuant to the first agreement was Rs.[6] lakhs. However, the balance amount was not paid at all nor was any attempt made to pay within reasonable time. The Petitioner paid that amount only after approaching this Court. Such conduct could not prejudice the Respondent who had by then spend considerable amounts of money and developed the property. The claims sought to be raised for reference to arbitration essentially are founded on the first agreement; that does not contain any arbitration clause.
15. The second argument made on behalf of the Respondent was that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present proceeding. Counsel adverted to Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure and submitted that the relief claimed is for specific performance of the contract relating to immovable property, in which event the Court under the Act, would be the concerned Court at Nainital. It was further submitted that the first agreement, which is sought to be enforced through arbitration proceeding, was entered into at NOIDA. In any event for these reasons the Courts at Delhi do not possess jurisdiction but if at all, the Court at Nainital would be the competent Court to decide the case, having CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 10 jurisdiction over the subject matter.
16. The analysis of the pleadings of the parties and the materials placed on record by both of them in support of their contentions would show that two agreements were entered into between them on 9.9.1993. In the first agreement, the Respondent agreed to sell the property to the extent of 50% to the Petitioner for a total consideration of Rs.9.[5] lakhs. There is no dispute that Rs.[6] lakhs was paid by the Petitioner. The documents relied upon by the Petitioner as regards its obligations include letters dated 20.12.1993 and 4.2.1993 which refer to mutual discussions betweens the parties with a view to defer payment of the balance consideration till an income tax clearance certificate was obtained by the Respondent. The copy of a letter dated 27.7.1994 has also been relied upon in this context. The Respondents on the other hand rely on their replies dated 4.12.1993,18.12.1993 and 30.1.1994 to say that they were insisting on payments of the balance in the first agreement.
17. The first question that arises for consideration by the Court is whether the disputes are covered by an arbitration clause. Now the Respondent does not deny the existence of the arbitration clause in respect of the second agreement. Its CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 11 contention, however, is that this agreement never became operational as it was dependent on the performance of the obligations by the Petitioner in terms of the first contract, which it allegedly never did. The first agreement undeniably does not contain an arbitration clause.
18. The Petitioner has, in its amended petition the following disputes to be sent for reference to arbitration: a) Whether the Petitioner is entitled to decree of specific performance of the agreements signed between the petitioner and the respondent on 9th September, 1993? b) Whether the respondent has obtained the sanction and approval from the local municipal authorities with respect to the layout plans annexed to the agreement dated 9.9.1993? c) Whether the respondent furnished to the petitioner any statements of expenditure required to be incurred in development of the aforesaid property? d) Whether the respondent has a right to enter into any agreement or agreements for the disposal of the cottages or any other constructed or non-constructed area belonging to the other party? e) Whether the Respondent has demolished/dismantled the existing cottages retaining walls, boundary walls over the said plot of land, and whether it has a right to do so? f) Whether the Respondent reconstructed/restricted two of the cottages and has been trying to sell the said cottages during the summer season? CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 12 g) Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the partition of the property, and if so, to what relief? h) Whether as an alternative relief to para (a ) above, the Petitioner is entitled to a sum of Rs.[1] Crore from the Respondent towards the cost and compensation of the portion which the Petitioner is entitled to under the Agreement executed between the parties on 9th September, 1993.”
19. The scope of jurisdiction of the Court under Section 20 is circumscribed. It can ascertain whether the disputes are covered by an arbitration clause. However, it cannot consider the merits of the disputes raised by either party. If one keeps this jurisdictional constraint in perspective what can be examined by the Court is only whether a valid arbitration clause or agreement subsists between the parties.
20. Both agreements were entered into by the parties on the same day they relate to the same property and are in fact part of the same transaction. Although consideration of some of the conditions of the first agreement would suggest that their due performance, was the basis for operationalization of the second agreement, the disputes raised in that regard by the Respondent cannot really be examined by the Court. Taken as a whole, the first agreement meant to convey the intention of the parties to confer equal rights of the property. Both parties CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 13 agreed to share such rights and develop the property. The second agreement, on the other hand, deals only with the issue of development by the Respondent, of the property and the other modalities connected with it. It is quite apparent that the Petitioner as well as the Respondent entered into these two agreements as part of one transaction. The second agreement indeed expressly adverts to the first agreement.
21. The view taken by the Courts in India in this regard, while discerning whether arbitration clauses appearing in one contract or document and referred to in another, are to be operative in the other have emphasized the need to ascertain intention of the parties in all such causes. In the ruling relied upon by the Petitioner i.e J.K. Jain’s case the Supreme Court had, after examining the conditions of the contract, which contained a clause referring to the tender conditions (which in turn contained an arbitration clause) held that the parties had agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration. The Court had relied upon Commercial Arbitration by Mustill and Boyd (Second Edition) to the effect that the parties need not expressly mention about the arbitration agreement in the contract concerned itself and that the intention to refer the disputes to arbitration CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 14 can be discerned by a condition referring to another document containing such clause. Earlier in the judgment reported as Abu Road Electricity & Industries Co. Ltd. Vs. Industrial Gases Ltd. AIR 1977 Cal 482, it was held that when the contract is one and the same between the same parties in respect of one and the single transaction, one document containing an arbitration clause and the other not expressly containing such condition, but adverting the previous agreement, nevertheless the intention of the parties to refer their disputes to arbitration should be inferred. Other High Courts have taken a similar view (Ref. T.N. Rao Vs. Palabhadra AIR1954 Mad 71 and Hindustan Computers Ltd. Vs. Oriental Business Consultants Pvt. Ltd.1989(1) ARB LR 176 [MP]).
22. The above rule had also been considered previously by the Supreme Court in the judgment reported as Alimenta S.A Vs. National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India 1987(1) SCC 615 and later in the The Owners and Persons Interested in the Vessel M.V. “Baltic Confidence” Vs. State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. 2001 (7) SCC 473. In both the cases the Court had to decide whether an arbitration clause, contained in the Charter Party could be deemed to have been incorporated in a bill of lading which generally referred to, CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 15 the charter-party, but did not specifically mention about that stipulation. It was held that in each case the Court has to examine the transaction to discern the intention of the parties and that unless the result of dealing such incorporation by reference leads to absurdity, the Court should conclude that disputes arising in respect of both agreements or transactions should be resolved by the parties through arbitration.
23. In view of the above decision and having considered the various clauses in the two contracts this Court is of the opinion that both contracts formed part of one transaction and the absence of arbitration clause cannot lead to the inference that parties consciously refrained from resolving their disputes arising from it, through arbitration; the reference to the first agreement and the further intention to carry out mutual obligations, in the latter agreement (which contains an arbitration clause), underline the parties’ resolve to refer their disputes to the arbitration.
24. The Respondents contentions on this score are, therefore, rejected. The second question agitated by counsel for the parties was concerning the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The Respondent had submitted that in view of CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 16 Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction as the disputes sought to be raised by the Petitioner as they primarily concern reliefs pertaining to immovable property located at Nainital and outside the jurisdiction of this Court. This was resisted by the Petitioner which relied on Section 20 and also on a decision of the Court.
25. The relevant provisions in this regard i.e Section 16 and Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure read as follows: “16. Suits to be instituted where subject-matter situate, -- Subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law, suits— ( a ) for the recovery of immovable property with or without rent or profits, (b ) for the partition of immovable property, ( c ) for foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of a mortgage of or charge upon immovable property, (d ) for the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property, ( e) for compensation for wrong to immovable property, (f ) for the recovery of movable property actually under distraint or attachment, Shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate: Provided that a suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immovable property held by or on behalf of the defendant may, where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience, be instituted either in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate, or in the Court CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 17 within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain.
20 Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises.-Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction--- ( a ) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b ) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c ) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. [Explanation].—A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in [India] or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place.….”
26. The Petitioner places reliance on clause 16 and the second recital to say that this Court has jurisdiction since the agreement was arrived at within its territorial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in the judgment reported as Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs. DLF 2005 (7) SCC 791, dealt with almost a similar dispute concerning the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the claims over immovable property. After examining the previous decisions including Hakam Singh Vs. M/s CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 18 Gammon (India) Ltd. 1971(1) SCC 236 and A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. A.P. Agencies, Salem 1989 (2) SCC 163 (cited on behalf of the Petitioner in these proceedings) it was held as follows: “Section 16 thus recognizes a well-established principle that actions against res or property should be brought in the forum where such res is situate. A court within whose territorial jurisdiction the property is not situate has no power to deal with and decide the rights or interests in such property. In other words, a court has no jurisdiction over a dispute in which it cannot give an effective judgment. The proviso to Section 16, no doubt, states that though the court cannot, in case of immovable property situate beyond jurisdiction, grant a relief in rem still it can entertain a suit where relief sought can be obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant. The proviso is based on a well-known maxim “equity acts in personam”, recognized by the Chancery Courts in England. The Equity Courts had jurisdiction to entertain certain suits respecting immovable properties situated abroad through personal obedience of the defendant. The principle on which the maxim was based was that the courts could grant relief in suits respecting immovable property situate abroad by enforcing their judgments by process in personam i.e. by arrest of the defendant or by attachment of his property. “
27. The Court also held that a reading of Section 20 of the CPC did not leave any room for doubt that it was a residuary clause which covered those cases subject to the limitations of Sections 15 to 19. It underlined the expression “subject to the limitation aforesaid”. It was further held that parties can CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 19 undoubtedly agree to confer jurisdiction on one Court in the event of more than one having jurisdiction to entertain a suit or dispute. Yet where the Court agreed to by the parties does not have jurisdiction in law, such a clause cannot be enforced. After discussing the impact of the other judgments the Supreme Court which was called upon to decide an issues to jurisdiction concerning specific performance of the contract and possession of immovable property, ruled that Section 16 of the Code would apply. In view of this judgment, which is later in point of time to the decision of this Court in Karan Mahendru & Anr. Vs. Vatika Plantations (P) Ltd. 2004 (74) DRJ 570 it has to be held that this Court is not the competent Court to exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter. The reliance placed on the proviso to Section 16 in the opinion of this Court is not opposite since the primary claim by the Petitioner is specific performance of the contract relating to immovable property; the claim for compensation is only in the alternative and not the primary subject matter of the dispute.
28. In view of the above findings and conclusions, this court cannot adjudicate the dispute and file the arbitration agreement, the reliefs claimed are CS (OS) NO. 1154/1994 20 declined. It is, however, open to the petitioner to approach the court of competent jurisdiction for the relief claimed by her. No costs. (S. RAVINDRA BHAT) Dated: 14th January, 2008 JUDGE