Full Text
MAC APP. 33/2008
JUDGMENT
Through: Mr. Jos Chiramel, Advocate.
Through: Nemo.
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may Yes be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported Yes in the Digest? KAILASH GAMBHIR, J. Oral: * The appellant, New India Assurance Co.Ltd., insurer of the offending vehicle has preferred the present appeal challenging the impugned order dated 05.10.2007 passed by the learned MAC APP. No.33/2008 2008:DHC:171 MACT. The impugned award has arisen out of the claim petition filed by respondent Nos.[1] to 5 against the appellant as well as against respondent No. 6 claiming compensation for the death of Shri Rajender Kumar Arora. The brief facts which are necessary for deciding the present appeal inter alia are that respondent Nos.[1] to 5 are the legal heirs of deceased Shri Rajender Kumar Arora who had died on 07.11.2001. On 07/11/2001 at about 12:15 a.m. deceased Shri Rajender Kumar Arora was plying his TSR bearing registration no. DL 1 RD 5448 from IGI Airport towards Munirka via Olof Palema Road. He reached T-point intersection of Major Somnath Marg near Swami Malai Mandir opposite Vasant Vihar and while he was crossing the said intersection, suddenly a Matador bearing registration no. DL 3CJ 2072 driven in a rash and negligent manner by Sh. Harish Saxena hit the TSR of the deceased. Due to the impact he fell on the road and sustained fatal injuries. From the accident site he was rushed to Safdarjung Hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries. The Tribunal after taking into consideration the facts of the case as well as evidence led by the parties had passed an award in the sum of Rs.7,29,660/- along with interest at the rate of 7% per annum payable from the date of the institution of the petition till the realization of the award. The said order passed by the Tribunal is now under challenge in the present appeal. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant at considerable length. The appeal is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage itself as the very maintainability of the appeal is in dispute. The appellant cannot assail the findings of the Tribunal on the quantum of compensation as determined by the Tribunal. The appellant had not been granted leave by the tribunal to take over the defence of the owner and driver as envisaged under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act and, therefore, it is debarred from challenging the impugned award so as to assail the findings of the Tribunal on the quantum of compensation. Mr. Jos Chiramel, counsel for the appellant contends that the application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act was moved before the Tribunal, but specific order was not passed by the Tribunal. The contention of counsel for the appellant is that there is no fault on the part of the appellant if no speaking order was passed by the Tribunal and, therefore, the appellant cannot be deprived of the remedy of appeal to challenge the award even on the grounds of quantum and negligence. Counsel further contends that there is a deemed permission in favour of the appellant as the appellant did move an application before the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act but the Court did not pass any order thereto and, therefore, it cannot be assumed that permission under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act was not granted by the Tribunal. Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2007 (9) Scale 216, New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Shanti Pathak & Ors. to contend that the Apex Court had interfered to lower down the compensation amount even in a case where the insurer had not taken any permission from the Court under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The counsel for the appellant also contends that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has already referred the said issue of lack of competence of the insurer to assail the findings of the Tribunal on the ground of quantum of compensation and negligence to a larger Bench and, therefore, this Court may await the decision of the Supreme Court in this regard. Counsel for the appellant further contends that remedy of the appellant to assail the impugned order is otherwise available under Section 105 of the CPC. Counsel for the appellant sought to urge that the right of the appellant to file an appeal cannot be taken away simply due to the lapse on the part of the Tribunal in not passing any order although the requisite application under Section 170 of the M.V. Act was filed by the appellant. It is failure on the part of the Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction and due to such failure on the part of the Tribunal the right to challenge the award by way of filing an appeal cannot be taken away, contends counsel for the appellant. Motor vehicle accident claim is a tortious claim directed against tortfeasors who are the insured/owner and the driver of the vehicle, the insurer comes in to the picture as a result of the statutory liability created under the Motor Vehicles Act. The legislature intended and has ensured by enacting Section 149 of the Act that the victims of motor vehicle are fully compensated and protected. It is for that reason the insurer cannot escape from its liability to pay compensation on any exclusionary clause in the insurance policy except those specified in Section 149(2) of the Act or where the condition enshrined in Section 170 is satisfied. Right of appeal is a creature of statute. The Parliament, while enacting Sub-section (2) of Section 149 only specified some of the defences which are based on conditions of the policy and, therefore, any other breach of conditions of the policy by the insured which does not fall under Sub-section (2) of Section 149 cannot be taken as a defence by the insurer. Had it been the intention of the Parliament to include the breach of other conditions of the policy as a defence, it could have easily provided for ‘any breach of conditions of insurance policy’ in Subsection (2) of Section 149. But it is not the case, since the legislator has enumerated specifically the grounds of defences available to the insurer. If the insurer is permitted to take any other defence other than those specified in Sub-section (2) of Section 149, it would mean we are adding more defences to insurer in the statute which is neither found in the Act nor was intended to be included. After having given my thoughtful and conscious consideration to the issue involved in the present case, I am of the view that the issue is no more res integra as in catena of judgments the Hon'ble Supreme Court has authoritatively held that right to file an appeal is a statutory right and the insurer can assail the findings of the Tribunal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, only in a case where insurer had taken permission of the Court to take over the defence of the owner or driver as the case may be as envisaged under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. No such permission was granted to the appellant under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act by the Tribunal and, therefore, in the absence of the same, the appellant being the insurer of the offending vehicle cannot maintain the present appeal on grounds other than those available to it under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It would be appropriate to refer Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act as under:-