Sucha Singh v. Union of India

Delhi High Court · 24 Jan 2008 · 2008:DHC:247-DB
J.M. Malik; A.K. Sikri
WP(C) No.1796/1992
2008:DHC:247-DB
criminal appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court upheld the jurisdiction of court-martial to try a military personnel for unnatural offence against a civilian, rejecting procedural and evidentiary challenges and dismissing the writ petition.

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Reserve : 14.01.2008
Date of Decision: 24.01.2008 WP(C) No.1796/1992
Sucha Singh .... Petitioner
Versus
JUDGMENT

1. Union of India

2. Chief of Army Staff... Respondents Advocates who appeared in this case: For the petitioner: Mr. Hameed S. Shaikh, Adv. For the respondents: Mr. Sanjay Katyal, Adv. CORAM: HON'BLE MR.

JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR.

JUSTICE J.M. MALIK

1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be Yes reported in the Digest? J.M. MALIK, J. *

1. The petitioner joined the Indian Army as Rifleman in JAK RIF WP(C) No.1796/1992 2008:DHC:247-DB Infantary on 24.07.1989. On 25.04.1990 charge sheet was issued to the petitioner alleging that on 11.03.1990, he committed an unnatural offence of Sodomy punishable under Section 46(a) of the Army Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the Army Act”) on the person of Sh. Inder Singh, private servant of Captain A.S. Kler of Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. He was awarded punishment of three months and five days of rigorous imprisonment in civil prison and dismissal from service. The Reviewing Authority confirmed the above said punishment. The Chief of Army Staff rejected his petition on 20.11.1990. His petition filed under Section 179 of the Army Act was also rejected.

2. The petitioner in this writ petition has called into question the above said proceedings on the following grounds. The proceedings against him are without jurisdiction. The offence was to be tried by a civilian court and the Army Act is not applicable. The court martial proceedings were not conducted by a competent officer and are contrary to Section 116 of the Army Act. The Army Authorities have got no right to withhold pension and pensionary benefits available to the petitioner under the law.

3. The respondents have contested this petition.

4. We have heard the counsel for the parties. Although a number of objections were raised in the writ petition but before us only the following three submissions were raised. It is not out of place to mention here that, although, the first submission finds place in the writ petition, yet, the remaining two submissions were raised for the first time during arguments and no specific averment was made.

5. The principal argument urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the alleged offence was committed by the petitioner against a civilian and as such the provisions of the Army Act do not stand attracted. It was submitted that if the petitioner was to be proceeded against, he could have been proceeded against only under the Indian Penal Code by a criminal court. Again this fact has prejudiced the petitioner no end. Had it been a trial before the criminal court the petitioner could have engaged an advocate and would have been given full, fair and complete opportunity to prove his innocence. On the contrary before the court martial proceedings, the petitioner was not allowed to engage any advocate and had only a friend to represent him under Section 129 of the Army Act.

6. This submission carries no conviction. Sections 69 and 70 of the Army Act when read together disclosed that court martial are prohibited from trying cases of murder or culpable homicide of a person not subject to Military, Naval, Air Force law or cases of rape in relation to such a person, unless the offence is committed on active service or at a specified frontier post or at any place outside India. It therefore clearly means that the court martial was authorised to try this case of unnatural offence under Section 69 of the Army Act. Again Section 46(a) provides: “Any person subject to this Act who commits any of the following offences, that is to say, - (a) is guilty of any disgraceful conduct of a cruel, indecent or unnatural kind; or (b) X X X

(c) X X X shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.” The Manual of Military Law Vol. II by Govt. of India, Ministry of Defence defines Section 46(a) of the Army Act and note appended thereto mentions:

“4. Disgraceful conduct of an unnatural kind ordinarily implies the commission or at least the attempted commission of an offence under IPC.S. 377. Therefore, in
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framing charges under this clause, the charge should invariably be laid for disgraceful conduct of an indecent kind unless the evidence permits of the averment in the particulars that an unnatural offence as ordinarily understood was committed or at least attempted.” Again, Section 125 of the Army Act gives discretion to the officer commanding the army, army corps, division or independent brigade in which the accused person is serving or such other officer as may be prescribed to decide before which court the proceedings shall be instituted, and, if that officer decides that they should be instituted before a court-martial, he would direct that the accused person shall be detained in military custody. Section 112 of the Army Act makes it clear that on active service, the officer commanding the forces in the field, or any officer empowered by him in this behalf shall have the power to convene a summary general court martial. In view of this discussion the arguments urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner must be eschewed out of consideration.

7. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that victim Inder Singh was never medically examined. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in absence of the medical report the entire proceedings stand vitiated. In order to buttress his argument he has cited an authority reported in Rahim Beg & Another Vs. State of U.P., 1972 SCC (Crl.) 827, wherein it was held that:

“26. According to Dr. Katiyar, Medical Officer of District Jail, Rae Bareli, if a girl of 10 or 12 years who is virgin and whose hymen is intact is subjected to rape by a fully developed man, there are likely to be injuries on the male organ of the man. No injury was, however, detected by the doctor on the male organ of any of the two accused. The absence of such injuries on the male organs of the accused would thus point to their innocence. The examination of the two accused by Dr. Katiyar, was on August 5, 1969. The two accused, however, had been arrested, according to the prosecution, on the morning of August 4, 1969. No cogent explanation has been furnished as to why they were not soon thereafter got medically examined by the police.”

8. The facts of this case are peculiar and unique. The evidence on the record reveals that the victim was made to drink before the above said offence was committed. The victim tried to commit suicide after the above said act. The victim unsuccessfully tried to hit the petitioner. The victim tried to put his hands in between the blades of the fan. Due to which the fan stopped. The victim also tried to electrocute himself by touching the bulb and catching naked electric wires but did not have any bad effect. He thereafter tried to break open the window panes by striking his head but his head struck against the wooden panel. In the meantime, the jawans entered and saved him.

9. Captain Alok Kler was examined as PW[4]. The witness when came to the spot he found victim in a pitiable condition. His clothes were awry and he was hysterical. He was sobbing uncontrollably. Upon being asked the victim said that he would become a saint and go to the hills. He further explained that he was physically abused and could not live with a shame of it. He narrated the details to the witness and ended up by saying that he had tried everything within his means to end his own life. The above said witness explained that thought of having the boy examined medically did cross his mind but seeing the condition of the boy he thought it prudent, not to expose him to any other act which he would consider shameful. The witness feared for his mental balance. The witness stated that on the aspect of medical examination the witness did make enquiries regarding RFN Sucha Singh's presence, but he was informed that he was absconding. Thereafter, he took victim to his residence. On seeing his serious condition he did not wish to aggravate the matter primarily by leaving the boy alone. He kept the boy close to him and even made him sleep under the same roof to ensure that he does nothing stupid.

10. We find considerable force in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that under these exceptional circumstances the petitioner could not be medically examined. In State of Kerala Vs. Kurissum Moottil Antony, JT 2006 (10) SC 370 it was held:

“7. To insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to equate one who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her claim of rape will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars as in “the case of an accomplice to a crime”. (See State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jain AIR 1990 SC 658. Why should be the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The plea about lack of corroboration has no substance. It is unfortunate that respect for womanhood in our country is on the decline and cases of molestation and rape are steadily growing. Decency and morality in public and social life cart be protected only if Courts deal strictly with those who violate the social norms.
The above position was highlighted by this Court in Bhupinder Sharma v. State of H.P., AIR 2003 SC 4684. The rule regarding non-requirement of corroboration is equally applicable to a case of this nature, relating to Section 377 IPC”

11. In a recent authority reported in State of MP Vs. Dayal Sahu, AIR 2005 SC 3570 it was held that once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence and accepted by the Courts as such, conviction can be passed only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the Courts for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Non-examination of doctor and non-production of doctor's report would not be fatal to the prosecution case, if the statement of the prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses inspire confidence.

12. We are of the view that this ground too does not enure in favour of the petitioner. Though the power of judicial review of this court is limited. It appears that there was enough evidence to convict the accused which also included the confession made by the petitioner on 1st June, 1990, evidence of the eye witnesses and other circumstantial evidence.

13. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that Section 130 of Army Act is mandatory and there is not even an iota of evidence which may go to show that same was complied with by the Summary Court Martial.

14. We see no force in this argument. This court in a case reported in Ram Nath Vs. Union of India and Ors.,1989 (16) DRJ 101 DB was pleased to hold,

“6. Mr.Jugal Wadhwa, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Supreme Court in Vidhya Prakash v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 705 has by implication upheld the principle that it is open to the accused to raise such an objection regarding his being tried by his Commanding Officer. The plea is that in the present case the petitioner having raised such an objection, the Commanding Officer was expected not to have tried the accused. In our view the submission is entirely mis-conceived. As has been noticed in Vidhya Prakash's case (supra), proceedings of a Summary Court Martial are to be governed under Section 116 of the Army Act. After the review of Ranjit Thakur's case, it is no longer open to read the rule laid in Section 130 of the Act to Summary Court Martial. Thus the Commanding Officer holding the Summary Court Martial is not to ask the accused whether he has any objection for being tried by him (the Commanding Officer).”

Consequently, the argument urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner must be left out of consideration.

15. The writ petition has no merit and the same is therefore dismissed. No costs. J.M. MALIK, J. January 24, 2008 A.K. SIKRI, J. dk