Full Text
Date of Decision: 12.02.2008
DDA ….… Petitioner
Through: Mr.Reetesh Singh & Mr.Ranjan Dubey, Advocates.
Through : Mr.Sanjoy Ghosh, Advocate for Respondent no.3.
JUDGMENT
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may YES be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? NO
3. Whether the judgment should be reported NO in the Digest? ANIL KUMAR, J. *
1. The petitioner has impugned the ex parte award dated 30th July, 1998 of Industrial Tribunal I holding that Shri Sudesh Kumar son of Late Shri Rajender Kumar, deceased employee of the petitioner after the demise of his father, is entitled for appointment on compassionate ground on the post of Beldar or any other equivalent job with the petitioner.
2. The facts relevant for adjudication of the present petition are that the respondent no.3 is the son of the deceased Shri Rajender 2008:DHC:500 Kumar, who was employed as a Beldar, claimed compassionate appointment with the petitioner. On the dispute being raised by Municipal Employees Union, Aggarwal Bhawan, G.T.Roard, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi on behalf of the respondent no.3 about his appointment on compassionate ground, the Secretary (Labour), Government of NCT of Delhi, referred the dispute `Whether Shri Sudesh Kumar is entitled to appointment on compassionate ground and, if so, what directions are necessary in this regard‟ for adjudication to the Tribunal by notification dated 23rd August, 1996.
3. Pursuant to the reference of dispute by the appropriate Government, notices were issued to the petitioner and the respondent no.3 for 26th November, 1996. Shri R.D. Tyagi appeared on behalf of the petitioner and an authorized representative of the workman also appeared and sought time to file the statement of claim. On the due date, the statement of claim was filed, however, no written statement was filed refuting the averments and pleas raised in the claim petition. The Industrial Tribunal despite no one appearing on behalf of the petitioner did not proceed ex parte on that date and adjourned the matter to 9th September, 1997, on which date also no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner. No written statement was also filed refuting the claim of the respondent. The Industrial Tribunal, therefore, proceeded ex parte against the petitioner, Delhi Development Authority. Thereafter, the respondent no.3 filed his evidence on affidavit and proved the documents. After considering the pleas, evidence of the respondent no.3 and other documents, it was noticed by the Industrial Tribunal that the father of the respondent no.3, Shri Rajender Kumar, was employed with the Management since 1978 and was made Work Charge – Beldar in 1983 and that he was a permanent employee of the petitioner. His last posting was with the Engineering Division – IV, Dilshad Garden, Shahdara and he died on 3rd April, 1990 in harness leaving behind a number of family members including the respondent no.3.
4. The respondent no.3 testified that he is 8th class pass and is entitled to be appointed on compassionate ground on regular basis with the petitioner in appropriate pay scale and allowance on the post of Mali/Beldar or any other class IV post. The respondent no.3 also deposed that there is no other bread winner in the family and none had been given employment on compassionate ground after the death of his father, late Shri Rajender Kumar. It was also deposed and proved that the family of the deceased, Shri Rajender Kumar, has no source of income and is facing extreme financial hardship.
5. The respondent no.3 had proved a copy of the report of the petitioner which was exhibited as WW1/8 where it was proposed by the Deputy Director (Personnel) that in view of the cases lingering for the last many years and the families of the deceased employees being distressed, the appointment be made of the legal heirs in each and every case and for such appointment Work Charge post in the Division/Circular where the person had served be created.
6. The Industrial Tribunal also considered the representation of the respondent no.3 dated 20th May, 1993 seeking appointment on the compassionate ground and thereafter passed an award directing the petitioner to appoint respondent no.3 on compassionate ground. The Industrial Tribunal answered the reference in favor of respondent no.3 on the ground that the respondent no.3 had appeared before the Screening Committee and the Screening Committee after considering his case for compassionate appointment declined it solely on the ground that his father, deceased employee of the petitioner was not in regular or work charge regular service of the petitioner, which was found to be not correct by the Tribunal. Reliance was also placed on a copy of the report exhibit WW.1/8 for appointment on compassionate ground whereby it was held that the Deputy Director (Personnel) was authorized to offer appointment to the legal heirs of the deceased workman on compassionate ground after creating of work charges posts in the division/circulars where the persons had served and whose cases were lingering on for past so many years and the deceased families were in distress.
7. Before the Conciliation Officer the petitioner had admitted that Late Sh.Rajinder Kumar father of the respondent no.3 was employed with the petitioner as a beldar and he was posted at Engineering Div- IV, Dilshad Garden, Shahdara but it was denied that he was regular and permanent employee of the petitioner and it was contended that the case of the respondent no.3 was not covered under the policy for appointment on compassionate ground. The Industrial Tribunal after considering the evidence on record has held that the case of the respondent no.3 is covered under the policy and there is sufficient merit in the claim of the respondent no.3 for his appointment on the compassionate ground and, therefore, an ex-parte award dated 30th July, 1998 has been passed in favor of the respondent no.3.
8. In the present petition, challenging the ex-parte award passed against the petitioner, the show cause notice was issued limited to the ground whether the legal heir claiming appointment on compassionate ground is not a `workman‟ within the definition of the workman in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and whether he is incapable of raising an industrial dispute.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on 1994 SCC (L&J) 737, Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs.Asha Ramachandra Ambekar (Mrs) and Another whereas the learned counsel for the respondent no.3 has relied on (2007) 8 SCC 549, Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coal Field Ltd and Ors. In Life Insurance Corporation of India (Supra) it was held that the Courts cannot order appointment on compassionate ground de hors the provisions of statutory regulations and instructions and that the hardship of a candidate does not entitle him to compassionate appointment de hors the statutory provisions. The Apex Court had held that the Court should endeavor to find out whether a particular case in which sympathetic considerations are to be weighed falls within the scope of law and that disregardful of law, however hard the case may be, it should not be done. In this case the order granting appointment on compassionate ground was set aside as the Courts had not examined whether the case had fallen within the scope of relevant statutory provision as the Life Insurance Corporation was a statutory corporation and was bound by Life Insurance Corporation Act as well as the statutory regulations and instructions. Apparently the case of the respondent no.3 is clearly distinguishable. After due consideration of the case of the respondent no.3, the petitioner Screening Committee had denied it on the ground that the case was not covered under the policy as the father of the respondent No.3, late Sh.Rajinder Kumar was not a regular employee. Reference was made regarding this on behalf of the respondent no.3 to the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal after consideration of the evidence adduced by the respondent no.3 on his behalf which evidence was not rebutted by the petitioner as the petitioner remained ex-parte, and after due consideration of all the material placed regarding the employment of late Sh.Rajinder Kumar passed an award in favor of the respondent no.3 on the ground that he is covered under the policy of the petitioner for compassionate appointment.
10. The petitioner is unable to show any cogent or sufficient reason for non appearance before the Industrial Tribunal. Even in the present writ petition no such facts has been disclosed by the petitioner which will show that there was sufficient reason or cause for non appearance of the petitioner and his counsel and that the exparte award passed against the petitioner could be set aside. Rather this Court did not issue notice on this plea of the petitioner and it was deemed to be rejected. The ground which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the legal heir of the `workman‟ claiming compassionate appointment under the policy of the petitioner is not a `workman‟ so as to invoke the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal.
11. S-2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 states that- “Industrial dispute" means "any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labor, of any person.”
12. This definition of Industrial Dispute in S-2(k) has three components/parts. The first part refers to the factum of a real or substantial dispute; the second part to the parties to the dispute; and the third, to the subject matter of that dispute. That subject matter may relate to any of two matters - (i) employment or non-employment, and (ii) terms of employment or conditions of labor, of any person. Apparently the first and second parts of the definition of „Industrial Dispute‟ are clearly fulfilled in the present case, because there is a dispute or difference over the non-employment of Respondent No.3, and the dispute or difference is between the employer, namely, Delhi Development Authority on one side, and its workmen (Municipal Employees Union) on the other, as the dispute was raised by the Union on behalf of the respondent.
13. As far as the third part is concerned, the import of the words „any person‟ was considered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. The Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353. S.K. Das, J. giving the majority decision observed, “…… the crucial test is one community of interest and the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. Whether such direct or substantial interest has been established in a particular case will depend on its facts and circumstances.” The court further held- “Having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act, and its other provisions, the expression 'any person' in S-2(k)of the Act must be read subject to such limitations and qualifications as arise from the context; the two crucial limitations are (1) the dispute must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute (as indicated in the first two parts of the definition clause) so as to be capable of settlement or adjudication by one party to the dispute giving necessary relief to the other, and (2) the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labor (as the case may be) the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. In the absence of such interest the dispute cannot be said to be a real dispute between the parties. Where the workmen raise a dispute as against their employer, the person regarding whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the dispute is raised, need not be, strictly speaking, a 'workman' within the meaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest.”
14. In the present case the dispute is regarding the nonemployment of Respondent No.3, the legal heir of a deceased workman. If the reference was made at the instance of Union of workers, and if the `workmen‟ can be said to have a direct and substantial interest in the employment or non-employment of respondent no. 3, then the dispute is essentially an industrial dispute. In the present case there is a scheme of compassionate appointment which the petitioner was bound to follow. The class of workmen as a whole can definitely be said to have an interest in the appointment of the legal heir of a co-worker who dies in-harness. A decision on whether the management has followed the scheme of compassionate employment in rejecting respondent No.3‟s application for employment is certainly in the interest of the other workmen. In any case, it cannot be inferred that the Union of workers of Municipal Corporation of Delhi had no interest nor has such a case been setup by the petitioner. The plea that the respondent no.3 could not raise an industrial dispute or that a dispute on his behalf could not be referred by an appropriate Union was never taken by the petitioner at the Industrial Tribunal.
15. It has now been well settled that, if after having raised the dispute, if the workman dies, his legal representatives can further agitate and prosecute the dispute before the industrial authorities. This is clear from Section 10(8) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The said section read as follows:- "10(8). No proceedings pending before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal in relation to an industrial dispute shall lapse merely by reason of the death of any of the parties to the dispute being a workman, and such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall complete such proceedings and submit its award to the appropriate Government." Section 18(3)(b) and (c) also make the position clear, which reads as follows:- "18(3). A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under Subsection (3A) of Section 10A or an award of a Labour Court. Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding on - ………………………… (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, Arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause;
(c) where a party referred to in Clause (a) or (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates."
16. The difference in opinion among the various High Courts, on this point of law was settled by the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Manjhi (Deceased) through his son Lakhiram Manjhi v. Managemenmt of Sangramgarh Colliery and others, (1994) 1 SCC
292. The court had held that, “on the death of the workman, even when the reference is of an individual dispute under S- 2A of the Act, the Tribunal does not become functus officio or the reference does not abate merely because, pending adjudication, the workman concerned dies. It is open to the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased workman to have the matter agitated and decided.” The court in this case had agreed with and approved the reasoning given and conclusions reached by the Kerala High Court and the Gujarat High Court in Gwalior Rayons, Mavoor v. Labour Court and Ors. (1978)
II LLJ 57 respectively. In the Gwalior Rayon‟s case Chandrasekhar Menon, J. of the Kerala High Court had observed: - “The scope of adjudication by a Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act is much wider than determination of the legal rights of the parties involved of redressing the grievances of an aggrieved workman in accordance with law. As Gajendradkar, J., points out in Cawnpur Tannery Ltd. v. Guha, (1961) II L.L.J. 110 at p.112, the adjudication by the Industrial Disputes Act is only an alternative form of settlement of Industrial disputes on a fair and just basis. The primary duty of the Industrial Tribunal is to establish peace in the industry between employer and workmen. Any unfair action by the management even against an individual worker might cast its shadow on the general body of workers who might get perturbed by such action. A resolution of the dispute might then become necessary for industrial peace notwithstanding the death of the workman concerned pending proceeding. The personal relief to the workman concerned to a certain extent occupies a subsidiary place in the scheme of things. Not that it is not important. It is only a consequential result of the decision primarily arrived at securing industrial peace settling the apprehension of the workman without losing sight of the interest of the industry. As Rajamannar, C.J. stated in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. State of Madras, (1952) II L.L.J. 326 DB, the essential object of enacting the Industrial Disputes Act is to provide recourse to a given form of procedure for the settlement of disputes in the interest of maintenance of peaceful relations between the parties without apparent conflicts such as are likely to interrupt production and entail other damages. In the circumstances proceedings before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be equated to a personal action in torts in a Civil Court which would come to an end with the death of the aggrieved party to the dispute. In the general set up of an industry, in the nature of the relationship between the employer and the employees, a dispute between an employer and even an individual employee generally affects the entire community of workmen in the industry. They acquire an interest in the dispute. It ceases to be an individual dispute and becomes an industrial dispute affecting the interest of the entire body of workmen. Any decision of the Labour Court will affect the interest of the whole body of workmen and the dispute, therefore, cannot die with the death of the individual workman……” It is clear from the abovementioned cases that an industrial dispute survives even when the workman concerned dies during its pendency and the proceedings before the Tribunal/Labour Court can be continued by the legal heirs of the deceased workman.
17. The question whether the legal heir of a deceased workman whose services were terminated can validly institute an industrial dispute was considered by Andhra Pradesh High Court in Anjilamma and Ors. v. Labour Court-III, Hyderabad and Anr, 1995(2) ALT 683. The Court had addressed the specific question whether the legal heirs of a deceased workman whose services were terminated by his employer as a measure of punishment can validly institute an industrial dispute before the Labour Court under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, questioning the validity of the action of the employer in terminating the services of such workman and claiming reliefs as provided under the Act. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Manjhi‟s case (supra) the court observed:- “If according to the Apex Court if a pending proceedings can be continued by the legal heirs/representatives of the deceased workman after the death of the workman during the pendency of the proceedings, there is no good reason to hold that such legal representatives/heirs are incompetent to institute the dispute before the Industrial Court after the death of a workman. If the legal heirs of a deceased workman have the locus standi to continue an industrial dispute instituted by such workman in a Labour Court in law, then they are also competent to institute such industrial dispute. The observation of the Supreme Court in paras 11 and 12 in general and in para 13 in particular read with the views expressed by the Calcutta (sic. Kerala) High Court in Gwalior Rayon's case (supra) and that of the Gujarat High Court in Bank of Baroda's case (supra) which views are affirmed by the Apex Court in Rameshwar Manjhi's case clearly go to show that legal heirs/representatives of a deceased workman can institute an industrial dispute before the jurisdictional Labour Court after the death of such workman.” The court in Anjilamma and Ors. (supra) had further held:- “the legal heirs/legal representatives of a deceased workman are entitled to institute an industrial dispute before the Labour Court questioning the validity of termination of services of such workman even after the death of such workman under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is not necessary that such legal heirs/representatives should be 'workmen' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act and in fact they are not and cannot be workmen within the meaning of that term unless in a given case they are also workmen under the same employer. The essence of the matter is that if on the death of a workman any or all causes of action survives/survive for the benefit of estate left behind by him, it is competent for the legal heirs of such workman, as the custodian of the estate of the deceased workman, either to continue the pending proceedings instituted by the deceased workman or to institute the proceedings after the death of the workman before of a Labour Court. An industrial dispute instituted by him or an industrial dispute capable of being instituted by him will not die with him and despite his death such a dispute remains to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act as contemplated under sub-sec.(8) of Section 10 of the Act and the legal heirs to and the administrators of, the estate-of the deceased have locus standi to prosecute such dispute either by continuing the pending proceedings or by instituting fresh proceedings in the Industrial Courts as representing the deceased's estate and for the benefit of the estate.”
18. In Smt. Dhanalakshmi and Another v. The Reserve Bank of India, Bombay and Others 1998 (6) KarLJ 603, a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court addressed the question whether the legal heirs of a deceased workman can initiate and prosecute an industrial dispute. The court observed: - “Under the scheme of the Act, an adjudication of an individual dispute is preceded by certain statutory requirements, namely, a raising of the dispute either under Section 2A, conciliation proceedings under the provisions of Section 12 and thereafter a reference by the State Government for adjudication of the dispute. If the workman is permitted to raise a dispute and initiate conciliation proceedings in view of the provisions of Section 2A of the Act, then his right to have an adjudication of the dispute, in case it is made to the Labour Court, cannot be taken away by his death since the award, if made in his favor, would enure to the benefit of his estate. Section 18(3) (d) of the Act is an exception to the Law of Contract. Under the Law of Contract it is only the parties who are signatories to the contract will be bound by the terms of the contract. But, under Section 18(3)(d) in the case of a settlement in the course of conciliation, even workmen who subsequently become employees of the employer will get the benefit of the settlement and will be bound by the terms of the settlement. If this scheme of the Act is kept in view, the intention of the Parliament becomes clear. That is, it had no intention to abrogate or cut down the rights of the workman when it concerned the benefits due from his employer when he raises an industrial dispute.”
19. The court in Smt. Dhanalakshmi and Another (supra) further had observed that: - “the legal heirs of deceased workman can initiate and prosecute the industrial dispute as there does not exist any statutory bar for such a course being adopted and followed. We do not agree with the submission made on behalf of the employer that in view of the provisions of Sections 2(k), 2A and 10(8) of the Act, the conciliation proceedings cannot be initiated or continued after the death of the workman. We are of the opinion that despite a workman's death, the points sought to be settled by his legal heirs remain an industrial dispute for the purposes of adjudication under the Act. Section 10(8) is a beneficiary provision made for the workman prescribing that despite his death, the proceedings would not lapse even without the formal application of bringing on record his legal representatives.”
20. What emerges from these precedents is that the legal heirs of deceased `workman‟ can raise an industrial dispute about his termination, even after his demise because the cause of action for such challenge will be the facts that the „workman‟ was in the employment of the employer and there was a relationship of employee and employer and there was an illegal termination of the services of the workman, and this cause of action will enure to the workman‟s legal heirs on his death. In the present the cause of action of respondent no.3, shall be the employment of his father with the petitioner and the policy of the petitioner to grant compassionate appointment and the rejection of his application for employment on compassionate grounds. Even though the relief for this cause of action can be claimed only after the demise of the workman, it nevertheless remains the right of the workman which can be invoked only after his demise and which devolves upon the legal heir. The preferential treatment for appointment as against the general treatment for appointment, which the legal heirs of a deceased workman are entitled to is entirely on account of the fact that the workman has died-in-harness.
21. The learned counsel for the respondent, Mr.Sanjoy Ghose has relied on Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coal Field Ltd and Ors, (2007) 8 SCC 549 and has contended that the expanding definition of workman as contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 shall include the legal representatives of a deceased worker who claims appointment on compassionate ground. In this case compassionate appointment provided under the terms of a binding settlement was claimed. It was held that the settlement shall be binding and will continue to be in force unless the same is altered. The Apex Court had held that the right to obtain appointment on compassionate grounds emanated from the settlement as defined in section 2(p) of the Act and the expanding definition of the workman as contained in the section 2(s) of the Act would confer a right upon the legal heir to obtain appointment on compassionate grounds, subject to compliance with the conditions precedent contained in the settlement and grant of such compassionate appointment shall be an exception to Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
22. In the case of the respondent No.3 he sought appointment on compassionate grounds according to the policy of the petitioner. Appointment on compassionate grounds was declined on the ground that the father of the respondent no.3 was not in the regular employment of the petitioner. The industrial tribunal has held that the respondent no.3 was entitled for appointment in accordance with the policy of the petitioner. The cause of action in the case of the respondent no.3 will be based on the fact that his father was in the employment of petitioner, the petitioner had a policy to appoint the legal heir of a deceased employee after the demise of the employee subject to fulfillment of terms and conditions of policy. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that the union of municipal Corporation employees could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on behalf of respondent no. 3.
23. In the facts and circumstances, the plea of the petitioner is not sustainable and the writ petition is without any merit. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed and the interim order dated 12th October, 1999 and 21st August, 2000 staying the operation of award are vacated, entitling the respondent no.3 to enforce the award against the petitioner. Parties are however left to bear their own costs. February 12th, 2008 ANIL KUMAR, J. 'Dev'