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Date of Reserve : 21.1.2008
Date of Decision: 08.02.2008 WP(C) No.17349/2006
Ex. Sepoy Anand Pal .... Petitioner
JUDGMENT
1. Union of India
2. Chief of Army Staff
3. GOC Delhi Area,... Respondents Advocates who appeared in this case: For the petitioner: Major K. Ramesh, Advocate. For the respondents: Ms. Maneesha Dhir with Mr. Sumit Attri and Major S.S. Pandey, Advocate CORAM: HON'BLE MR.
JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR.
JUSTICE J.M. MALIK
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers No may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be Yes reported in the Digest? J.M. MALIK, J. *
1. The indisputable facts of this case are these. Ex. Sepoy WP(C) No.17349/2006 2008:DHC:453-DB Anand Pal, the petitioner who is posted as Havildar / Clerk was indicted for accepting an illegal gratification of Rs.20,000/-. He was tried by a Summary Court Martial. The petitioner pleaded 'guilty' and he was sentenced, “To be reduced to ranks”. The petitioner does not pick up a dispute with these facts.
2. The GOC Delhi area while exercising administrative power awarded another punishment of “dismissal from service” under Section 20(3) of the Army Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred as Army Act) read with Rule 17 of Army Rules for the same charge. Aggrieved by that order the present petition was filed with the prayer that punishment awarded by the GOC Delhi, dated 06.06.2006 be quashed and the petitioner be granted pensionary benefits and other fiscal retrial benefits with immediate effect.
3. We have heard the counsel for the parties and considered the written synopsis filed by the counsel for the petitioner. The only question raised by the petitioner is whether the second punishment by way of dismissal from service after a full fledged operative and executed sentence by a Summary Court Martial would amount to a double jeopardy in terms of Article 20(2) of Indian Constitution. In this regard the counsel for the petitioner has made four submissions which are reproduced below:-
4. Ground A (ii) in page 4 of CWP is reproduced as follows: “A(ii) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Re Union of India Vs. Harjeet Singh Sandhu in (2001) 5 SCC 593 by a Larger Bench has held in Para G in Page 601 that, 'Once finding and sentence are confirmed exercise of power under Section 19 read with Army Rule 14 is impermissible.' The Apex Court in its elaboration of the judgment had held that 'To permit such a course would be violative of the principle of Double Jeopardy and would be subversive of the efficacy of the Court Martial proceedings, finding and sentence.' It is well known that for officers Section 19 read with Army Rule 14 is applicable and for jawans Army Act Section 20 read with Army Rule 17 is applicable.”
5. For the following reasons, we are unable to clap any significance to these arguments. It must be borne in mind that “page 601” pertains to the head note of the judgment, extracted from Para 27 at page 617. Para 27 of Re UOI Vs. H.S. Sandhu(supra) for rare clarity is reproduced as follows:
6. It must be borne in mind that Section 20 and Rule 17 or Section 19 and Rule 14 of Army Act were not struck down by the Apex Court. The Apex Court came to the conclusion that the question of double jeopardy will come into play only on certain situation clarified in above quoted para. The position was further made clear in the subsequent paras. Para 42 reads:-
7. Now let us turn to the relevant provisions of Army Act. Section 20(3) of the Army Act runs as follows: “(1) The Chief of the Army Staff may dismiss or remove from the service any person subject to this Act, other than an officer. (2) X X X X (3) An officer having power not less than a brigade or equivalent commander or any prescribed officer may dismiss or remove from the service any person serving under his command other than an officer or a junior commissioned officer. (4), (5), (6) & (7) X X X X Rule 17 of the Army Act runs as follows:
8. A Division Bench of this court in case Lt. Col. V.N. Singh Vs. Union of India and others, 2002(64) DRJ 379 (consisting of S.B. Sinha, Chief Justice, as he then was and one of us viz. A.K. Sikri, J) upheld the validity of Sections 153, 154 and 160 of the Army Act. The last section deals with revision of finding or sentence, relied upon three cases one pertaining to the Apex Court reported in Captain Harish Uppal Vs. Union of India and others, 1973 (2) S.C.R 1025 and two pertaining to this court reported in Gian Chand Vs. Union of India and others, 1983 Crl. L.J 1059 D.B and Havaldar D.K. Srivastava Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 6999 of 2001 decided on 06.02.2002 and made the following observations:
9. In Union of India and others Vs. K. Murugesan, (Kant) D.B, 2004 (6) KarLJ 120, the Karnataka High Court speaking through T.S. Thakur, J. held: “11-A. A plain reading of the above would show that the same does not envisage the conduct of any enquiry into the facts constituting the cause of action against him before an order of dismissal or removal from service can be made. All that is required is that the official concerned is informed of the particulars of the cause of action and allowed reasonable time to state in writing the reasons he may have to urge against his dismissal or removal. Proviso to Section 17 in fact makes it clear that even the requirement of informing the official concerned of the particulars of the cause of action against him may be dispensed with provided the officer competent to order the dismissal records a certificate to the effect that it is not expedient or reasonably practicable to comply with the same. The argument that Rule 17 envisaged the conduct of an enquiry before an order of dismissal could be passed must therefore be rejected. The provision satisfies bare minimal requirements of natural justice before an order of dismissal is passed against the officials concerned. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Lekh Raj Khurana v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 2111 and Union of India and Anr. v. K.S. Subramanian, AIR 1976 SC 2433 have authoritatively held that in the absence of protection conferred under Article 311 of the Constitution, the principles of natural justice cannot be invoked to widen the scope of enquiry or the opportunity available to an affected person over and above that prescribed by the relevant rules. To the same effect is the decision of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in V.Y. Thomas v. Commandant, A.D.C. Centre, Secunderabad and Anr., 1982 Lab.I.C 632 A.P. It follows that an order of dismissal passed under Section 20 of the Army Act read with Rule 17 of the Rules framed thereunder may be validly passed upon satisfying the requirements of a notice to the person affected and informing him about the cause of action on the basis whereof the proposed order of dismissal is sought to be made and after allowing him time to state in writing reasons that he may have to urge against his dismissal or removal from service. That requirement having been satisfied in the instant case, there was no illegality in the order to justify interference with the order of dismissal impugned in the writ petition. In as much as the learned Single Judge read into Rule 17, the requirement of an enquiry, he in our opinion, committed an error that needs to be corrected in appeal.”
10. This High Court in a case reported in Karan Singh Vs. UOI and others, 2000 IV A.D (Delhi) 831 decided by one of us (Hon'ble Justice A.K. Sikri) upheld the dismissal order from service under Section 20(3) of the Army Act read with Rule 17 of Army Rules. The petitioner in that case was sentenced to undergo five years imprisonment and fine for offence under Sections 376/323 Indian Penal Code by the Additional Sessions Judge.
11. It must be noticed that framers of the Army Act were well aware of the concept of double jeopardy. That is why Section 121 of the Army Act specifically ingrained this concept, which is reproduced as follows:
12. In V.N. Singh Vs. Union of India (supra) it was further held: “As by reason of the provisions of the Army Act which is a complete code by itself a detailed procedure as regards holding of different categories of proceedings have been laid down in terms whereof principles of natural justice are complied with and trials can be held in a fair manner, the requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be said to be violated. It is, thus, idle to contend that the aforementioned provisions of the Act are ultra vires. Furthermore, by reason of Section 164 of the Act, an additional protection has been afforded to a delinquent officer and thus, it cannot be said that thereby executive would have a say over the authorities discharging the judicial function.”
13. It thus boils down to the conclusion that above said proceedings are without any flaw. The corruption is a very serious offence. The authorities have to take punitive steps in order to curb this type of crime. Corrupt influence is itself the perennial spring of all prodigality, and of all disorder, it loads us more than millions of debt, takes away vigor from our arms, wisdom from our councils, and every shadow of authority and credit from the most venerable parts of our Constitution. Again, the accomplice to the crime of corruption is frequently our own indifference. The writ is meritless and therefore dismissed. J.M. MALIK, J. A.K. SIKRI, J. February 08, 2008 dk