Full Text
WP(C) Nos.4793/96 and 503/03
Date of Decision: 07.03.2008 #Mr.V.K. Shali .....Petitioner in WP(C) No.4793/96
Ms.Kamlesh Sambharwal .....Petitioner in WP(C) No.503/03
! Through: Mr.R.K. Saini
^ Through Ms.Avnish Ahlawat with Ms.Latika Chaudhary and
Ms.Nidhi Gupta for GNCT of Delhi.
Mr.Viraj Datar for Delhi High Court
JUDGMENT
2.To be referred to the Reporter or not? 3.Whether the judgment should be reported in the
Digest? A.K. SIKRI, J.
:
1.Most of the issues raised in these two petitions are common, based on similar set of circumstances and facts. Therefore, these cases were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, we
2008:DHC:874-DB WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 2 of 25 take note of the facts as appear in WP(C) No.4793/96 and thereafter deal with the issues in the other petition, which may be different from this writ petition.
WP(C) No.4793/1996 2.The petitioner in this petition was a Judicial Officer, who joined Delhi Higher Judicial Service (in short 'DHJS') on
3.12.1979. He worked in that capacity for a period of little more than 11 years before he quit the job with effect from
23.3.1991 by submitting his resignation. He, thus, rendered
11 years and 4 months' service, to be precise. His terminal dues were paid as admissible to him. There is, however, a dispute on payment of certain dues which the petitioner claims that he is entitled to receive but the respondents deny the same on the ground that in view of his resignation, he cannot be treated to have earned those benefits. The prayer made in this petition is to grant the following three benefits:- i. Payment of full encashment of earned leave which includes half pay leave also. ii. Payment of service gratuity; and iii. Payment of advance increments on account of acquisition of higher
WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 3 of 25 qualification.
3.No gratuity is paid to him. In so far as earned leave is concerned, the petitioner was given encashment of 44 earned leave being one-half of the total leaves standing to his credit. As regards advance increments for acquisition of higher qualification while in service, the denial is not on the ground of resignation, but admissibility of such increments and, therefore, this issue has to be considered on a different yardstick altogether. Since there is no dispute on facts and the case involves interpretation of the legal provisions, we proceed to discuss the issues at hand.
Encashment of full Earned Leave including half pay leave
4.As mentioned above, the petitioner is given encashment of one half of the total leave, which was outstanding to his credit. This is done in view of the provisions contained in
Rule 39(6)(ii) of the CCS (Leave) Rules, which read as under:-
“If a Government servant resigns or quits service, he may be granted suo moto by authority competent to grant leave, cash equivalent in respect of earned leave at his credit on the date of cessation of service to the extent of half of such leave at his credit subject to maximum of 120 days.”
WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 4 of 25 5.It is not in dispute that if the aforesaid Rule is applied, the petitioner is not entitled to encashment of full leave on resignation. Therefore, to overcome this difficulty, the petitioner has challenged the validity of this Rule.
Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was no other method of leaving the service except by resignation as the minimum period for voluntary retirement is 20 years of service. His further contends that a person who has been compulsorily retired and is considered to be
'dead wood', he is permitted to have full encashment of leave. As against this, a person who has rendered satisfactory and unblemished service and who has resigned, is given only encashment of the half of the earned leave standing to his credit. This kind of classification is arbitrary and discriminatory because the classification which has been done by the respondents does not satisfy three tests laid down by the Supreme Court for making it a valid law on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, it is liable to be struck down and full encashment of earned leave is to be paid to the petitioner. It is not necessary to deal with the aforesaid contention in any detail, WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 5 of 25 inasmuch as, the issue already stands concluded by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kanhaiyalal
Parasai Vs. Union of India and Ors., 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 73.
Identical ground was raised by the petitioner in the said petition before the Supreme Court challenging the vires of
Rule 39 as violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the
Constitution. There also the petitioner had quit the job by voluntary retirement and was granted cash equivalent of half pay of earned leave. Aggrieved by this action, he filed the writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging the vires of Rule 39. Repelling this challenge, the Court held as under:-
39(6)(a)(i) provides that where the services of a government servant are terminated by notice or by payment of salary, etc., in lieu of notice, he may be granted cash equivalent of earned leave to his credit on the date on which he ceases to be in service. Since the petitioner did not retire prematurely and since the notice period was not waived, he retired in due course and, therefore, the benefit of encashment of half pay leave could not be extended to him. Government servants who retire or are retired prematurely constitute a class distinct from the class of those who avail of the benefit of full service till the date of superannuation and, therefore, if they are governed by separate sets of rules in regard to leave encashment, the latter cannot complain of hostile discrimination nor can it be said that the rule governing the latter class is arbitrary as it does not extend the benefit of encashment of half pay leave to those who superannuate in due course. Under Rule 39(1) as soon as the services of a government servant terminates in one way or the other he ceases to be entitled to leave but provision is made for leave encashment and he would be entitled thereto under the rules only. The reasons for permitting encashment of half pay leave not exceeding the period between the date on which he retires or is retired and the date of his normal superannuation is that premature or compulsory retirement deprives the government servant of the chance to avail of half pay leave because of the sudden termination of his relationship which is not the case with those who retire in due course on superannuation. Since encashment of half pay leave was not admissible under the rules obtaining on the date of the petitioner's superannuation in 1980, we think the present
WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 7 of 25 petition is misconceived, more so because we do not find the challenge based on Article
19(1)(f) and Article 14 to be well founded.”
6.It is clear from the aforesaid discussion that the Supreme
Court has treated the government servants who retire prematurely as a different and distinct class from those who avail the benefit of full service till the date of superannuation and, therefore, the treatment of two classes by separate set of rules is treated as proper and not arbitrary. The Court was of the opinion that an employee, who ceases to be in the service of the government, is entitled to leave encashment only under the rules and provision for granting only half pay leave on resignation or premature retirement has a rationale because in that event, there is sudden termination of his relationship, which is not the case with those who retire in due course on superannuation.
7.The challenge of the petitioner to vires of Rule 39(6)(ii), therefore, has to fail and consequently, he is not entitled to the encashment of full leaves standing to his credit at the time of quitting the job.
Gratuity 8.Entitlement of service gratuity was the real bone of contention on which much emphasis was laid by the learned
WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 8 of 25 counsel for the petitioner. The entitlement of service gratuity arises in view of Rule 49 of the Fundamental Rules as per which gratuity is to be calculated at the rate of 15 days' salary for each year of completed service. This Rule reads as under:-
"49. Amount of Pension
(1) In the case of a Government servant retiring in accordance with the provisions of these rules before completing qualifying service of ten years, the amount of service gratuity shall be calculated at the rate of half month's emoluments for every completed six monthly period of qualifying service. (2)(a) In the case of a Government servant retiring in accordance with the provisions of these rules after completing qualifying service of not less than thirty-three years, the amount of pension shall be calculated at fifty per cent of average emoluments, subject to a maximum of four thousand and five hundred rupees per mensem.] (b) in the case of a Government servant retiring in accordance with the provisions of these rules before completing qualifying service of thirty three years, but after completing qualifying service of ten years, the amount of pension shall be proportionate to the amount of pension admissible under Clause (a) and in no case the amount of pension shall be less than rupee three hundred and seventy-five per mensem
(c) notwithstanding anything contained in Clause
(a) and Clause (b) the amount of invalid pension shall not be less than the amount of family pension admissible under sub-rule (2) of Rule 54. (3) In calculating the length of qualifying WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 9 of 25 service, fraction of a year equal to 3[three months] and above shall be treated as a completed one half-year and reckoned as qualifying service. (4)....."
9. It is also not in dispute that an employee becomes entitled to get the benefit of service gratuity, if he renders minimum of five years of service, in terms of Rule 49. However, here again because of Rule 26 of CCS (Pension) Rules, which mandates that on resignation a government employee forfeits his entire service unless the resignation is in pubic interest to join another post, the petitioner is denied his gratuity. Rule 26 is in the following terms:-
(3) Interruption in service in a case falling under sub-rule (2), due to the two appointments being at different stations, not exceeding the joining time permissible under the rules of transfer, shall be covered by grant of leave of any kind due to the WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 10 of 25 Government servant on the date of relief or by formal condonation to the extent to which the period is not covered by leave due to him. (4) The appointing authority may permit a person to withdraw his resignation in the public interest on the following conditions, namely:-
(i) that the resignation was tendered by the
Government servant for some compelling reasons which did not involve any reflection on his integrity, efficiency or conduct and the request for withdrawal of the resignation has been made as a result of a material change in the circumstances which originally compelled him to tender the resignation;
(ii) that during the period intervening between the date on which the resignation became effective and the date from which the request for withdrawal was made, the conduct of the person concerned was in no way improper;
(iii) that the period of absence from duty between the date on which the resignation became effective and the date on which the person is allowed to resume duty as a result of permission to withdraw the resignation is not more than ninety days;
(iv) that the post, which was vacated by the
Government servant on the acceptance of his resignation or any other comparable post, is available. (5) Request for withdrawal of a resignation shall not be accepted by the appointing authority where a Government servant resigns his service or post with a view to taking up an appointment in or under a private commercial company or in or under a corporation or company wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government or in or under a body controlled or financed by the Government. WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 11 of 25 (6) When an order is passed by the appointing authority allowing a person to withdraw his resignation and to resume duty, the order shall be deemed to include the condonation of interruption in service but the period of interruption shall not count as qualifying service. [(7) A resignation submitted for the purpose of Rule 37 shall not entail forfeiture of past service under the Government.] "
10. In order to overcome the aforesaid hurdle, the petitioner has attempted to challenge the vires of this rule as violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. This plea is founded in the following terms:- (a) As per the settled law, as interpreted by the Apex Court in catena of judgments, although the concept of gratuity started as 'gratuitous' payment made on account of good, efficient and faithful service having been rendered by the employee but over a period it has cased to be a gratuitous payment and has to be paid as a right on account of having rendered the minimum qualifying service with the employer.. In the case entitled ONGC Ltd. Vs. V.U. Warrier, AIR 2005 SC 3039, it was held that payment of gratuity as a pensionary benefit cannot be said to be bounty. Gratuity is earned by an employee for a long and meritorious service rendered by him. Gratuity is not paid to the employee WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 12 of 25 gratuitously or merely as a matter of boon. It is paid to him for service rendered by him to the employer.. In FR Jesu Ratnam Vs. Union of India, 1990 Supp. SCC 640, the Supreme Court has held that employees have a right to be paid gratuity and government has no discretion in the matter. In the said case also, the order of forfeiture of gratuity was set aside by the Supreme Court, although the facts of the case are not given in the judgment. (b) Even the Gratuity Act, 1972 confers such a right on an employee. According to Section 4(1)(b) of the Gratuity Act, 1972 also, a person who resigns does not suffer any disability of not getting the service gratuity. The validity of Section 4(1)(b) of the Gratuity Act, 1972 which entitles payment of gratuity in case of resignation also was upheld by the Supreme Court in Bakhshish Singh Vs. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 251. It is, thus, the submission that the substantive right contained in the Gratuity Act cannot be taken away by the aforesaid Rule, which should, therefore, be treated as invalid. The submission is that once qualifying service is rendered by the petitioner and the said service is treated as good, efficient and faithful service, the petitioner becomes entitled to get the gratuity which is his right and WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 13 of 25 not a bounty and, therefore, merely because he tendered his resignation, which was the only mode of quitting the service at that time, it cannot result in denying him the benefit of gratuity, otherwise legitimately earned on the purported ground that on resignation his past service had been forfeited.
11. The aforesaid submission appears to be attractive in the first blush. However, again we are prevented from going into this issue all over again as the field is already covered by the judgments of the Apex Court. Before adverting to these judgments, we may first take note of the legal provisions which govern the field. In this regard, Rule 49 of the FR has already been quoted above.
12. Likewise, Section 4 of the Gratuity Act, 1972, is couched in the following language:- "Section: 4 Payment of gratuity. (1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years, - (a) on his superannuation, or (b) on his retirement or resignation, or
(c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease:"
13. As per the aforesaid provisions, the petitioner would have been entitled to the gratuity, but for Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, which is couched in the following words:- "26. Forfeiture of service on resignation:- (1) Resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the appointing authority, entails forfeiture of past service. (2) A resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where service qualifies."
14. This Rule came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. Braj Nandan Singh, (2005) 8 SCC 325 and the Court opined that in terms of the aforesaid Rule, resignation would entail forfeiture of past service and, therefore, deny such an employee the benefit of pension. In the process, the Court observed as under:- “Rule 26 as the heading itself shows relates to forfeiture of service on resignation. In clear terms it provides that resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the appointing authority, entails forfeiture of past service. The language is couched in mandatory terms. However, sub-rule (2) is in the nature of an exception. It provides that resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 15 of 25 it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where service qualifies. Admittedly this is not the case in the present appeal. Rule 5 on which great emphasis was laid down by the learned counsel for the respondent deals with regulation of claims to pension or family pension. Qualifying service is dealt with in Chapter III. The conditions subject to which service qualifies are provided in Rule 14. Chapter V deals with classes of pensions and conditions governing their grant. The effect of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) cannot be lost sight of while deciding the question of entitlement to pension. The High Court was not justified in its conclusion that the rule was being torn out of context. After the past service is forfeited the same has to be excluded from the period of qualifying service. The language of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) is very clear and unambiguous. It is trite law that all the provisions of a statute have to be read together and no particular provision should be treated as superfluous. That being the position after the acceptance of resignation, in terms of Rule 26 rub-rule (1) the past service stands forfeited. That being so, it has to be held that for the purpose of deciding question of entitlement to pension the respondent did not have the qualifying period of service. There is no substance in the plea of the learned counsel for the respondent that Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) has limited operation and does not wipe out entitlement of pension as quantified in Rule 49. The said rule deals with amount of pension and not with entitlement.”
15. No doubt, the aforesaid case related to pension, which WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 16 of 25 was denied to the employee on the ground that since on resignation his service stood forfeited, he would not be entitled to pension. However, we may note that as per Rule 3(j) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, pension includes gratuity and, therefore, once the service is treated as forfeited on resignation, it shall have the same implication qua gratuity as well, namely, for the purpose of gratuity also, the service rendered would be treated as forfeited. To the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Subhash Chand, JT 2001(4) SC 306. In that case, the concerned employee, who had resigned from service, belong to the Border Security Force. Rule 19 of the BSF Rules provides that the Central Government may, having regard to the circumstances of any case, permit any officer of the Force to resign from the Force before attaining the age of retirement etc. Under this provision, the respondent in the said case was allowed to resign. His contention, therefore, was that once his resignation was accepted under the said Rule on ground of full pension, there could not be any legal impediment for disbursing the same. He also contended that in case resignation of member of the Force is accepted, it would not mean that he WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 17 of 25 had retired from service. Resignation would mean voluntary act of quitting the job/service and implies that that employee, though fit in all respects, decided to quit and leave the service. It was, however, a common case of the parties that for grant of pension, members of the BSF are governed by the CCS (Pension) Rules. Submission of the respondent was that pension rules are subject to Rule 19 of the BSF Rules. This contention was, however, brushed aside and not accepted holding that Rule 19 of the BSF Rules would only mean that in case of resignation and its acceptance by the Competent Authority, the member of the BSF would be entitled to get pension benefits "if he is otherwise eligible for getting the same under the CCS(Pension) Rules and to that extent Rule 26, which provides for forfeiture of service on resignation, would not be applicable. The Court, thus, allowed the appeal of Union of India by summarizing the legal position in the penultimate para by observing as under:-
WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 18 of 25 service of 20 years by voluntary retirement, are entitled to get pensionary benefits. Respondents who were permitted to resign from service under Rule 19 of the BSF Rules before the attainment of the age of retirement or before putting such number of years of service, as may be necessary under the Rules, to be eligible for retirement are not entitled to get any pension under any of the provisions under CCS (Pension) Rules. Rule 49 only prescribes the procedure for calculation and quantification of pension amount. The G.O. dated 27.12.1995 does not confer any additional right of pension on the BSF employees."
16. There is no dispute about the concept of gratuity and further that it is no longer treated as gratuitous payment but is now recognised as a right on account of having rendered minimum qualifying service with the employer. However, when by virtue of a particular rule such service is treated as forfeited on particular contingency, which is resignation in the instant case, it cannot be, therefore, held that the petitioner has rendered the minimum qualifying service to earn the gratuity. The case of ONGC Ltd. Vs. V.U. Warrier (supra), therefore, will not have any application as that was not a case where there was any Rule akin to Rule 26. Same was our answer to Bakhshish Singh (supra) and FR Jesu Ratnam (supra). We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner would not be entitled to the gratuity in view of WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 19 of 25 Rule 26, which cannot be held to be violative of the provisions of the Constitution on the same analogy as given by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. Braj Nandan Singh (supra). Advance increment on account of acquisition of higher qualification during service
17. The third benefit which the petitioner has claimed is that the Government of India, Department of Personnel had issued O.M. dated 15.12.1986, after the recommendation of the Fourth Pay Commission, by virtue of which advance increments were to be given to employees on attaining the higher qualification. The said circular was made applicable to the Judicial Officers also. Since the benefit of the said circular was not given to the Judicial Officers who had acquired higher qualification automatically, one of the officers had filed a writ petition being WP No.4799/1995 titled V.K. Jain Vs. Union of India & Ors., which was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court on 12.9.1996. It was ordered in the said judgment that three advance increments and the arrears thereof with effect from 1.1.1986 be given to the petitioner in the said case. A Special Leave Petition, which was filed by the Government of NCT of Delhi against the said judgment, was also dismissed. On the basis of the WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 20 of 25 aforesaid judgment not only the said incumbent but other similarly placed officers of the service were given the said incentive. However, the said benefit/incentive has not been given by the respondent No.3 to the petitioner. The petitioner had acquired Post Graduation in law in the year 1981-82, while in service and was thus entitled to the three advance increments with effect from 1.1.1986 till 23.3.1991 when his resignation was accepted and he was relieved from the service on 23.3.1991.
18. The respondents have refuted the aforesaid claim on the ground that the Fourth Pay Commission was not dealing with the cases in general but specifically with respect to Railways, veterinary surgeons and EDP personnels. Government of India's letter dated 15.12.1986 specifically mentions that at present incentives are allowed in case of acquiring qualifications like Post Graduate Degrees/Diploma in the case of Doctors, Hindi examination and for acquiring higher speed in stenography in the cases of Stenographers etc. As per that letter, all the Ministries/Departments of the Government were requested to review the existing schemes of granting incentive which are in vogue in the cadres administered by them and finalise fresh proposals, if any, in WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 21 of 25 consultation with the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievance and Pension. The review of the cases was to be completed by 31.3.1997. From the letter it is clearly evident that the scheme was not applicable to all concerned. It was applicable with respect to categories mentioned or existing scheme in vogue. It was the existing scheme which were to be reviewed and considered. As such, the O.M. dated 15.12.1986 had no application to the petitioner's case. Moreover, in case of Judicial Officers, information was also called for from the other State High Courts about the facts whether there is any provision of granting special benefits to the officer acquiring higher qualifications. Most of the High Courts have informed that there is no provision in their High Courts for granting incentives/facilities to the Judicial Officers of District Subordinate Courts. We are spared of making any efforts in deciding this issue as it is manifest that case of the petitioner is covered by the judgment of this Court in V.K. Jain (supra). While allowing that writ petition, a Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 12.9.1996, inter alia, observed as under:- “Issuance of Office Memorandum dated WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 22 of 25 31.01.1995 provided for one time lump sum incentive and replacement of the then existing increments based incentive cannot have retrospective effect. Petitioner had already submitted representation in March, 1998 and in case the petitioner was and is held entitled to the reliefs prayed for, the office Memorandum dated 31.01.1995 cannot be made applicable with retrospective date. It can only have prospective effect, namely, in the case of officers acquiring higher qualification on and after the date of issuance of Office Memorandum dated 31.01.1995.” (emphasis supplied)
19. The Court directed that three advance increments be granted to the said judicial officer from 1.1.1986, the date from which recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission were accepted. The Division Bench, however, added a rider to the effect that the said benefit would be allowed to be availed of till the issuance of Office Memorandum dated 31.1.1995 whereafter the three increments based incentive would be converted into one time lump sum increment. Mr.V.K. Jain filed review application No.95/1996 pointing out inadvertent error on the face of the record in the operative portion of the judgment dated 12.9.1996, seen against the backdrop of observations extracted above. The review application No.95/1996 was granted by this Court vide order WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 23 of 25 dated 4.4.1997, thereby modifying the operative part of the judgment (in the light of the observations referred to above and the fact that the Judicial Officer had acquired higher qualification prior to 31.1.1995) and, thus, directed the operative part to be read as under:- “Consequently, we allow the writ petition directing the respondents to grant the petitioner three advance increments from the date of acceptance of the recommendations of FPC, namely, 1.1.1986, throughout his employment as Judicial Officer and in case the petitioner is placed or has been placed in a higher or revised pay scale, he will get three advance increments in that higher/revised pay scale in Higher Judicial Service. The arrears payable to the petitioner will be duly worked out by the respondents and paid to him within a period of three months from the date of receipt of writ order.”
20. Subsequently, some other Judicial Officers filed separate writ petitions on similar grounds which were allowed with similar directions for grant of three advance increments on acquiring LLM Degree. One of the said petitions was CWP No.2271/2000 titled S.K. Kaushik v. Union of India, which was allowed on 20.2.2001. Union of India filed LPA No.390/2001 which was dismissed vide order dated 3.8.2001. In this judgment, the Union of India was directed “to grant similar benefits to all other similarly placed Judicial WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 24 of 25 Officers in Delhi State.” The petitioner herein had obtained his LLM Degree much before the issuance of OM dated 31.1.1995. In fact, it was almost at the same time when Mr.V.K. Jain had acquired post-graduation degree in law. His case is, therefore, similar to that of Mr.V.K. Jain (supra) on all force. In view of the directions issued by the Division Bench in its order dated 3.8.2001 in LPA No.390/2001 to grant similar benefits to all other similarly placed Judicial Officers in Delhi State, he could not have been denied the benefit of the said judgment and the office should have given him three increments with effect from 1.1.1986. Though he filed this petition in the year 1996, the same kept pending whereas the writ petition filed by Mr.S.K. Kaushik in the year 2000 was allowed following the judgment in the case of V.K. Jain (supra). We may clarify that we have not considered or given any opinion on the question as to whether such Judicial Officers who acquired post-graduation qualification after 31.1.1995 shall be entitled to this benefit or not, as that question is pending consideration in some other writ petition.
21. We, therefore, allow this petition partly and direct the respondents to grant the petitioner benefit of three WP(C) No.4793/96 & 503/03 Pg. 25 of 25 increments in his pay with effect from 1.1.1986 till 23.3.1991 when he resigned from service. The arrears on this basis shall be worked out and paid to him within three months. WP(C) No.503/03
22. The petitioner in this petition joined the DJS on 5,12,1979 and after rendering 12 years and 8 months of service, she resigned w.e.f. 8.8.1995. She is also claiming full leave encashment and gratuity. In view of our discussion in WP(C) No.4793/1996, we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to these two benefits. This petition is according dismissed.
(A.K. SIKRI) JUDGE March 07, 2008 (VIPIN SANGHI) HP.