Full Text
Writ Petition (Civil) No.547/2008 & CM No.1083/2008
Date of decision on 5th March, 2008 MS. JYOTSNA .....Petitioner through: Mr. Sudhir Kumar, Adv.
JUDGMENT
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? GITA MITTAL, J. (Oral)
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner claiming that she had taken admission to the L.L.B. Course on 1st August, 2005 which was being conducted at Law Centre, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. It is an admitted position that the petitioner completed the first to fourth semesters without any difficulty. While she was undergoing the fourth semester course, she had got married in the month of March, 2007. The petitioner is stated to have successfully completed the fourth semester as well.
2. The petitioner's grievance is that during the duration of the LLB fifth semester course, the petitioner was relocated to Pune, Maharashtra where her husband was posted as a professor. It has been complained that despite her matrimonial responsibilities, the petitioner did her best efforts to attend as many classes as possible 2008:DHC:859 and was able to complete 43% attendance in class. She has claimed that she has deposited fees for firth and sixth semester course as well for taking the examination at the Law Centre II office. However, in view of the admitted position that the petitioner had only 43% attendance, by a notice dated 27th February, 2007, the Professor- Incharge of the Law Centre-II, had detained the petitioner and prohibited her from appearing in the fifth semester of LLB examination.
3. The petitioner made repeated requests and explained the reasons for the shortage of attendance and sought condonation thereof by communications dated 28th November, 2007 and 30th November, 2007 to the authorities without success. The petitioner's grievance is that she was prevented from taking the L.L.B. fifth semester annual examination which commenced on 6th December, 2007 and was also not permitted to attend regular classes or to take the sixth semester examination in view of the order which was passed on 22nd November, 2007.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents has pointed out that so far as shortage of attendance is concerned, the respondents have no discretion in the matter. Reliance has been placed on decision dated 5th December, 2006 rendered in WP (C) No.7701/2005 entitled S.N. Singh Vs. Delhi University wherein this court has held that there can be no condonation of shortage of attendance in case the same is less than 66% in aggregate. It has been pointed out that the petitioner was able to attend only 43% classes held in fifth semester and consequently, the respondents had no option but to detain her as was communicated in the impugned communication dated 27th November, 2007.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the available record. There is no dispute that the manner in which the respondents were required to proceed in the matter was governed by the Delhi University rules, statutes and ordinances framed thereunder.
6. Before this court, reliance is placed on an Ordinance VII Rule 8(a) of the Ordinances framed under the Delhi University Act to contend that the respondents are adequately empowered to condone the delay. It would be appropriate to consider the relevant extracts of this Ordinance in extenso which read thus:- “8(a) The students shall be required to put in minimum attendance of 66% of the lectures on each of the subjects as also at the moot courts and practical training course. Provided that in exceptional cases for reasons to be recorded and communicated to the Bar Council of India, the Dean of the Faculty of Law/Professor-incharge of the Law Centre may condone attendance short of those required by this Rule, if the student had attended 66% of the lectures in the aggregate for the semester examinations. Provided further that no person shall be deemed to have satisfied the required conditions in respect of his instructions unless, in addition to the requirement regarding attendance and other conditions, he has appeared and satisfied by his performance the Professor-in-Charge of the Law Centre in such test, written and/or oral, as shall be deemed always to have had, the power to detain a student in the same class in which he has been studying, or not to send him up for the University Examination, in case he did not appear at the tests aforesaid or his performance was not satisfactory. The Professor-in-Charge of the Law Centre shall have power to strike off the name of a student who is grossly irregular in attendance in spite of warning, or, when the absence of the student is for such a long period that he cannot put in requisite percentage of attendance.”
7. Perusal of this ordinance shows that the Professor, the Dean of the Faculty of Law or the Professor of Law Centre is empowered to condone shortage of attendance only if the student had attended minimum of 66% of the lectures in the aggregate for the semester examination. This rule has required that a student would be required to put in a minimum attendance of 66% lectures in each subject, the moot court as well as the practical training course. It is only if the student has managed to attend 66% of the lectures in the aggregate for the entire semester that condonation of shortage of attendance could be permissible. In the instant case, the petitioner has admittedly attended only 43% in the aggregate for the semester examination. Consequently, on a plain reading of the application ordinance, the petitioner is disentitled to condonation of shortage of attendance.
8. Even otherwise, condonation of shortage of attendance is permissible only in exceptional case and for reasons to be recorded. L.L.B. is a professional course. The ordinance notices that the Bar Counsel is also to be informed of the decision which is taken by the respondents. Such condonation of shortage of attendance has to be clearly in exceptional circumstances. In the instant case, the sole ground which has been put forth by the petitioner is her marriage and the fact that her husband was located in Pune, Maharashtra where the petitioner has to join him to discharge her matrimonial obligations.
9. Mr. Sudhir Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the pronouncement reported at 132 (2006) DLT 648 Amanpreet Singh Vs. University of Delhi. This case related to a student who was granted admission long after the classes for the semester had commenced. In these circumstances, an issue arose as to the date from which his attendance is to be computed. It was held that the attendance was required to be computed from the date of admission. No such question arises in the present case.
10. My attention has been drawn to a judgment reported at 119 (2005) DLT 2005 Radhika Garg Vs. Delhi University & Anr. This judgment raised an issue as to cancellation of admission long after course commencement of student who had been permitted to migrate form one institution to another. The principles laid down in this pronouncement have no bearing on the facts of the instant case.
11. In the decision rendered on 5th December, 2006 in WP(C) No.7701/2005 S.N. Singh Vs. Delhi University & Ors., the court was called upon to consider a public interest litigation seeking a mandamus to the respondents to ensure strict compliance of the rules of attendance of the L.L.B. Degree classes. Reliance was placed on an earlier decision of the Division Bench reported at 106 (2003) DLT 329 S.N. Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. It is noteworthy that apart from the University, Campus Law Centres I & II, Bar Council of India & Bar Council of Delhi were parties before the Division Bench. The Bar Councils placed reliance on Rule 4 of the Bar Council of India Rules, notified in exercise of statutory power under the Advocates Act, 1961. This rule reads thus:- “The students shall be required to put in minimum attendance of 66% of the lectures on each of the subjects as also at the Moot Courts and Practical Training Courses;l Provided that in exceptional cases for reasons to be recorded and communicated to th4e Bard Council of India, the Dean of the Faculty of Law or the Principals of Law Colleges may condone attednance shortage of those required by this rule, if the student had attended 66% of the lectures in the aggregatte for the semester/examination as the case may be”
12. Reliance can usefully be made also to the principles laid down in the Division Bench pronouncement rendered in S.N. Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. (Supra) wherein it was held as follows:- “21. We find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner in respect of the first four submissions noted as above. A law course cannot be acquitted with a normal academic course. Attendance of lectures, tutorials and seminars is very essential to train the law students. Under the Advocates Act 1961, the Bar Council of India has been empowered, amongst others, “to promote legal education and to lay down standards of such education”. The Bar Council of India has framed statutory rules which bind all institutions conferring LL.B Degree Course which are recognized by the Bar Council of India. Section 4 of the Delhi University Act 1922, empowers the University to confer degrees of students who have pursued as course of study in the University or in any college attached or affiliated to the University. No student can be deemed to have pursued a course of study who does not comply with the various requirements prescribed under the Act, Statute, Ordinances or Rules framed by the Academic Council. Needless to state that the Academic Council is the Supreme Academic Body of the University. Clause 8 of Ordinance 7 clearly provides that no student shall be deemed to have pursued a regular course of study unless he has attended at least twothirds proviso permits relaxation of shortage of attendance upto 10%. Thus, as per the attendance norms prescribed under the Ordinary, pertaining to LL.B. Degree Course, shortage of attendance beyond 10% is not permissible. However, the Academic Council in exceptional cases is empowered to grant a further relaxation. The examination rules framed by the Bar Council of India also provides for relaxation, but makes a different provision for relaxation. The Bar Council of India requires 66% attendance in each paper and empowers relaxation in a particular paper, provided however total attendance in all the paper is 66%. The Academic Council decision to accept the Justice V.S. Deshpande Committee recommendation is thus a resolution limiting the exercise of power of relaxation unanimously adopted by the Academic Council. The Academic Council would thus be bound by its own resolution. The decision not to grant relaxation was a conscious decision taken for which a high powered Committee was considered and was taken in the interest of legal education.
22. Since the Bar Council of India recognizes the LL.B. Degree Course of the University of Delhi and the Bar Council of India is a statutory body constituted under the Advocates Act 1961, and is empowered to lay down standards of legal education, University of Delhi would be required to bring its rules in conformity with the rules of the Bar Council of India.
23. The respondent no.1 is thus issued a direction to amend its examination and promotion Rules in the matter pertaining to attendance to bring them in conformity with the corresponding rules framed by the Bar Council of India.
31. In matters pertaining to education no Court can permit total violation of the norms. LL.B. Degree to take on the challenges of the 21st Century. Decline in education norms in professional law courses was noted by the Supreme Court as far back as 1989. In the judgment reported as AIR 1989 SC 1541 titled Baldev Raj Sharma Vs. Bar Council of India, it was observed that there is a substantial difference between a course of study pursued as a regular student and a course of study pursued as a private candidate. It was observed that regular attendance for the requisite number of lectures, tutorials etc. has a purpose. Rules framed by the Bar Council of India were upheld.”
13. Placing reliance on these principles and the afore-noticed rules in the judgment dated 5th December, 2006, it was clearly laid down that the above provisions were mandatory in nature and should be strictly adhered to and complied with by the respective college. The court made it clear that the University Authorities shall not allow any deviation from the requirements of Rule 4 of Section A of the Part IV of the Bar Council of India Rules unless they receive specific permission from the Bar Council of India.
14. The afore-noticed principles bind this court and would guide adjudication in the present matter. Having regard to the attendance of the petitioner, the respondents had no option but to pass the order communicated by the notice dated 27th of November, 2007. The petitioner failed to meet th e requisite attendance percentage of 66% to enable consideration of her request for condonation of the attendance shortage. No adequate ground for condonation of shortage of attendance was made out by the petitioner, let alone any exceptional circumstances even if the same was permissible.
15. A grievance is made that the petitioner could not have been detained in the same semester even if her attendance was short. This submission fails to consider the requirement of Ordinance VII extracted above which specifically empowers the Professor-in-charge of the Law Centre to detain a student. The Ordinance empowers the Professor-in-charge to strike off the name of a student who is unable to put in the requisite attendance. For all the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in this writ petition which is hereby dismissed.
(GITA MITTAL) JUDGE March 05, 2008 aa