Full Text
Date of Decision: 12.03.2008
Sonica Jaggi ….… PETITIONER
Through: Mr.Rajiv Aneja, Advocate.
Through : Mr.Daiyan Hussain, Advocate for the respondent Nos.2 & 3.
Ms.Shefali Dhawan, Advocate for the respondent Nos.4 to 6.
JUDGMENT
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may YES be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? NO
3. Whether the judgment should be reported NO in the Digest? ANIL KUMAR, J.
1. The petitioner has sought a direction to respondent Nos.[4] to 6, The Manager, The Principal and The Chairman of Shakti Mandir Premwati Public School to refix the salary of petitioner in the proper pay scale of Physical Education teacher as provided by the recruitment rules and in accordance with Section 10 of Delhi School Education Act. 2008:DHC:926
2. A Division Bench of this Court in Kathuria Public School and Ors Vs. Director of Education and Anr, 2005 VI AD (Delhi) 893 relying on T.M.A.Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 345 had held that it is advisable that the specialized Tribunal constituted should look after the legal matters relating to hearing of grievances of teachers and employees. The Division Bench relying on T.M.A.Pai Foundation (Supra) had held that specialized Tribunal should hear any grievance of the teacher. It was held in Kathuria Public School and Ors (Supra) that no restriction has been placed on the scope and ambit of the consideration of the grievances of the teacher or employee by the Tribunal and consequently the Tribunal should be able to hear all the grievances including in respect of suspension of a teacher or an employee and, therefore, the Tribunal constituted under the Delhi School Education Act should be able to hear all the grievances of the staff and teachers and not necessarily as restricted to in sub Section (2) of Section 8 of the said Act. The Division Bench in para 42 at page 910 had held as under:-
3. Consequently, though this Court will have jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the relief claimed by the petitioner, however, the petitioner must exhaust the alternative remedy available to her to approach the tribunal constituted under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 for her grievance regarding re-fixing of her salary as provided in the recruitment rules.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on 2007 VI AD (Delhi) 749, Servants of People Society & Ors Vs. Smt.Sudesh Oberoi & Anr; (2001) 10 SCC 445, Shashi Gaur Vs. NCT of Delhi & Ors; 1978 SCC (L&S) 70, The Principal and Ors Vs. The Presiding Officer & Ors; 43(1991) DLT 139, The Manager, Arya Samaj, Girls Higher Secondary School & Anr Vs. Sunrita Thakur etc; 2005 SCC (L&S) 966, Management Committee of Montfort Senior Secondary School Vs. Vijay Kumar and Ors and 1996 (39) DRJ (DB), Sahdeo Singh Solanki Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi to contend that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of grievances of the petitioner for re-fixing of her salary by the respondent Nos.[4] to 6 in accordance with the recruitment rules.
5. Perusal of the judgments relied on by the petitioner, it is apparent that they are distinguishable and on the basis of the ratio of Kathuria Public School and Ors (Supra) it cannot be held that Delhi Schools Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973. In Servants of People Society and Ors (Supra) a Division Bench had held that a suit for release of benefits under the 5th Pay Commission was not barred as jurisdiction of the Civil Court was excluded by Section 25 of the Act only in respect of any matter in relation to which the Administrator or the Director or such other person as mentioned therein is empowered to exercise any power whereas with regard to matters where authorities are not empowered to exercise their power as in the case of grant of benefits under the 5th Pay Commission, the Civil Court shall retain the jurisdiction to entertain a suit and grant interim orders therein. The Division Bench in Servants of People Society and Ors had not considered the Kathuria Public School and Ors (Supra) relying on T.M.A Pai Foundation & ors, holding that Delhi School Education Tribunal will have jurisdiction in all the matters pertaining to the employees and teachers and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal cannot be restricted to as given in sub Section (2) of Section 8 of the said Act. In any case in Servants of People Society and Ors it was not held that that Delhi Schools Tribunal shall also not have jurisdiction in the matters of teachers and employees.
6. A case is only an authority for what it decides. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra MANU/SC/0047/1967:- "A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury, LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495: "Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically Page 2009 from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and Ors. MANU/SC/0049/1986 the Supreme Court observed:- "The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it." Similarly in In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd (2003) 2 SC 111 (vide para 59), the Supreme observed:- " It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision." The Supreme Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd and Anr. v. N.R.Vairamani and Anr. (AIR 2004 SC 778) had also held that a decision cannot be relied on without considering the factual situation. In the same judgment the Supreme Court also observed:- " Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.
7. In Shashi Gaur (Supra) the Supreme Court had explained the scope and object of Section 8(3) of Delhi School Education Act. In the said matter the Apex Court had held that the remedy provided by way of an appeal to the Tribunal is undoubtedly a more efficious remedy to an employee whose service has been terminated after serving the institution for number of years and, therefore, even if an appeal is provided under sub Section (3) of Section 8 the writ petition shall be maintainable. The High Court in the said matter had held that on account of alternative remedy available, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was ousted. The Supreme Court, however, held that there was no infirmity with the order of the High Court in not entertaining the writ petition in exercise of his discretion, however, the Apex Court did not agree with the conclusions that availability of an alternate remedy shall oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, even if the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if any alternative remedy provided, it is more appropriate for a party to exhaust the alternative remedy and it will be the discretion of the High Court to exercise or not the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8. Since the alternative remedy is available to the petitioner to approach Delhi Schools Tribunal, this Court is not exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the relief claimed by the petitioner, however, this is not the opinion of this Court that on account of alternative remedy available to the petitioner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is ousted.
9. In Principal and Ors (Supra) relied on by the petitioner it was held that under Section 8(3) it is only an employee of a recognized private school against whom an order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is passed who is entitled to file an appeal against such an order to the tribunal. As the school in the said case was not a recognized private school on the relevant date and the order impugned was not an order for dismissal, removal or reduction in rank but an order of simplicitor termination of services, the appeal was held to be incompetent. The case relied on by the petitioner is apparently distinguishable.
10. In Manager, Arya Samaj Girls Higher Secondary School & Anr (Supra) it was held by a Single Judge that Tribunal has no jurisdiction to make any order with regard to the salary and allowances to be paid to the employees on his/her reinstatement as a result of appeal. It was further held that the power under sub Section (9) of Section 11 of the Act cannot be used by the tribunal to encroach upon the powers specifically conferred upon the employer with regard to the payment of salary and allowances under Rule 121. Perusal of the said judgments reveals that neither the ratio of the Supreme Court in T.M.A.Pai Foundation was considered nor the decision of Kathuria Public School (Supra) was considered by the learned Single Judge because the decision was rendered by him much earlier to the decision by the Supreme Court in T.M.A.Pai Foundation and in Kathuria Public School. Consequently, on the basis of the ratio of the said judgments it cannot be held that Delhi Schools Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction in the matter of dispute of re-fixing of her pay scale raised by the petitioner. In Management Committee of Mortfort Senior Secondary School (Supra) the Apex Court was concerned whether in an appeal filed before the Tribunal, it was under any legal obligation to make a reference in view of an application filed by the school under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. The ratio of the said judgment in the circumstances is not that the Delhi School Education Tribunal will have jurisdiction or not in view of T.M.A Pai Foundation and Kathuria Public School (Supra). Another judgment of the Division Bench in Sahdeo Singh Solanki (Supra) also has not considered the ratio of the Supreme Court in T.M.A Pai Foundation. In any case the Division Bench had only held that sub Section (3) of Section 8 of Delhi School Education Act, 1973 does not create any absolute power to the maintainability of the writ petition and it is open to an aggrieved employee to assail the validity of an order which is patently illegal and void under the writ jurisdiction.
11. This court in the facts and circumstances is of the opinion that though this Court will have jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, however, since an alternative remedy is also available to the petitioner to approach Delhi Schools Tribunal for adjudication of her grievance, it will not be appropriate to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the present facts and circumstances of the case where the petitioner has sought the relief of re-fixing of her pay scale according to the recruitment rules.
12. Consequently, the writ petition is not entertained and disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to approach Delhi Schools Tribunal under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 or to invoke any other remedy available to her, if the petitioner so desires. With these directions the writ petition is disposed of. All the pending application are also disposed of. March 12th 2008 ANIL KUMAR, J. 'K'