The Management of M/s.Water Supply & Sewerage Disposal Undertaking of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Presiding Officer & Another

Delhi High Court · 10 Mar 2008 · 2008:DHC:888
Anil Kumar
W.P.(C) No.5048 of 1999
2008:DHC:888
labor petition_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court upheld the Labour Court's order granting wages to a workman unlawfully denied duty despite applying to resume, holding the application under Section 33(C)(2) maintainable and dismissing the writ petition.

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WP (C) 5048 of 1999 HIGH COURT OF DELHI W.P.(C) No.5048 of 1999
Date of Decision: 10.03.2008 The Management of M/s.Water
Supply & Sewerage Disposal Undertaking of Municipal Corporation of Delhi ….…Petitioner
Through: Mr.Suresh Tripathi, Advocate
VERSUS
Presiding Officer & Another ......... Respondents
Through : Mr. Amit Bhardwaj, Advocate
CORAM :-
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
JUDGMENT

1. Whether reporters of Local papers may YES be allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to the reporter or not? NO

3. Whether the judgment should be reported NO in the Digest? ANIL KUMAR, J. Rule. With the consent of the parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing.

1. The petitioner has impugned the order dated 7th January, 1997 of Labour Court passed on an application of the respondent No.2 under 2008:DHC:888 Section 33(C)(2) holding that the respondent No.2 is entitled for wages from 13th January, 1984 till the date of his joining duties with the management on the ground that the respondent No.2 was compulsorily put off from the duty by the Management and was refused duty despite respondent No.2 being not under suspension.

2. The respondent No.2/workman had filed an application under Section 33(C)(2) and has claimed wages from 13th January, 1984 till 31st December, 1987. His plea is that he had joined the petitioner in

1968. From 1982 he remained absent for certain period and proceedings were initiated against him. A notice was published against him directing him to join the duties within fifteen days and therefore, in January, 1984 he wanted to resume his duties, however, he was not allowed to join the duties till 31st December, 1987. The petitioner, therefore, prayed for wages during the said period.

3. The respondent No.2 admitted that after 18th June, 1982 he did not return for duty up till 13th January, 1984 on account of his family circumstances and after reading of notice in the newspaper on 5th January, 1984 whereby he was called upon to join his duties within 15 days, he sent a communication dated 11th January, 1984 and he reported on 13th January, 1984 and he also submitted his joining report to his Chief Engineer but he was not taken on duty.

4. According to respondent No.2, his case was transferred to Vigilance Department, however, charge sheet was issued to him only in October 1987 and though an inquiry was conducted and pursuant thereto disciplinary authority by order dated 17th April, 1990 had imposed a penalty of withholding of four increments with future effects and his period of unauthorized absence on 3rd January, 1981; 16th January, 1981; 17th January, 1981; 3rd February, 1981 to 21st February, 1981; 10th April, 1981 to 21st April, 1981 and 23rd May, 1981 to 26th May, 1981 was regularized with the sanction of issue as stood at the credit of respondent No.2 during the period 9th August, 1981 to 12th August, 1981; 16th June, 1981 to 25th June, 1981; 27th June, 1981 to 30th June, 1981, however, the period with effect from 18th June, 1982 till the date of his returning on duty was directed to be treated as dies non.

5. The respondent No.2, therefore, contended that he is entitled for wages from 13th January, 1984 when he returned for duty, however, he was not allowed the join the duties till 31st December, 1987 when he was allowed to join duties.

6. The application was contested by the petitioner contending that the respondent No.2 remained absent without prior permission or without intimation to the management with effect from 18th June, 1982 and did not come to join his duties up to the years 1987 and on this ground the claim of the respondent No.2 was denied.

7. The Labor Court framed issues regarding the maintainability of the application of the respondent No.2 and to what amount respondent No.2 is entitled.

8. On the maintainability, the Labor Court had held that no specific objections had been taken by the petitioner in their written statement nor any evidence led regarding the non maintainability of the application and consequently issue was decided in favor of the respondent No.2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the application is not maintainable on the ground that the application is under Section 33(C)(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and since the claim of the respondent No.2 is not pursuant to a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA or VB of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 consequently, the application is not maintainable.

9. Perusal of the application of the respondent No.2 reveals that the application was not filed under Section 33(C)(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 nor it has been treated as an application Section 33(C)(1) of the said Act by the Labor Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in the reply filed on behalf of respondent No.2, it has been stated that the application filed by respondent No.2 under Section 33(C)(1) was allowed by the Labor court and consequently the application is under Section 33(C)(1).

10. Perusal of the order of the Labor Court and the application filed by the petitioner, it is apparent that the application was filed under Section 33(C)(2) and was treated as an application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Merely because in the counter affidavit filed in this court, it has been stated that the application was filed by the respondent No.2 under Section 33(C)(1), it shall not become an application under Section 33(C)(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The learned counsel for the petitioner is also unable to point out any specific plea taken by the petitioner regarding non-maintainability of the application before the Labor Court. On the contrary, it is apparent that the application is under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which is as under:

“2. Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made in this Act, be deiced by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriative Government [within a period not exceeding three months]: [Provided that where the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for
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reasons to be recorded in writing extend such period by such further period as he may think fit).
11. The respondent No.2 was imposed the punishment of withholding of four increments with future effect and unauthorized absence was regularized, however, only the period from 18th June, 1982 till the respondent No.2 returned for duty was treated as dies non. Consequently, for the period when the respondent No.2 returned for duty on 13th January, 1984 till 31st December, 1987 is the period for which the wages have been claimed and the wages for such period can be computed in terms of money. In the circumstances, the plea of the petitioner that the application under Section 33(C)(2) is not maintainable is without any basis and cannot be sustained. The right of the respondent No.2 to claim wages from 13th January, 1984 till 31st December, 1987 was an existing right and the Labour Court was justified in adjudicating the rights of the respondent No.2 for the said period.
12. Regarding the entitlement of the respondent No.2 to receive the wages from 13th January, 1984 till the date of his joining date, i.e., 31st December, 1987, it has been held by the Labour Court that the application by the respondent No.2 dated 11th January,1984 to allow him to join the duties was received in the office of the petitioner on 13th January, 1984 requesting the petitioner to take him on duty in view of notice published in Nav Bharat Times on 5th January, 1984 whereby the respondent No.2 was asked to report for duty within 15 days. The Labor Court relied on the fact that despite the application being given by the respondent No.2 dated 11th January, 1984 which was received on 13th January, 1984, the petitioner did not take any action and the respondent No.2 was not allowed to resume his duties on the ground that the matter was referred to the Vigilance Department and the respondent No.2 was asked to wait for further orders.
13. Merely because the petitioner had referred the matter to the Vigilance Department, pursuant to the petitioner’s own notice dated 5th January, 1984 to resume the duty within 15 days, the respondent No.2 could not be denied to join the duties on the ground that the matter has been referred by the petitioner to the Vigilance Department. The petitioner was not put under suspension. After giving notice to the respondent no.2 to join the duties, the petitioner could not deny him from joining duties on any of the grounds. If the respondent no.2 was not allowed to join the duties without any legal justification, the respondent no.2 cannot be denied wages for the period till he was allowed to join the duties. The inquiry conducted by the petitioner also resulted into penalty of withholding of four increments, however, the period from 18th June, 1982 to the date of his returning to the duty was to be treated as dies non and, therefore, the period from 18th June, 1982 till 13th January, 1984 only could be treated as dies non. Consequently, the respondent No.2 is entitled for wages from 13th January, 1984 till 31st December, 1987 when the respondent was allowed to join the duties.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to point out any illegality in the order dated 7th January, 1997. Rather the attempt was made to confuse the issue that the period 13th January, 1984 to 31st December, 1987 was held to be dies non pursuant to the order of the Disciplinary Authority. From the order dated 17th April, 1990, it is apparently clear that the period only with effect from 18th June, 1982 till the date of returning on duty was to be treated as dies non and as the respondent No.2 returned on duty on 13th January, 1984, pursuant to the public notice given by the petitioner, however, he was not assigned any duties on the ground that his matter was pending with the Vigilance Department, will not disentitle the petitioner his wages. There is no manifest error or illegality in the order dated 7th January, 1997 passed by the Labor Court so as to entail inference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. By now it is a well-established principle of law that the High Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence as an appellate authority. Considering the pleas and evidence taken before the Labor Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to show any manifest error or violation of principles of natural justice.
15 The writ petition, in the facts and circumstances, is without any merit and it is, therefore, dismissed and the rule is discharged. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. March 10th, 2008. ANIL KUMAR, J. ‘Dev'