Full Text
FAO No.127/2006 M/s. Hindustan Lever Ltd. ........ Appellant through: Mr.Raman Kapur with Mr.Honey Taneja, Advs.
FAO No.131/2006 M/s. Hindustan Lever Ltd. ........ Appellant through: Mr.Raman Kapur with Mr.Honey Taneja, Advs.
Date of Decision: 28.03.2008
JUDGMENT
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes.
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest? Yes.: PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.
1. Above captioned appeals arise out of 2 identically FAO Nos.127/06 & 131/06 2008:DHC:1163 worded orders of even date 2.03.2006 passed by the learned Additional District Judge dismissing the objections filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 against the award dated 11.4.1995.
2. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of the present appeals are that respondent No.1 Mr.Shiv Khullar, the sole proprietor of M/s.Shivam Enterprises and M/s. Khullar Enterprises was the owner of two premises bearing municipal Nos.30 & 32, Main Market, Lodhi Road, Delhi.
3. Respondent No.1 acting as sole proprietor of M/s. Shivam Enterprises and M/s. Khullar Enterprises entered into 2 agreements dated 1.10.1998 with appellant company M/s. Hindustan Lever Ltd. Both the agreements were identically worded save and except, one agreement pertained to M/s. Shivam Enterprises and premises bearing No.30, Main Market, Lodhi Road, Delhi and the other related to M/s. Khullar Enterprises and premises bearing No.32, Main Market, Lodhi Road, Delhi.
4. As per the agreement respondent No.1 agreed to provide his premises to the appellant company for the use of its products. Respondent was required to receive the stock of Kwality Ice Creams (a product of appellant company, store the same in the premises and further deliver the same to the vending distributors of the appellant company). It was the responsibility of the respondent No.1 to maintain the vending carts and motorized carts as also ensuring that the ice cream is stored in safe and hygienic condition. The appellant company had to pay the service charges @ Rs.0.10 per litre of the products sold through vending carts and invoiced at the said premises. The period of the agreements was 3 years.
5. Respondent No.1 filed 2 petitions under Section 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking appointment of an Arbitrator to settle the dispute between the parties.
6. Noting the arbitration clause contained in the agreement dated 1.10.1998 the court referred the dispute to the Arbitrator. Respondent No.2 was appointed as the Arbitrator who was to decide the dispute as per the terms of the arbitration clause contained in the agreement. Since the dispute between the parties pertained to 2 different premises 2 arbitration proceedings were instituted.
7. In the statement of claim filed by respondent No.1 it was alleged that appellant company had illegally terminated the agreements dated 1.10.1998 and claimed service charges for the period 1.6.1999 to 30.9.2001 along with interest from the appellant company.
8. Appellant company in its reply stated that in May, 1999 respondent No.1 failed to perform his obligation under the agreement, therefore it is not liable to pay service charges claimed by the respondent No.1
9. Vide 2 identically awards of even date 11.4.2005 learned Arbitrator allowed the claim of the respondent No.1. A sum of Rs.7,77,374/- each was awarded in both the awards.
10. Aggrieved by the said awards appellant company filed two objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. Under-noted grounds were raised in the petition:-
Act which clearly provides that where the contract consists of reciprocal promises to be simultaneously performed, no promisor would perform his promise unless the promisee is ready and willing to perform his reciprocal promise. It became clear before the learned Arbitrator that respondent no.1 did not work after May 1999 and once he had clearly expressed his intention not to work under the agreement, the contract containing reciprocal promises, it was squarely covered by subclause II of the termination clause of the agreement. Therefore, once respondent no.1 refused to perform his obligations under the agreement, the petitioner to safeguard its interests in the market especially being ice cream products, could not take the risk of supplying any further ice cream products to the respondent no.1 and therefore, obligation to pay service charges by petitioner could not arise. The contract clearly provided for payment to respondent no.1 only for the work done at the rate of of Rs.0.10 per liter by products sold through vending carts/motorized carts.
11. Noting the judgments of the Supreme Court in Konkan Railway Corporation & Ors. Vs. Mehul Construction Co. AIR 2000 SC 2821 and Olympus Superstructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Meena Vijay Hetan and Ors. AIR 1999 SC 2102, the judgment of the Orissa High Court in the decision reported as Orissa Oils Ind. Ltd. Vs.
TRIFED & Ors. 98 (2002) DLT 659 (DB) and the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Union of India & Anr. Vs. Bakshi Steel Ltd., 2005(3) Arblr. 74 (Delhi) the learned Trial Judge returned a finding as under:- “In the present case, the petitioner company is assailing the said award on merits, which is beyond the purview of this court under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act.”
12. On the basis of the afore-noted finding vide impugned order(s) dated 2.3.2006 learned Trial Judge dismissed the objections filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.
13. It would be relevant to note that an award would always be challenged on merits. Thus, for the learned Trial Judge to record that it is impermissible to assail an award on merits is patently illegal. Probably, the learned Judge intends to say that it is impermissible for the court to re-appreciate the evidence while considering a challenge to the award. Indeed, Shri V.M.Issar, learned counsel for the respondent sought to urge that a perusal of the objections show that the appellant is challenging the findings of fact returned by the Arbitrator on the basis of evidence.
14. In the decision reported as ONGC Ltd. Vs. Garware Shipping Corporation Ltd. AIR 2008 SC 456 it has been held that there is no proposition that the courts would be slow to interfere with an award even if the conclusions are perverse and even when the very basis of the Arbitrator's award is wrong.
15. Needless to state the mandate of an Arbitrator is to be reasonable and not perverse. If an Arbitrator acts perversely he acts beyond his mandate. The statement of objects and reasons of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 states that one of the object of the Act is to ensure that the Arbitral Tribunal remains within the limits of its jurisdiction. Further, as per Sub-Section 3 of Section 28 of the Act, the Arbitral Tribunal has to decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and has to take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.
16. Exercising power under Section 34 of the Act it is the duty of the court to see whether the Arbitrator has acted within his mandate. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported as ONGC Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. JT 2003 (4) SC 171, if an award is contrary to a fundamental policy of Indian Law or is against justice or morality or is patently illegal, the same has to be set aside.
17. A commonly held belief that while considering objections under Section 34 of the Act the court cannot look into the evidence before the Arbitrator also needs to be clarified. There is a difference in re-appreciating evidence and considering whether material evidence has been ignored. Whereas the former would be an activity prohibited while considering objections under Section 34 of the Act for the reason an Arbitrator is a chosen forum by the parties to conclude rival issues of fact between the parties, the latter would be an activity to find out whether learned Arbitrator has acted within his mandate for the reason the mandate of the Arbitrator is to decide on facts after considering all the relevant facts and not ignoring the same.
18. Thus, while considering objections under Section 34 the court must be conscious of the nature of challenge and must bring out the same with clarity.
19. To illustrate with reference to the instant dispute, in ground No.C it has been urged that there is no evidence on record to establish that the respondent worked under the contract beyond May, 1999. A grievance has been laid that in spite thereof the learned Arbitrator has held that the contract remained in force till 30.9.2001. Does this challenge not require the court to consider whether indeed there is any evidence to sustain the finding that the agreement remained in force till 30.9.2001 or to otherwise consider the effect of the plea of the appellant pertaining to cessation of the work in May, 1999? Further, in ground No.E a specific challenge has been laid predicated under Section 51 of the Indian Contract Act. Suffice would it be to note that Section 51 of the Contract Act underlines a policy of reciprocity. Was the challenge not to be considered with reference to the decision in Saw Pipes where it was held that if a contract is contrary to a fundamental policy of Indian law it requires to be set aside.
20. Even in the realm of evidence, no doubt the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 are not strictly applicable before an Arbitral Forum, but underlining principles thereof would certainly apply. For example, Section 21 of the Evidence Act, 1872 mandates that an admission made by a party is a relevant fact. The said Section underlines a fundamental policy of the law that the best evidence of a party is the admission of the opponent. Suppose an Arbitrator ignores an admission made by a party which has not been explained? Would not such an award be liable to be challenged on the plea that by ignoring a material evidence, a fundamental policy of law relating to evidence being violated by the Arbitrator, the award is liable to be challenged? Surely, such an award would suffer from the mandate of the Arbitrator being violated as also on the ground that the conclusions are perverse.
21. I am not speaking any further lest parties are prejudiced before the learned Trial Judge for the matter requires to be remanded for fresh adjudication with a direction that the learned Judge would deal with the 8 objections specifically urged and consider each one of them within the parameters of Section 34 of the Act as explained in the decision in Saw Pipes case (supra) and ONGC's case (supra) as also clarified in the present order.
22. The appeals are allowed. Impugned orders dated 2.3.2006 in both appeals are set aside. Objections filed by the appellant before the learned Trial Judge are restored for fresh decision in accordance with law.
23. Parties are directed to appear before the learned District & Sessions Judge on 19.5.2008.
24. No costs.
25. TCR be returned forthwith. March 28, 2008 PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J. vg