Delhi Development Authority v. M/S Bharat Furnishing Co.; V.K. Mittal; Bhagat Construction Co. Ltd.; Harinder Anand

Delhi High Court · 02 Apr 2008 · 2008:DHC:1241-DB
MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA; SANJIV KHANNA
LPA Nos. 142, 280, 308 of 2003; LPA Nos. 1181-82 of 2007
2008:DHC:1241-DB
civil other Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court referred to a larger Bench the question whether DDA can recover contractual delay compensation as arrears of land revenue under Section 40A without adjudication by a court or arbitrator.

Full Text
Translation output
LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 1 LPA NOS.1181-82/2007
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
LPA NOS. 142, 280 & 308 OF 2003
Date of Decision: April 2nd , 2008.
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR. .... Appellants.
Through Mr. J.M. Sabharwal, Sr. Advocate with
Mr.Ajay Verma and Ms.Seema Bhaduriya, Advocates.
VERSUS
M/S.BHARAT FURNISHING CO. .... Respondent in LPA No.142/2003.
V.K. MITTAL .... Respondent in LPA Nos.280 & 308/2003.
Through Mr. G.N. Agarwal, Advocate.
A N D
L.P.A. NOS. 1181-82 OF 2007 BHAGAT CONSTRUCTION
CO. LTD. .....Appellant in LPA No.1181/2007.
Through Mr. Vikas Sharma, Advocate.
HARINDER ANAND .....Appellant in LPA No.1182/2007.
Through Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Advocate.
VERSUS
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR. .... Respondents.
Through Mr. J.M. Sabharwal, Sr. Advocate with
Mr.Ajay Verma and Ms.Seema Bhaduriya, Advocates.
2008:DHC:1241-DB LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 2
CORAM:
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
JUDGMENT

1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ? YES SANJIV KHANNA, J:

1. The question involved in these Appeals pertains to interpretation of Section 40A of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the D.D.A. Act, for short) and whether amounts claimed due and payable as per Clauses 2 and 29 can be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Section 40A of the D.D.A. Act reads as under:- “40-A. Mode of recovery of moneys due to Authority.- Any money due to the Authority on account of fees or charges, or from the disposal of lands, buildings or other properties, movable, or immovable, or by way of rents and profits may, if the recovery thereof is not expressly provided for in any other provision of this Act, be recovered by the Authority as arrears of land revenue.” LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 3

2. DDA contends that it can recover their contractual claims for delay in completion of work from contractors under Section 40A of the DDA Act as arrears of land revenue. It may be noted here that the claim made by the DDA under Clauses 2 and 29 of the agreement with the contractors has not been adjudicated by a Civil Court. The stand of the DDA is that it is open to the contractors to file a Civil Suit and contest their liability to pay but DDA need not file any civil proceedings and their claims under Clause 2 can be recovered as arrears of land revenue.

3. In support of their stand they have relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of DDA versus Sudhir Brothers reported in 1995 (2) ALR 306 (DB), in which it was held as under:-

“6. It will, therefore, be for the DDA to seek to recover the said amount of Rs.5,69,743/- in whatever manner it is open to it and in case any such proceedings are taken, it will be open to the contractor to raise all defences that may be open to him in law to contend that the levy is bad. In case the DDA seeks to recover the said amount of compensation from the contractor, it will be open to the contractor to file a suit and raise all such contentions as he may deem fit. We make it clear that the question of limitation will not be raised by either of the parties, in view of the above unfortunate procedure adopted by both the parties.”

4. The Division Bench of this Court relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vishwanath Sood versus Union of India LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 4 and another reported in AIR 1989 SC 952. On the basis of this judgment, learned Single Judge of this Court in Harinder Anand versus Delhi development Authority bearing WP(C) No. 5073/2003, by his decision dated 2nd August 2007, has held that Section 40A of the DDA Act applies to all contractual disputes and claims of the DDA under Clause 2 of the agreement. The aforesaid judgment has been impugned before us in two separate Letter Patent Appeals bearing no. 1181/2007 and 1182/2007.

5. Another Single Judge of this Court in his judgment dated 11th December, 2002 has taken different view after referring to Clauses 2, 29 and 30 of the contract. This judgment is impugned before us in LPA Nos. 142/2003, 280/2003 and 308/2003. In these cases, disputes between the parties were referred to arbitration. DDA had also referred their claims under Clause 2 of the agreement, due to delay in completion of the work, to arbitration. Counter claims were rejected by the Arbitrator in the Awards. However, while making the awards, Rule of the Court, adjudication made in respect of the said counter-claims was segregated and set aside following the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vishwanath Sood versus Union of India and another reported in AIR 1989 SC 952, on the ground that a claim under Clause 2 of the Agreement cannot be referred to and adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator as it was beyond scope of the arbitration clause. Rest of the Awards were made Rule of the Court. DDA has also made payments as per Awards. After some years, the DDA issued demand letters under Section 68 of the LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 5 Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 for recovery of the amounts claimed under Clause 2 of the Agreement as arrears of land revenue.

6. We feel that questions of substantial legal importance arise for consideration in the present cases and these Appeals should be listed before a larger Bench of three judges.

7. Principles of natural justice require that no one can be a judge of his own cause. In the case of Canara Bank versus Debasis Das, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 557, the Supreme Court referred to the first principle of natural justice and observed:- “The first rule is “nemo judex in causa sua” or “ nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua” as stated in Earl of Derby's case that is, “no man shall be a judge in his own cause”. Coke used the form “ aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa, quia non potest esse judex et pars “ (Co. Litt. 1418), that is, “no man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he cannot act as judge and at the same time be a party”. The form “nemo potest esse simul actor et jude”, that is, “no one can be at once suitor and judge” is also at times used.”

8. This principle has been accepted and followed in the case of Delhi Financial Corporation versus Rajiv Anand reported (2004)11 SCC 625 and further discussed in Crawford Bayley & Co. versus Union of India reported in (2006) 6 SCC 25. However, it is equally well settled that principles of natural justice cannot override specific provisions of a Statute. DDA has relied upon Section 40A and submitted that there is no violation of principles of natural justice merely because amounts payable under LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 6 Clause 2 can be recovered as arrears of land revenue for the contractor always has a right to file a civil suit and contest his liability.

9. We may also refer to the judgement of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka versus Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills reported in (1987) 2 SCC 160 wherein right of an authority to directly recover damages for breach of a contract under the applicable Land Revenue Act, had come up for consideration. It was observed;- “Even assuming for argument's sake that the terms of clause 12 afford scope for being construed as empowering the officer of the State to decide upon the question of breach as well as assess the quantum of damages, we do not think that adjudication by the officer regarding the breach of the contract can be sustained under law because a party to the agreement cannot be an arbiter in his own cause. Interests of justice and equity require that where a party to a contract disputes the committing of any breach of conditions the adjudication should be by an independent person or body and not by the officer party to the contract. The position will, however, be different where there is no dispute or there is consensus between the contracting parties regarding the breach of conditions. In such a case the officer of the State, even though a party to the contract will be well within his rights in assessing the damages occasioned by the breach in view of the specific terms of clause 12.”

10. Another question which arise for consideration pertains to the meaning of the expression “any money due to the authority on account of fee or charges or from the disposal of lands, buildings or other properties, movable, or immovable, or by way of rents and profits” used in Section LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 7 40A and whether this expression will include amounts due and payable under Clause 2 of the Agreement.

11. In the case of Vishwanath Sood (supra), the Supreme Court had examined Clauses 2 and 25 of the agreement, Clause 25 being the arbitration Clause, and it was held does not cover claims under Clause 2 of the Agreement and the decision of the Superintending Engineer is treated as final and a arbitrator is therefore barred from examining claims under Clause 2. The decision of the Superintending Engineer cannot be referred to arbitration. At the same time, the Supreme Court noticed that levy of penalty under Clause 2 is not automatic but based upon number of factors like period of delay, estimated amount of work, cause for delay, party responsible for delay, etc. It was also observed that the said Clause gives discretion to the authorities to determine the quantum of compensation, which cannot exceed 10% of the contractual amount. It was accordingly observed:- “Clause 2 of the contract makes the time specified for the performance of the contract a matter of essence and emphasises the need on the part of the contractor to scrupulously adhere to the time schedule approved by the Engineer-in-charge. With a view to compel the contractor to adhere to this time schedule, this clause provides a kind of penalty in the form of a compensation to the Department for default in adhering to the time schedule. The clause envisages an amount of compensation calculated as a percentage of the estimated cost of the whole work on the basis of the number of days for which the work remains uncommenced or unfinished to the prescribed LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 8 extent on the relevant dates. We do not agree with the counsel for the respondent that this is in the nature of an automatic levy to be made by the Engineer-in-charge based on the number of days of delay and the estimated amount of work. Firstly, the reference in clause to the requirement that the work shall throughout the stipulated period of the contract be proceeded with due diligence and the reference in the latter part of the clause that the compensation has to be paid 'in the event of the contractor failing to comply with' the prescribed time schedule make it clear that the levy of compensation is conditioned on some default or negligence on the part of the contractor. Secondly, while the clause fixes the rate of compensation at one per cent for every day of default it takes care to prescribe the maximum compensation of 10 per cent on this ground and it also provides for a discretion to the Superintending Engineer to reduce the rate of penalty from one per cent. Though the clause does not specifically say so, it is clear that any moderation that may be done by the Superintending Engineer would depend upon the circumstances, the nature and periods of default and the degree of negligence or default that could be attributed to the contractor. This means that the Superintending Engineer, in determining the rate of compensation chargeable, will have to go into all the aspects and determine whether there is any negligence on the part of the contractor or not. Where there has been no negligence on the part of the contractor or where on account of various extraneous circumstances referred to by the Division Bench such as vis major or default on the part of the Government or some other unexpected circumstance which does not justify penalising the contractor, the Superintending Engineer will be entitled and bound to reduce or even waive the compensation.”

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12. Clauses 2, 29 and 30 of the agreement read as under:- “Clause-2: The time allowed for carrying out the work as entered in the tender shall be strictly LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 9 observed by the contractor and shall be deemed to be of the essence of the contract on the part of the contractor and shall be reckoned from the Tenth Day after the date on which the order to commence the work is issued to contractor. The work shall throughout the stipulated period of the contract be proceeded with all due diligence and the contractor shall pay as Compensation an amount equal to one percent, or such smaller amount as the Superintending Engineer Delhi Development Authority (whose decision in writing shall be final) may decide on the amount of the estimated cost of the whole work as shown in the tender, for every day that the work remains uncommenced or unfinished, after the proper dates. And further, the ensure good progress during the execution of the work, the contractor shall be bound in all cases in which the time allowed for any work exceeds, one month (save for special jobs) to complete oneeighth of the whole of the work before one-fourth of the whole time allowed under the contract has elapsed, three-eights of the work, before one half of such time has elapsed, and three-fourth of the work, before three-fourth of such time has elapsed. However, for special jobs if a time-schedule has bee submitted by the Contractor and the same has been accepted by the Engineer-in-charge, the contractor shall comply with the said time schedule. In the event of the contractor failing to comply with this condition, he shall be liable to pay as compensation an amount equal to one percent or such smaller amount as the Superintending Engineer Delhi Development Authority (whose decision in writing shall be final)may decide on the said estimated cost of the whole work for every day that the due quantity of work remains incomplete; provided always that the entire amount of compensation to be paid under the provisions of this Clause shall not exceed ten percent, on the estimated cost of the work as shown in the tender.” “Clause-29: (1) Whenever any claim or claims for payment of a sum of money arise out of or under the contract against the contractor, the Engineer- LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 10 in-Charge or the DDA shall be entitled to withhold and also have lien to retain such sum or sums in whole or in part from the security, if any deposited by the contractor and for the purpose aforesaid the Engineer-in-Charge or the DDA shall be entitled to with-hold the security deposit, if any, furnished as the case may be; and also have a lien over the same pending finalisation for adjustment of any such claim. In the event of the security being insufficient to cover the claimed amount or amounts or if no security has been taken from the contractor, the Engineer-in-Charge or the DDA shall be entitled to withhold and have a lien to retain to the extent of such claimed amount or amounts referred to above, from any sum or sums found payable or which at any time thereafter may become payable to the contractor under the same contract or any other contract with the Engineer-in- Charge or the DDA or any contracting person through the Engineer-in-Charge pending finalisation or adjudication of any such claim. It is an agreed term of the contract that the sum or sums of money so withheld or retained under the lien referred to above, by the Engineer-in-Charge or DDA will be kept withheld or retained as such by the Engineer-in-Charge or DDA till the claim arising out of or under the contract is determined by the Arbitrator (if the contract is governed by the Arbitration clause) or by the competent court, as the case may be and that the contractor will have no claim for interest or damages whatsoever on any account in respect of such withholding or retention under the lien referred to above and duly notified as such to the contractor. For the purpose of this clause, where the contractor is a partnership firm or a limited company, the Engineer-in-Charge or the DDA shall be entitled to withhold and also have a lien to retain towards such claimed amount or amounts in whole or in part from any sum found payable to any partner/Limited company as the case may be; whether in his individual capacity or otherwise. LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 11 (2) Delhi Development Authority shall have right to cause an audit and technical examination of the works and the finals bills of the contractor including all supporting vouchers, abstract etc to be made after payment of the final bill and if as a result of such audit and technical examination any sum is found to have been overpaid in respect of any work done by the contractor under the contract or any work claimed by him to have been done by him under the contract and found not to have been executed, the contractor shall be liable to refund the amount of over payment and it shall be lawful for Delhi Development Authority to recover the same from him in the manner prescribed in subclause (1) of this clause or in any other manner legally permissible and if it is found that the contractor was paid less than what was due to him under the contract in respect of any work executed by him under it, the amount of such underpayment shall be duly paid by Delhi Development Authority to the contractor. Provided that Delhi Development Authority shall not be entitled to recover any sum overpaid nor the contractor shall be entitled to payment of any sum paid short where such payment has been agreed to upon between the Chief Engineer or Executive Engineer on the one hand and the contractor on the other under any term of the contract permitting payment for work after assessment by the Chief Engineer or the Executive Engineer.” Clause-30: Any sum of money due and payable to the contractor (including the security deposit returnable to him) under the contract may be withheld or retained by way of lien by the Engineer-in-Charge or DDA or any other contracting person or DDA or such other person or persons in respect of payment of a sum of money arising out of or under any other contract made by the contractor with the Engineer-in-Charge or the DDA or with such other person or persons. LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 12 It is an agreed term of the contract that the sum of money so withheld or retained under this clause by the Engineer-in-Charge or the DDA will be kept withheld or retained as such by Engineer-in- Charge or the DDA till his claim arising out of the same contract or any other contract is either mutually settled or determined by the Arbitrator (if the contract is governed by the Arbitration clause) or by the competent court, as the case may be, and that the contractor shall have no claim for interest or damages whatsoever on this account or any other ground in respect of any sum of money withheld or retained under this clause and duly notified as such to the contractor.”

13. The aforesaid Clauses stipulate that when a claim is made against a contractor by the Engineer In-charge or DDA, it would be entitled to withhold and have lien on such sum till the claim is adjudicated by an arbitrator or by a court of law. Clause 29 specifically refers to adjudication by the arbitrator or by the Court of all the claims including claims of the DDA or Engineer In-Charge. Clause 30 similarly states that DDA will be entitled to withhold payments till adjudication of its claims in another contract by an arbitrator or by a court, as the case may be. Prima facie, a harmonious or conjoint reading of the arbitration Clause with Clauses 2, 29 and 30 would indicate that the DDA or Engineer In-Charge are entitled to withhold and not make payments in respect of their claims till the claims of the DDA or Engineer In-charge are decided by an arbitrator, if covered by an arbitration clause or otherwise by a court of law. DDA can therefore refuse to make payment of the admitted amounts due and payable to the contractor to the extent they have decided to withhold payments in respect LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 13 of their claims but only till their claims are adjudicated by an arbitrator or the civil court. It was urged that adjudication of the claims of the DDA is required and not done away with. What is empowered and authorised is the right to withhold payments till adjudication of the claims of DDA either before an arbitrator or before court of law. Jurisdiction of an arbitrator can be restricted by terms of an arbitration clause. But whether jurisdiction of a civil court has been ousted or curtailed by Clauses 2, 29, 30 of the agreement is required to be considered. Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908, a Court can decide all suits of civil nature except those which are expressly or impliedly barred by any law. On the other hand it is the submission of DDA that Clause 2 of the contract is a complete code in itself and reference to Clauses 29 and 30 is not required. It is argued that the said Clause 2 provides for procedure for recovery of the amount due and DDA is not called upon to file a civil suit. Compensation calculated under Clause 2 of the contract can be recovered under the land revenue law without being circumscribed by the provisions of Clauses 29 and 30 of the agreement.

14. The observations made in the present order are tentative, for we feel that the matter should be referred to a larger Bench of this Court for examining and interpreting Section 40A of the D.D. Act in light of the observations made in the case of Sudhir Brothers (supra) on the following questions:- LPA NOS.142,280,308/2003 14

“1. Whether on interpretation of Clauses 2, 29 and 30 of the agreement, the amount determined by the Superintending Engineer under Clause 2 can be recovered by DDA as arrears of land revenue without adjudication and a decree of a civil court ?” 2. “Whether DDA can recover its claims due under Clause 2 of the agreement with the contractors under Section 40A of the DDA Act?”

15. The questions of law are broad. Various aspects of the matter and the issues involved have been briefly mentioned above. Larger Bench may modify, amend or add questions of law and may also consider any other aspect that arises for consideration.

(SANJIV KHANNA) JUDGE (DR.

MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

CHIEF JUSTICE APRIL 02, 2008. P