Lalit Kumar Seth v. S.R. Seth

Delhi High Court · 07 Apr 2008 · 2008:DHC:1287
S. Ravindra Bhat
CS(OS) 1254/2004
2008:DHC:1287
civil appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that a 1969 decree recognizing an oral partition of family property is binding and not barred by registration or benami laws, affirming the plaintiff's right to his share.

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
CS(OS) 1254/2004
Reserved on 26th March,2008 Pronounced on 7th April, 2008 LALIT KUMAR SETH ..... Plaintiff
Through Mr. Manish Vashisht, Advocate with Mr. Sameer Vashisht, Advocate
VERSUS
S.R.SETH ..... Defendant
Through Mr. Jeevesh Nagrath, Advocate for D-4 and D-5.
Mr. J.C. Mahendroo, Advocate for D-1 to D-3.
CORAM:
Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat
JUDGMENT

1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be reported Yes in the Digest? Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat:

1. This order will dispose of issue Nos. 3 and 6 which were heard on 26.3.2008 as preliminary issues.

2. The brief facts necessary for this purpose are that the plaintiff, who is CS(OS) 1254/2004 1 of 19 2008:DHC:1287 son of the first defendant, has claimed a decree for partition of his share is his deceased mother's share in the property being H-17, Maharani Bagh, First Floor; or in case such share is impartible in metes and bounds, a direction to auction the property inter se parties and distribute the sale proceeds among them; a decree for rendition of accounts in respect of 966 Equity Shares of M/s Larsen and Tourbo and a decree for restraining defendant Nos. 1 to 3 from interfering with the plaintiff's use, occupation and enjoyment of the portion in his possession, have been sought.

3. According to the suit averments, the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 to 5 are sons and daughters of the first defendant. The plaintiff and defendant No.3 had filed a suit for declaration i.e. 688/1969 before the Senior Sub Judge, Delhi claiming that the suit property i.e. C-74 (old) i.e. 17-H (new), Maharani Bagh, New Delhi (hereinafter called "suit property") belonged to, and was constructed with Joint Hindu Family (HUF) funds and that it had been orally partitioned amongst the parties on 01.4.1968. The plaintiff avers that in the said suit the allocation regarding oral partition of the property was in the following manner:- (a ) Plaintiff 's Share (present Plaintiff and Shri Vinod Kumar Seth Defendant No.3) Ground Floor complete, Right Hand Garage and servant room over it with CS(OS) 1254/2004 2 of 19 lawns (shown in red) ( b) Defendant No.2 and 3 (Smt. Bhagwati Devi, Mother of the Plaintiff now deceased and Shri Anil Kumar Seth Defendant No.2 in the present suit): First Floor Complete and Barsati Floor complete, left hand garage and servant room over it shown in yellow, together with the right of passage from the main entrance and use of stair cases for going on the first floor and barsati c ) Defendant No.1 (Shri Salig Ram Seth, Father of the plaintiff) Drawing Cum Dining, Kitchen, Verandah, Latrine on second floor and two bedrooms, verandah and bath on third floor over the garages together with the right of passage from the main entrance as well as in the back shown in brown color. ( d) Joint share of Plaintiffs and Defendants No. 2 and 3 Bath cum Latrines attached with garages, servant quarters and also kitchen and verandah attached with the servant quarter over the garages shown in green colour.

4. The suit property is a 800 sq. yards plot on which a building which comprises ground, first floor and Barsati Floors are said to exist. On 17.10.1969 the suit was decreed in terms of an oral partition. The said decree reads as follows:- “to the effect that the partition effected between the parties to the CS(OS) 1254/2004 3 of 19 suit in respect of Joint Hindu Family property No. C-74, (Old), 17H (New), Maharani Bagh, New Delhi on 01.04.1968 and physical possession taken by the respective parties to their shares delineated in the plan annexed and agreement regarding payment of property taxes, income taxes, wealth taxes etc. and also water and electricity charges is perfectly legal and binding on the parties; and Plaintiffs are the exclusive owners with possession in equal shares as per the said partition of the portion shown in colour red in the plan attached i.e. Ground Floor complete, right hand garage and servant room over it with lawn and similarly it be held that Defendant No.1 is the owner with possession of portion shown in Brown colour in plan i.e. dinning cum drawing, kitchen, Verandah, latrine on second floors and two bed rooms, verandah and bath on third floor over the garages with the right of passage from the main entrance as well as in the back and the Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are owners with possession in equal shares of the portion shown in yellow colour in the plan attached i.e. first floor complete and barsati room complete, left hand garage and servant room over it, together with the right of passage from the main entrance and use of stair cases for going on the floors and barsati, and portion in the joint possession shown in green colour in the plain i.e. bath cum latrines, attached with garage, servant quarters and also kitchen and Verandah attached with the servant quarters over the garage; and that each one of the party responsible for the payment of property taxes, income taxes, wealth taxes etc., and also water and electricity charges etc for their respective shares be and the same is hereby passed in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant.”

5. The plaintiff has filed a sketch plan of the property similar to what was allegedly passed in a decree of 17.10.1969. He further claims that the decree attained CS(OS) 1254/2004 4 of 19 finality. The plaintiff relied upon a Memorandum of Partition dated 27.10.1981 allegedly arrived at amongst the members of the HUF and duly signed on his behalf through General Power of Attorney as well as defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and his mother Smt. Bhagwati Devi Seth. She died intestate on 25.3.2003.

6. The plaintiff claims to be in possession of the barsati floor measuring 400 sq. feet in area allegedly permitted to be used by him during the life time of his mother. It is claimed that the remaining half portion of the property which fell to the exclusive ownership of the plaintiff's deceased mother is with the second defendant. According to the plaintiff, the second defendant tired to damage the suit property by making major changes which are impermissible in law leading to filing of Suit No. 158/2004 for permanent injunction against the said defendant, which is pending. The plaintiff, in these circumstances, claims his share out of his mother's share i.e. 1/5th share as well as the share in another property at Patiala as well as a share in the equity shares of M/s Larsen and Turbo.

7. The defendant Nos. 1 to 3 in their common written statement allege that the suit property is solely and exclusively owned by the first defendant, the plaintiff's father and that the latter along with defendant Nos. 2 and 3 were permitted to stay in it as licensees, being his sons without creating any title or interest in their favour. The CS(OS) 1254/2004 5 of 19 suit property is the first defendant's self-acquired asset. The first defendant claims that he was a member of Maharani Bagh Cooperative house Building Society Ltd (“the society”) and a plot was allotted to him for which a Perpetual Sub-Lease dated 14.5.1965 was executed. In terms of the said lease deed, he i.e. the first defendant, could not sell, transfer, assign or otherwise part with the possession of the whole or any part of the residential plot in any form or manner, benami or otherwise to a person who was not member of the Lessee Society.

8. The defendants also state that the plea regarding existence of HUF and the averments to the extent it is based on decree passed in the previous suit No. 688/1969 is not tenable, by a reason of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 which requires compulsory registration of such instruments. It is alleged that the document relied upon i.e. decree or the partition upon which the decree is based is an unregistered document and therefore could not create any interest or title in the plaintiff's favour by virtue of Section 17and 49 of the Registration Act. It is also claimed that the said decree cannot be given effect to as it did not implead the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and the Society who were necessary and affected parties.

9. After considering the submissions this court framed issues on 8.11.2005. The order of that day stated that Issue No. 6 would be treated as a preliminary issue. When CS(OS) 1254/2004 6 of 19 the matters were being heard, learned counsel also agreed that issue No.3 in addition, could be treated as preliminary issue and a common order in that regard could be made. Accordingly, counsel for the parties were heard on 26.3.2008, on both those issues.

10. Learned counsel for the plaintiff relied upon the decree of the Civil Court dated 17.10.1969 and submitted that it did not create any new rights but recognized and gave cover to a pre-existing arrangement, which was presented before the Court in the form of a compromise. Statements of the counsel on behalf of the defendants i.e. on behalf of the first defendant as well as Smt. Bhagwati Devi and Sh. Anil Seth were recorded on 10.10.1969. The Court expressly recorded that the defendants did not contest the suit and it was accordingly decreed. Learned counsel contended that the decree of the court drawn pursuant to the order reveals that partition had been effected on 1.4.1968 and physical possession had been taken by the respective parties in regard to the shares delineated in the plaint. That agreement was also part of the record and after being satisfied the court decreed the suit. In the circumstances neither any document nor the decree created new rights but merely recognized existing rights. As a consequence there was no question of the decree requiring registration.

11. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported as CS(OS) 1254/2004 7 of 19 Som Dev and others Vs. Rati Ram and Another (2006) 10 SCC 788 as well as Kalyani (dead) by LRs. Vs. Narayanan and others, AIR 1980 SCC 1173. It was submitted that the court recognized that the manifestation of intention to separate and to partition can be inferred in different ways. This may include issuance of notice or filing of a suit; as long as it goes as an intimation to other members of the joint family, a severance can be deemed. It was contended that a decree based on admission, recognizing a preexisting right under a family arrangement, is not compulsorily registrable in terms of Section 17 or 49 of the Registration Act. In addition to the judgment in Som Dev, the plaintiff relied on S. Noordeen Vs. V.S. Thiru Venkita Reddiar, (1996) 3 SCC 289 and submitted that only compromise decrees which create new rights in respect of properties for which parties did not possess rights earlier, are compulsorily registrable under Section 17 (2 ) (vi) of the Registration Act.

12. It was also urged that the defendants are estopped from contending about unenforceability of the decree of declaration and the partition embodied in it, as it has been unchallenged and remained undisturbed. So long as the decree is not set aside in any manner known to law, the declaration subsists; the parties i.e. the first defendant and the plaintiff (and the others claiming through the deceased mother of the plaintiff), and her heirs are bound by it. CS(OS) 1254/2004 8 of 19

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13. On the question as to whether the property is a benami transaction and therefore hit by provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1986 is concerned it was contended that no such plea was set up by the plaintiff. In any event the shares in the property had vested with the plaintiff as far back in 1969, much before the enactment.

14. Counsel for the defendants- applicant, on the other hand, contended that the decree cannot be given effect to as it sought to deal with a perpetual sub lease that was impartible in its terms. The terms of the perpetual lease deed clearly mentions that allocation or any form of transfer was prohibited. The decree set up by the plaintiff sought to achieve exactly could not have been done. To compound the error, necessary parties such as the DDA and the Society (which was the main lessee) were not impleaded.

15. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the execution of the conveyance deed on 24.3.2000 exclusively in favour of the first defendant, there was a complete change in the circumstances. This gives a lie to the plaintiff's claim so far as it is founded on the decree of 1969.

16. Learned counsel relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court reported as Bankey Bihari Vs. Surya Narayan 2004 (11) SCC 393 and C.T. Ponnappa Vs. State of CS(OS) 1254/2004 9 of 19 Karnataka 2004 (11) SCC 391 as well as Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh (1995) 5 SCC 709 to say that a declaratory decree in respect of immovable property, stating that a party to the litigation would be the owner in possession had to be compulsorily registered. He relied upon on para 18 of the said judgment. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment reported as Kasturi Lal Jain Vs. Inder Prakash Jain & Others 1997 VI AD (DELHI) 179 in support of the submission that where the terms of a lease place restriction on the power of the sub- lessee to transfer it without consent of the lessor, the latter has the right to re-entry.

17. Learned counsel next contended that a plain look at the decree relied upon would show that it decided nothing and that the plaintiff had no absolute right to claim a declaration. The suit and the subsequent decree were attempts to circumvent provisions of the Stamp Act on a partition deed and the court would be acting well within its right to ignore such a judgment which is not binding for many reasons. In support of this argument, he relied upon a judgment reported as Mrs. Santosh Sachdeva Vs. Mr. Yog Raj, ILR (1980) I Delhi.

18. It was lastly urged that the plaintiff in the other pending suit described the second plaintiff as a licensee and that the said claim does not any-where mention a partition or the decree of 1969. In these circumstances, the said decree and the CS(OS) 1254/2004 10 of 19 alleged partition said to have been embodied in it having no force in the eye of law and are not binding.

19. The two issues requiring decision i.e. issue Nos. 6 and 3 read as follows:-

6. Whether the decree dated 17.10.1969 passed in suit No. 688/1969 is not binding on the defendants as alleged in the written statement? OPD.

3. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred under the provision of Benami Transaction Act, if so, to what effect? OPD. Issue No. 6:

20. Three arguments were made on behalf of the defendant applicants to say that the decree of 17-10-1969 was not binding upon them. The first relates to its inadmissibility and unenforceability on the ground of non-compliance with Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act.

21. Section 17(1) of the Act provides that the document shall be registered if the property in which they relate is an instrument or non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property. Sub-section (2) enacts an exception. It reads as follows: CS(OS) 1254/2004 11 of 19 "Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to -

(vi) any decree or order of a court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subjectmatter of the suit or proceeding."

22. In Somdev (supra), the Supreme Court, after considering several previous decisions, held that: “We shall now advert to Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. Sub-section (1) specifies what are the documents that are to be registered. An instrument of gift of immovable property, an instrument which purports to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future any right, title or interest in immovable property, the value of which exceeds Rs. 100/-, any instrument which acknowledges the receipt or payment of consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any right title or interest, leases of immovable property from year to year or for a term exceeding one year and instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of court or any award where such decree or order or award operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property, the value of which exceeds Rs. 100/-. Sub-section (1A) provides that agreements for sale to be used to claim protection of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act entered into after 24.09.2001 require registration. Sub-section (2) excludes from the operation of clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 17, the various transactions described therein under various clauses. We are concerned with clause (vi) therein. We shall set down that provision for convenience: "Any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than which is subject matter of the suit or proceeding". It may be noted that going by clause (vi), a decree or order of court need not be registered on the basis that it comes within the purview of Section 17(1)(b) or 17(1)(c) of the Act as an instrument purporting to or operating to create, CS(OS) 1254/2004 12 of 19 declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property. It may further be seen that a compromise decree also does not require registration in terms of clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Registration Act unless that decree takes in immovable property valued above Rs. 100/-, that is not a subject matter of the suit or the proceeding giving rise to the compromise decree. In other words, only if the compromise also takes in any property that is not the subject matter of the suit, it would require registration. If the compromise is confined to the subject matter of the suit, it would not. It may be noted that Section 43 of the Registration Act of 1864 and Section 41 of the Registration Act of 1866 provided that when any civil court should by a decree or order, declare any document relating to immovable property, which should have been registered, to be invalid or when any civil court should pass a decree or order affecting any such document and the decree or order should create, declare, transfer, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest under such document to or in the immovable property to which it relates, the court should cause a memorandum of the decree or order to be sent to the Registrar within whose district the document was originally registered. But these sections were omitted while enacting the Registration Act of 1871. But in the Specific Relief Act, 1877, Section 39 was introduced providing that where an instrument is adjudged void or voidable under that section and ordered to be delivered up and cancelled, the court should send a copy of its decree, if the instrument has been registered under the Registration Act, to the officer in whose office the instrument had been so registered and such officer should note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the effect of its cancellation. But under the 1887 Act, decrees and orders of courts and awards were exempted from registration. They were also not mentioned in Section 18 which related to documents of which registration was optional. Sargent, CJ in Purmananddas vs. Vallabdas (ILR 11 Bombay 506) explained the position as follows: "The application (for execution) was refused on the ground that the decree was an instrument, which created an interest in immovable property, and could not be given in evidence for want of registration. Provision was made for the registration of such a decree by Section 42 of Act XX of 1886, but that section was not re-enacted in Act VIII of CS(OS) 1254/2004 13 of 19

1871. If, therefore, it required registration under the Act, it could only be as an 'executed instrument' under Section 17, a description which is scarcely applicable to a decree..’”

23. In S. Noordeen (supra) the Supreme Court held that immovable properties whose sale was impugned were not properties other than the subject-matter of the suit or proceedings; they were therefore not required to be registered. Similarly, in Amteshwar Anand –vs- Virender Mohan Singh 2006 (1) SCC 148 it was held that courts should lean in favour of family arrangements and as long as the document itself does not create rights, but records past events relating to arrangements about such property and the property is subject matter of the suit, the court cannot reject it on the ground that it is unregistered.

24. Today, there is no dispute about the existence of the decree, to which the plaintiff and the defendant were parties. The content of the suit too, was the same property; it is also not disputed that the decree was issued upon statements made on behalf of the defendants; they did not oppose the plaint averments. The decree has attained finality. Therefore, the argument about its unenforceability on the ground of its not being registered is insubstantial and unfounded.

25. The second objection to enforceability of the decree was that two necessary CS(OS) 1254/2004 14 of 19 parties were not impleaded, i.e the DDA and the society. No doubt, the deed of Sub- Lease to which the first defendant is a party was issued by the DDA. The society is the lessee. However, the argument about their not being parties does not detract from the efficacy and binding nature of the declaration issued by a competent court; the declaration continues to subsist, and bind the defendant. As between the parties to the litigation, the decree is binding; it creates issue estoppels in regard to matters declared. It is a judgment in rem regarding the status of the parties and the property vis-à-vis each of them. The effect of such a declaration was explained by the Supreme Court, in its judgment reported as Satrucharla Vijaya Rama Raju –vs- Nimmaka Jaya Raju 2005(9) JT 545 in the following words: “A judgment in rem is defined in English Law as "an adjudication pronounced (as its name indeed denotes) by the status, some particular subject matter by a tribunal having competent authority for that purpose". Spencer Bower on Res Judicata defines the term as one which "declares, defines or otherwise determines the status of a person or of a thing, that is to say, the jural relation of the person or thing to the world generally".

26. As regards the question of the decree being contrary to the terms of the lease which prohibits partition or alienation is concerned, that can hardly be urged as a ground for invalidating a judgment which has become final. No law, rule or decision CS(OS) 1254/2004 15 of 19 that such partition, giving effect to a court decree amounts to “transfer” amongst family members, inviting the wrath of the Lessor, to determine the leasehold rights or re-enter the property was shown. In any case, the existence of such an option alone cannot persuade the court to infer that the decree relied upon is void or a nullity relieving the defendants from its operation.

27. In view of the above discussion, Issue No. 6 is held in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant; the decree dated 17-10-1969 is valid and binding against the latter. Issue No. 3

28. Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1986 reads as follows:

"4. Prohibition of the right to recover property held benami. - No
suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property
held benami against the person in whose name the property is held
or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a person
claiming to be the real owner of such property.
(2) No defence based on any right in respect of any property held
benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is
held or against any other person, shall be allowed in any suit,
claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real
owner of such property.
(3) Nothing in this section shall apply, -
(a) where the person in whose name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family and the property is held

CS(OS) 1254/2004 16 of 19 for the benefit of the coparceners in the family; or (b) where the person in whose name the property is held is a trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary capacity, and the property is held for the benefit of another person for whom he is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity."

29. The defendant’s counsel urged that the claim is barred by the above provisions, as the relief sought is a partition decree in respect of property which belongs to the first defendant; it is also urged that a conveyance deed was executed by the DDA, in terms of which, the said defendant is absolute owner. The plaintiff’s position is that the decree of declaration was made in 1969, before the coming into force of the Act and that in any case, no declaration or relief is sought that the first defendant is a benami owner on behalf of the plaintiff.

30. Section 2(a) of the Act defines " benami transactions" as any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person. Sections 3(1) and (2) read as under: "3. (1) No person shall enter into any benami transaction. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to the purchase of property by any person in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter and it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the said property had been purchased for the benefit of the wife or the unmarried daughter." CS(OS) 1254/2004 17 of 19 In R. Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandrasekharan (1995) 2 SCC 630 the Supreme Court, while interpreting the purport of the Act, held that it did not have retrospective operation, in the following terms: “clear legislative intention is seen from the words 'no such claim, suit or action shall lie', meaning thereby no such suit, claim or action shall be permitted to be filed or entertained or admitted to the portals of any court for seeking such a relief after coming into force of Section 4(1)." The above decision has been followed in other judgments (See Probodh Chandra Ghosh v. Urmila Dassi (2000) 6 SCC 526 C. Gangacharan v. C. Narayanan (2000) 1 SCC 459 and G. Mahalingappa, V. G. M. Savitha 2005-(006)-SCC -0441)

31. The plaintiff in this case is not seeking a relief that he is the real and true owner of the property; he is asserting his right to a share in his mother’s share; it is founded partly on the decree of 17-10-1969. The correctness or soundness of that claim is a matter of trial; however in the absence of any relief that he is the real and true owner (“benami”) it cannot be said that provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1986 would apply. The issue is therefore answered against the defendant; the suit is not barred by provisions of that Act. CS(OS) 1254/2004 18 of 19 CS(OS) 1254/2004 The court has today decided Issue Nos. 6 and 3. List the suit for further proceedings before court, on 28th April, 2008.

APRIL 7th 2008 S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J pkv