Union of India v. J.R. Dhiman & Another

Delhi High Court · 21 Apr 2008 · 2008:DHC:1385
A.K. Sikri; J.R. Midha
WP(C) No.6987/1999
2008:DHC:1385
administrative petition_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court upheld the Tribunal's order restraining enhancement of disciplinary penalty beyond that imposed earlier, emphasizing fairness and protecting the respondent's service benefits after superannuation.

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
WP(C) No.6987/1999
Date of Decision: 21.04.2008 #Union of India ....Petitioner
! Through: Mr.A.S. Dateer
VERSUS
$Shri J.R. Dhiman & Another .....Respondent ^ Through Mr.M.K. Bharadwaj for
Respondent No.1.
CORAM :- THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE A.K.SIKRI THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R. MIDHA
1.Whether Reporters of Local papers may be allowed to see the
JUDGMENT
?
2.To be referred to the Reporter or not? 3.Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
A.K. SIKRI, J. (Oral)
:
The respondent, in the instant case, was served with the charge-sheet dated 3.6.1983 levelling certain allegations against him and with respect to which the departmental inquiry was initiated against him. In the said inquiry, charges were held to be proved and on that basis the Disciplinary Authority, vide orders dated
2008:DHC:1385 18.12.1987, imposed punishment of removal from service against him. The respondent preferred departmental appeal before the
Appellate Authority, which was also dismissed. Thereafter, he filed revision before the Revisional Authority in which orders dated
26.4.1989 were passed by the Revisional Authority reducing the punishment from removal to that of reduction in pay scale by two stages. It would be necessary to reproduce the said order vide which the penalty was reduced and the same reads as under:-
“I have gone through the relevant papers and petition of Sh. J.R. Dhiman, Pharmacist. The charges against Sh. Dhiman which are proved during the inquiry are of serious nature. The penalty imposed on Sh. Dhiman is commensurate with his misconduct.
Keeping in view the young age of Shri Dhiman I would like to give him a chance to reform his conduct. Accordingly, I reduce the penalty of removal from service to that of reduction in time scale of pay by two stages for a period of two years with cumulative effect. He may be allowed to be posted to Delhi Area but outside the Central
Hospital as well as the Queens Road Hospital.”

2. The respondent was accordingly reinstated in service and by that very order asked to report to CHS/CH/NDLS for posting. The respondent joined the duties pursuant thereto. However, he was unhappy with the order of reduced penalty as, according to him, the charges leveled against him in the charge-sheet and the findings thereon were incorrect and perverse, based on no evidence. In these circumstances, he preferred OA No.784/90, which was decided by the Tribunal vide its judgment dated 28.9.1993. Vide the said judgment, OA of the respondent was allowed in part whereby the order of the Revisional Authority was quashed and it was directed that the said authority shall dispose of the revision of the respondent on merits in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the said judgment. It was further directed that the petitioners herein shall maintain the status quo qua the respondent herein in terms of the order already passed by the Revisional Authority meaning thereby that the reinstatement of the respondent not to be interfered with during the pendency of the said revision petition. It is also not in dispute that after the respondent was reinstated, he was held entitled to get promotion. The main reason for passing this order by the Tribunal was that various contentions put forth by the respondent herein were not considered, and speaking order thereon was not passed, by the Revisional Authority.

3. The Revisional Authority again decided the revision petition and dealing with various contentions and assessing the evidence on record maintained its findings vide order dated 10.4.1995. The Revisional Authority concluded that there was sufficient evidence to hold the charges as proved against the respondent herein and was also satisfied that there was no violation of the procedure laid down in the rules with respect to the conduct of the inquiry. However, the Revisional Authority further opined that penalty of removal was warranted in his case. Thus, in so far as this aspect is concerned, it is complete departure from the earlier punishment given by the Revisional Authority, namely, reduction in pay scale by two stages. The respondent again filed application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 challenging the order of the Revisonal Authority. Challenge was on two counts, namely, (i) the impugned order of the Revisional Authority was bad in law as there was no evidence to hold the charges as proved; and (ii) the punishment of removal was clearly illegal and erroneous inasmuch as same authority had earlier, in the first instance, reduced the punishment of removal from service to that of reduction in pay scale by two stages. The Tribunal, vide its judgment and order dated 5.4.1999, has rejected the first contention of the respondent herein but accepted the second submission. Thus, while holding that it was a case of no evidence and the Tribunal could not sit as an Appellate Authority so as to examine whether the conclusions drawn by the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority were correct or not when they were based on evidence, the Tribunal at the same time on the second aspect held that the Revisional Authority could not have given higher punishment than it gave in the first instance. The Tribunal was of the view that in case the submissions of the respondent herein were not found to be correct on merits, the propriety would demand that the Revisional Authority should have confirmed the order passed by the predecessor Revisionary Authority instead of awarding enhanced penalty. Following observations of the Tribunal in this respect need to be extracted:- “In our considered view the penalty awarded by the revisional authority not smacks of vindictiveness. The possibility that the applicant has been awarded an enhanced penalty only on the ground that he had shown the audacity to come to the Tribunal cannot be entirely excluded in this case. In this regard we may further mention that even after the penalty of removal from service had been awarded to the applicant by the disciplinary authority which penalty was upheld by the appellate authority, the appellate authority had passed an order appointing the applicant as a fresh candidate and had thereby shown some mercy to the applicant. The then revisional authority showed more magnanimity and reduced the punishment to reduction in pay by two stages for two years. This was done keeping in view the young age of the applicant and the need to give him a chance to improve himself. All these measures taken earlier should not have been washed away in this manner by the successor revisional authority. We are convinced that this is one of those rare cases where we must hold that the penalty awarded shocks the judicial conscience of the Tribunal.”

5. In these circumstances, the order of penalty is quashed by the Tribunal and it is directed that penalty of reduction in pay by two stages for two years with cumulative effect, as imposed by the Revisional Authority earlier, would be maintained.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that once the earlier order of the Revisional Authority had been quashed, the mater was set at large and it was open to the Revisonal Authority to give a fresh conclusion about the quantum of punishment as well. He also pointed out that after the order was passed by the Revisional Authority second time and it was placed before the Tribunal, the Tribunal had passed the orders that such a course of action was not permissible. Learned counsel also pointed out that the respondent had filed the Contempt Petition when the revision before the Revional Authority after the remand of the case was pending. On passing of the impugned order by the Revisional Authority, the said order was placed before the Tribunal and whereunder in the Contempt Petition the Tribunal remarked that it was not open to the Revisional Authority to pass such an order. Against that order, the Union of India preferred Civil Appeal No.3169/1997 before the Supreme Court in which judgment dated 7.4.1999 was given whereby quashing the order of the Tribunal. In the process, the Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal could not have passed such an order as it could not direct the Revisional Authority to pass punishment in a particular manner.

7. We find that while setting aside the order of the Tribunal passed in contempt petition, the main reason weighed with the Supreme Court was that the Tribunal could not pass such an order in the contempt petition as it was sitting as an appellate court. It was because of this reason that while setting aside the order, the Supreme Court gave opportunity to the respondent herein to challenge the order of the Revisional Authority by filing substantive application before the Tribunal. As a result thereof, the respondent had filed OA No.1348/97. The respondent had, thus, filed the OA in question in which impugned order dated 5.4.1999 is now passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the petitioner cannot take advantage of the observations made by the Supreme Court in its order dated 7.4.1999, which was passed in altogether different circumstances, namely, the power of the Tribunal to pass such an order in the contempt petition. When substantive application was filed by the respondent under Section 19 of the Act, the Tribunal could go into this question.

8. Coming to the propriety of the orders passed by the Revisional Authority, it is obvious that first time when the Revisonal Authority passed the order, it reduced the punishment from removal to that of reduction in pay scale by two stages giving specific reasons which are already extracted above. Had the respondent not challenged the said order, he would have been inflicted with this punishment only. The plea of the respondent was that the entire inquiry was illegal as violative of principles of natural justice and even otherwise there was no sufficient material to hold the charges as proved against him. Thus, it was the respondent who was aggrieved against even the lesser punishment awarded by the Revisional Authority and filed the first OA. Finding that the matter was not dealt with properly by the Revisional Authority in so far as the aforesaid contentions of the respondent are concerned, the matter was remitted back to the Revisional Authority. If the Revisional Authority after due consideration still did not find any merit in the aforesaid contentions of the respondent, there was no reason now to take a different view in so far as the penalty is concerned. Merely because there was a change of officer who was to act as the Revisional Authority, the successor Revisional Authority should not have brushed aside the opinion of the first Revisional Authority while reducing the punishment. What was necessary, in these circumstances, was to at least give the reasons for doing so. Why such a departure is made is not stated in the impugned order passed by the Revisional Authority except mentioning that nature of charges is grave.

9. We may also note that the respondent has since retired from service, in January 2007, on attaining the age of superannuation as he was allowed to continue in service by orders dated 28.9.1993. The respondent has, thus, performed his duties till the age of superannuation. It would be travesty of justice if at this stage the order of removal, which was passed way back in the year 1988 is revived and the respondent is treated as not in service and the service of 18-19 years rendered by him is totally wiped out for the purpose of terminal benefits, which would be the only consequence after his retirement. Weighed with all these considerations, we are not inclined to interfere with the directions given by the Tribunal in exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This petition is accordingly dismissed. The terminal benefits shall be worked out and paid to the respondent within two months from today.

(A.K. SIKRI) JUDGE April 21, 2008 (J.R. MIDHA) HP.