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Date of Decision: 02.05.2008 #Ex. Head Constable No.83001274
Bazir Singh ....Petitioner ! Through: Ms.Jyoti Singh with
Mr.Ankur Chhibber
Mr.Yadunath Singh, Dy. Commandant, BSF
JUDGMENT
2.To be referred to the Reporter or not? 3.Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
A.K. SIKRI, J.
:
1. The petitioner was enrolled in the Border Security Force (BSF) in the year 1983. In February 2004, when he was working as Head Constable, orders dated 13.2.2004 came to be passed, compulsorily retiring him 2008:DHC:1539 from service. These orders are passed pursuant to the Court of Inquiry convened against the petitioner on the charge that during the subsistence of his first marriage, he performed second marriage in the year 1997, which amounted to bigamy and therefore, was a conduct punishable under Rule 7 of the BSF Rules as well as Section 494 of the IPC. The petitioner has filed this petition challenging the aforesaid order of compulsory retirement after his appeal against the said order has also been rejected by the Appellate Authority vide orders dated 19.7.2004.
2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner got married to Smt.Rajwanti Devi in the year 1981. He has one daughter and one son from this wedlock. It is also not in dispute that Smt. Rajwanti Devi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘first wife’) is still alive and the marital status between the two also stands intact as the said marriage is not dissolved by a decree passed by any court of law.
3. During the subsistence of this marriage, the petitioner concededly got married to one Ms. Shephali in July 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘second wife’). The explanation of the petitioner, however, is that in the year 1997 his first wife met with a severe accident and on account of this she suffered major injuries in her backbone as a result of which she has been rendered totally disabled. Due to spinal injury she is bed ridden and is, therefore, not able to look after either herself or her husband or her children. After this accident of the first wife, the family was passing through a very bad phase and it was becoming impossible to take care of the children as the petitioner’s duty did not allow him any time for looking after his children or his bed ridden wife. When it became unmanageable to control the household work, the first wife herself suggested that the petitioner should get married to another lady so that there is some female member in the house who would be able to look after the first wife as well as two small children. As it is not acceptable in villages to keep a lady to look after the household work without giving her a legal status, the petitioner under these compelling circumstances agreed to get married, though reluctantly, on great insistence of his first wife itself. It was under these circumstances that he performed second marriage and the first wife even gave an affidavit of no objection. The petitioner did not know that this was any kind of offence or a wrong in the eyes of law and his entire action was bona fide. He further alleges that he has been taking due care of both his wives and none of them has any problem with each other. The family is now running smoothly and the first wife of the petitioner as well as the children from the first wedlock are being properly looked after. However, the petitioner was shocked to learn that a Court of Inquiry had been ordered against him for his marriage to second wife.
4. The court of inquiry assembled at headquarters, 182 Battalion, BSF, on 27.6.2003. One ASI/Clerk B.K. Pradhan was examined. The Court of Inquiry gave its findings that the petitioner had married second time while his first wife was living. The contention of the petitioner that his first wife had given no objection did not convince the Court of Inquiry, which was of the opinion that it was not a ground to condone the lapse on the part of the petitioner since second marriage was illegal. It, thus, returned the finding that the petitioner was blameworthy for bigamy under BSF Rule 7 and punishable under Section 494 IPC.
5. On the basis of these findings and opinion of the court of inquiry, the petitioner was served with show-cause notice dated 13.9.2003 under BSF Rule 26 asking him to submit his defence against the proposed action of compulsory retirement. Thirty days’ time was given to the petitioner for this purpose. The petitioner gave reply to the said show cause notice. He admitted that he has solemnized second marriage but gave his explanation that it was due to compelling domestic circumstances which have already been noted above. The petitioner thereafter received order dated 13.2.2004 compulsorily retiring him from service with effect from 31.3.2004 under Rule 26 of the BSF Rules read with Rule 40 of the CCS(Pension) Rules, 1972. He preferred appeal dated 8.5.2004 to the Inspector General (Frontier Headquarters, Shilong, which has been rejected by the Appellate Authority vide orders dated 19.7.2004.
6. The admitted fact, as narrated above, is that the petitioner married second time even when his first wife is living. Therefore, the charge is, in fact, admitted by the petitioner which is also clear from the fact that the entire endeavour of the petitioner before the court of inquiry was to justify the circumstances in which he had to marry second time. However, we are of the opinion that such a justification would be of no avail. Bigamy is an offence punishable under Section 494 IPC, which reads as under:-
7. It also amounts to misconduct for a public servant/civil servant, who performs second marriage during the life time of his first wife and subsistence of first marriage. Therefore, merely because the petitioner has some explanation or his wife gave no objection to the second marriage would not be a ground to condone this misconduct and illegality. It is also no defence to state that such an act was bona fide and he was not aware of the consequences. The petitioner being a government employee is supposed to know the Conduct Rules and also the law of the land.
8. Faced with the aforesaid stark reality and legal position in so far as the conduct of the petitioner is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner tried to find loopholes in the Court of Inquiry as well as the orders of punishment. It was argued, in the first instance, that the order of compulsory retirement could not have been passed in violation of BSF Rule 7(b) read with Rule 21(2) of the CCS(Conduct) Rules. It was argued that Rule 7 is contained in Chapter II which relates to ‘Recruitment’. Therefore, the disqualification mentioned in this rule would apply to the acts committed at the time of recruitment and appointment and not subsequently. It was also submitted that Rule 21(2) of the CCS(Conduct) Rules also did not have any application as BSF Act and Rules framed thereunder contain all necessary substantive provisions and were exhaustive in nature. Chapter III of the Act lays down various offences for which alone an employee of BSF can be punished and penalised. The offence of bigamy is not an offence stipulated under the BSF Act. The submission is that in view of exhaustive nature of the Act, provisions of CCS (Conduct) Rules would have no application.
9. We are not impressed by this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Rule 7 of the BSF Rules reads as under:- “7.Disqualifications.—(1) No person – (a) Who has entered into or contracted a marriage with a person having a spouse living, or (b) who having a spouse, has entered into or contracted a marriage with any person, shall be eligible for appointment into Force: Provided that the Central Government may if satisfied that such marriage is permissible under the personal law applicable to such person and the other party to the marriage and that there are other grounds for so doing, exempt any person from the operating of this rule.]” No doubt, this Rule is contained in the Chapter ‘Recruitment’ and stipulates that any person who enters into marriage while having a spouse shall not be eligible for appointment. However, if a person with two wives is not eligible even for appointment, obviously he is not permitted to do so after getting appointment. It would be totally absurd to say that he would be entitled to perform second marriage after he enters the service. The aforesaid rule has to be given pragmatic and constructive interpretation in order to advance and subserve the objective with which the said rule is inserted. The spirit and purport behind the Rule cannot be negated by such a hyper technical approach which the petitioner seeks to advance. The rationale and objective of the Rule is abundantly clear, namely, a person with two wives when not made even eligible for appointment and recruitment to the service, he cannot enter into second marriage after his appointment as well. When an employee does so, he would be rendered ineligible to continue in the employment, as that is the basic eligibility condition for the appointment itself.
10. The rule of purposive interpretation would clearly get attracted in a case like this. In Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation & Anr. V. Nilaybhai R. Thakore & Anr., AIR 2000 SC 114, Rule 7 of Rules for Admission to Smt. N.H.L. Municipal Medical College defining “local students” was in issue, and it was observed as under:- “Before proceeding to interpret Rule 7 in the manner which we think is the correct interpretation, we have to bear in mind that it is not the jurisdiction of the court to enter into the arena of the legislative prerogative of enacting laws. However, keeping in mind the fact that the Rule in question is only a subordinate legislation and by declaring the Rule ultra vires, as has been done by the High Court, we would be only causing considerable damage to the cause for which the Municipality had enacted this Rule. We, therefore, think it appropriate to rely upon the famous and oft-quoted principle relied by Lord Denning in the case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd.
V. Asher (1994) 2 All ER 155 wherein he held: “When a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hand and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament and then he must supplement the written words so as to give ‘force and life’ to the intention of the Legislature. A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases”. This statement of law made by Lord Denning has been consistently followed by this Court starting in the case of M. Pentaih and Ors. V. Muddala Veeramallappa and Ors. AIR 1961 SC 1107 and followed as recently as in the case of S.Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1996 SC 2184.”
11. The three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Sanjay Dhar v. J & K Public Service Commission & Anr., AIR 2000 SC 3238 observed that Rule 9 of the J&K Service (Judicial) Recruitment Rules, 1967 must receive a purposive interpretation. Purposive interpretation enable ascertaining the purpose of enactment, the object sought to be achieved and the mischief sought to be taken care of or prevented.
12. In Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 1489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the dicta in respect of principles of interpretation, and the same reads as under:-
78. However, the pith of this statement has now found form in the doctrine of purposive construction, as accepted by this Court in several cases.
79. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal and Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 638, while interpreting the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the rule of purposive construction was followed.
80. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424 this Court stated: “...If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act...”
81. In 'The Interpretation and Application of Statutes', Reed Dickerson, at p.135 discussed the subject while dealing with the importance of context of the statute in the following terms: “... The essence of the language is to reflect, express, and perhaps even affect the conceptual matrix of established ideas and values that identifies the culture to which it belongs. For this reason, language has been called "conceptual map of human experience.”
82. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh (1990) 3 SCC 682, this Court referred to the following passage from Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory Law of Law: “…The legal act applying a legal norm may be performed in such a way that it conforms (a) with the one or the other of the different meanings of the legal norm, (b) with the will of the norm- creating authority that is to be determined somehow, (c) with the expression which the norm- creating authority has chosen, (d) with the one or the other of the contradictory norms, or (e) the concrete case to which the two contradictory norms refer Page 1235 may be decided under the assumption that the two contradictory norms annul each other. In all these cases, the law to be applied constitutes only a frame within which several applications are possible, whereby every act is legal that stays within the frame.” [See also High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat (2003) 4 SCC 712, Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 589 and Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda (2004) 5 SCC 385] xx xx xx
92. It is also a well-settled principle of law that common sense construction rule should be taken recourse to in certain cases as has been adumbrated in Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) Volume 44(1) (Reissue). We would refer to the said principle in some details later.”
13. We can even apply ‘mischief’ rule of interpretation. What is the mischief which Rule 7(b) wants to do away with. Since bigamy is a criminal offence, it is this mischief which this rule ensures that the same be not permitted. We, therefore, are of the opinion that Rule 7(b), which does not permit bigamy, has been violated by the petitioner.
14. In view of our answer to the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is not even necessary to go into the question as to whether Rule 21(2) of the CCS(Conduct) Rules applies or not. However, we may only note that the learned counsel for the respondent had pointed out that CCS (Conduct) Rules are also applicable to BSF personnel being employees of the Central Government in view of Rules 181 and 182 of the BSF Rules, 1969, which read as under:-
It was pointed out that provisions in BSF Act deal with offences and not the misconducts and therefore, CCS (Conduct) Rules shall continue to apply. Prima facie we find force in this submission.
15. Next contention of the learned counsel for the respondent was that a proper trial by Security Force Court should have taken place and the petitioner should not have been compulsorily retired on the basis of court of inquiry and show cause notice. This submission was premised on Section 46 of the BSF Act, which, inter alia, stipulates that any person subject to the said Act, who commits any civil offence, shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence under the BSF Act and if charged therewith under the said Act shall be liable to be tried by Security Force Court. Submission was that since second marriage is considered to be a civil offence, as per the provisions of Section 46, the petitioner should have been tried by Security Force Court.
16. There are at least two reasons to reject this contention, namely, (a) in the first instance it is to be noted that in the court of inquiry convened to go into the allegations of bigamy, the petitioner had virtually accepted the fact that he indulged in the second marriage. The allegation on the basis of which court of inquiry was held was, thus, admitted by him. In such a case there was hardly any reason to try him by Security Force Court; (b) the petitioner is not punished on the basis of any departmental inquiry for which trial by Security Force Court was necessary. Show cause notice was issued under Rule 26 of BSF Rules which deals with the retirement of the enrolled person on the ground of unsuitability. This rule is in the following terms:-
It, thus, deals with administrative termination of service and not for the offence under the BSF Act. The act of bigamy is not the offence under the BSF Act, but is a misconduct on the basis of which opinion was formed by the authorities that the petitioner was rendered unsuitable to be retained in the service. For this purpose, the Security Force Court was not required to be convened.
17. The last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that an accused can be tried for an offence of bigamy only on the basis of the complaint filed by the first wife and not otherwise. That may be so. However, that would not mean that a person who performs second marriage when his first wife is alive has not committed the offence of bigamy. It would only mean that such a person cannot be tried for that offence by a criminal court as for such a trial mandatory required is the complaint of the first wife. Therefore, the petitioner could only save himself from criminal prosecution under Section 494 of the IPC. It, however, would not wash away the misconduct in so far as relation between the employer and the employee is concerned. Therefore, the employer would be entitled to take appropriate action for such misconduct. For this, the employer does not require consent of first wife.
18. Learned counsel for the petitioner had also made a fervent plea that the order of compulsory retirement was harsh keeping in view the circumstances in which the petitioner was forced to marry again and submitted that lenient view should have been taken by the authorities. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent argued, and rightly so, that the services of the petitioner were not terminated but he was compulsorily retired because of which the petitioner was not only able to get all terminal benefits but pension as well.
19. No other argument was pressed before us. As we have not found any substance in any of the arguments raised, we dismiss this petition but refrain to pass any orders as to costs.
(A.K. SIKRI) JUDGE May 02, 2008 (J.M. MALIK ) HP.