Full Text
W.P.(C) No.3608/1989
Date of Decision: 5th May, 2008.
SH. C V MADAN, S/O SH. T D MADAN, R/O C-46, VIKASPURI, NEW DELHI-110018 ..... Petitioner
Through Ms. Avnish Ahlawat, Advocate with Ms. Latika Choudhary, Ms. Nidhi Gupta and Ms. Simran, Advocates
JUDGMENT
1. STATE BANK OF PATIALA THROUGH ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, HEAD OFFICE, THE MALL, PATIALA-147001.
2. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, STATE BANK OF PATIALA,
3. THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF STATE BANK OF PATIALA THROUGH MANAGING DIRECTOR,
4. THE ZONAL MANAGER (DELHI), STATE BANK OF PATIALA, C-31, CONNAUGHT PLACE, NEW DELHI-110001...... Respondents Through Ms. Raavi Birbal with Mr. Raj Birbal Advocates for the respondents CORAM: HON’BLE MR.
JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA 2008:DHC:1546
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? SANJIV KHANNA, J:
1. The petitioner Mr. C V Madan by way of the present writ petition has challenged the Order of dismissal dated 21.12.1987 and the appellate orders confirming the said dismissal. The petitioner was working as Branch Manager of Janak Puri branch of State Bank of Patiala at the time of his dismissal.
2. I need not examine the factual details in great depth and detail in view of the narrow controversy on the basis of which I propose to dispose of the present writ petition. It is admitted by the respondent State Bank of Patiala that the petitioner was not furnished a copy of the enquiry report and that the Disciplinary Authority had disagreed with some of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer but before passing the punishment order, the Disciplinary Authority did not issue show cause notice or call for any explanation from the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard has rightly relied upon judgments of the Supreme Court. In the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. Kunj Behari Misra (1998) 7 SCC 84, the Supreme Court examined the question of the procedure to be adopted by the Disciplinary Authority when the said authority differs from the report/conclusions of the Enquiry Officer in respect of all or some of the charges and wants to give a contrary finding. It was observed that the relevant regulations did not specifically state what procedure should be adopted when the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings or some of the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The Supreme Court referred to an earlier decision in the case of Union of India Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan 1991 (1) SCC 588. Reference was also made to decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad Vs. B. Karunakar 1993 4 SCC 727 and it was the observed that the Disciplinary Authority before finally disagreeing with the enquiry officer must give to the delinquent officer a hearing if it wants to overrule the Enquiry Officer in respect of all or some of his findings. It was observed that in departmental proceedings the findings given by the Disciplinary Authority are important and it would be unfair and iniquitous that the charged officer who has wholly or partly succeeded before an Enquiry Officer should be deprived of right to representation before the Disciplinary Authority, before the said authority differs with the enquiry officer’s report.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent-State Bank of Patiala did not dispute the legal ratio laid in the decision but has urged that the Doctrine of Prejudice applies. It was submitted that the petitioner must show and establish prejudice caused before a writ is allowed on the ground that the Disciplinary Authority had disagreed with some or all findings given by the Enquiry Officer and did not follow the procedure of giving notice and hearing before passing the final order. Reliance in this regard is placed upon decision and the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL (supra) wherein the Doctrine of Prejudice was referred to. I may note here that the said case was also relied upon and referred to by the Supreme Court in the case of Kunj Behari Misra case (supra) but without reference to the Doctrine of Prejudice. Kunj Behari Misra (Supra) was in turn followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Yoginath D Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. JT 1999 (6) SC 62 and it was observed as under: “28. In view of the provisions contained in the statutory rule extracted above, it is open to the Disciplinary Authority either to agree with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority or disagree with those findings. If it does not agree with the findings of the Inquiring Authority, it may record its own findings. Where the Inquiring Authority has found the delinquent officer guilty of the charges framed against him and the Disciplinary Authority agrees with those findings, there would arise no difficulty. So also, if the Inquiring Authority has held the charges proved, but the Disciplinary Authority disagrees and records a finding that the charges were not established, there would arise no difficulty. Difficulties have arisen in all those cases in which the Inquiring Authority has recorded a positive finding that the charges were not established and the delinquent officer was recommended to be exonerated, but the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with those findings and recorded its own findings that the charges were established and the delinquent officer was liable to be punished. This difficulty relates to the question of giving an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer at that stage. Such an opportunity may either be provided specifically by the rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution or the Disciplinary Authority may, of its own, provide such an opportunity. Where the rules are in this regard silent and the Disciplinary Authority also does not give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer and records findings different from those of the Inquiring Authority that the charges were established, “an opportunity of hearing” may have to be read into the rule by which the procedure for dealing with the Inquiring Authority’s report is provided principally because it would be contrary to the principles of natural justice if a delinquent officer, who has already been held to be “not guilty” by the Inquiring Authority, is found “guilty” without being afforded an opportunity of hearing on the basis of the same evidence and material on which a finding of “not guilty” has already been recorded.”
4. In another paragraph it was observed as under: “ In view of the above, a delinquent employee has the right of hearing not only during the enquiry proceedings conducted by the Enquiry Officer into the charges levelled against him but also at the stage at which those findings are considered by the Disciplinary Authority and the latter, namely, the Disciplinary Authority forms a tentative opinion that it does not agree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. If the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are in favour of the delinquent and it has been held that the charges are not proved, it is all the more necessary to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee before reversing those findings. The formation of opinion should be tentative and not final. It is at this stage that the delinquent employee should be given an opportunity of hearing after he is informed of the reasons on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority has proposed to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. This is in consonance with the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as it provides that a person shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. So long as a final decision is not taken in the matter, the enquiry shall be deemed to be pending. Mere submission of findings to the Disciplinary Authority does not bring about the closure of the enquiry proceedings. The enquiry proceedings would come to an end only when the findings have been considered by the Disciplinary Authority and the charges are either held to be not proved or found to be proved and in that event punishment is inflicted upon the delinquent. That being so, the “right to be heard” would be available to the delinquent up to the final stage. This right being a constitutional right of the employee cannot be taken away by any legislative enactment or service rule including rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution.”
5. One of the contentions raised by the management in the case of Yoginath D Bagde (supra) was that the Disciplinary Authority in the said case had given opportunity of hearing to the employee before finally suggesting to the State Government to dismiss the said employee from service. It was stated that the requirements of the principles of natural justice were fully complied with and reasons why the Disciplinary Authority had not agreed with the Enquiry Officer were communicated to the employee to whom notice was issued to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. It was also stated that the employee had right to reply to the reasons given by the Disciplinary Authority for disagreeing with the findings given by the inquiry officer. The said contention was rejected by the Supreme Court for reasons given in paragraph 39 of the judgment that the final decision with regard to the charges leveled against the respondent had already been taken by the Disciplinary Authority without providing opportunity and the show cause only in respect of the decision to impose major punishment. It was observed that in disciplinary proceedings, the decision taken by the Disciplinary Authority is of utmost importance and before the said decision is taken an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent should be provided as there is always some possibility of convincing the Disciplinary Authority that the findings already recorded by the inquiry officer were just and proper. Post decisional opportunity of hearing though available in certain cases was held to be of no avail in such cases.
6. Doctrine of Prejudice was specifically referred to and considered in the case of State Bank of India & Ors. Vs. K P Narayanan Kutty JT 2003 (1) SCC 479. The Management-respondent, in the said case had relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Union Bank of India Vs. Vishwa Mohan (1998) 4 SCC 310 wherein the Management’s plea on the basis of Doctrine of Prejudice was accepted. Vishwa Mohan’s case relates to failure to supply enquiry report. The Supreme Court however in the case of K.P. Narayanan Kutty (supra) rejected the said contention in view of the specific decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kunj Behari (supra) and it was observed as under: “19. ……………………………. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the Enquiry Officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the Disciplinary Authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the Enquiry Officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the Disciplinary Authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.”
7. The Enquiry Officer in his report has referred to various charges in depth and detail. He has bifurcated the charges also. The petitioner was found guilty of some charge but in respect of some other charges or part thereof, he was exonerated. Inquiry Officer gave reasons for his decision. The respondent-State Bank of Patiala has not been able to pinpoint and show that no prejudice was caused to the petitioner by failure to issue show cause notice before the Disciplinary Authority disagreed and recorded contrary findings. In fact the Disciplinary Authority has specifically mentioned in paragraph 2 of his order dated 30th December, 1987 that the Enquiry Officer had held that the charges (1), 2(c) and 2(d) were partly proved and charge 2(b) was not proved. Prejudice caused in such cases is almost certain. I am therefore not inclined to agree with the contention of the counsel for the respondent/management that in the present case no prejudice was caused to the petitioner by the failure of the Disciplinary Authority to issue notice or disagreement note and to hear the petitioner before the order of dismissal dated 21st December, 1987 was passed.
8. The next question is what direction and relief should be granted in the present case. It is well settled that when an order is set aside for failure to comply with principles of natural justice, fresh proceedings can be initiated or the earlier proceedings can be continued from the stage when the violation had taken place. In the present case I also find that the petitioner is involved in a criminal case and is facing trial on account of alleged disbursement of loan of Rs.3.75 crores to another party. Learned counsel for the respondent management has further pointed out that the petitioner was suspended after the factum of alleged disbursement of loan of Rs. 3.75 crores came to their knowledge. As the petitioner was dismissed from service by the impugned order dated 21st December, 1987, no departmental proceedings in the said case were instituted and continued. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, states that an application for quashing a criminal case has been filed before the High Court but it is admitted there is no order in favour of the petitioner. In these circumstances I am inclined to follow the procedure adopted by the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL (Supra) wherein it was directed that on reinstatement of an employee, back wages in all cases may not be justified as it will reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. It was also stated that theory of reasonable opportunity and principles of natural justice have been evolved to hold the Rule of Law to vindicate rights. Accordingly, in para 31 of the judgment it was observed as under: “31. …….Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer’s report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.”
9. The respondent/management will follow the procedure as directed in the case of Managing Director, ECIL (Supra) and accordingly further steps will be taken. The writ petition is disposed of with the directions given above. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
SANJIV KHANNA, J. MAY 05, 2008 Vld/P/vld