Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. M/S. Stiefel und Schuh India Ltd. & Ors.

Delhi High Court · 13 May 2008 · 2008:DHC:1626
S. Ravindra Bhat
CS(OS) 2062/1996
2008:DHC:1626
civil appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that a suit instituted by a non-financial institution before the establishment of the Debt Recovery Tribunal cannot be transferred to the Tribunal after assignment of debt to a bank, and the civil court retains jurisdiction.

Full Text
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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: May 13, 2008
CS(OS) 2062/1996
KOTAK MAHINDRA BANK LTD. ..... Plaintiff
Through Mr.B.L.Wali, Advocate.
VERSUS
M/S. STIEFEL UND SCHUH INDIA LTD. & ORS....... Defendants
Through Mr. Deepak Dhingra, Advocate for defendants5 & 7.
Mr. Kewal Singh Ahuja, Advocate for defendant No.6.
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Ghosh, Advocate for the Official Liquidator.
Coram: Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat
JUDGMENT

1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes % 13.05.2008 Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat: (OPEN COURT) IAs 1188/2008 and 3537/2008

1. This order will dispose of two applications filed by the plaintiff, i.e IA Nos 1188/2008 and 3537/2008. The first application is under Section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the second, under Section 18 of the said Act. CS(OS) 2062/1996 1 of 5 2008:DHC:1626

2. Detailed facts are not required, for the purposes of this order. This suit was filed by State Bank of India Home Finance Ltd, for foreclosure of a mortgage of immovable property and recovery of Rs. 2,53,76,136/- under Order 34, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure, (CPC). During course of the proceedings, several developments took place. Importantly, the original plaintiff assigned the debt to the State Bank of India on 17-2-2004, as part of its assignment of various assets owned by it. This was noticed by this court, in the order on IA 2269/2005. By another deed of assignment, dated 23-3-2006, the State Bank of India assigned all rights, interest titles and claims in respect of the transaction and advances extended to the first defendant, to the applicant, M/s Kotak Mahindra Bank. After noticing this event, the court, by order dated 26th July, 2007, substituted the said bank, i.e Kotak Mahindra Bank.

3. The substituted bank contends that the amounts due from the first defendant are debts, in terms of Section 2(g) of the Act. It is further urged that the bank is defined as such under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and also under Section 2(d)(2) of the Act. Therefore, this court, it is contended, should not entertain the suit any longer, but transfer it to the Tribunal created under the Act.

4. Section 2(g) of the Act defines a ‘debt’ to mean any liability which is claimed as dues from any person by a bank, FI or by a consortium of banks. CS(OS) 2062/1996 2 of 5 It covers secured, unsecured and assigned debts. It also covers debts payable under a decree, arbitration award or under a mortgage.

5. Chapter III of the Act is concerned with jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal. Section 17 refers to jurisdiction of DRT. Section 17 provides that the tribunal (hereafter “DRT”) shall exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and Financial Institutions, for recovery of debts due to them. Section 18 reads as follows: Section 18: Bar of jurisdiction—On and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in Section 17.” Section 31 of the Act states that every suit or other proceeding pending before any court immediately before the establishment of a tribunal under the Act, over which the tribunal would have to exercise jurisdiction if such action had to be initiated after its establishment, would stand transferred to the tribunal. The question is whether the present suit has to be transferred under any of the provisions of the Act.

5. There is no dispute that the original plaintiff in this case was not a financial institution. The assignee, i.e the State Bank of India, was a bank; so is the present plaintiff, Kotak Mahindra Bank. Facially, the argument that this court does not have jurisdiction is attractive. The bar under Section 18 CS(OS) 2062/1996 3 of 5 does appear to be absolute. Yet, the phraseology of Section 31 is such that only cases pending on the date of establishment of the tribunal can be transferred. It is nobody’s case that the tribunal was established recently, or that this suit was filed when it was so established. The applicant plaintiff’s contention is premised on the court losing jurisdiction.

6. Now a plain reading of Section 18 would suggest that the plaintiff’s contention appears to be sound and feasible. Yet, a deeper analysis would belie the argument. Parliament intended only one species of action, i.e cases pending as on date of establishment of the tribunal, under Section 31 to be transferred. Neither Section 17 nor Section 18 anywhere provide, nor does any other provision of the Act, state whether acquisition of a debt, and an attendant competently instituted litigation such as a recovery suit, would be subject to transfer. Here, the original creditor-plaintiff was clearly no bank or financial institution entitled to invoke provisions of the Act; this suit was therefore competent and maintainable. It is only a supervening or intervening event which has raised this controversy, whereby the assignee plaintiff has acquired the asset (i.e the debt of the first defendant). It could well be that this might be later assigned to another entity, which may not be a bank or financial institution. If the plaintiff’s logic were to be accepted, in such event, the matter would have to be sent back to a civil court. Obviously, such anomalous situations were not contemplated by Parliament. Another aspect; if Parliament had intended that in the eventuality banks CS(OS) 2062/1996 4 of 5 acquired or became assignees of debts which were subject to competently instituted litigation, and such litigation were to be transferred to the tribunal, such an intention would have been more explicit. It is well settled that courts should not readily infer ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts, unless there are express provisions or an inescapable implication is shown (Dhulabhai v. State of M. P. (AIR 1969 SC 78; Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke (1976) 1 SCC 496; Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. City of Jabalpur Corpn (1977) 2 SCC 472 Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta (1979) 3 SCC 83 and Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava v. Union of India (1988) 1 SCC 681).

7. The structure of the Act, and Section 31, does not permit an interpretation that suits of this kind can be transferred, as is suggested. Also, the subject matter of transfer having been dealt with and enacted by Parliament, under Section 31, this court cannot act outside the statute and send this case, on a mere reading of Section 18.

8. For the above reasons, it is held that these applications are unmerited. IA Nos 1188/2008 and 3537/2008 are accordingly dismissed. CS(OS) 2062/1996 List on 20th August, 2008.

S. RAVINDRA BHAT,J

MAY 13, 2008