A.F. Ferguson & Co. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.3 & Anr.

Delhi High Court · 21 May 2008 · 2008:DHC:1716-DB
CHIEF JUSTICE; S. MURALIDHAR
LPA No.21/2007 and LPA 185/2007
2008:DHC:1716-DB
labor appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that an Executive Secretary performing primarily clerical duties is a 'workman' under the Industrial Disputes Act, and her illegal termination warrants full compensation without reduction.

Full Text
Translation output
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
LPA No.21/2007 and LPA 185/2007 LPA No.21/2007
A.F. Ferguson & Co. …..Appellant
Through: Mr.C.D. Mulherkar, Advocate.
VERSUS
Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.3 & Anr. …Respondents
Through: Mr.Yakesh Anand, Advocate for respondent No.2.
LPA No.185/2007
Smt.Kanwaljeet Ghura …Appellant
Through: Mr.Yakesh Anand, Advocate
VERSUS
A.F. Ferguson & Co. …..Respondent
Through: Mr.C.D. Mulherkar, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR
1.Whether reporters of the local newspapers be allowed to see the
JUDGMENT
? Yes
2.To be referred to the Reporter or not ? No

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ? No LPA No.21/2007 & LPA No.185/2007 2008:DHC:1716-DB JUDGMENT 21-05-2008

1. Both the management and the workman have preferred appeals against the judgment and order of the learned single Judge passed in WP(C) No.2649/2002 dated December 15, 2006.

2. Briefly stated the facts leading to the appeals are as under:- A.F. Ferguson & Co. (appellant in LPA No.21/2007 and respondent in LPA No.185/2007 – hereinafter referred to as management) is a firm of Chartered Accountants that has two main divisions, namely, the Audit Division and the Consultancy Division. Smt.Kanwaljeet Ghura (respondent No.2 in LPA No.21/2007 and appellant in LPA No.185/2007 – hereinafter referred to as workman) was appointed as an Executive Secretary with the Consultancy Division vide an appointment letter dated November 12, 1986. The employment agreement contained a clause that the same could be terminated by three months notice on either side. The workman’s services were terminated with effect from March 10, 1992 vide letter dated February 17, 1992. She made representations to the management vide letters dated February 28, 1992 and March 20, 1992. The management revoked the earlier letter of termination and extended her services upto March 31, 1992. Finally, her services were terminated with effect from April 1, 1992 vide letter dated March 31, 1992. The workman raised an industrial dispute alleging that her termination was illegal and the same was referred to the Labour Court in the following terms: “Whether the termination of services of Smt.Kanwaljeet Ghura is illegal and/or unjustified and if so, to what relief is she entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?”

3. The designation of the workman was Executive Secretary and she was attached to Shri Ashok Behl, Director. The workman claimed that she performed tasks like taking shorthand dictation, typing on electronic typewriter or computer, handling of correspondence, fixing of appointments, attending to filing work, handling petty cash and handling of operation of PABX Board etc. Therefore, she is covered under the definition of “workman” within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Her work and conduct throughout her service was satisfactory and the management was never given a chance for any complaint whatsoever. The management, however, abruptly terminated her services without any rhyme or reason with effect from March 10, 1992 and asked her to collect three months’ salary in lieu of the three months’ notice as mentioned in the employment agreement. As the termination of services was illegal, she made representations to the management vide letter dated February 28, 1992 and March 20, 1992. The management did not reply to any of her letters but extended her service upto March 31, 1992. Finally, the management terminated her services on April 1, 1992. The workman represented against the termination to the management vide letter dated April 2, 1992 but the same was never replied to by the management. The management had terminated her services because they wanted to get a fresh hand at cheaper rate. The employees junior to her were retained in service while she was retrenched from service in violation of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. Neither one month’s notice in writing as provided under Section 25-F was given to her nor she was paid retrenchment compensation. Three months pay was paid to her only on June 2, 1992 whereas her services were terminated on April 1, 1992. She, therefore, contended that termination of her services is illegal and unjustified.

4. The management resisted the workman’s claim on the ground, inter alia, that she was appointed as an Executive Secretary and she is not covered under the definition of “workman” as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. As an Executive Secretary, she was responsible for maintaining liaison with clients, fixing up appointments and ensuring meetings, etc. Besides, she was responsible for ensuring preparation and submission of reports to the clients within the specified time, looking after travel bookings, hotel bookings for some of the parties for whom the Consultancy Division was working. Taking of dictation in shorthand and transcribing the same or typing were only incidental to her duties. The duties performed by her were of such nature, which disentitles her to take shelter of definition of “workman” given under the Industrial Disputes Act. Her services were terminated because she had not been discharging her duties upto the expectation of the management. The initial letter of termination was revoked as she approached the management for settlement. The matter was settled and after making payment of agreed amount, her services were terminated vide letter dated March 31, 1992 with effect from April 1, 1992. In this way she had already settled her dispute with the management in full and final and she could not raise any dispute now. It was also contended that the firm of the management is not covered under the definition of “industry”. Reference was thus bad and it was made without jurisdiction. The management, therefore, prayed for dismissal of her statement of claim.

5. On consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the Labour Court recorded a categorical finding that Smt.Kanwaljeet Ghura was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the management – firm was an industry applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and others reported in (1978) 2 SCC 213. The Labour Court also rejected the objection raised by the management that the workman had settled her accounts with the management and received a payment in full and final settlement on June 2, 1992. The Labour Court then went on to hold that having regard to the nature of the post held by the workman it would not be appropriate to grant reinstatement and awarded a sum of Rs.[5] lacs as compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages.

6. The management filed a Writ Petition being WP(C) No.2649/2002 challenging the award dated October 22, 2001 passed by the Labour Court, which came to be decided by the learned single Judge vide the judgment and order dated December 15, 2006. The learned single Judge confirmed the findings of the Labour Court that Smt.Kanwaljeet Ghura was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the termination was illegal and in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, but reduced the amount of compensation from Rs.[5] lacs to Rs.2.[5] lacs.

7. Shri C.D.Mulherkar, learned counsel appearing for the management strenuously contended that being an Executive Secretary it was the duty of the employee to supervise and control the work of various clerical staff, typists, stenographers etc. in the organization. She was also performing administrative duties insofar as she had the authority to independently distribute / assign work to the staff junior to her including part time typists etc. As an Executive Secretary she had also the special responsibility of ensuring that the reports were prepared and submitted to the various clients of the management within the specified time. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the decision reached by the Labour Court and which has been accepted by the learned single Judge is erroneous and contrary to the evidence on record. In the alternative learned counsel submitted that the workman had settled all her claims with the management and thus there was no dispute leave alone an industrial dispute and, therefore, the entire proceedings were without jurisdiction. Learned counsel also submitted that the management being a firm of chartered accountants doing professional activities is not an “industry” as defined under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are not applicable to it.

8. In reply, Shri Yakesh Anand, learned counsel for the workman, submitted that there is no ground warranting interference with the concurrent findings of fact that Smt.Kanwaljeet Ghura is a workman. He submitted that whether or not Smt.Kanwaljeet Ghura is a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be determined with reference to her duties and functions and the material placed on record unmistakably shows that the main function of the workman was only clerical, though incidentally and only for a fraction of time she was required to do some supervisory work and, therefore, it would have to be held that Smt.Kanwaljeet Ghura was an employee in clerical capacity and the mere fact that some supervisory duties were also carried out incidentally or for a small fraction of time will not convert her employment from clerk into supervisory capacity. He submitted that in view of authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and others (supra) there is no scope for contending that the management – firm is not an “industry” within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. As regards the issue of compensation, the learned counsel submitted that the learned single Judge ought not to have reduced the amount of compensation from Rs.[5] lacs to Rs.2.[5] lacs. He pointed out that the amount of back wages alone would be around Rs.[5] lacs and considering the fact that the workman would have continued in service for considerable long time had she been reinstated in service, the compensation of Rs.[5] lacs fixed by the Labour Court cannot be said to be excessive or unreasonable and the learned single Judge committed a serious error in reducing the compensation to Rs.2.[5] lacs.

9. The first issue, which falls for our consideration, is whether Smt.Kanwaljeet Ghura was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is undisputed that the designation of the workman was Executive Secretary and she was attached to Shri Ashok Behl, Director Management. However, it is well settled that the test to be applied to decide whether an employee is a ‘workman’ is to take into account his basic or primary duties and the dominant purpose of his employment. Incidental performance of supervisory duties will not impress his employment with the character of supervisory capacity. Where an employee has multifarious activities and a question is raised whether he is a ‘workman’ or someone other than a workman, the test that court must apply in order to determine the question is what was the primary, basic or dominant nature of duties for which the person whose status is under enquiry was employed. If he is incidentally asked to do some other work, which may not necessarily be in tune with the basic duties, the additional duties cannot change the character and status of the person concerned. A few extra duties would hardly be relevant to determine his status. The words like managerial or supervisory have to be understood in their proper connotation and their mere use should not detract from the truth.

10. In the present case, the evidence on record clearly shows that dominant nature of workman’s duties was clerical in nature. Her duties mainly consist of taking shorthand dictation, typing on electronic typewriter or computer, handling of correspondence, fixing of appointments, attending to filing work, handling petty cash and handling of operation of PABX board etc. The fact that some time she was distributing the work to other typists and supervising their work would not convert her position from a Private Secretary to the supervisory position. There is no evidence on record that she was authorized to take disciplinary action against the other employees for example typists. She was only authorized to take work from other typists. There is nothing to show that she used to write confidential reports of other employees working with the management. It is not the case of the management that she used to mark attendance of other employees. The fact that she was doing hotel reservation or travel reservation of her own is also of no consequence as she was doing so only as per the order of her superior i.e. Director Management Shri Ashok Behl in the present case. Essentially, a Private Secretary is a person attached to a senior officer, with the duty to arrange his official functions and to carry out his directions. Duties of a Private Secretary cannot be equated with administrative or managerial duties. Learned counsel was unable to show any incidence where post of a Private Secretary is equated to a managerial or administrative capacity. We, therefore, do not see any reason to interfere with this finding of the Labour Court that the respondent was a workman within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and which has been affirmed by the learned single Judge.

11. The next issue raised by the learned counsel for the management is as to whether the management – firm is covered under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act as held in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and others (supra). The word ‘industry’ as defined under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act has vide import and when the principles laid down in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and others (supra) are applied to the facts of the present case, certainly the conclusion would be that management is covered under the definition of ‘industry’ as it has been carrying on systematic activity organized by co-operations between the management and its employees for the services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes.

12. The submission of the management’s counsel regarding full and final settlement is not supported by any evidence. The management terminated the services of the workman vide letter dated February 17, 1992 against which the workman made representations vide letters dated February 28, 1992 and March 20, 1992. The management then decided to revoke the said letter dated February 17, 1992 upto March 31, 1992. Finally, her services were terminated vide letter dated March 31, 1992. In that letter it was stated that she was being paid three months pay in lieu of notice period and a cheque of Rs.26,336.55p was issued to her only on June 2, 1992. No break up of the said amount was given to her. In our opinion, there was no option with the workman but to receive her dues. In our opinion the mere acceptance of the dues by workman will not debar her from seeking the remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act and doctrine of estoppel has no application to a remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act.

13. The only question that remains to be considered is whether the learned single Judge was right in reducing the amount of compensation from Rs.[5] lacs to Rs.2.[5] lacs. It is undisputed that the workman was appointed and working with the management for about six years. Her services were terminated without following the principles of natural justice on April 1, 1992. As the termination was held to be violative of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act the workman would be ordinarily entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. The Labour Court, however, keeping in mind sensitive nature of post of a Secretary awarded compensation of Rs.[5] lacs in lieu of reinstatement and back wages. The amount of back wages itself comes to about Rs.[5] lacs and the workman would be certainly entitled to some compensation towards the loss of remainder of service. Under these circumstances, the amount of Rs.[5] lacs fixed by the Labour Court cannot be said to be excessive or unreasonable. The fact that the workman made no attempt to seek any alternative job cannot be a ground to deprive her of a just and correct compensation. We, therefore, hold that the compensation of Rs.[5] lacs granted by the Labour Court was reasonable and proper and the learned single Judge was not right in reducing the amount of compensation from Rs.[5] lacs to Rs.2.[5] lacs.

14. In the result, the appeal filed by the management is dismissed and the appeal filed by the workman is allowed. Under the directions of this Court, an amount of Rs.2.[5] lacs was deposited by the management with the Registrar General and the said amount is earning interest. The said amount of Rs.2.[5] lacs along with interest be released in favour of the workman. The management is given eight weeks time to make the payment of the balance amount of Rs.2.[5] lacs.

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CHIEF JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR, J May 21, 2008 “nm”