Jai Singh Panwar v. Gajendra Singh & Others

Delhi High Court · 19 May 2008 · 2008:DHC:1688
Vipin Sanghi
C.S. (OS) No.3351/1991
2008:DHC:1688
civil appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The court held that the plaintiff's power of attorney was valid, the defendants' documents were forged, and the plaintiff was entitled to possession and mesne profits, dismissing the defendant's claim as a bona fide purchaser.

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
C.S. (OS) No.3351/1991
JUDGMENT
reserved on : July 19, 2007
Judgment delivered on : May 19, 2008 Shri Jai Singh Panwar @ Jaisi ... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. A.K. Verma, Advocate.
versus
Shri Gajendra Singh & Others ... Defendants
Through: Mr. Meet Malhotra, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI

1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to Reporter or not?

3. Whether the judgment should be reported No in the Digest? VIPIN SANGHI,J.

1. The plaintiff, Jai Singh Panwar, has filed the present suit through his General Power of Attorney, Sh. Jagdish Panwar. The suit has been filed for seeking, inter alia, the following reliefs:a) A decree for possession in respect of house No.35-B, situated in Village Shahpur Jat, P.O. Hauz Khas, New Delhi-16 shown in red colour in the plan annexed hereto against the defendants, their agents, assignees, nominees, transferees and representatives. b) A decree for the recovery of Rs.12,000/- (Rupees Twelve thousands) as mesne profits/damages for use and occupation of the above said house in suit and for pendente lite and the future mesne profits @ Rs.6,000/- (Six thousands) per month in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants jointly or 2008:DHC:1688 severally. c) A decree for declaration that the plaintiff is the sole and absolute owner of house in suit having No.35-B, situated at Village Shahpur Jat, P.O. Hauz Khas, New Delhi and any document, device or contrivance purporting to divest, undermine or curtail the title of the plaintiff in respect thereof is concocted, forged, fabricated, false fictitious, illegal, null and void and ineffective qua the ownership rights of the plaintiff therein and not binding on the plaintiff. d) A decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants their agents, relatives, representatives, assignees and nominees from damaging or demolishing any part of the disputed house, or constructing, making any structural changes or additions, alterations of digging any part of it tempering or removing the plaintiff's water connection No.43,986 and his Electricity connection No.RP 016691771-L 129/ DL installed therein or doing anything which may adversely effect the present condition of the house in dispute and from entering into any agreement(s)/ arrangement(s)/ contract(s) selling, encumbering, alienating, parting with possession or transferring it wholly or partly by way of sale, gift, lease, mortgage, licence or any other manner whatsoever or creating any right, title or interest of any kind inter-se or getting it mutated in MCD records in their names jointly or severally or in favour of any other person prejudicially affecting the rights, title or interest of the plaintiff in the house in suit bearing No.35-B situated at Village Shahpur Jat, P.O. Hauz Khas, New Delhi shown in red colour in the plan attached with the plaint at any time in any manner whatsoever till delivering of possession thereof to the plaintiff. PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN THE PLAINT 2(i). The plaintiff states that he is resident of Village- Shahpur Jat, Post Office Hauz Khas, New Delhi since the time of his ancestors. Presently, he is residing in USA. In an oral family settlement, he got a residential plot of land with a temporary structure thereon, as his share of ancestral property situated in Village- Shahpur Jat, New Delhi which was then made Pakka in the year 1978. He resided in the said property with his family. The property was given Municipal No.35-B, Village- Shahpur Jat, Delhi and is shown in Red colour in the plan filed Exhibit PW-1/2. It is bounded as under:- NORTH: GALI SOUTH: House of Gopi and partly house of Suraj EAST: House of Hari Chand No.35 WEST: House of Parkash and partly house of Gian Chand and a Gali. The same is referred to as the “suit property” hereinafter. 2(ii). The property taxes were being assessed in his name and the water and electricity connections are also in his name. 2(iii). The plaintiff left for USA in the year 1980 or thereabout where he is residing with his wife and one son, leaving the suit property in care and possession of Mr. Hari Chand Kadian, his brotherin-law (wife's brother) who began residing therein with his family. The plaintiff thus claims to be in constructive possession of the suit property which was left with his relative as licensee. He had been visiting India from time to time and has lived in the suit property. 2(iv). The plaintiff's son Shri Jai Panwar visited India in February,

1990. During that visit the marriage of the plaintiff's son was arranged with the daughter of defendant No.1, viz. Km. Sneh Singh. After the marriage, the plaintiff's son returned with his wife, ie., the daughter of defendant No.1 to USA in October 1990. The matrimony of the plaintiff's son with the daughter of defendant No.1 did not last very long and resulted in divorce. The said incident lead the defendant No.1, with the support of and in conspiracy with defendant Nos.[2] to 5, into terrorising the plaintiff's brother-in-law, Sh. Hari Chand Kadian to vacate the suit property, and thereafter into trespassing into the suit property, by breaking open the locks of the suit property. The said defendants were able to easily accomplish the trespass on account of the absence of the plaintiff from India, and the caretaker also fleeing to his home town in Haryana. Defendant No.1 in connivance and conspiracy with defendant Nos.[2] to 5 forcibly and illegally occupied the suit property as rank trespassers. On getting information of the trespass, the plaintiff made complaints to various authorities, but to no avail. 2(v). The plaintiff came to know that defendant No.1 in complicity and conspiracy with defendant nos. 3 to 5 forged and fabricated some documents falsely purporting to authorize the sale of the suit property, and on that basis, the defendant No.1 had illegally, unlawfully and fraudulently purported to agree to sell the said property to defendant No.2 or to some members of his family or confidants to enrich himself from the proceeds, at the cost of the plaintiff. The plaintiff believed that some agreement to sell, receipt of consideration, affidavit, Power of Attorney had been concocted, forged and fabricated as a prelude to taking further steps to execute and get registered false sale deed or other documents to clandestinely transfer and sell the suit property behind his back and without his consent, permission or authority. Soon after coming to know about the trespass of the suit property, the plaintiff appointed his aforesaid Attorney to file the present suit. The plaintiff further states that the defendants have started demolishing parts of the suit property to make new and unauthorized structural additions and alterations therein. The defendants have no right or authority to do the aforesaid acts. They have no right to usurp the suit property or to do anything detrimental to the interest of the plaintiff. The actions of the defendants are stated to be revengeful on account of the unfortunate breaking up of the marriage of Smt. Sneh with the son of the plaintiff. The defendants are trespassers in the suit property. They are liable to be evicted and also to be prohibited from making any construction, structural additions or alterations in the suit property or from transferring it, or dealing with it in any manner. The plaintiff is entitled to possession of the suit property. The defendants are also liable to pay mesne profits or damages for their use and occupation thereof. The plaintiff claims mesne profits and damages at Rs.6,000/per month for the months of August and September, 1991 and at the same rate towards future mesne profits after filing of the suit until the defendants are evicted from the suit property in due course of law.

3. Summons in the suit were issued to the defendants on 31.10.1991. By an interlocutory order of the same date, the defendants were restrained from selling, alienating, encumbering or parting with possession of the suit property. They were also restrained from raising any construction without getting a plan sanctioned from the concerned authorities.

4. Defendant Nos.[3] to 5 had been served in the suit at the initial stage itself and despite service neither of them put in appearance, nor filed their written statement. Consequently, they were proceeded ex-parte vide order dated 15th January 1992. Defendant No.1 was served by publication in Amar Ujala. Despite service, defendant No.1 neither put in appearance nor filed his written statement to contest the suit of the plaintiff. Only defendant No.2 appeared and filed his written statement.

DEFENCE OF DEFENDANT NO.2

5. The defence set up by defendant No.2 is that he is a bonafide purchaser without notice in respect of the suit property. He denied that Jagdish Panwar is the duly appointed General Attorney of the plaintiff and also disputed his right to sign and verify the plaint and file the suit against him. He states that the suit has been filed on account of the matrimonial dispute between the plaintiff's son and the daughter of defendant No.1 and with a view to exert pressure on defendant No.1 to settle the matrimonial dispute. Defendant No.2 denies that Shri Hari Chand Kadian was in possession of the suit property in late July/early August 1991. The allegation of connivance and conspiracy made by the plaintiff against defendant No.2 is also denied. Defendant No.2 also denies having broken open the locks of the suit property and that he came into forcible occupation of the same as a trespasser. Defendant No.2 states that he has purchased the suit property from defendant No.1 on the strength of a power of attorney issued by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1. He had paid a sum of Rs.[9] lacs to defendant No.1, the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff. Photocopy of the power of attorney stated to have been created by plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1, and copies of the receipts of payment of Rs. 9 lacs issued by defendant No.2 to defendant No.1 are also filed alongwith the written statement. He has also denied knowledge of any forgery of any document on the part of the defendant Nos.[1] and 3 to 5. So far as he is concerned, he is a bonafide purchaser for consideration and he is entitled to the enjoyment of the suit property since he has paid a substantial amount to the plaintiff through his power of attorney holder. His case is that if the plaintiff has any grievance against defendant No.1, his power of attorney holder, or any other defendants, the plaintiff may initiate civil and criminal action against them, but that he, i.e., defendant No.2 is entitled to own and occupy property in question having purchased the same from the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff. He also sought to defend his possession of the suit property under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and states that he is ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration to the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff or to the plaintiff himself. He also denied that he was making any illegal or unauthorized construction in the suit property and stated that he was only making improvements in the house to make it more usable and beautiful. He also disputed the case of the plaintiff that he was not entitled to remain in occupation of the suit property or that he was a trespasser and that he was liable to be evicted, or possession liable to be restored to the plaintiff. He also disputes the claim of the plaintiff that he is liable to be restrained or prohibited from making any construction, change in structure or alteration in the suit property or to be restrained from transferring or dealing with the suit property. He also denies that he is liable to pay damages for use and occupation of the suit property @ Rs.6,000/- per month or at any other rate. He has sought the dismissal of the suit with costs. PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN REPLICATION:

6. The plaintiff has filed his replication to the written statement of defendant No.2 wherein he has denied the claim of defendant No.2 that he had appointed defendant No.1 as his attorney. The plaintiff also states that what has been claimed as a power of attorney allegedly executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1, and filed as Annexure R-1 to the written statement, in fact purports to be a deed of power of attorney executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2, which too is a manufactured document to devour the suit property of the plaintiff. The claim of defendant No.2 that he had paid an amount of Rs.[9] lac to defendant No.1 is also disputed and denied as false and fictitious. The plaintiff also disputes the claim of defendant No.2 that he was a bonafide purchaser without notice for valuable consideration in respect of the suit property. The plaintiff reiterated the averments made in the plaint and denied the assertions made by defendant No.2.

7. From these pleadings, one aspect that emerges is that defendant No.2 does not challenge or dispute the title and ownership of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property. In fact, he claims his rights and interest in the suit property, from and under the plaintiff. Consequently, no issue of the ownership or title of the plaintiff with regard to the suit property arose, and none was claimed by defendant No.2.

8. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the court struck the issues on 21st August 1995 as follows: “1. Whether the plaint has been signed, verified and instituted by a duly authorised person? OPP

2. Whether the plaintiff had executed a power of attorney dated 4th June 1990 in favour of defendant No.1? If so, to what effect? OPD[1].

3. Whether defendant No.1 has validly and legally entered into agreement of sale with defendant No.2 in respect of the suit property? If so, to what effect?

4. Whether defendant No.2 has acquired any right, title or interest in the suit property and is entitled to remain possession of the same? OPD[1]

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5. Whether defendant No.2 is entitled to make any alterations, constructions or improvement in the suit property?

6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession, as prayed for? OPP

7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration and permanent injunction as claimed by him? OPP

8. To what amount, if any, the plaintiff is entitled towards mesne profits and future mesne profits and against whom?

9. Whether defendant No.2 has paid a sum of Rs. 9 lakhs to defendant No.1? If so, to what effect? OPD[1]

10. Relief.”

9. The court appointed a Local Commissioner on 20th August 2001 for recording the evidence of the parties with their consents. The examination-in-chief of the witnesses of the parties were filed by way of affidavits. The cross-examination of the witnesses of the parties were conducted before the Local Commissioner. The Local Commissioner, from time to time, filed the proceedings conducted before him. The plaintiff produced four witnesses including himself as PW-1. The other witnesses examined by the plaintiff were, Mr. Hari Singh Kadian, PW-2; Mr. Devi Ram, PW-3; and Shri Jagdish, PW-4. On the other hand, defendant No.2 led his own evidence. No other witness was examined by defendant No.2 in support of his case.

10. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the plaintiff and defendant No.2 and I have been taken through the record, including the evidence and the testimonies of the parties. Learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr. A.K. Verma has analyzed the testimonies of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's other witnesses on one hand and that of defendant No.2 on the other hand. He has also analyzed the documents filed on record by defendant No.2 on the basis of which he claims to have derived title from the plaintiff in respect of the suit property. The submissions of learned counsel for the plaintiff have been dealt with a little later while dealing with the various issues arising in the suit.

11. The thrust of the submission of learned counsel for defendant No.2 Mr. Meet Malhotra is that the plaintiff has not established that defendant No.2 had taken forcible possession of the suit property after breaking open the locks. His further submission is that the allegation with regard to the forgery and fabrication of document was primarily directed against defendant No.1, inasmuch as, it was alleged by the plaintiff that defendant No.1 had forged and fabricated the documents in complicity and conspiracy with defendant Nos.[3] to 5. He refers to the plaintiff's averment in this regard in paragraph 7 of the plaint to say that defendant No.2 is not even alleged to be a conspirator with the plaintiff in so far as the alleged forgery and fabrication of documents is concerned. It was argued by Mr. Malhotra that the plaintiff had failed to prove, even prima facie, his case and therefore there was no need for the defendant No.2 to lead his defence. He argued that the defendant had been able to establish that he was a bonafide purchaser without notice for consideration in respect of the suit property. He submits that: a) It is for the plaintiff to prove his case; b) A decree cannot be granted to plaintiff merely because the defendant took no defence or had a week or improbable defence; c) It is only when the plaintiff proves his case in accordance with law that the defendant is called upon to lead his evidence to disapprove his case. A decree will not be passed in favour of plaintiff who has failed to prove his case and merely on the ground that the defendant could not adequately prove his defence.

12. He relies on section 101, 102 and 110 of the Evidence Act in support of his submission. He also relied on AIR 2006 SC 1971, Anil Rishi vs. Gurbaksh Singh, wherein the Supreme Court had held that the initial burden to prove would be on the plaintiff in view of section 101 of the Evidence Act. It is for that party to prove the facts who substantially asserts the affirmative issues and not the party who denies it. He submits that the Suit will fail if both the parties do not adduce any evidence in view of section 102 of the Evidence Act. He submits that the initial onus is always on the plaintiff and only when the plaintiff discharges this onus and makes out a case which entitles him a relief, the onus shifts on the defendants to prove his defence i.e. the circumstances, which would dis-entitle the plaintiff to the relief claimed. He also relied on AIR 1998 SC 2352, Punjab Urban Planning Authority vs. Shri Saraswati etc., wherein the Supreme Court has observed that plaintiff/ Appellant must succeed or fail on his own case and cannot take advantage of weakness in the defendance. On the same proposition, he also relies on AIR 1995 (Orissa) 270, Nirakar Das vs. Gourhari Das. He also relied on Periasami Vs. State of Tamilnadu (1996) 6 SCC 457, which was a criminal Appeal and the Supreme Court held that the prosecution must prove that the accused has committed the offence charged against. Based on the aforesaid decision, the submission of Mr. Malhotra was that on a perusal of the cross-examination of all the PWs and in particular PW- 1, it would be seen that the plaintiff failed to explain how, in spite of having other relatives in the village, no FIR was lodged when alleged forcible possession was allegedly taken of the suit property. He further argued that the plaintiff admitted not to have known defendant No.2 or met him ever and also admitted that certain averments in the plaint were not based on his personal knowledge. He also admitted that he has learnt of the forgery and fabrication of the documents after the suit had been filed and that he had learnt of the said fabrication and forgery through Shri Jagdish Panwar, PW-4. However, Jagdish Panwar, PW-4 in his cross-examination while answering the question “when did you get to know the defendant had forged and fabricated documents pertaining to the suit premises?”, answered by stating that he saw the document for the first time when they were filed by the defendant in the present suit. He argued that there was no basis for the plaintiff to allege in the plaint that the documents were forged, if this knowledge accrued after the filing of the suit. He submits that with regard to the alleged forcible dispossession of the suit premises the plaintiff, PW-1 stated that the same had taken place between the last week of June and the first week of September 1991. However, he did not remember the exact date. This span of over two months throws doubt on the allegation of trespass itself. He submits that in view of the aforesaid admission, nothing remains to be proved in defence. He further argued that PW-2 had admitted that defendant No.1 had informed him that he had sold the property on the basis of power of attorney. He also argued that though Devi Ram, (PW-3), claims that he was a witness to the altercation at the time of the alleged forcible possession and had claimed that PW-4 Jagdish Panwar had called the police, Jagdish Panwar, PW-4 in his cross-examination states that he was not present when forcible possession was taken and that he did not know the circumstances in which possession was taken. He questions the stand of the plaintiff that possession was forcibly taken since, PW-3 and PW- 4 claim to be allegedly present at the time of the forcible possession, they did not inform the police and they were also not in a position to inform the date of the said possession. He further argued that even though Jagdish Panwar, PW-4 states in his cross-examination that he got to know that defendant No.2 had not purchased the house when he spoke to the plaintiff in USA, and he claims to have intimated to his lawyer also, in the entire plaint it is not mentioned that defendant No.2 broke the locks of the suit property. He argues that even though PW-4, in his cross-examination states that he learnt about the forgeries after the filing of the suit, yet he has signed and verified the plaint.

13. I now proceed to consider the evidence led by the parties on each of the aforesaid issues and give my findings on these issues.

ISSUE NO.1

14. The first issue that calls for determination is whether the plaint has been signed, verified and instituted by a duly authorised person? The onus to prove this issue was placed on the plaintiff. In his evidence by way of affidavit towards examination-in-chief, dated the 11th of July 2002, marked as exhibit PW[1], the plaintiff PW[1] states that the present suit was filed by him through his relative Shri Jagdish Panwar, son of Shri Hari Chand of the same village who is his duly constituted general attorney authorised and empowered to sign and verify the plaint and to file this suit on his behalf. The plaintiff has identified the signatures of Shri Jagdish Panwar at points “A” and “B” on the plaint. The general power of attorney executed by the plaintiff in favour of Shri Jagdish Panwar at New York, USA dated 28th September, 1991 and duly notorised is exhibit PW 1/1. In his cross examination the plaintiff was asked whether the present suit had been filed by him through his power of attorney holder, to which the plaintiff had replied in the affirmative. He was then asked where the power of attorney was executed, to which he replied that the same was executed before the Indian consulate in New York, USA.

15. During the course of his cross-examination, the defendant put the document, that is, the general power of attorney dated 28th September 1991 to the witness. It transpired that the original of the power of attorney was not on the court record although a photocopy thereof was found on the court record, filed along with the plaint by the plaintiff. At this stage, the counsel for the plaintiff produced the original power of attorney, Ex.PW-1/1. This was objected to by the defendant. The local commissioner took the original power of attorney on record subject to orders of the court and the same was also marked exhibit PW1X.

16. Before proceeding further, I may notice that at the time of arguments, Counsel for the defendant waived the objection to the production of the original power of attorney by the plaintiff at the stage of recording of his cross-examination. In any event, and without, in any manner, being influenced by the said waiver of this objection by the defendant, I am inclined to allow the production of the original power of attorney at the stage of cross-examination of the plaintiff, since a photocopy thereof was already placed on record and the defendant was not taken by surprise, or in any manner prejudiced by the production of the original document. In 89 (2001) DLT524, Bank of India vs. Goyal Textiles and others, this court has taken the view that documents can be taken on record for the sake of a fair trial. It is well settled that rules of procedure are the handmaids of justice. The belated production of the original general power of attorney, exhibit PW1X, does not prejudice the defendants in any manner whatsoever. It is not disputed by the defendant that the photocopy filed along with the plaint is a copy of the original exhibit PW1X, later sought to be produced by the plaintiff. The possibility of exhibit PW1X having been created or forged by the plaintiff at a subsequent stage is therefore non-existent, and the same existed at the time of filing of the suit.

17. The plaintiff has explained that exhibit PW1X was executed before the notary public, New York, whereas the document was attested before the Indian consulate in New York. The plaintiff also confirmed that PW1X is the document authorising Shri Jagdish Panwar to institute the present suit.

18. From the cross-examination of the plaintiff nothing adverse or contradictory has been brought on record by the defendant to reject the testimony of the plaintiff that exhibit PW1X, the power of attorney was executed by the plaintiff in favour of his attorney Shri Jagdish Panwar at New York on 28th September 1991.

19. Shri Jagdish Panwar, PW[4], in his examination in chief by way of affidavit has stated that the plaintiff, who is his uncle, on coming to know of the trespass into the suit property by the defendants contacted him over the telephone from USA and requested him to take appropriate legal action on his behalf against the persons responsible for illegally taking away the possession of the house of the plaintiff. He further states that the plaintiff executed the general power of attorney in his favour at New York, USA dated 28th September 1991. The same was sent to him by the plaintiff and on the basis of the said power of attorney, which is exhibit PW1X the present suit was filed by the attorney on behalf of the plaintiff which authorises him to sign and verify the plaint and to file the suit. PW[4] has identified his signatures at points “A” and “B” on the plaint. Despite the aforesaid clear and categorical statements made by PW[4], the defendant No.2, in the cross-examination of PW[4] put only one question i.e. whether PW[4] had signed and verified the plaint in the present suit. To this, PW[4] replied in the affirmative by stating that he had signed and verified the plaint. Defendant No.2 did not even make a suggestion to PW[4] that he had not been duly authorised by the plaintiff to sign and verify the plaint, or that he had not signed and verified the plaint as claimed by him, and that he had not instituted the suit as stated by him on oath.

20. Perusal of the general power of attorney exhibit PW1X shows that the plaintiff confirmed that his nephew Jagdish Panwar had been officially nominated by him to act as guardian of his property House No.305B village Shahpur Jat, Delhi 110016. By this general power of attorney he appointed, nominated, authorised and constituted Shri Jagdish Panwar as his true and lawful general attorney to do various acts, deeds and things in his name and on his behalf. Amongst the powers vested in the attorney was the power to engage advocates, for the purpose of filing a suit, petition, appeal, revision or writ petition, up to the highest court of the land as and when required regarding any litigation to be instituted by him or against him by any person, in respect of the said property. The general power of attorney further authorises the attorney to sign and verify the plaints, written statements, replications and any other document/papers, affidavits, to give statement in any court of law or before any local authority as deemed fit and proper. It further authorises the attorney to adduce evidence, file documents, and receive documents from the court. It also authorises the attorney to appear before the courts of law or any local body or authority as and when required.

21. The due execution of the power of attorney exhibit PW1X appointing Sh. Jagdish Panwar as his general attorney by the plaintiff has been duly proved by the plaintiff. In my view, the power of attorney exhibit PW1X sufficiently authorises the attorney Shri Jagdish Panwar to file the present suit on behalf of the plaintiff and to sign and verify and Institute the present suit on behalf of the plaintiff. The signatures on the plaint have also been duly proved as that of the attorney Shri Jagdish Panwar. The plaint has been signed, verified and instituted by Shri Jagdish Panwar for and on behalf of the plaintiff. Accordingly, I decide issue No.1 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.

ISSUE NO.2

22. The next issue that arises for consideration is, whether the plaintiff has executed the power of attorney dated 4th June 1990 in favour of defendant No.1?, and if so, to what effect? The onus of proving this issue was placed on defendant No.1. However, since defendant No.1 did not contest the suit either by filing his written statement or by putting in his appearance, and the suit has been contested by defendant No.2 alone, it was left to defendant No.2 to establish the valid execution of the power of attorney dated 4th June 1990 by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1. It is the defence of defendant No.2 that the plaintiff, acting through his attorney i.e. defendant No.1, had agreed to sell the suit property to him and that he had paid an amount of Rs.[9] lakhs to the attorney of the plaintiff namely defendant No.1. Therefore, it is for him to establish the valid execution of the power of attorney by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1, particularly since the plaintiff has vehemently denied having executed any power of attorney in favour of defendant No.1, much less the power of attorney dated 4th June 1990.

23. First and foremost, I may note that defendant No.2 has neither filed the original power of attorney dated 4th June 1990, nor has he taken any steps that he was obliged to take, to lead secondary evidence to prove the said document on record. The defendant No.2, along with his list of documents dated the 9th September 1994 placed on record only a photocopy of the power of attorney dated 4th June

1990. Section 64 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 mandates that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases mentioned, inter-alia, in section 65 of the said Act. Section 65(a) states that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of a person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it.

24. In the present case the original of the power of attorney dated the 4th June 1990, as per the statement of defendant No.2, is in possession of defendant No.1. It is not the case of defendant No.2 that defendant No.1 is out of reach of, or not subject to the process of this court. It is also not the case of defendant No.2 that defendant No.1 is not legally bound to produce the same, if he is so required by the process of this court. Defendant No.1 is bound to produce the same if he is so required to, and is subject to the process of this court. Admittedly, defendant No.2 has not given any notice to produce the original of the said power of attorney to defendant No.1 as required by section 66 of the Evidence Act. Defendant No.2 has also not cited defendant No.1 as a witness and has not summoned the said document from defendant No.1. The language employed in section 66 of the Evidence Act is couched negatively, inasmuch as, it provides that secondary evidence of the contents of the documents referred to in section 65, clause (a), "shall not be given unless the party proposing to give such secondary evidence has previously given to the party in whose possession or power the document is.... such notice to produce it as is prescribed by law... ". The mandate of Section 65 of the Evidence Act is strict and cannot be ignored. Therefore, the photocopy of the power of attorney dated 4th June 1990 relied upon by defendant No.2 cannot be led in evidence. It is in-admissible in evidence.

25. In his examination in chief, defendant No.2 states that defendant No.1 had shown him the original copy of the said power of attorney and had given to him a photocopy. In his cross-examination defendant No.2 admitted that this power of attorney was not executed in his presence. He also states that the original was not in his possession but was in possession of defendant No.1. The plaintiff had given specific suggestions to defendant No.2, that no power of attorney was executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1 and that the said document was false, forged and fabricated by defendant No.2 in collusion with defendant No.1.

26. Now, I come to the evidence led by the plaintiff on this aspect and the cross-examination of the plaintiff by defendant No.2. Once again, I find that the testimony of the plaintiff has gone unchallenged for its material part. In paragraph 10 of his evidence by way of affidavit in his examination-in-chief the plaintiff has categorically denied the existence and the correctness of the power of attorney dated 4th June 1990. In paragraph 11 he further affirms on oath that he never appointed Shri Gajendra Singh, i.e. defendant No.1 as his attorney for any purpose. He affirms that the alleged power of attorney was not executed by him, and it does not bear his signatures and that he has not signed the same. He further affirms that he was not at Bullandshahar on 4th June 1990 when the said power of attorney is purported to have been executed and/or attested. He further states that the said power of attorney is a false document and has been forged and fabricated by defendant Nos.[1] and 2. In paragraph 12 of the same evidence by way of affidavit, the plaintiff denies having empowered defendant No.1 to sell the suit property to defendant No.2 or to any other person or to place any person in possession of the suit property. He also denies the execution of the agreement to sell dated 20th September 1990 claimed to have been executed between Shri Gajendera Singh i.e. defendant No.1 and Shri Jasbir Singh defendant No.2, relating to the suit property. He repudiates and disowns the execution of the agreement to sell or the validity thereof. In paragraph 13, the plaintiff, with a view to challenge the signatures attributed to him on the power of attorney dated 4th June 1990, produces his passport bearing No.S944042 issued by the Consulate General of India in New York, USA. He states that the passport bears his true and real signatures. A photocopy of the present passport bearing the signatures of the plaintiff, encircled in red is exhibit PW 1/18.

27. The cross-examination of the plaintiff on the aforesaid categorical statements in his examination-in-chief is woefully deficient. Ld. Counsel for the defendant No.2 during the course of his arguments emphasised that the plaintiff was in Bullandshahar on 30th of May 1990. From this he wishes to draw an inference that the plaintiff was present in Bullandshahar on 4th June 1990, the date on which the power of attorney is claimed to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1. The defendant No.2 also refers to the answer given by the plaintiff in the affirmative, to the suggestion given to him in the course of his cross-examination to the effect that since he had spent a lot of money and faced harassment because of matrimonial problem between his son, and the daughter of defendant No.1, he had filed the present suit. He also refers to the suggestion given to the plaintiff that defendant No.2 purchased the property from defendant No.1 on the basis of documents shown to him by defendant No.1 and the answer given by the plaintiff in the affirmative. Lastly, counsel for the defendant No.2 draws my attention to the answer given by the plaintiff to the query: “have your signatures been consistent over the years or have you signed variously before different authorities as J. S. Panwar, Jai S. Panwar and/or Jai Singh Panwar?”. The plaintiff answered this query by stating that he had consistent signature, but there is a possibility of being different from consistent.

28. The aforesaid submissions of Ld. Counsel for the defendant however do not advance his case with regard to execution of the power of attorney by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1. Merely because the plaintiff admits to being present in Bullandshahar on the 30th of May 1990, it does not necessarily follow that he was in Bullandshahar on the 4th of June 1990 as well or, in any event that he executed the said power of attorney. The marriage of the plaintiff's son with the daughter of defendant No.1 was solemnised on 30th May 1990 at Bullandshahar. For the said purpose he was in Bullandshahar on 30th of May 1990. However, there is nothing to suggest, and no independent evidence has been led by the defendant No.2 to establish the presence of the plaintiff in Bullandshahar on 4th June

1990.

29. The answer given by the plaintiff that he had filed the suit since he had spent a lot of money and faced harassment because of the matrimonial problem between his son and the daughter of defendant No.1 is an answer given in response to a suggestion given by the learned counsel for defendant No.2 to the same effect. This answer has to be viewed in the light of the plaintiff's positive case that defendant No.1 had colluded with defendant Nos.[2] to 5 to devour the suit property of the plaintiff to wreck his vengeance on account of the failed marriage of his daughter with the son of the plaintiff.

30. So far as the suggestion that defendant No.2 had purchased the property from defendant No.1 on the basis of documents shown to him by defendant No.1, and the answer of the plaintiff that he agrees with this suggestion, is concerned, the same was objected to by the counsel for the plaintiff on the ground that this question does not relate to the plaintiff and relates only to defendant Nos.[1] & 2, since it is not the case of defendant No.2 that the plaintiff was present at the time when the alleged transaction took place between defendant Nos.[1] and 2. The answer given by the plaintiff has to be seen in the context of his case as pleaded, as well as in the overall context of his detailed testimony. The plaintiff had stated that he learnt of the forgery and fabrication of documents as stated in the plaint, after the filing of the suit. This stand of the plaintiff was not challenged by defendant No.2. Consequently, there is merit in the submission of learned counsel for the plaintiff that the answer given by the plaintiff in relation to the aforesaid suggestion cannot be relied upon to infer the valid execution or existence of the power of attorney dated 4th June 1990. The answer given to the aforesaid suggestions by the plaintiff, therefore, does not advance the case of the defendant.

31. So far as the last of the aforesaid suggestions, and the answer given by the plaintiff is concerned, it is pertinent to note that the suggestion was only in relation to the use of “J. S. Panwar”, “Jai S. Panwar” and/or “Jai Singh Panwar”. It was not even suggested to the plaintiff that he had ever used the name “Jai Singh”. This assumes importance when one looks at the power of attorney dated 4th June 1990 wherein the plaintiff is claimed to have used the name “Jai Singh”. The answer given by the plaintiff, therefore, does not takeaway anything from his testimony that he had not signed and executed the so-called power of attorney dated 4th June 1990. A mere comparison of the signatures of the plaintiff on his passport exhibit PW 1/18 with those attributed to the plaintiff on the document dated 4th of June 1990 shows that they are not one and the same. In fact, there is absolutely no similarity between the two signatures. Pertinently, the passport exhibit PW 1/18 was issued on 13th May 1993, i.e, within a period of about three years from the date when the plaintiff is claimed to have executed the document dated 4th June

1990. The time lag is also not so large as to suggest that there might have been a drastic change in the manner in which the plaintiff would append his signatures.

32. Looking to the facts of the case, even otherwise there are various loopholes in the story set up by defendant No.2. Firstly, it seems rather strange that the plaintiff, who has been residing abroad for a number of years even prior to the marriage of his son on 30th May 1990 with the daughter of defendant No.1, would create a general power of attorney in respect of the suit property in favour of defendant No.1 within four days of the said marriage. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff had other close relatives living in the same village. Even if the plaintiff had to create a power of attorney in respect of the suit property, it would have been natural for him to give the power to one of his close relatives in the village, and not to the father-in-law of his son in Bullandshahar, who was comparatively a new relative. It is not the case of the plaintiff, or even defendant No.2 that the plaintiff and defendant No.1 were acquainted with each other for a long time prior to the aforesaid marriage. The acquaintance of the plaintiff with defendant No.1 was of recent origin when he is claimed to have executed the power of attorney in favour of defendant No.1 on 4th June 1990. A general power of attorney is created, naturally, in favour of a person in whom one has complete faith and confidence, which in the facts of this case is not shown to have been established, as between the plaintiff an defendant No.1, either as a matter of fact or of implication. Secondly, it is equally strange that defendant No.1 would retain the original of the so-called power of attorney dated 4th June 1990 even after having entered into an agreement to sell with the defendant No.2, and defendant No.2 allegedly having parted with substantial amount of money to the tune of Rs.[9] lakhs. Normally the prospective purchaser would take into his possession the documents of title from the seller. It is not the case of defendant No.2 that the said power of attorney pertained to any other property as well. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that defendant No.2 would have permitted the defendant No.1 to retain the custody of the so-called power of attorney, when, according to the defendant No.2 he had also been put in actual physical possession of the suit property by defendant No.1.

33. For the aforesaid reasons, I reject the stand of defendant No.2 that the plaintiff had executed a power of attorney dated 4th June 1990 in favour of defendant No.1. Consequently, defendant No.1 had no power or authority to deal with the suit property in any manner, much less to agree to sell the same to anyone including defendant No.2. I decide issue No.2 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.

ISSUE NO.3

34. In view of my finding on issue No.2 that the plaintiff had not executed a power of attorney dated 4th June 1990 in favour of defendant No.1, and consequently defendant No.1 had no authority or power to deal with the suit property, the necessary corollary that must follow is that defendant No.1 had not entered into an agreement of sale with defendant No.2 validly and legally. The so-called agreement to sell claimed to have been executed by defendant No.1 as the attorney of the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.2 on 20th September 1990 at Bullandshahar, even if assumed to have been executed by defendant No.1, did not create any right, title or interest in favour of defendant No.2 in the suit property.

35. I now proceed to examine the evidence led by defendant No.2 to prove the execution of the agreement to sell dated 20th September 1990. Defendant No.2 in his examination-in-chief on affidavit has deposed that the agreement to sell Exhibit DW-1/B was entered into between him and defendant No.1 in respect of the suit property. He has further stated that the total sale consideration was Rs.11 lakhs. He states that he paid Rs.[3] lakhs on 20th September 1990, which was duly acknowledged by the receipt of even date exhibit DW 1/C. He further states that another some of Rs.4.[5] lakhs was paid by him on 11th September 1991, i.e., after nearly 1 year of the agreement to sell dated 20th September 1990 and the same is contained in the receipt, Ex. DW-1/D. It is important to note at this stage itself, that though the documents have been given exhibit marks in the evidence by way of affidavit, the documents in original as filed by the defendant No.2 have not been given exhibit marks. However, in my view the same is merely a procedural omission on the part of the defendant and his counsel. From a perusal of the original receipt dated 11th September 1991 placed on record, I find that the same refers to the delivery of two cheques of Rs.4.[5] lakhs and Rs.3.[5] lakhs to defendant No.1. However, defendant No.2 in his examinationin-chief states that he and his wife issued three cheques for Rs.1.[5] lakh dated 25th of September 1991, Rs.[1] lakh dated 28th of September 1991 and Rs.[1] lakh dated 25th of October 1991, drawn on Punjab National Bank, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi towards payment of the rest of the consideration. He states that the cheques were dishonoured and he and his wife were served with legal notices dated 24th of February 1992 from the advocate of defendant No.1. The original copies of the legal notices are exhibit DW 1/E. He further states that out of the amount of these cheques, he had later paid Rs.1.[5] lakhs in cash which was not acknowledged by a receipt and the balance is still due. He states that defendant No.1 had put him in peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property on or about the 11th September 1991 itself.

36. There are various discrepancies that are noticed in the version set up by defendant No.2 in his examination-in-chief. Firstly, the receipt Ex. DW-1/D is not just in respect of one cheque of Rs.4.[5] lakhs, but a receipt in respect of two cheques; one for Rs.4.[5] lakhs and the other for Rs.3.[5] lakhs. It does not talk about the three cheques of Rs.1.[5] lakhs dated 23.9.1991, Rs.[1] lakh dated 28.9.1991 and 1 lakh dated 25.10.1991. Further, A perusal of the notices stated to have been issued by defendant No.1 to defendant No.2 and his wife shows that these legal notices do not even make a whisper as to on what account these cheques had been issued by defendant No.2 and his wife to defendant No.1. In these notices, defendant No.1 does not claim to have received the two cheques on account of the agreement to sell in respect of the suit property. It is also pertinent to note that these three cheques, which are claimed to have been issued to defendant No.1 and dishonoured upon presentation by defendant No.1 have not seen the light of the day.

37. Apart from the aforesaid infirmities in the case of defendant No.2, the plaintiff has pointed out a fundamental lacuna. He has drawn my attention to paragraph 7 of the written statement of defendant No.2. The stand of defendant No.2 in paragraph 7 of his written statement was that he has paid a sum of Rs.[9] lakhs to defendant No.1 under the agreement to sell. From the aforesaid it is seen that there are different versions of defendant No.2 with regard to the alleged payment of the part consideration to defendant No.1. If the documents filed by defendant No.2, and his stand that he has paid an amount of Rs.1.[5] lakhs in cash for which defendant No.1 has not issued any receipt, is to be believed, what emerges is that defendant No.2 has paid an amount of Rs.[9] lakhs. This would be the case, if one were to believe that Rs.4.[5] lakhs was paid vide receipt Ex.DW-1/D, though I may hasten to add that no proof of payment by cheque of Rs.4.[5] lakhs as per the receipt dated 11th September 1991, Ex.DW-1/D has been brought on record. However, a perusal of the agreement to sell dated 20th September 1990 shows that according to its recitals, defendant No.2 was stated to have paid an amount of Rs.9.95 lakhs as earnest money in advance, and the remaining balance of Rs.1.05 lakhs was agreed to be paid within one year from the date of the agreement. This brings out the glaring contradictions and discrepancies in the stand of the defendant No.2. In his written statement defendant No.2 does not come out with the story that is found in his affidavit by the evidence towards his examination in chief. These discrepancies in my view make the stand of defendant No.2 completely unreliable and unworthy of being believed.

38. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon (2000) 8 SCC 191, Ravinder Singh vs. Gen Major Sing & Others, wherein the Supreme Court has held that no evidence can be led on the plea not raised in the pleadings and no amount of evidence can cure a defect in pleadings. He also relies upon 2002 (1) RCR 574, A. V. G. P. Jetty and Sons vs Tea Money Swami, wherein the Supreme Court has held that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. In (2003) 8 SCC 740, Kashinath (dead), the Supreme Court has held that an adverse inference is to be drawn when pleadings and evidence are at variance. In my view the present is a glaring case where there is no consistency to be found in the stand taken by the defendant No.2 in his written statement, the documents relied upon by him and his evidence by way of affidavit towards examination-in-chief. Defendant No.2 has sought to improve upon his case at the stage of leading his evidence and has sought to introduce a different version with regard to the alleged payments made by him to defendant No.1 under the alleged agreement to sell. Unfortunately for defendant No.2, even the modified version is incoherent with the agreement to sell dated 20th September 1990 claimed to have been executed between him and defendant No.1.

39. The cross-examination of defendant No.2 on the aspect of execution of the agreement to sell setup by him also makes a very interesting reading. In his cross-examination conducted on the 9th May, the stand of defendant No.2 is that the agreement to sell was executed by defendant No.1 in his favour at Bullandshahar. He states that possession of the suit property was delivered to him on the following day and a large number of villagers, including defendant No.1, were present. Curiously, he has failed to produce even one of the so-called half the village population that was claimed to be present at the time when he was delivered physical possession of the suit property by defendant No.1.

40. On being asked as to when he had met defendant No.1 for the first time, defendant No.2 answered that he met defendant No.1 for the first time only on 20th September 1990 at Bulandshahar. He also admitted that prior to his entering into the agreement with defendant No.1 he had absolutely no dealing with him. He states that within a matter of 2 & 1/2 hours of negotiation with defendant No.1 the agreement to sell was entered into with him. He states that he is 10th grade pass. Therefore, he is sufficiently literate. He states that the stamp papers on which the agreement to sell was drawn were bought in Bulandshahar by defendant No.1 on the same day, in the name of Shri Gajendra Singh, i.e. defendant No.1 and that he accompanied Shri Gajendra Singh at the time of buying of the stamp paper. However, in later part of his cross-examination on the same day, he contradicts himself by stating that the stamp papers “had been bought before me I was not there.” Defendant No.2 further states that at the time of entering into the said agreement to sell, he paid Rs.[3] lakhs to defendant No.1 in cash. What follows makes an even more interesting reading. The agreement to sell produced by defendant No.2 was shown to him. He was confronted with the fact that the stamp paper had been purchased on 6th September 1990 in the name of defendant No.2. When so confronted, he simply admitted the same. Defendant No.2 was then confronted with the following passage in the agreement to sell exhibit D/W 1/B: “And whereas this agreement a first part has agreed to sell the property No.35-B, Shahpur Jat, New Delhi to the second party for a total consideration of Rs. 11 lakh out of which Rs.9.95 lakh has been paid as earnest money in advance and the remaining balance of Rs.1.05 lakh shall be paid within a year from today on the additional terms and conditions:”

41. When so confronted, defendant No.2 evaded to answer the same by stating that he could not read this level of English. This witness was then confronted with the translation of the aforesaid extract from the agreement to sell. He again avoids to give an answer by saying that he does not know, as it is an old transaction. On being confronted with the discrepancy in his statement that he had paid only Rs.[3] lakhs at the time of entering into an agreement to sell, while it being recorded in the agreement to sell that a sum of Rs.9.95 lakhs had already been paid and the balance payable was only Rs.1.05 lakhs, and why he had not taken any steps to make the necessary correction, defendant No.2 stated that all that he remembered is that in the first instance he paid only Rs.[3] lakhs. He also had no explanation for not getting the aforesaid discrepancy removed. On being asked, whether he had maintained any books of account and whether the amount of Rs.[3] lakhs had been withdrawn from a bank or Post Office account and reflected in the books of account, the defendant No.2 stated that he does not maintain any books of account and there is no entry with regard to the payment of Rs.[3] lakhs made to defendant No.1. He stated that in his business he had the money readily available with him. He does not state what that business is. The Local Commissioner recorded that as an afterthought, the witness stated that the amount of Rs. 3 lakhs was a part of his agricultural income and agricultural income is not recorded anywhere. He further stated that he did not file income tax returns when he entered into the agreement to sell and that he started paying income tax only in the last five to six years.

42. From the cross-examination of defendant No.2 it is evident that when he was cornered and confronted with uncomfortable questions, he was evasive. He has also contradicted himself during the course of his cross-examination. If the story of defendant No.2, that he met defendant No.1 for the first time on 20th September 1990 is to be believed, one fails to understand how defendant No.1 would have purchased the stamp paper two weeks in advance, on 6th September 1990 and that too in the name of defendant No.2. It also seems rather strange that in the very first meeting, and within a matter of just about 2 & 1/2 hours he closed the deal with defendant No.1 and paid him Rs.[3] lakhs as per his own statement and the receipts, (and Rs.9.95 lakhs as per the agreement to sell on 20th September 1990) for which he has no account. While at one stage he states that the stamp papers were purchased by defendant No.1 on 20th September 1990 in his presence, at the subsequent stage he states that the stamp papers had been purchased on the same day but prior to his visit to Bullandshahar. I may also notice that even while cross-examining the plaintiff, despite the categorical assertion of the plaintiff that the defendants had forged and fabricated false documents including false authority, agreement to sell, receipt of consideration, affidavit etc., and despite the fact that the plaintiff had disputed the validity and execution of the said documents, including the power of attorney dated 4th June 1990 and the agreement to sell Ex.DW-1/B, the plaintiff was not even given a suggestion to the contrary by defendant No.2.

43. I also do not find much substance in the submissions of learned counsel for defendant No.2 that the plaintiff had failed to establish that defendant No.2 had taken forcible possession of the suit property after breaking open the locks. Admittedly, defendant No.2 has been, and continues to be in possession of the suit property. It is the case of defendant No.2 that he had been placed in possession of the suit property by defendant No.1 soon after the execution of the agreement to sell Ex.DW-1/B on 20th September 1990. To be entitled to the reliefs of possession of the suit property and damages for the illegal use and occupation of the suit premises by the defendants, including defendant No.2, it is not essential for the plaintiff to establish that the possession was taken by use of force. Pertinently, defendant No.2 does not claim to have come into permissive occupation and user of the suit property with the consent and permission of the plaintiff. Even if he came into possession with the consent and under the authority of defendant No.1, the same is of no avail, since defendant No.1 had no such authority to deal with the suit property in the first place. Therefore, the possession of the defendant No.2 of the suit property was unauthorised and illegal. It is also not relevant for the grant of the said reliefs that the plaintiff should have established that in the forgery and fabrication of the documents, defendant No.2 had participated. There cannot be any doubt that, at least from the time that defendant No.2 became aware of the claim of the plaintiff in the present suit, from then onwards the possession of defendant No.2 in respect of the suit property could not be justified, even if one were to assume that he had acted bonafide while entering into the alleged agreement to sell Exh.DW-1/B with defendant No.1, though, as I have already held, that the alleged agreement Ex.DW-1/B cannot be said to be a bonafide transaction. The fact that no first information report was filed by the relatives of the plaintiff with regard to the taking over the possession of the suit property by defendant No.2 does not render the possession of defendant No.2 legal. It is the case of the plaintiff that he is a permanent resident of United States of America and in case his relatives did not file a police complaint or FIR, since they did not wish to get personally involved in the dispute, that to my mind does not lend any strength to the claim of the defendant with regard to his claim for interest in the suit property. I also do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel for defendant No.2 that the plaintiff had failed to prove his case and that therefore defendant No.2 was not obliged to prove his defence. In fact, in this case the onus squarely lays on the defendant to prove his defence, since there was no dispute raised with regard to the ownership and title of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property and the defendant No.2 claimed title through the plaintiff. It was for the defendant to prove the execution of the general power of attorney by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1, and further the execution of agreement to sell by defendant No.1, acting as the attorney of the plaintiff, in favour of defendant No.2 and the passing of consideration from defendant No.2 to defendant No.1. Neither of these facts have been established on record by the defendants. On the contrary, the defence set up by defendant No.2 has been completely exploded in his own cross-examination. Consequently, the reliance placed by defendant No.2 on section 101, 102 and 110 of the Evidence Act and on the decision of the Supreme Court in Anil Rishi (supra), Shri Saraswati etc., (Supra), Nirankar Das (Supra) is wholly misplaced. In fact the aforesaid authorities support the case of the plaintiff since the burden of proving a transfer of title in favour of defendant No.2 squarely lay at the door of defendant No.1. The decision of the Supreme Court in Periasami (supra) relied upon by defendant No.2 is also of no avail. The same pertains to a criminal trial in which the burden of proving the guilt of the accused is entirely upon the prosecution and the accused is not expected to prove his innocence. The said decision cannot be applied in respect of a civil dispute, since the parameters with regard to the burden of proof, as well as the approach of the Court in appreciation of evidence in the two situations is entirely different. An accused in a criminal trial is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty. Whereas in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused is required to be established “beyond reasonable doubt”, in civil proceedings the Court proceeds to determine the issues on “preponderance of probabilities”.

44. The submission of learned counsel for defendant No.2 that the plaintiff had made averments with regard to the alleged forgery and fabrication of documents without even being aware of the same is also not correct. It is clear from the averments made in the plaint, particularly paragraph 7 and clause (c) of the prayer clause, that the plaintiff, at the time of filing of the suit was unaware of the exact nature and contents of the documentation that might have been created by defendant No.1 to usurp the suit property of the plaintiff. The details of the said documents were brought forth only when defendant No.2 filed his written statement, wherein he claimed that the plaintiff had executed a power of attorney in favour of defendant No.1, who had in turn entered into an agreement to sell with the defendant No.2 on the strength of the said power of attorney acting for and on behalf of the plaintiff, and had also received consideration under the said agreement. Merely because the plaintiff had not seen the forged documents prior to filing of the suit, it does not mean that he could have no knowledge or reason to believe that some documents have been forged and fabricated by the defendants with a view to stake a claim on the suit property. It has come on record from the mouth of PW-2 that defendant No.1 had informed him that he had sold the suit property on the basis of a power of attorney. Since the plaintiff had not executed any such power of attorney, the logical conclusion draw the plaintiff to try was that the defendants had forged and fabricated documents to stake a claim in respect of the suit property.

45. Similarly, I see no force in the submission of learned counsel for the defendant No.2 that the plaintiff had not made any allegation of complicity and conspiracy qua defendant No.2 in respect of the forgery and fabrication of documents allegedly committed by defendant No.1 in complicity and conspiracy with defendant Nos.[3] to

5. As I have already discussed, the so-called documents of title relied upon by defendant No.2 do not vest him with any right, title or interest in the suit property. Whether or not there was a conspiracy in which defendant No.2 was a conspirator, is not relevant to determine any of the issues raised in the present suit. I may also notice that the arguments of learned counsel for defendant No.2 proceeded as if this Court is dealing with a criminal trial involving the charge of forgery and fabrication of documents, and trespass, wherein defendant No.2 is an accused. However, that is not the case. From the evidence on record it is also evident that defendant No.2 cannot be said to be a purchaser, much less a bonafide purchaser without notice for consideration in respect of the suit property. The plaintiff has proved his case to the hilt and the defence of the defendant No.2 has been completely demolished.

46. In view of my aforesaid analysis, I am convinced that defendant Nos.[1] and 2 have not validly and legally entered into any agreement to sell with respect to the suit property. Accordingly, I decide Issue No.3 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant No.2. ISSUE NOS.4, 5, 6, 7 & 9

47. The aforesaid issues are all of consequential nature and resolve themselves in view of my finding on Issue Nos.[1] to 3. They can all be taken up together. The defence set up by defendant No.2 that he is a bona fide purchaser without notice for valuable consideration has also not been established. Neither there appears to be any “bonafides” as claimed by defendant No.1 in his transaction with defendant No.1, nor is there any purchase or sale of the suit property which has taken place. It has also not been established by defendant No.2 that he has paid a sum of Rs.[9] lakhs to defendant No.1. Even if it were to be assumed that defendant No.2 has paid Rs.[9] Lakhs or any other amount to defendant No.1, that does not create any right in favour of defendant No.2 qua the suit property or against the plaintiff, because defendant No.1 had no authority to deal with the suit property. If at all, he may have a claim against defendant No.1. In view of the aforesaid findings it follows that defendant No.2 has not acquired any right, title or interest in the suit property and, consequently, he is not entitled to remain in possession of the same. It also follows that defendant No.2 is not entitled to make any alteration, construction or improvement in the suit property. Admittedly, the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property since it is through him that defendant No.2 was claiming right, title and interest in the suit property. In fact, the existence of the plaintiff's title to the suit property was not even questioned by defendant No.2. It, therefore, follows that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession as against the defendants. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to declaration that the documents and device purporting to divest the plaintiff of his right, title and interest in the suit property or which undermine or curtail his title to the suit property as set up by defendant No.2, namely the power of attorney dated 4th June 1990 purported to have executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1, the agreement to sell claimed to have been executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 and the receipts claimed to have been executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 are illegal and ineffective in so far as they purport to effect the rights of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property. The plaintiff is also entitled to the perpetual injunction sought in relief (d) to the plaint.

ISSUE NO.8

48. In view of my finding that defendant No.2 had no right, title or interest to come into, and retain the possession of the suit property and that the plaintiff being the lawful owner of the suit property is entitled to possession thereof, it follows, that the plaintiff is entitled to claim damages for the continued trespass into the suit property by defendant No.2. On the aspect of the quantum of damages, the plaintiff/PW-1 has stated in his evidence that similar properties in the area are fetching rents of more than the amount of Rs.6,000/- per month. He claims Rs.12,000/- towards arrears of mesne profits/damages for use and occupation of the suit property for the months of August and September, 1991 and at the same rate from the date of filing of the suit till the defendants are dispossessed. The cross-examination of PW-1 on the aspect of the rate of damages claimed by the plaintiff is nil. There is no denial of the statement of PW-1 either about the rate for damages claimed by the plaintiff or that similar properties in the area are fetching rents much more than the said amount. Even in his evidence, the defendant No.2 is completely silent on this aspect. I am, therefore, inclined to agree with the plaintiff that he is entitled to damages and mesne profits @ Rs.6,000/- per month. Even otherwise, the Court can take notice of the fact that the property in question is situated in a South Delhi village, and the rate of damages claimed by the plaintiff cannot be said to be unreasonable by any standards.

49. Even according to defendant No.2 he was put in possession of the suit property on 11.09.1991. The plaintiff is claiming damages at the aforesaid rate from August, 1991 onwards. The suit was filed on 29.10.1991. I am, therefore, of the view that the plaintiff would be entitled to damages @ Rs.6,000/- per month from 01.10.1991 onwards and uptill he is dispossessed in execution of the decree, or he surrenders possession to the plaintiff and not from the month of August, 1991, as claimed by him.

ISSUE NO.10

50. In view of my aforesaid findings and discussions, I decree the suit filed by the plaintiff and grant the following reliefs: -

(i) A decree for possession in respect of the suit property bearing

No.35B, situated in Village Shahpur Jat, P.O. Haus Khas, show in red colour in the plan, Ex.PW-1/2 and bounded as under: NORTH: GALI SOUTH: House of Gopi and partly house of Suraj EAST: House of Hari Chand No.35 WEST: House of Parkash and partly house of Gian Chand and a Gali in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, their agents, assigns, nominees, transferees and representatives;

(ii) A decree of damages in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant No.2 @ Rs.6,000/- per month from 01.12.1991 onwards, till date, and at the same rate, till the plaintiff is put in possession of the suit property;

(iii) A decree of declaration thereby declaring that the defendants have no right, title or interest in property bearing No.35-B, situated in Village Shahpur Jat, P.O. Hauz Khas, New Delhi-16, as described hereinabove;

(iv) A decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants their agents, relatives, assigns, nominees from damaging or demolishing any part of the aforesaid property bearing No.35B, situated in Village Shahpur Jat, P.O. Hauz Khas, New Delhi-16, or making any construction or carrying out any structural changes, additions, alterations in any part of the said property or entering into any agreement/arrangements, contracts for selling, encumbering, alienating or parting with possession or transferring it wholly or partly in any manner whatsoever, including by way of sale, gift, lease, mortgage, licence, creating any third party's right, title or interest of any kind in respect of the suit property, or getting it mutated in MCD records in their own names jointly or severally or in favour of any other party.

51. The suit is decreed with costs quantified at Rs.50,000/- in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant No.2. May 19, 2008 VIPIN SANGHI, J. PKB/RSK