Full Text
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI . Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal & Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for
Respondent GNCTD.
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
This appeal is dismissed in terms of the common
ORDER
Gupta" and connected matters.
Registry is directed to place on record a copy of the judgment passed in LPA No.
319 of 2007.
CHIEF JUSTICE
2008:DHC:9417-DB HIGH COURT OF DELHI LPA No. 319 of 2007
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate IVIr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
ThroughMr. Sanjay Gosvvamy and Mr. AjayKumar, Advocates for theRespondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh,Advocates
ThroughMi'. Sanjay Gosv/amy and ]S4r. AjayKumar, Advocatesfor the Respondents., Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 374/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S.Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
2008:DHC:9417-DB KEY POINT Respondent
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mi-. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 376/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELIil Appellant
Tiirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. SanjeevSabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates forthe Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 377/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tiirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, SeniorAdvocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
' • versus
VAREjHMAN PROPERTIES Respondent Tiirough Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for theRespondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 378/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tiirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate 2008:DHC:9417-DB
,a.
N,.
ILK, ENTERPRISES Respondent Tlirougli Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mi-. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 380/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Plioolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. AlokSingh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD, LPA No, 381/2007
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Ml*. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 382/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Ml-. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr.Alok Singh, Advocates 2008:DHC:9417-DB Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 383/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mi\ Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
PA No. 384/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPOMTION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabhanval and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 385/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mf. Alok Singh, Advocates 2008:DHC:9417-DB Advocates for theRespondents..
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates fof Respondent GNCTt).
LPA No. 386/2007 MmiCIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 387/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELffi Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, SeniorAdvocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mi*. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, ~ Advocates forthe Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid andMs. ZubedaBegum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 388/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OP DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, SeniorAdvocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
^ . •
I
Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 389/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI ..... Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
A No. 391/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELm Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Irarti Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 394/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates 2008:DHC:9417-DB S'T.,f A
\ VARDHMAN PROPERTIES. Respondent
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 395/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPOMTION OF DELHI . Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mi-. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for theRespondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 396/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
MANISH AGGRAWAL Respondent
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates forthe Respondents.
Ms. IramMajidand Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 400/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, SeniorAdvocate 2008:DHC:9417-DB n
\P VARDHMAN PROPERTIES Respondent Tlirough Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates fortheRespondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent CnCTD.
LPA No. 401/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Ml-. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Ml-. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy andMr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates fortheRespondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 402/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates fortheRespondents.
Ms. IraniMajidand Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 403/2007 2008:DHC:9417-DB
Through Ml*. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 405/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharvval and
Ml*. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates fortheRespondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 406/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates forthe Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 407/2007 2008:DHC:9417-DB
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTt).
LPA No. 408/2007 municipal CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mi*. Ajay Kumar, Advocates fortheRespondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 1051/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for RespondentGNCTD.
LPA No. 1057/2007 2008:DHC:9417-DB
Through Mi*. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates forthe Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 1058/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OFDELHI Appellant
Tlirough; Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Ml*. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. IraniMajidand Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 1059/2007 MUNICIPALCORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough; Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. SanjayGoswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 1060/2007 2008:DHC:9417-DB Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mi-. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 1061/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwai and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
AND
LPA No. 1285/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwai and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for theRespondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates
2008:DHC:9417-DB V
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be /. allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported //, in Digest?
JUDGMENT
1. These appeals are directed against the common judgment dated 13^ March, 2007 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 8161 of 2005 and Batch. The writ petitions challenged the validity of the notices issued by the Collector of Stamps under Section 40 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 ('Stamp Act') demanding transfer duty as well as deficient stamp duty and penalty equalto ten times of the deficient duty.
2. The demand for transfer duty was made in respect of the conveyance of plots of land in favour of the appellants who successfully bid for them in auctions held by the Delhi Development Authority ('DDA')/ Municipal Corporation of Delhi ('MCD'). Consequently, perpetual lease deeds were executed and registered in their favour. The writ petitioners had also paid the appropriate stamp duty and transfer duty in terms of the certificate issued by the Collector of Stamps in each of the cases. 2008:DHC:9417-DB Commissioner, Delhi stating that the Collectors of Stamp of difterent districts had adopted varying methods ofcalculation ofduty in respect of perpetual leases which had resulted in the duty being short levied and collected. This conclusion was reached on an interpretation ofArticle 35 ofSchedule 1(A) to the Stamp Act as applicable to Delhi and Section 147 to the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 ('DMC Act'). Consequently, the impugned notices were issued in Februaiy 2005 to each ofthe appellants calling upon them to pay the deficient duty as well as the penalty equaling ten times of the deficient duty. In respect of Vardliman Properties, for instance, the auction purchaser had paid Rs.12,42,215 as stamp duty. This was now recomputed as Rs.13,30,604 being the aggregate of Rs.10,79,772 as stamp duty and Rs.2,00,832 as transfer duty. In re-worldng the duty, the total consideration for the perpetual lease was taken as the aggregate of the premium amount of Rs.1,91,11,000 and the annual rent calculated as a percentage of the premium amount. In addition a penalty of Rs.8,88,389 (being ten times of the deficient duty) was also demanded.
4. Before the learned Single Judge the respondents contended that they were not challenging the re-worlcing of the stamp duty since the question of interpretation of Article 35 of Schedule 1(A) of the Stamp Act was debatable. Their challenge was, therefore, confined to the /] dues in the transferduty as demanded in the impugned notices.
5. On the question ofpenalty, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that in terms of Section 40 of the Stamp Act, tlie power to impose a penalty was consequential upon the Collector of Stamps impounding an instrument. Since no instrument had yet been impounded by the Collector, the question of imposition of any penalty did not arise. To the extent, therefore, that the impugned notices sought to levy penalty, they were held to be unsustainable in law.
6. The next question before the learned Single Judge concerned the interpretation ofthe relevant entry in Section 147 (2) (b) (v) DMC Act. After referring to tlie decision ofthe learned Single Judge ofthis Court in Niagara Hotels &Builders (P) Ltd. v. Union ofIndia 65 (1997) DLT 826, the learned Single Judge concluded that the words 'amount' and 'value' in Section 147 (2) (b) (v) DMC Act did not refer to the premium collected for the grant ofthe lease. The learned Single Judge rejected the contention of the MCD that the word 'amount' referred to premium and ' theword 'value' referred to therent. It was held thatthey referred to the quantum of the rent for the first fifty years of the lease. Consequently, transfer duty would be leviable on one-sixth of the rent for the first fifty years of the lease. Althougli the lease referred to only the first thirty 30 year period but computed for the first fifty years".
7. The petitions were accordingly partly allowed holding that no penalty could be imposed in respect ofthe transfer duty under the DMC Act since that was a debatable issue. Adirection was issued to re-work the transfer duty in terms ofthe judgment ofthe learned Single Judge. It was further held that no further stamp duty in addition to the amounts already paid was payable nor was any penalty chargeable.
8. Aggrieved by the judgment ofthe learned Single Judge, the MCD has filed thepresent appeals.
9. It is contended by Mr. H.S. Phoolka, the learned senior counsel appearing for the MCD that in the sense and in the context in which the word 'rent' is used inSection 147 (2) (b) (v) DMC Act, ithad to connote the total consideration payable under the lease deed. His submission was that unless the total consideration as shown on the lease deed was paid by the lessee, the execution of the peipetual lease deed could not have taken place. Therefore, the word 'rent' would include the premium paid bytheauction purchaser for obtaining thelease. In other words, the expression 'rent' meant 'rent + premium' and not the rent alone. Reference was made to the definition ofthe word 'premium' in Black's 2008:DHC:9417-DB given full effect to keeping in view the context in which the word occurs. Therefore the disjunctive 'or' had to be read as &conjunctive 'and'. Since the lease could not have been executed without the premium being paid, the legislative intent was to levy transfer duty on the amount equal to one-sixth ofthe entire consideration payable in respect of the lease which, in any event, has been set forth in the instrument. Mr.Phoolka contended that since the annual rent payable is calculated as a percentage ofthe premium paid, it is a measure ofthe premium itself. Consequently, there itwas logical to include the premium amount as part • ofthe rent for the purposes ofcomputing the transfer duty.
10. In supportofhis contention that all words in the statute have to be given full effect Mr.Phoolka referred to the judgmems ofthe Supreme Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. (2005) 7 # see 234, Mdnohar Lai v/ Vinesh Anand (2001) 5SCC 407, Noorie Manure Mill v. Commissioner Trade Tax (2007) 10 SCC 478, Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. State of MP (2004) 9 SCC 727 and Indcon Structurals (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of CentralExcise (2006) 6 SCC 786..
11. Mr.Sanjay Goswamy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that a taxing statute admits of only strict Wj the provision should expressly indicate it. Reliance is placed on Section 105 ofthe Transfer ofProperty Act, 1882 ('TP Act') where the words 'premium' and 'rent' have been separately defined. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner ofIncome Tax v. Panbari Tea Company AIR 1965 SC 1871, it is submitted that the expression 'premium' and 'rent' have to be separately understood and one cannot include the other in the context in which it is used in the deed ofperpetual lease in the instant case. The word 'rent' can only refer to the actual rent indicated in the lease deed and not the premium. Reference is also made to the decisions in Govind Ram v. Rajphul Singh AIR 1973, Punjab & Ilaiyana 94 and S. Venkataraman Swami
V. S. Abdul Wahab AIR 1969 Madras 473.
12. In order to appreciate the respective contentions, a reference may be made first to Section 147 (2) (b) (v) oftheDMC Actwhich reads: "147. Duty on transfer of property and method of assessment thereto.- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Coiporation shall levy a duty on transfers of immovable property situated within the limits of Delhi in accordance with the provisions hereafter in this section contained. (2) The said duty shall be levied - (a) in the fomi of a surcharge on the duty imposed by the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) as in force for the time being in the Union Teiritory of Delhi, on every instrument of the description specified below, and Description of instrument Amount on which duty should levied
(i) Sale ofirnmovable property The amount or value of consideration for the sale, as set forth in instrument.
(ii) Exchange of immovable property
(iii) Giftof immovable propert; Thevalue of theproperty, as setforth the instrument.
(iv) Mortgage with possession immovable property
(v) Lease in perpetuity immovable property
The amount equal to one-sixthof the whole amount or value of the rent which would be paid or delivered in respect ofthe first fifty years ofthe le: as set forth in the instrument, (emphasis supplied)
(v) Contract for transfer of immovable property
13. In Niagara Hotels & Builders (P) Limited a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the word 'or' in Section 147 (2) (b) (v) DMC Act could not be read in a manner so as to enable MCD to levy the transfer duty on an aggregate both the premium amount as well as the rent. In the impugned order in the instant cases, the learned Single Judge has held that the expression "amount' or 'value' both qualified "rent andrent alone" and, therefore, the rent (and not the premium) could alone form the basis for calculating the transfer duty.
14. Depending on the context, the word 'premium' can have both a ^Premmmmm^ a sum of money paid as consideration for grant oflease. It represents "capitalized rent which in fact is the dilfeEence between the actual rent and the rent:#|fl;ch^mi^t otherwise be obtained by thelessor. other Like Sums'\ "are sums paid^ ift «>ccess of the agreed rent in consideration of grant, continuance or renewal ofthetenancy" In Black's Law Dicfioiiatj., Sixth Edition, premium is defined as capitalizedrent"paidin lumpsum attiietime oflease is granted."
15. The question whether the 'rent' payable under the deeds of perpetual lease in the instant cases includes the 'premium' paid will depend on the context in which the word is used. This distinction is acknowledged in the definitions of the terms 'premium' and 'rent' in Section 105 ofthe TP Act as well.
16. The decision of the Supreme Court in Panbari Tea Company supports the contention of the respondent that, given the context, the word 'rent' in Section 147 (2) (b) (v) DMC Act has to have anarrow meaning. The question that arose in the said case was "whether the premium collected as alump sum (although payable in instalments) could also be considered to be arevenue receipt in the same mamier as 2008:DHC:9417-DB premium in the sum ofRs.2,25,000 ofthe annual rent ofRs.54,000. The premium was to be paid in the following manner: Rs.45,000 as lump sum at the time of execution of the lease deed and the balance of Rs.1,18,000 in sixteen half yearly instalments of Rs.l 1,250 before the 3r' Januaiy and 31^' July of each year. The annual rent of Rs.54,000 was payable in the following manner:Rs.1,000 per month to be paid on or before last date ofeach month, thus, making in all Rs.12,000 per year and the balance of Rs.42,000 to be paid on or before 31^' December of each year. In the assessment year for 1952-53, the income tax officer treated the instalment of Rs. 11,250 paid towards premium as a revenue receipt. This assessment was upheld by the Appellant Assistant Commissioner as well as the Tribunal. The High Court reversed the Tribunal andheldthatthe sum of Rs.11,250 was a capital receipt and not a revenue receipt. The Department then appealed the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court referred to the decisions in Kamakshya Narain - Singh V. Commissioner ofIncome Tax (1943) IIITR 513, Memberfor the Board ofAgriculture v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1957) 32 ITR 169 and Chintamani Saran Nath Sah v. Commissioner ofIncome Tax AIR 1961 SC 732 to underscore the distinction between the premium and rent. It pointed out that a one-time payment of premium for the grant of a lease was Idiown as 'salami' which is in the nature of a 2008:DHC:9417-DB between aprice paid for atransfer ofaright to enjoy the property and the rent to be paid periodically to the lessor. When the interest ofthe lessor is parted with for aprice, the price paid is premium or salami. But the periodical payments made for the continuous enjoyment of the benefits under the lease are in the nature of rent. The former is &capital income and the latter a revenue receipt. There may be circumstances where the parties may camouflage tlie real nature of the transaction by using clever phraseology. In some cases, the so-called premium is in fact advance rent and in others rent is deferred price. It is not the fonti but the substance ofthe transaction that matters. The nomenclature used may not be decisive or conclusive but it helps the Court, having regard to the other circumstances, to ascertain the intention of theparties." On an analysis ofthe relevant clauses in the lease deed, it was held that the amount paid as premium could not be construed as rent and, such premium was a capital receipt inthe hands ofthe lessor.
17. In Hotel Kings v. Sara Farhan Lukmani (2007) 1 SCC 202, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance ofacontextual interpretation and held that while the permitted increase in rent can serve as ayardstick for the landlord to increase the rents it did not make such permitted increase "apart ofthe rent though it may be aconsideration for the grant of lease."
18. The lease deed in the instant cases a makes reference to the amiual rent that would be payable in future. This is not a-pre-determined figure December, 2003 in favour of M/s N.K. Gupta, the fourth paragraph of the preamble reads: "NOW THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH that, in consideration of the ainount of Rs. 1,31,04,000/- (Rupees One Crore Thirty One lacs and Four thousand only) paid towards premium before the execution of these presents (the receipt where of the Lessor hereby acloiowledges) and of the rent hereinafter reserved and of the covenants on the part of the lessee hereinafter contained, the Lessor doth hereby demise unto the Lessee, all that plot of land being the Commercial Plot No. 09 Block No. X in the lay out plan of New Friends Colony District Centre"
19. In the later portion ofthe same paragraph ofthe lease deed, the annual rent is stated as being two and a half per cent ofRs.1,31,04,000 and the first annual rent instalment is to be paid on January, 2008. The relevant portion reads as under: "TO HOLD the premises imto the lessee in peipetuity from 24"^ day of January two thousand and three YIELDING AND PAYING therefore yearly rent payable in advance of.Rs. 5/- (Rupees Five only) up to the 23'^^ day of January two thousand and Eight and thereafter at the rate of two and a half per cent of the premium (the sums already paid and such other sum or sums hereafter to be paid towards premium under the covenants and conditions hereinafter contained) or such other enhanced rent as may hereafter be assessed under the covenants and conditions 2008:DHC:9417-DB oM
20. Areading of the aforementioned portions of the perpetual lease deed brings out the distinction between 'premium' on the one hand and 'rent' on the other. The word 'premium' carries more than one definition; it has to be understood in the context in which it is used in a lease deed. The question whether the word 'premium' is also subsumed in the words "whole amount or value ofthe rent" occurring in Section V 147 (2) (b) (v) DMC Act has to be answered with reference to the context in which the word is used in the lease deeds in question. A careful examination ofthe above clauses ofthe lease deed, leads to the conclusion that the 'premium' paid for the lease is distinct from the 'rent' payable thereunder. In other words, 'rent' in Section 147 (2) (b)
(v) DMC Act cannot be said to include the premium paid for the lease.
21. It is also not possible to constme the premium paid as advance rent since the annual rent in is not indicated as a pre-determined sum in the lease deed. It is a percentage of the premium paid. The premium amount serves as a yardstick for determining the rent payable. It is therefore not possible to intei-pret the word 'rent' in the lease deeds in theinstant cases asincluding the premium paid.
22. This Court is inclined to accept the contention ofthe respondent 2008:DHC:9417-DB interpretation. The-principle enunciated in the decisions relied upon by the appellants that every word in astatute must be given its full meaning is unexceptionable. However, the meaning so given must be in the context of the statute in general and the provision in particular. In the context ofthe lease deeds in question in the instant cases, the word 'rent' cannot possibly be inteipreted to include the premium paid for the grant of the lease. As rightly contended by the respondents, ifthe legislature intended to make the premium paid for the lease as includible for the purposes of determining transfer duty then the statute should have been expressly worded to reflect that intention.
23. Accordingly, this Court concurs with the conclusion arrived at by the by the learned Single Judge. The appeals are dismissed with no orders as to costs. July 02,2008 sb
S. MURALIDHAR, J.
CHIEF JUSTICE