Full Text
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, SeniorAdvocate Mr. SanjeevSabharwal & Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
ThroughMr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for
Respondent GNCTD.
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
I This appeal is dismissed in terms of the common
ORDER
Gupta" and connected matters.
Registry is directed to place on record acopy ofthe judgment passed in LPA No.
319 of 2007.
CHIEF JUSTICE
2008:DHC:9405-DB HIGH COURT OF DELHI LPANo.319 of 2007
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh,Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 374/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, SeniorAdvocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
2008:DHC:9405-DB KEY POINT Respondent
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mi*. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA Noo 376/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELffl Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Ml-. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 377/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELffl Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Iraill Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 378/2007 MUiNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELffl Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate 2008:DHC:9405-DB
\.
K.K. ENTERPRISES Respondent Tlirough Ml". Sanjay Goswamy and Mi*. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 380/2007 MmiCIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Plioolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Ml". Alok Smgh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Gosv^amy and Mr. Aja>' Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for ilespofident GNCTD.
LPA No, 381/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Ml-. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 382/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELITI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Ml'. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. AlokSingh, Advocates 2008:DHC:9405-DB Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPANo. 383/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mf. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Itaffl Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent ONCTD.
PA No. 384/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 385/2007 MUNICIPAL COi^ORATlON OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates 2008:DHC:9405-DB Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for RespondentGNCTD.
LPA No. 386/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF t)ELHl Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 387/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OP DELm Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mi-. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid andMs. ZubedaBegum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 388/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OP DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, SeniorAdvocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and iVIr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPANOc 389/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharvval and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
ThroughMr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. AjayKumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPANo. 391/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OFDELPH Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPANo. 394/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singli, Advocates 2008:DHC:9405-DB \0V
VARDHMAN properties . Respondent I Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, .}| Advocates for theRespondents.
Ms. Irani Majid andMs. ZubedaBegum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTt).
LPA No. 395/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OFDELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates forthe Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid andMs. ZubedaBegum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 396/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Ml-. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
]VIi-. Alok Singh, Advocates versus v..
MANISH AGGRAWAL Respondent
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Irani Majid andMs. ZubedaBegum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 400/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
2008:DHC:9405-DB VAIIDHMAN properties Respondent
Tlirough Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iraln Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GnCTD.
LPA No. 401/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough; Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Ml-. Alok Singh,Advocates
Through Ml'. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 402/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough; Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Ml*. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. IramMajidand Ms. ZubedaBegum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 403/2007 2008:DHC:9405-DB V
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy andMr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for theRespondents.
Ms. IraniMajidand Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 405/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, SeniorAdvocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharvval and
Ml-. Alok Singh,Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid andMs. ZubedaBegum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 406/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, SeniorAdvocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Smgh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid andMs. ZubedaBegum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 407/2007 2008:DHC:9405-DB
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswaniy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates forthe Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid andMs. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTt).
LPA No. 408/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Smgh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 1051/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, SeniorAdvocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh,Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for the Respondents.
Ms. IramMajidand Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates forRespondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 1057/2007 2008:DHC:9405-DB
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates for theRespondents.
Ms. IraniMajid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 1058/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELffi Appellant
Through; Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocates forthe Respondents.
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 1059/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Ml-. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPA No. 1060/2007 2008:DHC:9405-DB Mr. AlokSingh, Advocates
Ms. Iram Majid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent GNCTD.
LPANo. 1061/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Tlirough: Mr.H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh,Advocates
Ms. IramMajid and Ms. Zubeda Begum, Advocates for Respondent (jNCTt).
A^t> LPANo. 1285/2007 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Appellant
Through: IVIr.H.S. Phoolka, SeniorAdvocate Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal and
Mr. Alok Singh, Advocates
Through Mr. Sanjay Goswamy and Mr. Ajay Kumar, 2008:DHC:9405-DB
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
1. Whether Reporters oflocal papers may be • allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether thejudgment should be reported 'U, in Digest?
JUDGMENT
1. These appeals are directed against the common judgment dated 13^ March, 2007 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 8161 of 2005 and Batch. The writ petitions challenged the validity ofthe notices issued by the Collector ofStamps under Section 40 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 ('Stamp Act') demanding transfer duty as well as deficient stamp duty and penalty equalto ten times ofthe deficient duty.
1. The demand for transfer duty was made in respect of the conveyance ofplots of land in favour ofthe appellants who successfully bid for tliem in auctions held by the Delhi Development Authority ('DDA')/ Municipal Corporation of Delhi ('MCD'). Consequently, perpetual lease deeds were executed and registered in their favour. The writ petitioners had also paid the appropriate stamp duty and transfer duty interms ofthe certificate issued by the Collector ofStamps in each 2008:DHC:9405-DB Commissioner, Delhi stating that the Collectors of Stamp of different districts had adopted varying methods of calculation of dutyin respect of perpetual leases which had resulted in the duty being short levied and collected. This conclusion was reached on an interpretation of Article 35 of Schedule 1 (A) to the Stamp Act as applicable to Delhi and Section 147 to the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 ('DMC Act'). Consequently, the impugned notices were issued in Februaty 2005 to each ofthe appellants calling upon them topay the deficient duty as well as tlie penalty equaling ten times of the deficient duty. In respect of Vardliman Properties, for instance, the auction purchaser had paid Rs.12,42,215 as stamp duty. This was now recomputed as Rs.13,30,604 being tlie aggregate of Rs.10,79,772 as stamp duty and Rs.2,00,832 as transfer duty. In re-worldng the duty, the total consideration for the perpetual lease was taken as the aggregate of the premium amount of Rs.1,91,11,000 and the annual rent calculated as a percentage of the premium amount. In addition a penalty of Rs.8,88,389 (being ten times ofthe deficient duty) was also demanded.
4. Before tlie learned Single Judge the respondents contended that they were not challenging the re^working of the stamp duty since the question of interpretation of Article 35 of Schedule 1(A) of the Stamp Act was debatable. Their challenge was, therefore, confined to the 2008:DHC:9405-DB dues in the transfer duty as demanded in the impugned notices.
5. On the question ofpenalty, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that in terms of Section 40 of the Stamp Act, the power to impose a penalty was consequential upon the Collector of Stamps impounding aninstrument. Since no instrument had yet been impounded by the Collector, the question ofimposition ofany penalty did not arise. To the extent, therefore, that the impugned notices sought to levy penalty, they were held to be unsustainable in law.
6. The next question before the learned Single Judge concerned the interpretation of the relevant entry in Section 147 (2) (b) (v) DMC Act. After referring to the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court inNiagara Hotels &Builders (P)Ltd. v. Union ofIndia 65 (1997) DLT 826, the learned Single Judge concluded tliat the words 'amount' and 'value' in Section 147 (2) (b) (v) DMC Act didnotrefer to the premium collected for the grant of the lease. The learned Single Judge rejected the contention of the MCD that the word 'amount' referred to premium and the word 'value' referred to the rent. It was held that they referred to the quantum of the rent for the first fifty years of the lease. Consequently, transfer duty would be leviable on one-sixth of the rent for the first fifty 30 year period but computed forthe first fifty years".
7. ' The petitions were accordingly partly allowed holding that no penalty could be imposed in respect of the transfer duty under the DMC Act since that was a debatable issue. A direction was issued to re-work the transfer duty in terms ofthe judgment ofthe learned Single Judge. It was fiirther held that no further stamp duty in addition to the amounts already paid was payable nor was any penalty chargeable.
8. Aggrieved by the judgmentof the learned Single Judge, the MCD has filed the present appeals.
9. It is contended by Mr. H.S. Phoolka, the learned senior counsel appearing for the MCD that in the sense and in the context in which the word 'rent' is used in Section 147 (2) (b) (v) DMC Act, it had to connote the total consideration payable under the lease deed. His submission was that unless the total consideration as shown on the lease deed was paid by the lessee, the execution of the peipetual lease deed could not have taken place. Therefore, the word 'rent' would include the premium paid by the auctionpurchaser for obtaining the lease. In otherwords, the expression 'rent' meant 'rent + premium' and not the rent alone. Reference was made to the definition of the word 'premium' in Black's 2008:DHC:9405-DB givefi full effect to keeping in view the context in which the word occurs. Therefore the disjunctive 'or' had to be read as a conjunctive 'and'. Since the lease could not have been executed without the premium beingpaid, the legislative intentwas to le\7 transfer duty on the amount equal to one-sixth of the entire consideration payable in respect of the lease which, in any event, has been set forth in the instrument. Mr.Phoolka contended that since the annual rent payable is calculated as a percentage of the premium paid, it is a measure of the premium itself Consequently, there it was logicalto includethe premium amount as part ofthe rent for the purposes of computing the transfer duty.
10. In support ofMs contentionthat all words in the statutehave to be given full effect Mr.Phoolka referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Shin-Etsii Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Alish Optijibre Ltd. (2005) 7 see 234, Manohar Lai v/ Vinesh Anand (2001) 5 SCC 407, Noorie Manure Mill v. Commissioner Trade Tax (2007) 10 SCC 478, Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. State of MP (2004) 9 SCC 727 and Indcon Structurals (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise (2006) 6 SCC 786..
11. Mr.Sanjay Goswamy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 0^ 'y tlie provision sliould expressly indicate it. Reliance is placed on Section 105 ofthe Transfer ofProperty Act, 1882 ('TP Act') where the words 'premium' and 'rent' have been separately defined. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner ofIncome Tax v. Panbari Tea Company AIl^ 1965 SC 1871, it is submitted that the expression 'premium' and 'rent' have to be separately understood and one cannot include the other inthe context inwhich it isused.in the deed of perpetual lease in the instant case. Tlie word 'rent' can only refer to the actual rent indicated in the lease deed and not the premium. Reference is also made to the decisions in Govind Ram v. Rajphul Singh AIR 1973, Punjab <& Haryana 94 ond S. Venkataraman Swami
V. S. Abdul Wahab AIR 1969 Madras 473.
12. In order to appreciate the respective contentions, a reference may be made first to Section 147 (2) (b) (v) of the DMC Act which reads: "147. Duty on transfer of property and method of assessment thereto,- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Coiporation shall levy a duty on transfers of immovable property situated within the limits of £)elhi in accordance with the provisions hereafter inthis section contained. (2) The said duty shall be levied- (a) in the fomi of a surcharge on the duty imposed by the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) as in force for the time being in the Union Territory of Delhi, on every instrument of the description specified below, and Description of instrument Amount on which duty should leyied
(i) Sale of immovable property The amount or value of consideration for the sale, as. set forth in instrument.
(ii) Exchange of immovable property
(iii) Giftof immovable propert; The value oftheproperty, assetforth the instrument.
(iv) Mortgage with possession immovable property
(v) Lease in perpetuity immovable property
The amount equal to one-sixth of the whole amount or value of the rent which would be paid or delivered in respect ofthe first fifty years ofthe le; as set forth in the instrument, (emphasis supplied).
(v) Contract for transfer of immovable property
13. InNiagara Hotels &Builders (P) Limited a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the word 'or' in Section 147 (2) (b) (v) DMC Act could not be read in a manlier so as to enable MCD to levy the transfer duty on an aggregate both the premium amount as well as the rent. In the impugned order in the instant cases, the learned Single Judge has held that the expression "amount' or 'value' both qualified "rent and rent alone" and, therefore, the rent, (and not the premium) could alone form the basisfor calculating the transfer duty.
14. Depending on the context, the word 'premium' can have both a 2008:DHC:9405-DB a sum of money paid as coBsid^iatiGfi for grant oflease. Itrepresents rent which in fact is the diltefMie^ between the actual rent and the rerite^M^il-lni^t otherwise be obtained by thel^ori other Like Sums", "are sums pai# la ^^Gess of the agreed rent in considsFgliQii of grant, continuance or renewai>dMe tenancy" In Black's Law Dictionayy, Sixth Edition, premium is defined as capitalized rent "paid in lump sum at the time oflease is granted."
15. The question whether the 'rent' payable under the deeds of perpetual lease in the mstant cases includes the 'premium' paid will depend on the context in which the word is used. This distinction is adcnowledged in the definitions of the terms 'premium' and 'rent' in Section 105 oftheTPActaswell.
16. The decision of tlie Supreme Court in Panbari Tea Company supports the contention of the respondent that, given the context, the word 'rent' in Section 147 (2) (b) (v) DMC Act has to have a narrow meaning. The question that arose in the said case was "whether the premium collected as a lump sum (although payable in instalments) could also be considered to be arevenue receipt in the same mamier as # premium in the sum of Rs.2,25,000 of the annual rent of Rs.54,000. The premium was to be paid in the following manner; Rs.45,000 as lump sum at the time of execution of the lease deed and the balance of Rs.1,18,000 in sixteen half yearly instalments of Rs. 11,250 before the 31®' January and 31®' July of each year. The annual rent of Rs.54,000 was payable in the following manner:Rs.1,000 per month to be paid on or before last date of eachmonth, thus, making in all Rs. 12,000 per year and the balance ofRs.42,000 to be paid on or before 31®' December of each year.. In the assessment year for 1952-53, the income tax officer treated the instalmentof Rs. 11,250 paid towards premium as a revenue receipt. This assessment was upheld by the Appellant Assistant Commissioner as well as the Tribunal. The High Court reversed the Tribunal andheldthatthe sum of Rs.l 1,250 was a capital receipt and not a revenue receipt. The Department then appealed the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court referred to the decisions in Kamakshya Narain Singh V. Commissioner ofIncome Tax (1943) IIITR 513, Memberfor the Board of Agriculture v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1957) 32 ITR 169 and Chintamani Saran Nath Sah v. Commissioner ofIncome Tax AIR 1961 SC 732 to underscore the distinction between the premium and rent. It pointed out that a one-time payment ofpremium for the grant of a lease was Iciiown as 'salami' which is inthe nature ofa 2008:DHC:9405-DB between aprice paid for atransfer ofaright to enjoy the property and the rent to be paid periodically to the lessor. When the interest ofthe lessor is parted with for aprice, the price paid is premium or salami. But the periodical payments made for the continuous enjoyment of the benefits under the lease are in the nature of rent. The fonner is a capital income and the latter a revenue receipt, there may be circumstances where the parties may camouflage tlie real nature of the transaction by using clever phraseology. In some cases, the so-called premium is in fact advance rent and in others rent is deferred price. It is not the form but the substance of the transaction that matters. The nomenclature used mav not be decisive or conclusive but it helps the Court, having regard to the other circumstances, to ascertain the intention of the parties." On an analysis ofthe relevant clauses in the lease deed, it was held that the amount paid as premium could not be construed as rent and, such premium was a capital receipt inthe hands of the lessor.
17. In HotelKings v. Sara Farhan Lukmani (2007) 1 SCO 202, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance ofacontextual intei-pretation and held that while the permitted increase in rent can serve as ayardstick for the landlord to increase the rents it did not make such permitted increase "apart ofthe rent though itmay be aconsideration for the grant of lease."
18. The lease deed in the instant cases a makes reference to the annual December, 2003 in favour ofM/s N.K. Gupta, the fourth paragraph of the preamble reads: "NOW THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH that, in consideration of the amount of Rs. 1,31,04,000/- (Rupees One Crore Thirty One lacs and Four thousand only) paid towards premiuiii before the execution of these presents (the receipt where of the Lessor hereby aclaiowledges) and of the rent hereinafter reserved and of the covenants on the part of the lessee hereinafter contained, the Lessor doth hereby demise unto the Lessee, all that plot of land being the Commercial Plot No. 09 Block No. X in the lay out plan of New Friends Colony District Centre"
19. In the later portion of the same paragraph of the lease deed, the annual rent is stated as being two and a half per cent of Rs.1,31,04,000 and the first annual rent instalment is to be paid on 15^'^ January, 2008. The relevant portion reads asunder: "TO HOLD the premises unto the lessee in pei-petuity from 24^ day of January two thousand and three iTlELDlNG AND PAYING therefore yearly rent payable in advance of.Rs. 5/- (Rupees Five only) up to the 23'^'' day ofJanuary two thousand and Eight and thereafter at the rate of two and a half per cent of the premium (the sums already paid and such other sum or sums hereafter to be paid towards premium under the covenants and conditions hereinafter contained) or such other enhanced rent as may hereafter be assessed under the covenants and conditions hereinafter contained clear of all deductions
20. A reading of the aforementioned portions of the perpetual lease deed brings out the distinction between 'premium' on the one hand and 'rent' on the other. The word 'premium' carries more than one definition; it has to be understood in the context in which it is used in a lease deed. The question whether the word 'premium' is also subsumed in the words "whole amount or value of the rent" occurring in Section 147 (2) (b) (v) DMC Act has to be answered with reference to the context in which the word is used in the lease deeds in question. A careful examination of the above clauses of the lease deed, leads to the conclusion that the 'premium' paid for the lease is distinct from the 'rent' payable thereunder. In other words, 'rent' in Section 147 (2) (b)
(v) DMC Act cannotbe saidto include the premium paid forthe lease. ® 21. It is also not possible to construe the premium paid as advance rent since the annual rent in is not indicated as a pre-detemined sum in the lease deed. It is a percentage of the premium paid. The premium amount serves as a yardstick for determining the rent payable. It is therefore not possible to interpret the word 'rent' in the lease deeds in the instant casesas including the premium paid. 2008:DHC:9405-DB t interpretation. The'principle enunciated in the decisions relied upon by the appellants that every word in astatute must be given its full meaning is unexceptionable. However, the meaning so given must be in the context ofthe statute in general and the provision in particular. In the context ofthe lease deeds in question in the instant cases, the word 'rent' caimot possibly be interpreted to include the premium paid for the grant ofthe lease. As rightly contended by the respondents, ifthe legislature intended to make the premium paid for the lease as includible for the purposes of determining transfer duty then the statute should have been expressly wordedto reflectthat intention.
23. Accordingly, this Court concurs with the conclusion arrived at by the by the learned Single Judge. The appeals are dismissed with no orders as to costs. July 02,2008 sb
S. MURALIDHAR, J.
CHIEF JUSTICE