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WP(C) No.3760/1992 MAHARAJA AGARSAIN PUBLIC SCHOOL
& ORS. ........ Petitioners through: Mr. S.P.Gautam, Advocate
Date of Decision: 07.07.2008
JUDGMENT
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest?: PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.
1. Petitioner No.1, Maharaja Agrasen Public School has been established by Aggarwal Welfare Society, petitioner No.3. The school has been recognized by the competent authority under the Delhi School Education Act 1973. Petitioner No.3 was functioning as the principal of the school at the relevant time.
2. Petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated W.P.(C) No.3760/1992 2008:DHC:1951 25.8.1992 passed by the Delhi School Tribunal in Appeal No.25/1988 filed by respondent No.2. Vide said order dated 25.8.1992, order dated 9.5.1988 passed by petitioner No.1 dispensing with the services of respondent No.2 has been treated to be an order of termination. Holding that respondent No.2 was deemed to be a confirmed employee of the school and that the motive behind the order was to penalize respondent No.2 for her misconduct and hence amounted to a penalty, the order dated 9.5.1988 has been quashed. Respondent No.2 has been directed to be reinstated in service.
3. Operation of the impugned order passed by the Delhi School Tribunal was stayed by a Division Bench of this Court on 23.10.1992 and since then has, due to the said order, not been implemented.
4. It is not in dispute that second respondent was appointed, on probation, as a teacher under the first petitioner in the pay scale of Rs.1200-30-1560-EB-10-2040 and that her services were dispensed with vide order dated 9.5.1988.
5. There is a dispute whether second respondent was appointed against a permanent vacancy or against a casual leave vacancy. The letter of appointment produced by the petitioners before the Delhi School Tribunal records that second respondent was temporarily appointed to the post of a teacher against a casual leave vacancy and would be on probation for a period of 12 months or till such time the vacancy exists. The second respondent did not produce any letter of appointment before the Delhi School Education Tribunal and asserted that none was given to her. The office copy of the letter of appointment produced by the petitioners before the Delhi School Tribunal did not bear any acknowledgment by the second respondent of having received the same. No other proof was furnished by the petitioners before the Tribunal that the letter of appointment produced by them was ever sent to the second respondent. The Tribunal has, therefore, not gone by the terms of the office copy of the letter of appointment produced by the petitioners.
6. Since both parties i.e. the petitioners and second respondent were not at variance that second respondent was on probation for a period of 1 year and that she was appointed with effect from 2.5.1987 and admittedly there being no order extending the period of probation; the view taken by the Tribunal is that on expiry of 1 year period of probation the second respondent would be liable to be treated as a permanent employee. In para 9 of the order dated 25.8.1992 it has been categorically held by the Tribunal that: “it cannot be said that the appellant was a probationer at the time when the impugned order dated 9.5.1988 was passed.”
7. The Tribunal has further held that admittedly, when she was serving under the first petitioner, respondent No.2 was issued certain memos. Conclusion drawn is that the management has proceeded to terminate the services of respondent No.2 for the alleged misconduct and thus the termination had to be preceded by an inquiry and since none was held the termination is contrary to law.
8. Learned counsel for the parties did not dispute that the Delhi School Education Act 1973 and the Delhi School Education Rules 1973 would govern the appointment, discharge or termination of the services of employees of recognized schools and thus in the instant case the Act and the Rules would be attracted for the reason first petitioner is a school recognized by the competent authority under the Delhi School Education Act 1973.
9. Rule 105 of the rules which was in existence at the relevant time reads as under:- “105Probation – (1) Every employee shall, on initial appointment, be on probation for a period of one year which may be extended by the appointing authority by another year and the services of an employee may be terminated without notice during the period of probation if the work and conduct of the employee, during the said period, is not, in the opinion of the appointing authority, satisfactory: Provided that no termination from the service of an employee on probation shall be made by an aided school except with the previous approval of the Director. (2) If the work and conduct of an employee during the period of probation is found to be satisfactory, he shall be on the expiry of the period of probation or the extended period of probation as the case may be, confirmed with effect from the date of expiry of the said period. (3) Nothing in this rule shall apply to an employee who has been appointed to fill a temporary vacancy for a limited period.”
10. The first petitioner is not an aided school. Thus, no prior approval of the Directorate of Education had to be obtained for termination of services of an employee on probation.
11. The Rule does not stipulate that on expiry of the period of probation if probation period is not extended and the employee continues to remain in service he would be automatically confirmed. Thus, the view taken by the Tribunal that on expiry of one year of probation second respondent would be entitled to be treated as a permanent employee of petitioner No.1 is incorrect. The settled legal position is that a probationer cannot after the expiry of the probation period automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of the service, unless the rules expressly provide for such a result. (See AIR 1966 SC 175 G.S.Ramaswamy Vs. I.G.Police).
12. Indeed, at the hearing, Sh. Rahul Sharma learned counsel for respondent No.2 did not seriously dispute the aforesaid legal position.
13. Thus, the decision rendered by the Tribunal on the premise that the status of the second respondent has to be treated as that of a permanent employee requires to be corrected by setting aside the said finding.
14. It is true that a probationer would, under certain circumstances be entitled to vindicate himself if his services are dispensed with as a probationer. The said circumstance is limited to the category of cases where the probationer is stigmatized at the time of discharge. The reason is that an order of discharge which casts a stigma affects the future career prospects of the employee and therefore such an employee would be entitled to claim that he should be given an opportunity of coming clean.
15. The issue of termination of a probationer has cropped up time and again and has received judicial attention for nearly 5 decades. Tests have been evolved. Some of them were found difficult in their application. These have been reformulated and retested from time to time.
16. A person who undergoes selection and is found more meritorious than others cannot contend that since his employer has tested his suitability he is entitled to serve till he attains the age of superannuation. The reason is that no test has been devised till date where a person's capacity, integrity, utility, suitability and capacity to work in harmony with the others can be tested at one go.
17. Therefore, law vests a right in the employer to keep under watch the service of his employee for a period of time. This is to guard against errors of human judgment in selecting a suitable candidate. The new recruit remains on test during the period of probation. The employer gets the locus during this period to watch the efficiency, ability, integrity, sincerity, suitability, competence and the ability to act in comity of the probationer. This is the period of reassurance for the employer to re-assure himself that his initial judgment was correct. Thus, every employer has a legal right to dispense with the services of the employee without anything more, during or at the end of the prescribed period of probation.
18. In the light of the aforenoted concept of probation as understood under service jurisprudence, the termination of the services of a probationer, during or at the end of the period of probation, does not affect any of his right, as he has no right to continue to hold the post, save and except after confirmation. Indeed, in the decision reported as AIR 1962 SC 1711 S.Sukhwant Singh Vs. State of Punjab, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:- “12...........But the very fact that a person is a probationer implies that he has to prove his worth, his suitability for the higher post in which he is officiating if his work is not found to be satisfactory, he will be liable to be reverted to his original post even without assigning any reason, it would, therefore, not be correct to say that a probationer has any right to the higher post in which he is officiating or a right to be confirmed. A probationer being merely made eligible for being absorbed in a permanent post is in no better position.”
19. However, as noticed above, where a probationer is stigmatized, evil consequences flow. He has to live with the stigma all his life, thereby hampering his future prospects of getting suitable employment. Therefore, harmonizing the right of the employer and that of the employee, service jurisprudence has recognized that where the termination/discharge of service of a probationer visits him with a stigma or is penal or mala fide, the probationer would have a right to justify that the cause which has resulted in his being removed is other than related to his suitability.
20. In the celebrated decision reported as AIR 1958 SC
36 Purushottam Lal Dhingra Vs. UOI the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is not the form of the termination order but the substance thereof which would determine whether it is penal. It was held that this would entitle the Court, in an appropriate case, to tear the veil behind the termination order. Where the probationer alleged that the termination was actually the result of certain memos issued to him and inquiry was dispensed with, the test evolved by the courts was whether the alleged misdemeanour were the foundation or the motive for the termination. It was held that where the order of termination or discharge was founded on the allegations of misconduct the same would fall foul with law but where the allegations of misconduct were a motive and not the foundation of the order of discharge/termination, the same would be valid. (See 2003 (3) SCC 263 Mathew P.Thomas Vs. Kerala State Civil Supply Corpn. Ltd.)
21. From a commonsense point of view it stands to reason that no employer would dispense with the services of an employee if the service rendered by him during the period of probation is satisfactory. Similarly, the services of a probationer would not be confirmed if found wanting either in respect of integrity or suitability or utility or capacity to work in harmony with the others. If extended to the extreme it could always be urged that every discharge of a probationer does affect his future career prospects because obviously, an impression would be formed in society that this person has not been found suitable for a particular job. But this is not the way law requires issue of termination/discharge of a probationer to be considered.
22. Thus, merely because when in service, the probationer was served with certain memos to explain his conduct would not mean that the order of termination is penal i.e. by way of punishment for the misconduct alleged in the memorandum.
23. Indeed, the Tribunal has not found any stigma in the letter of discharge. It is a discharge simplicitor. In fact the letter does not even state that the services of the second respondent have been terminated. It simply records that the services of second respondent are no longer required. It records that the second respondent was appointed against a temporary vacancy.
24. The memos issued to the second respondent related to her unauthorized absence from duty without a sanctioned leave. Indeed, the service record of the second respondent shows that she availed unauthorized leave and was called upon by the first petitioner to explain why she did so. But, this does not lead to the conclusion that the order of discharge was to punish the second respondent for her unauthorized leave. Indeed, it is a relevant factor to be taken into account while confirming or not confirming the services of a probationer whether or not the employee was sincere in discharging his/her duties and what was the propensity of the employee to sit at home or report for duty.
25. It is unfortunate that the Tribunal has not considered the law on the subject pertaining to discharge/termination of the services of a probationer and has treated as if the law is that wherever a probationer is served with a memorandum during service the termination has to be treated penal. As noted hereinabove the law is different. The law requires it to be considered whether the alleged misconduct was the motive or the foundation of the impugned order. The Tribunal has not carried out the aforesaid exercise.
26. I am not remanding the matter for fresh consideration by the Tribunal for the reason the events relate to the year 1988. 20 years have gone by. I have myself looked into the service record of the second respondent. I find no linkage between the discharge and the memos. I hold that the services of the second respondent have not been terminated by way of penalty.
27. The order of discharge does not stigmatized the second respondent.
28. The petition is allowed.
29. Impugned order dated 25.8.1992 passed by the first respondent is quashed.
30. Appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of discharge is dismissed.
31. No costs.
32. Record of the Delhi School Tribunal be returned forthwith. 07 July, 2008 (PRADEEP NANDRAJOG) mm JUDGE