Full Text
COMPANY APPEAL 65/2006
Through : Ms.Ruchi Sindhwani, Advocate.
^ Through : Mr.Sandeep P.Aggarwal, Advocate for R-2.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL 1.Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
JUDGMENT
2.To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes.
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes.
JUDGMENT
SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J:
1. This is an appeal under Section 483 of the Companies Act against the decision of the Company Judge dated 4th October, 2006, disposing of CA No. 1181/2006 and CA No. 472/2002 in CP No. 59/2002. The present appeal is as much against the direction to the appellant to deposit Rs. 29.15 lacs in this Court as it is for the appellant to be treated as a secured creditor having a preferential right over other creditors including the respondent no.2 herein i.e. Pradeshiya Industrial Investment Corporation of U.P. Limited (PICUP). 2008:DHC:1842-DB
2. It is the case of the appellant that between 14th November, 2000 and 7th February 2001, after negotiations between the appellant and a Director of the respondent no.1 company prior to its liquidation, a verbal agreement was entered into, for the sale by the respondent no.1 company of its goods comprising of machinery etc., for a consideration in the sum of Rs.32 lacs. According to the appellant, in pursuance of the said oral agreement a sum of Rs.15 lacs was paid to the company against receipts, and included a sum of Rs.3.30 lacs paid by draft to PICUP. Certain other amounts were paid by the appellant to the respondent company, specifically for payment to the Trade Tax Officer and the State Bank of India. A written agreement was executed between the petitioner and the company on the 7th February, 2001 which acknowledged receipt of payment of all the above amounts. It is stated by the appellant that vide this agreement for sale of goods, the property in the goods was transferred to the appellant and consequently they became the owner of the goods. As such, upon the liquidation of the company and the sale of the assets by PICUP, they were secured creditors with a preferential right over other unsecured creditors including PICUP.
3. The appellant filed a winding up petition being CP No.59/2002 under Sections 433(c)(e) and (f) and Section 434(1)(c) read with Section 439 of Companies Act, 1956 seeking a direction that the company be wound up on the ground that it is unable to pay debts, and on the ground that it is just and equitable that the company be wound up since it is being used by its Director as a vehicle of fraud, when no business activity is being carried on and the factory has been lying closed.
4. The winding up petition was contested on behalf of PICUP who stated that vide common loan agreement dated 24th January 1990 the respondent no.1 company had mortgaged the fixed assets and created first charge on the assets in favour of PICUP and Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation(UPFC). It was further stated that by a separate agreement being common deed of hypothecation dated 24th January, 1990 the whole of the moveable assets of the respondent-company had been hypothecated by way of first charge in favour of PICUP and UPFC.
PICUP thus submitted that the respondent company could not sell its plant and machinery without prior written consent from PICUP, and that therefore the entire transaction for the alleged sale of goods in favour of the appellant is bogus and an attempt to defeat the legitimate claims of secured creditors. On behalf of PICUP it was further submitted that the assets of the respondentcompany had already been taken over under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation(SFC) Act by PICUP and that if any claim is made out by the appellant the same is against the Director of the respondent-company and not against the company itself.
5. Vide order dated 8th July, 2004 the Company Court directed that it would be just and equitable to wind up the respondentcompany.
6. The appellant filed CA No. 472/2002 instituting its claim against the respondent-company as well as PICUP, for the payment to the appellant of the amount received by PICUP from the sale of the goods, sold to the appellant by the respondentcompany vide agreement dated 7th February, 2001. The appellant also filed CA 1181/2006 in CP No. 59/2002, praying therein that the Court frame issues under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC read with Rule 6 and 9 of the Company Court Rules, 1959.
7. The learned Company Judge, vide the impugned order dated 4th October, 2006, disposed off CA No. 1181/2006 thereby refusing to frame issues or permit the parties to lead evidence. By a common order of the same date the Company Judge also directed deposit by the appellant of Rs.29.15 lacs, received by the appellant from PICUP out of the proceeds of the sale of goods of the company in liquidation, under an earlier direction dated 3rd May, 2002 issued by the Company Court, within a period of one month in Court and directed release of the said amount to PICUP upon such deposit.
8. On behalf of the appellant Ms. Ruchi Sindhwani, Advocate urged that the impugned order was contrary to Rule 6 of the Company Court Rules, 1959 and refusal to frame issues and record evidence resulted in failure of justice. Counsel submitted that, on account of failure to specify distinctly the points in controversy, in the facts of this case and the nature of serious contentions raised, the impugned order suffers from a material irregularity, resulting in prejudice to the appellant. Substantial pleas were not considered and the matter was adjudicated without formulation or determination of the issues. Counsel further urged that the procedure laid down in Rule 6 is required to be followed in every substantive matter. The learned counsel invited the Court’s attention to the judgment of the Kerala High Court reported as 1992(73) Company Cases 393, in this behalf.
9. In Ravindra S. More and Another vs. Sudarsan Chits (India) Ltd. (In Liquidation); 1992 (73) Company Cases 393, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held that, for rendering judgment in a case, where serious contentions have been raised, the failure to frame issues was a material irregularity, and the formulation of the issues that arose for the consideration was essential. In that case the respondentcompany had filed a claim against the appellants on the original consideration and balance of accounts. The appellants resisted the claim on the plea that they were rendering professional services to the respondent-company and stated that the understanding between the parties was that no amount be repaid to the claimant-company. It was stated that the promissory note which was the basis of the claim was executed only for company records and further that the claim of the respondent-company was barred by limitation prior to the commencement of the winding up of the company. The company in liquidation denied this and stated that part payment received from the appellants amounted to an acknowledgement of the debt and that the claim had been preferred within the period of limitation from the said acknowledgement. The Division Bench after considering the rival pleas and Rule 6 of the Company Court Rules, 1959 held:- “In the nature of the pleadings in the case, the real dispute between the parties could be highlighted only by framing appropriate issues. The framing of issues has a very important bearing on the trial and decision of a case. In this case, the pleadings raise points with sufficient clearness, warranting the framing of issues. It does not appear that the parties invited the attention of the court for framing of the issues or to post the case for trial. However, it cannot be forgotten that it is primarily the duty of the court to frame the issues: Kesavan v. Narayanan, AIR 1953 Trav-Coch 118, at page 119. A court commits a grave irregularity in proceeding to the final hearing of a case without settling the issues therein: Muttayan Chetti v. Sangili Vira Pandia Chinnathambiar [1882] ILR 6 Mad 1, 9 (PC); Chiranji Lal v. Shankar Lal, AIR 1951 Raj 56; Aziz Ahmed Khan v. I.A. Patel, AIR 1974 AP 1 [FB] and Kaniz Fatima v. Shah Naina Ashraf, AIR 1983 All 450. We are satisfied that such irregularity, on the facts of this case, is a material one affecting the disposal of the case on merits. On the facts of this case, in the nature of the serious contentions raised, the failure to frame the issues is a material irregularity which has resulted in prejudice and injustice to the appellants, in that, prima facie substantial pleas could not be and were not adjudicated. For rendering the judgment in the case, formulation or determination of the issues that arose for consideration was essential. That alone will focus the attention of the court as to what are the points that arise for determination, and the evidence to be adduced in that behalf by the parties, depending upon the burden of proof cast on them.”
10. Counsel for the appellant also invited our attention to a decision of this Court in Jaimal Singh Makin vs. Official Liquidator, Majestic Financiers P. Ltd. and Others, reported as 1978(48) Company Cases 419, to urge that a claimant making a money claim against the company in winding up does not necessarily have to institute a suit and that it can be made alternatively by a petition under Clause (b) of Section 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956. In that case a Full Bench of this Court held that: “In the object of bringing sub-clauses (b), (c) and (d) to sub-section (2) of section 446 of the Companies Act was to avoid inevitable delay and expense which would be incidental to the institution and trial of a suit, we do not see any reason why, as a matter of construction, even a money claim by the official liquidator against any person has to be made only by a suit and not by a petition. The fact that a suit is contemplated by clause (a) of sub-section (2) does not go counter to this construction. The right to file a suit by or against the company or a petition making any claim by or against the company is an option conferred by the statute. These options do not militate against each other.”
11. The counsel further invited our attention to the decision of this Court in Sushil Prasad vs. Official Liquidator, Vinod Motors P. Ltd., reported as 1978 (48) Company Cases 462, to urge that a dispute between official liquidator and a claimant relating to the nature of the debt and interest and priority or its preferential nature in relation to other creditors of the company is a matter which has to be decided by the Court and cannot be adjudicated upon by the official liquidator. In this case the Court held: “The present case is really one in which the dispute relates not to the amount of the debt, but to its inter se priority or preferential nature in relation to other creditors of the company. This is a question which has to be decided under section 446(2) of the Act.”
12. Per contra, it was urged on behalf of PICUP by Sh. Sandeep Agarwal, Advocate that there was no infirmity or material irregularity in the impugned order. He urged that the appellant was fully aware that the goods purchased by them were secured and were subject matter of prior charge with PICUP. Further that the company in liquidation had entered into one time settlement for payment of its dues with PICUP, pursuant to which the company could sell their assets for the purpose of liquidation of liability, subject however to the payment of Rs.9,87,251.99 to PICUP, which down payment was in fact never made by respondent-company. Counsel also submitted that the present company petition was filed only after the advertisement for sale of assets of the respondent-company. He relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Financial Corporation & Anr. vs. Official Liquidator and Another, reported as (2005) 8 SCC 190, to urge that, sale of assets of a company and the distribution of proceeds thereof, must be in terms of the Companies Act and after obtaining appropriate permission from Company Court, only in cases where there is an order of winding up of the company. It was his contention that since winding up order was subsequent to the exercise of its rights under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951, the Company Court had no jurisdiction over the distribution of proceeds of sale of the security of the respondent-company by PICUP and consequently PICUP was entitled to receive back the sum of Rs.29.15 lacs it had earlier been directed to pay to the appellants, in view of the latter’s purported claim, from out of the sale proceeds of the goods belonging to the respondentcompany. Mr. Agarwal also contended that the claim if at all, that the appellant could make, would be against the Director of the company in liquidation, and could be instituted, if so advised, in a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction.
13. In Rajasthan State Financial Corpn. vs. Official Liquidator (supra), the Supreme Court held that:
14. It is also relevant to extract the provision of Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 in this behalf:
29. Rights of Financial Corporation in case of default. - (1) Where any industrial concern, which is under a liability to the Financial Corporation under an agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or in meeting its obligations in relation to any guarantee given by the corporation or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation, the Financial corporation shall have the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concerns, as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realize the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation. (2)…….. (3)…….. (4)…….. (5) Where the Financial Corporation has taken any action against an industrial concern under the provisions of sub-section (1), the Financial Corporation shall be deemed to be the owner of such concern, for the purposes of suits by or against the concern, and shall sue and be sued in the name of the concern.
15. The above provision makes it explicit that where a State Financial Corporation takes any action against an industrial concern, pursuant to the provisions of Sub Section (1) of Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, it shall thereupon be deemed to be the owner of the industrial concern instead of the industrial concern, inasmuch as, it can sue or be sued, in the name of the concern, in all pending or future litigation.
16. A conspectus of the judicial precedents and the statutory provision cited above predicates the following legal position: (a) A money claim for and on behalf of or against a company in liquidation does not necessarily have to be instituted by a suit and that it can be made alternatively by a petition under Clause (b) of Section 446(2) of the Companies Act 1956. (b) A dispute relating to the nature of the debt and interest and priority or its preferential nature in relation to other creditors of the company is a matter which has to be decided by the Company Court and cannot be adjudicated upon by the Official Liquidator.
(c) In a proceeding relating to a claim against a company in winding up if the facts raise disputes of a serious nature, the failure to frame issues is a material irregularity if it results in prejudice to a party.
(d) Distribution of assets of a company under liquidation can only be in terms of Section 529 read with Section 529-A of the Companies Act under the control, supervision and directions of the Company Court. (e) A State Financial Corporation is liable to be sued in place of an industrial concern, for a claim against that industrial concern, pursuant to any action taken by the SFC under the provision of Sub Section (1) of Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act.
17. In the present case the pleadings and the record disclose that, the appellant contended; firstly that vide the agreement for sale of goods, the property in ascertained goods of the company in liquidation passed to the appellant and it became the owner of the said goods. Therefore, upon sale of these goods by PICUP the entire sale proceeds ought to come to the appellant and PICUP should pay the said proceeds to the appellant; secondly, that hypothecation in favour of PICUP was without possession of the goods and therefore, before such hypothecation was converted into a pledge by possession, the property in ascertained goods had already passed to the appellant, thereby relegating PICUP to the position of an unsecured creditor; thirdly, that the appellant had taken physical possession of the ascertained goods and appointed watch and ward security for its protection and that PICUP had forcibly deprived them of the said goods by misusing its position as an instrumentality of the State; fourthly, that assuming the property in the goods did not pass for any reason, then in that event the consideration of Rs.29.15 lacs paid by the appellant to the company in liquidation was trust money and did not become the property of either the company or PICUP. On the other hand PICUP disputed the appellant’s claim and asserted that it was the only secured creditor of the company under liquidation. Further, it was stated that the title to the goods in question being setup by the appellant was based on a sham transaction in order to defeat the claim of other secured creditors. Evidently there were two entities, each claiming to be the sole secured creditor in respect of the same property. The appellant was claiming from PICUP the entire sale proceeds of the goods in question. Also that it was only in view of the claim of the appellant that this Court had by its order dated 3rd May, 2002 conditionally permitted PICUP to complete the sale of the assets of the company under liquidation subject to PICUP depositing Rs.30 lacs in Court to secure the appellant. Further, by an order dated 11th December, 2002 this Court had directed that Rs.29.15 lacs out of the said amount of Rs.30 lacs to be released to the appellant-petitioner. Furthermore, in the appeal preferred by PICUP against the said order dated 11th December, 2002 the Division Bench was pleased to pass an order dated 25th May, 2003 which read as follows: “……the Ld. Counsel for parties to seek disposal of this Appeal by the following consent order:- “Impugned order dated 11.12.2002 is affirmed to the extent that release of Rs.29.15 lacs to respondent No.1 on furnishing of the bank guarantee for this amount and of Rs.85,000/- to Appellant shall be subject to rights and contentions of Appellant in C.P. No. 59/02. The direction to dispose of C.P. shall stand set aside. This position shall revive and be re-considered and disposed of by the learned Company Court afresh under law.” (emphasis added)”
18. In view of the facts above, where substantial pleas were raised by the appellant, and an application filed praying for the framing of issues and direction for filing evidence by way of affidavits, the refusal of the Company Court to frame issues, amounts to a material irregularity affecting the disposal of the case on merits. In view of the serious nature of the contentions raised, it was imperative for the Company Court to have framed issues and allowed evidence to be recorded. In proceeding to finally adjudicating the case without settling the issues therein, the Company Court committed a grave irregularity causing extreme prejudice to the appellant. As a result substantial pleas that arose for consideration were not adjudicated before rendering judgment in the case. The Company Judge erred in coming to the conclusion that since PICUP had no privity of contract with the appellant it could not be held responsible and liable for any acts of omission or commission by the respondentcompany. Under the provision of the SFC Act PICUP could be liable, even if it was only to the extent that the assets and property of the Company under liquidation came into its hands and subject to its disposal. Consequently, the judgment of the learned Single Judge merits interference, in view of the material irregularity in the procedure adopted in the disposal of the case. We set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and remit the matter to the Company Judge for disposal in accordance with law. The claim of the appellant will be posted for framing of issues and recording evidence followed by adjudication on the basis of the evidence adduced at the trial by the parties. The amount of Rs.29.15 lacs, deposited by the appellant in this Court, shall be kept in a fixed deposit to earn maximum interest for a period of one year to enure to the benefit of the successful party.
19. With the above directions, the present appeal is allowed and disposed of accordingly. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.
SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J. T.S. THAKUR, J. May 30, 2008 mk