Full Text
JUDGMENT
Through : Mr. Sanjiv Sharma with Mr.Harinder Singh, Advocate
Through : Mr. K.Venkatraman, Advocate.
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? Yes
2. To be referred to Reporters or not ? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ? Yes Rajiv Shakdher, J.
1) This is an Appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as in short the „Act‟) against the judgment dated 21.4.1999 corrected by an order dated 27.5.1999 passed in Suit No.740/1992 by the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as in short the „Tribunal‟).
2) In the judgment in appeal the Tribunal has awarded the Appellant a total compensation in the sum of Rs. 1,80,000/-. However, the interest @ 12% pa has been awarded only on a sum of 2008:DHC:1839 FAO No.316/1999 2 of 43 Rs.30,000/-. Apart from other issues this itself has been raised as a separate issue in the appeal, which I shall deal with in the latter part of my judgment.
3) Before I deal with the issues raised in the Appeal, the following facts which are relevant for disposal of the Appeal are set out hereinafter:--
4) On 21.6.1992 the Appellant accompanied by his mother was standing in one of the lanes to his house situated in Jaffar Pur Kalan, New Delhi when, a truck bearing Registration No. HR-26A-7646 (hereinafter referred to as in short the „Offending Vehicle‟) entered the lane and hit the petitioner on his right leg. The Appellant at this point in time was seven (7) years of age. As a result of this accident, the Appellant suffered grievous injury to his right leg which got crushed because of the impact. The Appellant was admitted to the Deen Dayal Upadhyay Hospital and thereafter referred to Dr.Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital where he lay admitted till 16.7.1992.
5) The gravity of the Appellant‟s injury was such that on the very day of the accident i.e 21.6.1992 the doctors had to operate upon his right leg and consequently; the Appellant‟s leg above the right knee was amputated. FAO No.316/1999 3 of 43 6) This resulted in permanent disability. As found by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment, the extent of disability has been pegged at 60% in respect of the right lower limb.
7) Aggrieved by the same, the Appellant through his father and natural guardian, Shri Rajbir Singh instituted an action in the Tribunal. The said action was instituted on or around 18.12.1992. The action was registered as Suit No.740/1992. In the said suit the owner who was driving the offending vehicle at the relevant point in time was arrayed as Respondent No.1 whereas; the Insurance Company, i.e The United India Insurance Company Limited was arrayed as Respondent No.2.
8) Before the Tribunal, Respondent No.1 did not file any written statement nor did he lead any evidence to oppose the claim of the Appellant. On the other hand, Respondent No.2 filed a written statement opposing the claim of the Appellant.
9) By an order dated 28.1.1998 the Tribunal framed the following issues:- “1. Whether the petitioner got injuries because of rash and negligent driving of truck no.HR-26A-76 by R- 1?
2. Whether the petitioner is entitled for any amount of compensation and if so, for what amount and from whom? FAO No.316/1999 4 of 43
3. Relief.”
10) Thereafter, the Tribunal set down the matter for trial. In support of his case the Appellant examined three witnesses i.e his mother Smt Shakuntla (PW[1]), his father; Shri Rajbir Singh (PW[3]); and a Constable, Shri Rajpal Singh (PW[2]) to prove the FIR Ex. PW2/1 placed on record. The testimony of the mother (PW[1]) was recorded on 28.1.1998 and that of the father was recorded on 8.9.1998.
11) Respondent No.1 was proceeded ex-parte. At this stage it is important to note that both Respondents did not lead any evidence in the matter.
12) The Tribunal decided the first issue in favour of the Appellant; in as much as, based on the testimony of PW[1] and the other evidence which went unrebutted unhesitatingly came to the conclusion that the Appellant No.1 had sustained injuries on account of rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by Respondent No.1. The relevant part of the Tribunal‟s judgment with respect to this issue is extracted hereinbelow:- “ …….. A perusal of the testimony of Shakuntla shows that no suggestion was put to her that Ram Kishan was not driving the offending truck and that the offending truck had not caused this accident. In fact a suggestion was put to her that this accident was not caused due to the fault of the truck driver. FAO No.316/1999 5 of 43 This suggestion was denied by the witness. The testimony of Shakuntla does not suffer from any infirmity whatsoever. The presence of Shakuntla on the spot is not doubtful. An FIR was recorded by the police immediately after the accident on the statement of this witness. Ram Kishan the truck driver, respondent was a resident of her own village and she knew him prior to the accident. She had no animus to depose against respondent no.1. I have no hesitation in holding that this accident was caused in the manner narrated by Shakuntla. The petitioner was standing in one of the lanes of the village. The offending truck had entered the said lane and was being driven at a high speed. Apparently respondent no.1 was rash and negligent in driving the offending truck. I, therefore, held that the petitioner had received injuries on account of rash and negligent driving of truck no. HR-26A-76 by R-1.”
13) I have perused the reasoning and the conclusion of the Tribunal and see no reason to differ with the same. This is more particularly so, as the Respondents have not led any evidence to rebut the stand of the Appellant.
14) As regards the issue of compensation, the Tribunal after perusal of the evidence placed before it, came to the conclusion that the Appellant is entitled to compensation in the total sum of Rs.1,80,000/-. The break up of the compensation awarded is set out in Paragraph 14 of the judgment in Appeal. The relevant portion of which reads as follows:- “ …… 14.Thus, in all I grant the following sums under the different heads: FAO No.316/1999 6 of 43
1. Expenses on treatment/purchase Rs.5,000/of medicine
2. Conveyance charges Rs. 10,000/-
3. Pain and agony Rs. 10,000/-
4. On special diet Rs. 5,000/-
5. Compensation on account of Rs.1,00,000/- Permanent disability
6. Compensation for marital prospects Rs. 50,000/- Rs. 1,80,000/- (RUPEES ONE LAC EIGHTY THOUSAND ONLY)”
15) In respect of interest the Tribunal, as noted herein above, has awarded interest @ 12 % pa but only on Rs.30,000/- out of Rs.1,80,000/- awarded; from the date of filing of the petition till its realisation. No interest has been awarded on the balance compensation in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/-.
16) Aggrieved by the judgment of the Tribunal, the Appellant has preferred the present Appeal. The said Appeal was filed on 19.7.1999.
17) The counsel for the Appellant in support of his Appeal has made the following submissions:i) a reading of provisions of Section 158(6) read with Section 166(4) would lead to a conclusion that the role of the Tribunal is inquisitorial in nature and hence; whether or not FAO No.316/1999 7 of 43 any evidence is placed before the Tribunal it is really for the Tribunal to enquire and determine as to what ought to be a fair and just compensation in case of death or even of personal injury. In this regard, the learned counsel has also relied upon provisions of Sections 168 & 169 of the Act to demonstrate that the Tribunal in determining what it considers „just‟ compensation is required to follow a summary procedure and to that end is empowered to take assistance of any persons having special knowledge. A reference was also made to the provisions of Order 16 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code which empowers Court to summon witnesses whenever it deems necessary. ii) the second submission which is a corollary to the first is that, in the instant case, the Tribunal ought to have enquired on its own as to what would be the 'loss of income' which the Appellant would suffer in the future on account of the disability suffered due to the accident. In this context it was submitted that the Appellant in the very least would have earned a sum of Rs. 4,000/- pm given the value of rupee at the relevant point in time; which on account of FAO No.316/1999 8 of 43 disability would get reduced to a loss of income of about Rs.2,000/- pm. Thus the learned counsel for the Appellant went on to submit that on annualisation of the monthly loss of income it could be capitalized, keeping in mind the age of the Appellant, with a multiplier of eighteen (18). By this calculation according to the learned counsel, the Appellant ought to recover as compensation for 'loss of income' a sum of Rs. 4,32,000/- (i.e. 4000 x 50% x 12 x 18). It is the submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant that if the Court is so pleased to award the Appellant the said compensation for 'loss of income', the Appellant would not press his claim for interest on this amount. (ii)(a) The learned counsel for the Appellant, in the alternative submitted that in any event, the Tribunal ought to have relied upon the provisions of Second Schedule to the Act to award pecuniary damages for „loss of income‟ that the Appellant would suffer in future on account of injuries sustained. The learned FAO No.316/1999 9 of 43 counsel submitted that if recourse is taken to the provisions of Paragraph 6 and Paragraph 5(b) of the Second Schedule to the Act then, the Tribunal ought to have ascertained the future „loss of income‟ as at least Rs.15,000 p.a. Given the age of the Appellant on the date of the accident was seven (7) years then; the proper multiplier would be 15. He further submitted that based on the notional loss of income as per Paragraph 6 of the Second Schedule to the Act and given the multiplier of 15 for victims below 15 years of age, which if, discounted by the disability factor as per Part 5(b) of the second schedule to the Act, read with, schedule 1 Part II Item 18 of the Workman‟s Compensation Act, 1983 then, the total compensation on account of 'loss of income' which the Tribunal ought to have awarded would be Rs.1,57,500. It is his submission that this sum ought to have been awarded in the very least with interest @ 9 % pa from the date of the petition till realisation. FAO No.316/1999 10 of 43 While, these were the only two substantive alternatives submitted by the learned counsel for the Appellant in respect of compensation on account of the „loss of income‟ a third alternative was also submitted for consideration of the Court which is the same as the second alternative, except that in this case the rate of interest demanded is 12 % pa from the date of the petition till realisation. iii) the third submission with respect to pecuniary damages is that while Appellant has no grievance with respect to sums awarded towards medical expenses and special diet, the Tribunal ought to have granted a sum of Rs.1,00,000/towards future expenses on conveyance seeing the age of the victim and also; accordingly an additional sum of Rs.35,000/- towards expenditure for replacement of his artificial leg. iv) the fourth submission of the counsel of the Appellant is related to non-pecuniary losses. It is the submission of the Appellant that he ought to have been awarded a minimum of Rs.1,00,000/- FAO No.316/1999 11 of 43 for pain and suffering, and a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- towards compensation for loss of marital prospects; as against, Rs.10,000/- and Rs. 50,000/- respectively granted by the Tribunal. In addition to the above the Appellant submits that an additional sum of Rs.2,50,000/towards loss of amenities should also have been awarded in the instant case, looking at the age of the Appellant.
18) In support of his submissions, the counsel for the Appellant has relied upon the following judgments: a) B.Imtiaz Ahmad vs. G.Banumathi and another reported in 2003ACJ 142 b) Nitin Walia Minor though vs. Union of India & Ors. Reported in 2001(57)DRJ(DB) c) M/s Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Nirmala Devi and others reported in 1980 ACJ 55 d) Shashendra Lahiri vs.
UNICEF and others reported in 1998 ACJ 859 e) R.D.Hattangadi vs. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd and others reported in 1995 ACJ 366.
19) The first case cited by the Learned counsel for Appellant is „B.Imtaiz Ahmad vs G Banumathi & Another‟. This case was pressed into service to demonstrate the quantum of compensation granted by FAO No.316/1999 12 of 43 the Court under various heads. Reliance has been placed on paragraph 7 at page 145 and paragraph 12 at page 146 of the judgment. The second case cited is that of „Nitin Walia vs Union of India & Ors‟. This is a case where a three year old child‟s arm got bitten off by a tigress on his visit to the Zoo. The claimant had filed a suit for compensation on the ground of negligence against the State and Zoological Park Authority. This court after considering the entire circumstances and law on negligence awarded the plaintiff a compensation of Rs. 5 lac. The third case cited by the learned counsel for Appellant is „M/s Concord of India Insurance vs Nirmala Devi & Others‟. This case was pressed into service to highlight the observations of Supreme Court that, in determining the quantum of compensation the approach should be „liberal‟, as against „niggardly‟. The fourth case -- „Shashendra Lahiri v/s UNICEF & Others‟ was cited by the learned counsel for Appellant to demonstrate that in a case of disability arising on account of injuries sustained in a motor accident which, resulted in amputation of leg; the Supreme Court had awarded a compensation of over Rs. 4.00 lac. The point to be noted in the said judgment is that the claimant was a brilliant student, prosecuting a B. Com course and was 17 years of age. Furthermore, FAO No.316/1999 13 of 43 evidence had been led to establish that, had he continued his education, he could have had a good academic career. The last case -- „R D Hattangadi vs Pest Control (India) Pvt Ltd & Others‟ cited by the Appellant‟s counsel was a case where the claimant met with an accident which resulted in his becoming a paraplegic on account of injuries sustained by him. Based on facts and circumstances obtaining in the case, the Supreme Court awarded a consolidated sum of Rs. 3.00 lac towards pain and sufferings and loss of amenities.
20) In rebuttal the counsel for Respondent No.2 i.e United India Insurance Company Limited; Mr.K.Venkatraman has submitted that even though there is no dispute as to the extent of injury suffered; the provisions of Section 163A read with the Second Schedule to the Act will apply only if the injured was working and the resultant injury had led to reduction in the working capacity of the claimant. The counsel for the Respondent further submits that in view of the fact that there is no evidence on record, the compensation granted by the Tribunal is more than adequate. He further submits that since this was a case where the Appellant/ Claimant was a child, the multiplier table would not be applicable.
21) The respondent in support of his submissions relied upon the judgment of a Single Judge of this Court passed in the case of “Om FAO No.316/1999 14 of 43 Parkash vs Davender Singh‟ being MAC Application No. 654/2007 decided on 05.11.2007. On perusal of the facts of the said case it is clear that the Court declined to grant the loss of future income as claimed, on account of the lack of evidence on record which possibly, could have been adduced to establish the period for which the claimant in that case was unable to attend to his vocation as a result of injuries sustained in the accident.
22) It is the submission of the counsel for the Respondent that the Appellant / Claimant is required to produce relevant evidence in support of his claim none of which was produced before the Tribunal. Therefore, the view of the Tribunal cannot be found fault with and deserves to be sustained.
23) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, my opinion in the matter is as follows:-
24) As regards the first contention of learned counsel for Appellant there is no gain-saying that the role of the Tribunal is inquisitorial in nature. The Tribunal is empowered under provisions of Section 166 (4) read with 158(6) of the Act to treat any information of accident which results in death or bodily injury to any person, as an application for compensation. The Tribunal after receipt of such application is required under Section 168 of the Act to give an FAO No.316/1999 15 of 43 opportunity to the defendant(s) which includes the insurer, who wish to oppose the claim. The underlying principle of Section 168 of the Act is crystal clear. The defining feature of the provision is that the Tribunal in determining the compensation is required to arrive at a figure of damages after an inquiry which is fair and just in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The provisions of Section 169 of the Act also make it clear that in proceeding with the inquiry, the Tribunal is to follow a summary procedure and in doing so, it is empowered to enforce attendance of any witness or production of any document or choose any one or more person who possess special knowledge on any aspect of the matter to bring to fruition its inquiry. In this regard, see the observations in the case of Muktesh Sawhney vs. D.T.C & Anr. in FAO No.201/1999 decided on 9.5.2008 wherein the role of the Tribunal in the context of Section 166(4) and Section 158(6) has been dealt with and also the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Nagappa v. Gurdayal Singh & Ors reported at (2003) 2 SCC 274 at page 288 Paragraph 21. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned case while discussing a claim for enhancement of compensation, observed that there was no fetter on the Tribunal / Court in awarding compensation exceeding the amount claimed. In this context, the Supreme Court discussed the provisions of Section 166 (4) and 158 (6) of the Act. The relevant observations are contained FAO No.316/1999 16 of 43 in paragraph No. 15 to 21 at page No. 281 to 282 and paragraph NO. 28 at page no. 286 which reads as under:-- „… 15. Mr. P K Chakaravarti, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company, in support of his contention that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to award higher amount of compensation than what is claimed even though it is not likely to cause prejudice to the Insurance Company, heavily relied upon the decision rendered by the Full Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Urmila J Sangani (Dr) v. Pragjibhai Mohan Lal Luvana reported at AIR 2000 Gujarat 211 (FB). In that case the High Court after considering relevant decisions on the subject observed thus: (AIR P220 para 10) “We may mention that when the claimant feels that he is entitled to more compensation than what is claimed in the petition, it is always open to him/her to amend the claim petition and if the same is in consonance with the equity, justice and good conscience, there is no reason why the Claims Tribunal should not grant amendment. Before compensation more then claimed is awarded, the opposite parties should to be put to notice, the requisite additional issue / issues should be raised and the parties should be permitted to adduce their evidence on the additional issues, but if no such opportunity is given, the procedure would obviously suffer from material irregularity affecting the decision.”
16. From the aforesaid observations it cannot be held that there is a bar for the Claims Tribunal to award the compensation in excess of what is claimed, particularly when the evidence which is brought on record is sufficient to pass such award. In cases where there is no evidence on record, the court may permit such amendment and allow to raise additional issue and give an opportunity to the parties to produce relevant evidence. FAO No.316/1999 17 of 43
17. In support of her contention, the learned counsel for the appellant Ms. Kiran Suri referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay V. Kisan Gangaram Hire, 1987 ACJ 311 (Bom) wherein the Court dealt with a similar contention and observed thus:
18. The High Court observed that in all such cases, it is necessary to keep the doors open for the claimant to make the claims, on grounds not stated earlier or for more amounts under heads already specified in the application.
19. The aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court was relied upon and referred to by the Orissa High Court in Mulla Mod. Abdul Wahid V Abdul Rahim, 1994 ACJ 348 & G B Pattanaik, J (as he then was) observed that the expression „just compensation‟ would obviously mean that what is fair, moderate and reasonable and awarded in the proved circumstances of a particular case and the expression „which appears to it to be just‟ vests a wide discretion in the Tribunal in the matter of determining of compensation. Thereafter, the Court referred to the decision in Shikhupura Transport Co Ltd and held that the pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party would depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately but FAO No.316/1999 18 of 43 must necessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture, and if this is so, then it will be reasonable to expect the party to state precisely the amount of damages or compensation that it would be entitled to. The Court also held that there are no fetters on the power of the Tribunal to award compensation in excess of the amount which is claimed in the application.
20. Similarly, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Devki Nandan Bangur V. State of Haryana, 1995 ACJ 1288 (P&H) observed that the grant of just and fair compensation is the statutory responsibility of the court and if, on the facts, the court finds that the claimant is entitled to higher compensation, the court should allow the claimant to amend his prayer and allow proper compensation.
21. For the reasons discussed above, in our view, under the M V Act, there is no restriction that the Tribunal / Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal / Court is to award “just’ compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. Further, in such cases there is no question of claim becoming timebarred or it cannot be contended that by enhancing the claim there would be change of cause of action. It is also to be stated that as provided under sub-section (4) to Section 166, even the report submitted to the Claims Tribunal under sub-section (6) of Section 158 can be treated as an application for compensation under the MV Act. If required, in appropriate cases, the court may permit amendment to the claim petition.
28. In this view of the matter, in our view, it would be difficult to hold that for future medical expenses which are required to be incurred by a victim, fresh award could be passed. However, for such medical treatment, the court has to arrive at a reasonable estimate on the basis of the evidence brought on record. In the present FAO No.316/1999 19 of 43 case, it has been pointed out that for replacing the artificial leg every two to three years, the appellant would be required to have some sort of operation and also change the artificial leg. At that time, the estimated expenses for this were Rs. 18,000/- and the High Court has awarded the said amount. …….. „
25) In view of above, in my opinion, as regards first contention of learned counsel for the Appellant it cannot but be accepted that the Tribunal is empowered to carry out an enquiry to arrive at a fair and just compensation. But the question is what would be the contours of the enquiry? To my mind the enquiry should firstly; lead to collation of evidence and relevant material. And in this respect who better than the claimant himself. There may be cases where the Tribunal may have to extend the requisite assistance on this aspect but all the while it will have to keep in mind the dividing line between its role as an inquisitor and adjudicator. And secondly; any evidence or material which is brought on record will have to be put to the other side in consonance with the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience, so that it is in a position to meet the case of the claimant. The remaining contentions of the appellant will thus required to be examined by me in the light of aforesaid principle.
26) As regards the second contention of Learned counsel for the Appellant, it is his case that while awarding the pecuniary damages, the Tribunal ought to have awarded the damages for „loss of income‟. FAO No.316/1999 20 of 43 In my view, while broadly the submission of the learned counsel for Appellant has to be accepted, but what is to be borne in mind is, that the pecuniary damages for „loss of income‟ are usually divided into the „special damages‟ and „general damages‟. The special damages are awarded for 'loss of income' on actual basis, in the case of personal injury, from the date of the accident till the date of the trial. As regards the period after the date of the trial, the Courts/ Tribunal would award general damages which are necessarily estimates based on relevant material placed on record.
27) In the instant case, the Appellant on the date of the accident was seven (7) years of age. There could have been no possibility of any special damages being awarded for actual loss of income. The Tribunal could, in the instant case, have only awarded loss of future income based on evidence or the material brought on record. The appellant has proved that the child who was in second class on the date of the accident had a good academic record. Reliance in this regard is placed on Ex. PW1/C i.e. Report Card of the child issued by the Midfields School situate at Rawata Mor, New Delhi; in which, the Appellant was admitted at the relevant time. However, the position in the case of personal injury as regards future loss is required to be examined on the date of the trial. The issue in this case with regard to the loss of future income would have to be examined firstly; FAO No.316/1999 21 of 43 in the light of the alternate submissions made by the learned counsel which are noted by me in Paragraph 17(ii) hereinabove and second; that in choosing the appropriate multiplier should the age of the Appellant be taken on the date of the accident or on the date of the trial.
28) Let me begin with by dealing with the first alternative whereby the learned counsel for the Appellant has submitted that a sum of Rs. 4000 pm be considered as the possible loss of future income. According to me, this figure will have to be rejected because there is neither evidence placed on record to substantiate the same nor is recourse taken to any statutory basis to enable me to accept the said figure. I, therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting the first alternative. In so far as second and third alternatives are concerned, before I set out to discuss them, it would be beneficial to note the provisions of the Second Schedule to the Act and observations in two judgments mentioned hereinafter by me, on the powers of the Courts / Tribunal to take recourse to the Second Schedule to the Act. Paragraphs 5 and 6 referred to in Second Schedule to the Act read as follows: “5. Disability in non-fatal accidents: The following compensation shall be payable in case of disability to the victim arising out of non-fatal accidents: FAO No.316/1999 22 of 43 Loss of income, if any, for actual period of disablement not exceeding fifty two weeks. PLUS either of the following:- (a) In case of permanent total disablement the amount payable shall be arrived at by multiplying the annual loss of income by the Multiplier applicable to the age on the date of determining the compensation, or (b) In case of permanent partial disablement such percentage of compensation which would have been payable in the case of permanent total disablement as specified under item (a) above. Injuries deemed to result in Permanent Total Disablement/Permanent Partial Disablement and percentage of loss of earning capacity shall be as per Schedule I under Workmen‟s Compensation Act, 1923.
6. Notional income for compensation to those who had no income prior to accident:- Fatal and disability in non-fatal accidents:- (a)Non-earning persons Rs.15,000/-pa (b)Spouse 1/3rd of income of the earning/ surviving spouse In case of other injuries only “general damage” as applicable.)”
29) A perusal of the provisions of paragraph 5 & 6 of the Second Schedule to the Act would show that; where a person suffers from a permanent partial disablement his claim is divided into two periods. The first period to my mind is relatable to loss of income for actual period of disablement which is limited to the period not exceeding fifty two weeks while, the second, which is, in addition to the first is determined by multiplying the annual loss with a multiplier appropriate to the age of the victim on the date of determination of compensation. FAO No.316/1999 23 of 43 30) In the instant case, the first part is perhaps not applicable, the Appellant being a child of seven years of age, it can be safely said he would not have been earning any income therefore, one would not be required to guesstimate as to what would be the loss of income. In so far as the second period is concerned, in the absence of evidence some enquiry ought to have been made as to whether any material could have been gathered, as in the present case, in the form of provisions found in the Second Schedule to the Act. But whether in making the enquiry, the Tribunal could have taken resort to the Second Schedule to the Act would depend upon the fact whether or not there was material placed on record by the Appellant. In the instant case admittedly, there is very little evidence to go by except the report card of the Appellant when he was studying in Class 2nd. Given this state of affairs, could the Tribunal have taken guidance of the provisions contained in Paragraph 5(b) and 6 of the Second Schedule to the Act to determine compensation for future loss of income, in order to arrive at a just and fair compensation. In this regard the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Arti Bezbaruah vs Dy.Director General, Geological Survey of India & Anr. reported in 2003 ACJ 680 are relevant. The observations in Paragraph 11 at Page 682 of the judgment may be quoted with profit. The same read as follows: FAO No.316/1999 24 of 43
31) A similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rattan Lal Mehta vs. Rajinder Kapur & Ors. reported in 1996 ACJ 372. Chief Justice Jagannath Rao (as he then was ) in Paragraphs 36 to 38 at Pages 386-387 of the judgment has observed as follows:
36. Question arises to whether the multiplier in the Table appended by the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act 1994, which is prospective, can also be of relevance in respect of accidents which occurred before 14.11.1994, on which date the Table came into force. In our opinion, the statutory multiplier Table is clearly relevant for the following reasons.
37. That is why we are of the view that even in regard to cases of accidents prior to 14.11.1994, the date from which the Table in the Second Schedule brought in by the Amending Act, 1994, has come into force, it will be open to the Courts/Tribunals to take the multiplier as per the said statutory Table as relevant. (In fact, the objection or dispute must come from the tortfeasors or the insurance companies. Even if they do raise an FAO No.316/1999 25 of 43 objection, we may say from experience that the defendants need not be apprehensive of a higher award on the basis of the 1994 statutory Table, because difference in each multiplier over a period of 10 years will be higher only by small fractions ranging between 0.25 and 0.50 generally).
38. If the above procedure enunciated by us based on the statutory multiplier provided by Parliament is applied, we can steer clear of conflicts in the multipliers applied by the courts on the judicial side in several cases. This approach of ours will help in rationalising awards, remove ad hocism in selection of multipliers based on the individual preferences. A whole range of discrimination between case and case can easily be avoided. That is why we have taken pains to give reasons as to why the statutory multiplier Table provided for prospective use can also be used for accidents which occurred before 14.11.1994.
32) A conjoint reading of the provisions of the Second Schedule to the Act and observations made in the judgment mentioned above leave no doubt in my mind that in absence of any other material on record, there is no fetter on the power of the Tribunal or the Court to take guidance of the multiplier table, in particular, in the instant case the provisions set out in paragraph 5 & 6 of the Second Schedule to the Act. The provisions of paragraph 5 & 6 provide that in case of disability arising out of the non-fatal accidents, which result in permanent or partial disablement so far as the future loss of income is concerned, the same can be calculated, in respect of a person whose FAO No.316/1999 26 of 43 income is not specified, by taking a notional income of Rs.15,000/- pa. In the case of permanent partial disablement, the said annual loss after being capitalised by an appropriate multiplier is, required to be discounted at a rate which is dependent on the loss in earning capacity as provided under the Workmen‟s Compensation Act, 1923; if applicable.
33) As regards the second sub-point, which is while choosing an appropriate multiplier should the age of the Appellant be taken on the date of the accident or on the date of the trial. The consistent view of the Courts in this regard is that, in the case of personal injury, the multiplier appropriate to the age of the victim on the date of the trial is to be taken. The rationale being that the victim having survived between the date of the accident and the date of trial, in determining the loss of future income the ascertainment of the appropriate multiplier would have to be made with regard to the age of the victim on the date of the trial. In this regard, see observations of Mr. Justice M J Rao (as he then was) in the case entitled Andhra Pradesh State Road Trans. Corpn. vs. G.Ramaniah reported at 1988 ACJ 223 at page No.223 Paragraph 30 which reads as follows:- “30. Before leaving this part of the discussion, I have to emphasise a certain difference between claim by parents in cases of death of children and cases of claims by injured children. It will be noticed that in cases of death of children, because the parents are older and the dependency will not FAO No.316/1999 27 of 43 last till the total expected period of life of the child, the multiplier is to be selected on the basis of the age of the parents. But, in the case of injured children, the claim being not by the parents but by the child himself, there is no question of selecting the multiplier appropriate to the parents' age. The multiplier appropriate to the age of the injured child at the date of trial will have to be selected. Point No.2.
31. It is argued for the appellant that Multiplier Tables have to be prepared separately for fatal accident cases and separately for injury cases and that there cannot be a single Table for both fatal and non-fatal cases. 32 (I) Obviously, the doubt here is as to why, in cases of injuries, the multiplier suitable to the age of the injured person at the time of accident, is not selected. Now, in the case of a fatal accident, the uncertainties of the future are to be 'estimated' with the aid of the mortality rates, right from the date of death. There is, in fact, no dispute on this score. However, in the case of an injured person, if the matter could, perhaps, be brought up before Tribunal on that very day of accident, the Tribunal could say, 'well, the future of the injured person from tomorrow is uncertain' and, having regard to the general average mortality, take a multiplier suitable to the date of accident. Unfortunately, on account of the lengthy legal procedures involved in adjudication, there is considerable time-lag between the date of accident and the date of adjudication. In such cases, the future (which was uncertain on the date of accident) would have unfolded itself upto the date of evidence and if the injured person is still alive on the date of evidence, there is no need to go back to the mortality rate or chances of death of the injured person for the past period upto the date of evidence. The evidence of the injured person or someone on his behalf proves that he is very much alive on that date. Hence the mortality rates become relevant only for the period after the date of trial. Once the trial is over, the future of the injured person is the subject of uncertainty depending on the future mortality rates, such mortality rates being identifiable with reference to the age of the injured at the trial or rather soon after the trial. This is FAO No.316/1999 28 of 43 what is meant by saying that the future earnings in the case of dead person have to be 'estimated', and they are 'estimated' on the basis of a multiplier based on the age at the time of death in the accident. Likewise, the estimation in the case of an injured person starts only for the period after the trial. Upto that date, the injured being alive no question of uncertainty of life or estimation arises. (The loss of salary or wages from date of accident to date of trial can be computed on an 'actual basis'). If the period between date of accident and date of trial is (say) 2 years the actual loss in wages for 2 years can be worked out. But if at the date of trial, he is (say) 20 years, the future earnings (from date of trial) have to be computed with reference to mortality rates and converted to present value. This is to be done by applying a multiplier suitable to his age at the trial. (Emphasis supplied)”
(II) In fact, it is logically and mathematically unthinkable
(may, impossible) to have separate Multiplier Tables for fatal and non-fatal cases because for each age (at death or at trial in accident case) the basic material, namely, the mortality rates and the conversion rates will be the same. There is no change in basic data so far as the period from which the 'estimate' for future is to be made. If still one wants separate Tables, they have to be only specified as follows:
1. Fatal accident (b) Injury cases: