Full Text
FAO(OS) 426/1996
M/S.HANS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY ..... Appellant
Through Mr.P.N.Kumar, Mr.Anurag Kumar, Advocates
Through Ms.Anusuya Salwan, Adv.
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR
JUDGMENT
1. Whether reporters of the local papers be allowed to see the judgment ?n
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ?n
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ?n % JUDGMENT 18.07.2008
1. This appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 30th July, 1996, dismissing the petition filed by the appellant under Section 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act,
1940. The appellant in paragraph 13 of the said petition has raised two disputes, which are as follows: “(A) Whether the respondent/Delhi Development Authority is entitled to levy compensation under Clause 2 of the Agreement having rescinded the contract under clause 3 prior to the invocation of Clause 2? [FAO(OS) 426/1996] 2008:DHC:2057-DB The Arbitrator is to determine the dispute in question. Justified or not, if so, to what extent ? (B) Whether the respondents are justified in levying of Rs.5,89,034/- by way of compensation under clause 2 when having not reserved any right, and having not following the requisite ingredients of the said clause when there being no breach of contract by the petitioner firm ?”
2. It is seen that the aforesaid two disputes as raised by the appellant are matters connected with clause 2 of the contract. Clause 2 of the contract clearly stipulates that the time allotted for carrying out the work by the Contractor is to be strictly observed. Time is made essence of the contract and is required to be reckoned from the tenth day after the date on which the order to commence the work was issued to the contractor. Further, the clause requires the contractor to proceed with the work throughout the period with all due diligence and in the event of failure, the contractor is made liable to pay compensation to be determined by the Superintending Engineer, whose decision in writing has been made final. In the matter of determining the question whether the contractor delayed execution of the work and if so what amount of compensation should be levied falls within the jurisdiction of the Superintending Engineer and his decision cannot be tested by the arbitrator appointed under clause 25 of the agreement. Clause 25 which is the arbitration clause starts with the opening phrase “Except where otherwise provided in the contract”, excluding certain matters and disputes from the arbitration and these are matters and disputes in respect of which provision has been made elsewhere or otherwise in the contract. The implication is that all the questions and disputes excepting the ones mentioned in the opening words are to be referred to the sole arbitration of the person appointed by the Chief Engineer.
3. The Supreme Court in Vishwanath Sood v. Union of India & Another 1989 (1) SCR 288 had occasion to examine clauses similar to the aforesaid clauses 2 and 25. In this regard the Court held as follows: “We have gone through the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and we have also considered the arguments advanced on both sides. With great respect, we find ourselves unable to agree with the interpretation placed by the Division Bench on the terms of the contract. Clause 2 of the contract makes the time specified for the performance of the contract a matter of essence and emphasises the need on the part of the contractor to scrupulously adhere to the time schedule approved by the Engineer-in-charge. With a view to compel the contractor to adhere to this time schedule, this clause provides a kind of penalty in the form of a compensation to the Department for default in adhering to the time schedule. The clause envisages an amount of compensation calculated as a percentage of the estimated cost of the whole work on the basis of the number of days for which the work remains uncommenced or unfinished to the prescribed extent on the relevant dates. We do not agree with the counsel for the respondent that this is in the nature of an automatic levy to be made by the Engineer-in-charge based on the number of days of delay and the estimated amount of work. Firstly, the reference in the clause to the requirement that the work shall throughout the stipulated period of the contract be proceeded with due diligence and the reference in the latter part of the clause that the compensation has to be paid "in the event of the contractor failing to comply with" the prescribed time schedule make it clear that the levy of compensation is conditioned to some default or negligence on the part of the contractor. Secondly, while the clause fixes the rate of compensation at 1 per cent for every day of default it takes care to prescribe the maximum compensation of 10 per cent on this ground and it also provides for a discretion to the Superintending Engineer to reduce the rate of penalty from 1 per cent. Though the clause does not specifically say so, it is clear that any moderation that may be done by the Superintending Engineer would depend upon the circumstances, the nature and period of default and the degree of negligence or default that could be attributed to the contractor. This means that the Superintending Engineer, in determining the rate of compensation chargeable, will have to go into all the aspects and determine whether there is any negligence on the part of the contractor or not. Where there has been no negligence on the part of the contractor or where on account of various extraneous circumstances referred to by the Division Bench such as vis major or default on the part of the Government or some other unexpected circumstances which does not justify penalising the contractor, the Superintending Engineer will be entitled and bound to reduce or even waive the compensation. It is true that the clause does not in terms provide for any notice to the contractor by the Superintending Engineer. But it will be appreciated that in practice the amount of compensation will be initially levied by the Engineer-incharge and the Superintending Engineer comes into the picture only as some sort of revisional or appellate authority to whom the contractor appeals for redress. As we see it, Clause 2 contains a complete machinery for determination of the compensation which can be claimed by the Government on the ground of delay on the part of the contractor in completing the contract as per the time schedule agreed between the parties. The decision of the Superintending Engineer, it seems to us, is in the nature of a considered decision which he has to arrive at after considering the various mitigating circumstances that may be pleaded by the contractor or his plea that he is not liable to pay compensation at all under this clause. In our opinion the question regarding the amount of compensation leviable under Clause 2 has to be decided only by the Superintending Engineer and no one else. ………………Clause 25 which is the arbitration clause starts with an opening phrase excluding certain matters and disputes from arbitration and these are matters or disputes in respect of which provision has been made elsewhere or otherwise in the contract. These words in our opinion can have reference only to provisions such as the one in parenthesis in Clause 2 by which certain types of determinations are left to the administrative authorities concerned. If that be not so, the words "except where otherwise provided in the contract" would become meaningless. We are therefore inclined to hold that the opening part of Clause 25 clearly excludes matters like those mentioned in Clause 2 in respect of which any dispute is left to be decided by a higher official of the Department. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the question of awarding compensation under Clause 2 is outside the purview of the arbitrator and that the compensation, determined under Clause 2 either by the Engineer-in-charge or on further reference by the Superintending Engineer will not be capable of being called in question before the arbitrator. The learned single Judge following the decision in Vishwanath Sood’s case (supra) held that the disputes as raised by the appellant cannot be referred for arbitration.
4. In the present case the appellant could not complete the work during the stipulated time and applied for extension of time. The concerned Executive Engineer extended the time subject however to the right of the respondent to levy compensation on the appellant under clause 2 of the contract. Ultimately, the contract was rescinded by the respondent under clause 3 of the agreement. The Superintending Engineer in exercise of power under clause 2 of the agreement held that the appellant is liable to pay a sum of Rs.5,89,034/- by way of compensation for the delay in execution of the work.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the Superintending Engineer has not followed the procedure while taking action under clause 2 of the agreement. He also contended that the order of the Superintending Engineer is completely unfair and biased, requiring intervention of the arbitrator in resolving the disputes. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Superintending Engineer’s order is illegal or improper, it cannot be tested in the arbitration proceedings under clause 25 of the contract as clause 25 of the contract falls in the category of excepted matters. We therefore do not see any reason to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
CHIEF JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR JULY 18, 2008 JUDGE “v”